

Foreign and Security Policy of the Republic of Serbia¹

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Introduction

Traditionally, states are important actors in foreign and security policy. Erhard Cziomer defines foreign policy as "the process of formulating and implementing national – state interests in relation to other countries and participants in the international system."² It is distinguished by objective and subjective determinants which are both internal and external (international). The first group of internal objective indicators include: the geographic environment, the demographic potential, economics, scientific-technical, socio-political system and military factors. Among the subjective are: perceptions of the international environment by the elite and society, formulating concepts and programs, the vision of foreign policy, the role of prominent individuals and the quality of foreign service³. External determinants consist of objective factors such as the evolution of the external environment, the position of countries in the international system, the nature of contracts and legal-international obligations. The subjective factors include: the perception of international countries, concepts of foreign policy and diplomatic activity of other countries⁴.

By referring to the security of the state, one should bear two dimensions in mind. Internal, relating to aspects occurring in the internal politics - political, social, economic, and external, referring to relations with other countries⁵. In addition, the security of the state consists of many factors that can be divided, such as foreign policy, into objective and subjective. Minimally objective factors include territorial integrity, effective governance, providing basic goods, minimum employment, providing defense against aggression, etc. On the other hand, optimal factors are the ability to cooperate with other countries' economic

¹ Article was published in Polish in the book: *Republika Serbii. Aspekty polityki wewnętrznej i międzynarodowej*, Ed. A. Jagiełło-Szostak, Wrocław 2016, p. 165-185. Translated into English by: Chantal Radkiewicz-Prymka.

² E. Cziomer, L.W. Zyblikiewicz, *Zarys współczesnych stosunków międzynarodowych*, Warsaw – Kraków 2000, pg.106.

³ *Tamże*, pg.108-110.

⁴ *Tamże*, pg.112.

⁵ J. Czaputowicz, *Bezpieczeństwo międzynarodowe. Współczesne koncepcje*, Warsaw 2012, pg 23.

growth, population, military capacity, efficient political structure and intelligence services, active participation in military alliances. Jacek Czaputowicz for Richard Stempowski included as subjective factors: the perception of security by society, the welfare of citizens, realization of social needs as well as the country's image in the eyes of public opinion at home and abroad⁶.

Both policies are complex and penetrate each other. While analysing their different aspects, one must take into account the changing international environment, more and more network connections, transnational threats, migration, asymmetric threats, such as: terrorism, cyber-terrorism, transnational crime and others. This chapter, in the largest part, refers to the external dimension of both foreign policy and security of the Republic of Serbia. It starts with a periodization of policies while taking the historical events from the 80s into account and showing the impact of the internal situation on the conduct of foreign policy and security. The next goal is to indicate the directions of foreign policy and the most important documents affecting them. The author's attention is focused on the international cooperation of the Republic of Serbia with countries such as the USA, Russia, China and Turkey, and international organizations such as the EU, NATO, the UN, the OSCE and the CoE. Next, bilateral relations of Serbia with the post – Yugoslav states (Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro and Kosovo) are shown.

The author first assumes that Serbia is at a crossroads in terms of the choice of its priority of direction in foreign policy and security. Secondly, Serbia is trying to restore the good image of a country for whom human rights, building a democratic society and respect for the rights of national minorities are important, which can be seen by the events of the late twentieth century.

Periodization and directions of foreign and security policy

Mladen Mladenov identified six stages of Serbia's foreign policy: the years 1981 - 1987, 1987 - 1994, 1995 - 2000, 2000-2003, 2003 - 2012 and the years after 2012⁷. In this chapter, we will discuss the issues which arose particularly after 2000, i.e. after the

⁶ *Tamże*, pg 24.

⁷ M. Mladenov, *An Orpheus Syndrome? Serbian Foreign Policy After the Dissolution of Yugoslavia w: The Foreign Policies of Post-Yugoslav States. From Yugoslavia to Europe*, ed. S. Keil, B. Stahl, Palgrave Macmillan 2014, pg.147-166.

overthrowing of the president, the then Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milosevic. Since 2000, Serbia is at a stage of state, economic, political and social transformation. For this publication, the author adopts four stages. The first stage is the years 1987/1989 – 2000, the second is 2000-2003, the third from 2004 to 2012 and the last period from 2012 to the present. Irina Zarin and Dragan Đukanović indicate that the years 2000-2010 appear as a new decade and a moment of challenges for foreign policy⁸. Analysis of the phenomena occurring in foreign policy and security of Serbia, and their impact on bilateral regional and multilateral relations, require a reference to earlier events - especially from the 80s and 90s.

In the period of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which includes Serbia, the 80s are characterized by a significant increase in nationalism among the nations living in Yugoslavia. In the 80s, Serbia, as defined by M. Mladenov, received the title of "pariah"⁹ among Yugoslav republics. During this period, Serbia lost its reputation, engaged in spreading the idea of Greater Serbia and the "protection" of the Serbian element living in other republics. In addition, the Albanian national movement (protests by Albanians in 1981.) as well as the growth of Serbian nationalism, contributed to the conflict and the disintegration of Yugoslavia.

The first stage, during the years 1987 - 2000, was a period of reaching power and the "reign" of Slobodan Milosevic on the wave of Serbian nationalism. A more detailed breakdown can be made for the years 1987 - 1992, 1992 - 1995, 1995 -2000. 1987 is a symbolic date, as S. Milošević gave a speech to the Serbian people at Kosovo Polje, in which he emphasized that "no one will beat you anymore" Then, in 1989, the autonomy of Kosovo and Vojvodina was abolished, and in 1992, the third Yugoslavia was established – the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (hereinafter FRY) which consisted of Serbia and Montenegro. In the years 1992 – 1995, Serbia was involved in the conflict in Croatia and Bosnia as well as Herzegovina. However, there was a gradual escalation of the conflict in Kosovo between the Albanian and Serb populations. The years 1995 - 2000 in Serbia's foreign policy and security were focused on maintaining dominance over Kosovo. In 1998, there was an exacerbation of the conflict, and Serbia refused to withdraw its troops which led to international intervention

⁸ I. Žarin, D. Đukanović, *Twenty years of the forum For International Relations of the European Movement in Serbia w: The Challenges of Serbia's Foreign Policy- Collection of Papers*, Belgrade 2015, pg. 10, <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueeros/belgrad/12484.pdf> (accessed: 10.07.2016).

⁹ M. Mladenov, *op. cit.*.

and NATO air strikes on Serbia. In addition, S. Milošević was less and less supported by the Serb population outside of Serbia¹⁰.

The second stage, the years 2000 - 2003 was a kind of breakthrough in democratization and opening up of Serbia towards Western Europe, and especially the accentuation of a pro-EU position and turning toward the United Nations (the UN), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (the OSCE) and the European Council (hereafter EC). During this period, the discourse on foreign policy was dominated by the position of the FRY President Vojislav Koštunica¹¹ and Prime Minister Zoran Đinđić¹². The first was an opponent of EU cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (the ICTY), to stop Kosovo within Serbia as well as cooperation with Russia. In turn, the second politician advocated a course towards the EU as well as a profound political, social and political system transformation. The assassination Z. Đinđić resulted in changes in the objectives of foreign policy and its reform, but did not stop them¹³. The period 2000 - 2003 also marks the existence of the Federation of Serbia and Montenegro.

In the years 2004-2012, the presidential elections were won twice (2004 and 2008) by Boris Tadić, a Modest pro-European politician, who was also skeptical about the independence of Kosovo. During the time of the first presidency, the prime minister was V. Koštunica of the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS), who was distrustful of the EU, unwilling to accept the war crimes committed by Serbs and opposed to the secession of Kosovo from Serbia. This period is characterized by a deepening of cooperation with the EU, normalization of relations with Kosovo, cooperation with the ICTY, reconciliation with its neighbors (especially with Croatia), as well as Montenegro and Kosovo obtaining the status of independent states. After 2008, the foreign policy and security of the Republic of Serbia has focused on the four pillars of cooperation with Russia, the EU, the US and China, which I. Žarin and D. Đukanović described as "highly dispersed and undirected, based on an artificial uniform distance between the four key players in contemporary global politics"¹⁴. In addition

¹⁰See M. Mladenov, *op. cit.*; D. Gibas - Krzak, *Serbsko - albański konflikt o Kosowo w XX wieku. Uwarunkowania-przebieg – konsekwencje*, Toruń 2009, pg. 167 – 203.

¹¹ Vojislav Koštunica – president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 2000 - 2003 , prime minister of Serbia in 2004 -2008

¹² Zoran Đinđić – prime minister of FRJ in 2001 -2003.

¹³ S.P. Ramet, *Serbia and Montenegro Since 1989 w: Central and Southeast European Politics since 1989*, ed. S. P. Ramet, Cambridge 2010 , pg. 297.

¹⁴ I. Žarin, D. Đukanović, *op. cit.*, pg. 11.

to partnerships with major players in international politics, the other goals established: maintaining good relations with the countries of the region of Southeastern Europe, including post Yugoslav countries, cooperation with Turkey and NATO and the protection of the Serbian diaspora¹⁵.

The Government of Serbia also indicates a desire to pursue a policy of neutrality and maintaining good relationships with all of the major players: the EU, the US, NATO and Russia. According to a resolution adopted by the National Assembly in 2007 *on the protection of sovereignty, territorial integrity and the internal order of the Republic of Serbia*¹⁶, Serbia remains a belligerently neutral country - the term is however not clearly explained. The policy of neutrality calls to mind the third way policies implemented by Josip Broz Tito in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (hereinafter SFRY). In 2011, Belgrade was the host country of the renewed Non-Aligned Movement. Thus, one can venture to say that Serbia sees itself as heir of Yugoslavia, and aspires to be a strong country in the region of Southeastern Europe.

Jelena Milić indicates that, "Serbia has neither a coherent foreign policy nor its strategy"¹⁷. The documents, which relate to foreign policy are: *The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Serbia, Strategic Review of Defence and Strategy for Defence*, effective from 2009, followed by *On the protection of sovereignty, territorial integrity and internal order of the Republic of Serbia* from 2007 and from the same year, *The National Security Strategy of Serbia regarding Serbia and Montenegro's accession to the EU* as well as *the Constitution of Serbia from 2006*, which indicated the territorial integrity of Kosovo and Metohija. For comparison, the neighbouring countries have the following strategic documents: BiH adopted *General Directions and Priorities for Implementing the Foreign Policy of Bosnia and Herzegovina* in 2003, Croatia enacted *Foreign Policy Determinants* in

¹⁵ *Serbia's priorities – EU integration, dialogue with Priština*, 15.01.2015, http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2015&mm=01&dd=15&nav_id=92870 (13.05.2015); *From Four Pillars of Foreign Policy to European Integration. Is there a Will for Strategically Orienting Serbia's Foreign Policy?*, ed. I. Novaković, Belgrade 2013, http://www.isac-fund.org/download/From_four_pillars_of_foreign_policy_to_european_integration.pdf, pg. 6 (13.05.2015).

¹⁶ *Резолуција Народне Скупштине Републике Србије о заштити суверенитета, територијалног интегритета и уставног поретка Србије*, 26.12.2007, http://dss.rs/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/44_Rezolucija-Narodne-skupstine-Republike-Srbijeo-zastiti-suvereniteta-teritorijalnog-integriteta-i-ustavnog-poretka-Srbije-26-decembar-2007.pdf (accessed: 17.02.2015).

¹⁷ J.Milić, *Serbia Has No Coherent Foreign Policy*, "New Eastern Europe" 3.06.2015, <http://www.neweasterneurope.eu> (accessed: 15.08.2016).

2000, Montenegro adopted *Foreign Policy* in 2007; Macedonia in 2009 adopted *Goals and Priorities Document* and in 2008, Kosovo enacted the internal document *The Program and Core Objectives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kosovo*¹⁸.

Despite the acceptance of *The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Serbia, Strategic Review of Defence* and *Strategy for Defence*, effective from 2009, the documents were not amended. So far, the *Doctrine of Defence of the Republic of Serbia* has not been accepted. As indicated by Maja Bijeloš, Serbia lags behind the Western Balkan countries, as strategic documents were adopted between 2002 - 2006¹⁹. A few words must be said about the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Serbia (hereinafter: SBN), which is the most important document as it defines the security policy of Serbia and speaks of the protection of its national interests. The SBN's aim is to protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country, economic development, social stability, development of democracy and the rule of law, respect for human rights and national minorities, to maintain the European orientation of foreign policy and the improvement of cooperation with the key players in international relations and countries of the region²⁰. In addition, it is important for the Republic of Serbia to create a peaceful, stable and secure international environment, to maintain and strengthen ties of the Serbian diaspora whilst away from their homeland, the promotion of cultural, economic and other forms of cooperation and support for the maintenance of national and cultural identity²¹. It is also worth emphasizing that in the SBN, the greatest national security threat for Serbia was the secession of Kosovo and BiH as the region declared as having a negative impact on the stability of the Western Balkans. The authors of the report, *From Four Pillars of Foreign Policy to European Integration: Is there a Will For Strategically Orienting Serbia's Foreign Policy?*, show that the foreign policy of Serbia in the period 2008 - 2012 is characterized by: a lack of a long-term strategy (which can also refer to the period 2012-2016), an incorrect decision-making system and supervision as well as difficulties in the

¹⁸ I. Novaković, I. Kajganović, N. Baćanović, *From Four Pillars of Foreign Policy to European Integration: Is there a Will For Strategically Orienting Serbia's Foreign Policy?*, Belgrade 2013, pg. 15. http://www.isac-fund.org/download/From_four_pillars_of_foreign_policy_to_european_integration.pdf (accessed: 16.08.2016).

¹⁹ *Security Policies in the Western Balkans*, ed. M. Hadžić, M. Timotić, P. Petrović, Beograd 2010, pg. 142.

²⁰ *National Security Strategy of the Republic of Serbia*, Belgrade, October 2009, pg.3, <http://www.vo.mod.gov.rs/documents/national-security-strategy-of-the-republic-of-serbia.pdf> (accessed: 25.05.2015).

²¹ *National Security Strategy... op. cit.*, pg.16. See. A. Jagiełło - Szostak, *Konflikty etniczne i wyznaniowe w świetle strategii Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego Serbii w: Konflikty etniczne i wyznaniowe a funkcjonowanie systemu bezpieczeństwa narodowego*, ed. E. Szyszlak, T. Szyszlak, Kraków 2015, pg. 41 – 51.

process of harmonization with the Common Foreign Policy and Security of the EU. Serbia led an uncoordinated foreign policy with unclear priorities that varied, depending on the political elite which was governing at the time²².

The last stage, the years 2012 – 2016, is related to the consequences of the financial crisis and systemic transformations. This period falls on the president Tomislav Nikolic, selected twice - in 2012 and 2016. Under the policy of the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS Srpska Napredna Stranka), the state renewed relations with Russia in the field of cultural cooperation, political, economic, energy and military²³ and cooperates with the EU, China, and is unenthusiastic towards its NATO membership.

International and Regional Cooperation

Serbia leads a broad policy of cooperation with international and regional organizations. The primary objectives included active participation in the work of international organizations, strengthening of multilateral relations through involvement in solving global problems, among which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Serbia first mentions: climate change, the fight against terrorism, sustainable development and energy issues. Serbia among its priorities, focuses on: the protection of the sovereignty and territorial integrity and obtaining a "compromise on the issue of Kosovo and Metohija, by obtaining even wider support for the position of Serbia [...]". In addition, promoting the nation in order to develop tourism, attract foreign investors and improve the image of Serbia in the world was specified²⁴. Foreign and security policy is focused mainly on cooperation with the EU, in the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (including the Common Security Defense), cooperation with the UN, the OSCE and NATO (Partnership for Peace).

Serbia's relations with the EU

Marko Stojić writes, 'skepticism towards Europe and the West in the last two decades, was an important part of Serbian society and politics'²⁵, which is reflected in the approach to

²² I. Novaković, I. Kajganović, N. Baćanović, *op. cit.*, pg. 5.

²³ M. Szpala, *Rosja w Serbii – miękka siła i twarde interesy*, 29.10.2014, <http://www.osw.waw.pl> (accessed: 15.08.2016).

²⁴ Sektor za multilateralnu seradnju, <http://www.mfa.gov.rs> (accessed: 15.07.2016).

²⁵ M. Stojić, *From Deep-Seated Animosity to Principled Disagreement: A Comparative Analysis of Party-Based Euroscepticism in Serbia w: Europe and the Post-Yugoslav Space*, ed. B. Radeljić, ASHGATE 2013, pg.133.

the EU among the political parties and their leaders. M. Stojic divides the parties into several groups. He includes the Democratic Party, G17 plus and the Liberal Democratic Party as Euro-enthusiasts. In turn, the Serbian Radical Party was definitely classified as eurosceptics. The group of moderate Euro-enthusiasts included: the Serbian Progressive Party, the Socialist Party of Serbia, New Serbia, Democratic Party of Serbia until 2008, while moderate Eurosceptics are: the Democratic Party of Serbia, the Socialist Party of Serbia until mid-2000, and New Serbia from 2008 to 2010²⁶.

The European Union became involved in the Balkan region in 1997 through political and economic cooperation, and remains the most important economic partner and the biggest investor in Serbia. Since 2000, the Republic of Serbia, together with the other countries of Southeastern Europe has become a potential candidate for EU structures. The EU introduced a series of pre-accession instruments such as CARDS, PHARE, OBNOVA, IPA and IPA II to the described region. The last is realized in the years 2014 - 2020. After signing a Stabilisation and Association Agreement in 2008, Serbia applied for official membership and negotiations began in 2014 - decision of the European Council on 20 December 2013 - are 35 thematic chapters. The first two chapters (chapters 32 and 35) were opened in December 2015, and are devoted to financial control and the normalization of relations with Kosovo.

Among the most important aspects that have been treated with special attention are: the relationship of Serbia and Kosovo - Serbia has not yet recognized Kosovo's independence, proclaimed in 2008. The situation in Kosovo is still monitored by the crisis management missions of the EU - EULEX which was extended to June 2018. The second aspect is Serbia's cooperation with the ICTY and particularly, giving The Hague the most serious war criminals. The following came before the Court, in order: S. Milošević in 2006, Radovan Karadzic in 2008, Stojan Zupljanin in 2010, Ratko Mladić and Goran Hadžić in 2011. The next issue was separating Montenegro from Serbia, which was resolved in a peaceful manner. The problematic issues were: the recognition of the independence of the Montenegrin Orthodox Church, the Euro-Atlantic aspirations of Milo Djukanovic, a long serving President and Prime Minister of Montenegro, Montenegrin national identity and the Montenegrin language, which is indicative of the diversity between Serbian and Montenegrin nationalities. Internal problems, such as socio - economic and political, including corruption,

²⁶ *Tamże*, pg. 139.

unemployment, the immigration crisis, are delaying Serbia's access to the EU. Serbia is willing to cooperate with the EU on the immigration crisis but makes their decisions contingent on the position of the EU, as mentioned by Minister of Labour and Social Policy Aleksandar Vulin and Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić in 2015. The EU has earmarked funds for the support of Serbia, which turned out to be a transit country during the migration crisis.

Serbia also cooperates in the field of the Common Security and Defence Policy of the EU. In 2011, Serbia signed two agreements (to take effect in 2012): Agreement of the Republic of Serbia and the EU, which establishes rules for the participation of the RS in EU crisis management operations and the Agreement on security procedures for the exchange and protection of classified information. In 2012, two representatives of the Ministry of Defense and the Army of the Republic of Serbia took part in the operation EUTM Somalia and EUNAVFORATALANTA Somalia. Among the challenges to the security of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Serbia there are: issues of energy security, cyber security, terrorism, organized crime, migration, the impact of demographic and climate change²⁷.

Serbia aims to join the European Union in 2018. However, the EU seems to still be a distant goal, which was affected by slow negotiations, migration crisis, the situation within the EU (i.e. Brexit), dwindling support for the unity of the EU, insufficient growth and high unemployment in Serbia, as well as the opposition of the Member States, i.e. Croatia. In May of 2016, Serbia criticized Croatia for the lack of a "green light" for the opening of more accession chapters. Croats, according to Serb negotiator Tanja Mišćević, do not formally express agreement for further negotiations, which slows down further talks²⁸.

Serbia's relations with NATO

Serbia and NATO relations remain more strained than relations with the EU. The events of 1999 cast a shadow on mutual relations, when NATO launched air strikes on Serbia due to the escalation of the conflict in Kosovo. On the one hand, these events give NATO less public support as it associates the organization as one of rampant aggression²⁹. On the other hand, participation in the organization can give a sense of security and closeness to the west.

²⁷ *ZBOR i bezbednosni izazovi*, www.mfa.gov.rs (accessed: 19.07.2016).

²⁸ *Serbowie i negocjacje akcesyjne*, 11.05.2016, www.euractiv.pl (accessed: 18.07.2016).

²⁹ J. Radoman, *NATO-Serbia relations: New strategies or more of the same?*, 14.04.2011, <http://www.eurodialogue.org> (accessed: 6.11.2013).

During the presidency of Boris Tadic, there were many significant steps made in the integration of the structures of NATO, in spite of keeping reservations towards mutual relations. In 2006, Serbia joined the Partnership for Peace program and in 2011, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) approved the Individual Cooperation Programme for Serbia (IPAP), under which NATO can support reforms (reforms in the defense sector), and deepen political cooperation, for example, in the context of the presence of KFOR in Kosovo and peacekeeping in Kosovo. After the election of T. Nikolic, the road towards NATO has changed. In the context of security policy, the president prefers cooperation with Russia and not with NATO and does not indicate a future membership of Serbia in its structures. Nevertheless, Serbia still cooperates with NATO on issues relating to: the reform of the security sector and defense (including international operations training), cooperation in the field of security policy (cooperation of the Serbian army with KFOR. In addition, NATO promotes democratic control of the armed forces. Three projects were also realized which were related to the destruction of weapons, landmines, unexploded ordnance and to help former military in establishing small businesses³⁰. In 2014, for the first time, Serbia took part in the NATO summit in Newport in the UK. In the same year, Serbia's mission with NATO took the lead in SEEGROUP (South East Europe Security Steering Group)³¹.

Serbia in the UN, OSCE and the Council of Europe

The Republic of Serbia has been a member of the UN since 2000, as well as most of its agencies, such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, UNESCO, WHO, ICAO, UNIDO, FAO and others). As part of the SFRY, it was a founding state in 1945. From September 2012 to September 2013, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs Vuk Jeremic chaired the 67th Meeting of the UN General Assembly, whose theme was to solve international disputes by peaceful means. In 2012, RS visited the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon. Serbia also has permanent representation in New York, Geneva, Vienna and at UNESCO in Paris. In relations with the UN, the issue of Kosovo is important, which under UN resolution 1244 of 1999, defines the UNMIK mission conditions in this area. In

³⁰ *NATO's relations with Serbia*, 6.11.2013, <http://www.nato.int>, J. Radoman, *op. cit.*

³¹ SEEGROUP - an informal forum for consultation on security and politics in the region of Southern Europe, which includes members of NATO countries from the Western Balkans, the members of NATO and the Western European NATO partners. *Učešće Republike Srbije u programu Partnerstva za mir (PzM)*, www.mfa.gov.rs (accessed:19.07.2016).

addition, Serbian government officials and soldiers participate in eight peacekeeping missions, the largest of which is the UNIFIL in Lebanon and UNOCI (Obala Slonovace), MONUSCO (DR Congo), UNMIL (Liberja), UNFICYP (Cyprus), United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (Middle East) MINUSCA (Central African Republic) and MINUSTAH (Haiti)³².

In 2000, Serbia joined the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and since 2001, the OSCE mission has been active there. Serbia is engaged in activities in three areas: military - political (including confidence-building measures and security CSBMs), economic and ecological (i.a. energy security) and human rights (i.a. sending observers within the OSCE and ODIHR). The programs implemented within the framework of the OSCE relate to the issues of democratization, rule of law, human rights, freedom of the press. In turn, in Kosovo since 1999, the OSCE mission operates under the name of OMIK, whose purpose is to develop a democratic multiethnic society³³.

Serbia and Montenegro became members of the Council of Europe in 2003. Serbia ratified eighty conventions of the Council of Europe and signed eight, among which are: the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages³⁴. An element of Serbian cultural diplomacy is human rights, which is a priority, both in domestic and international policy. Therefore, Serbia is in extensive cooperation with the United Nations and the Council of Europe. Among these, the most serious problems are minorities, displaced persons and missing persons. Serbia participated, among others, in the 32nd International Conference of the International Red Cross and Crescent Societies in Geneva in December 2015 as well as the and the World Humanitarian Summit, held in Istanbul in May 2016.³⁵ Since 2011, they are a member of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA). The organization was founded in 1998, and its aim is to work in the field of education, maintaining memory and research on the Holocaust³⁶. The aforementioned aspects indicate that the Serbian government, through involvement in

³² *Republika Srbija i Ujedinjene nacije (UN)*, www.mfa.gov.rs (accessed: 18.07.2016).

³³ *Republika Srbija i Organizacija za saradnju i bezbednost u Evropi (OEBS)*, www.mfa.gov.rs (accessed: 18.07.2016).

³⁴ *Republika Srbija i Savet Evrope (SE)*, www.mfa.gov.rs (accessed: 18.07.2016).

³⁵ *Ljudska prava*, www.mfa.gov.rs (accessed: 18.07.2016).

³⁶ International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance, www.holocaustremembrance.com (accessed:18.07.2016); Medunarodna alijansa za sećanje na holocaust, www.mfa.gov.rs (accessed: 18.07.2016).

issues concerning human rights and national minorities, is trying to warm up the image of Serbia in the international arena.

Non-Aligned Movement

The Non-Aligned Movement, (srb. Pokret nesvrstanih zemalja, further NAM) was established in 1961 at the initiative of Prime Minister of India Jawahralal Nehru, Egyptian President Gamal Nasser, President Sukarno of Indonesia and Josip Broz Tito. Involvement in the movement was treated as third way politics and balancing between "East and West". On the wave of change and conflict in 1992, FRY suspended its participation in the NAM. Almost ten years later, in 2001, the request of FRY to obtain observer status in the organization was accepted. On the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Serbia it was stated that: "Our presence and cooperation within the NAM are not in contradiction with the European perspective of Serbia, but indicate a complementary dimension of the commitment of our entire foreign policy"³⁷. The Republic of Serbia, as noted, does not want to change its status as the current position of the observer allows participation in the NAM, to monitor the political and economic global problems, and enables and revives bilateral economic cooperation with the Member States of the Movement. In 2010, Serbia established a scholarship program for students from member countries of the NAM named *Svet u Srbiji - 100 stipendija for studente that država članica PNZ*. In September 2011, Serbia held a meeting of the non-aligned countries in Belgrade on the 50th anniversary of the founding meeting³⁸.

Regional Relations

Serbia is a member of regional initiatives that are conducive to deepening cooperation and improving regional and bilateral relations, and which are focused on supporting the processes of democratization, development of civil society, human rights and national minorities, to build the rule of law, regulating the relations of economic and educational ties. Among the most important are: Southeast European and Eastern Europe Initiative Cooperation (SECI), South - East European Cooperation Process (SEECF), Central European Initiative (CEI) Adriatic and Ionian initiative (AII), Southeast Europe Police Chiefs

³⁷ Republika Srbija u Pokretu Nesvrstanih Zemalja (PNZ), www.mfa.gov.rs (accessed: 18.07.2016).

³⁸ *Tamže*.

Association (SEPCA), Migration, Asylum and Refugees Regional Initiative (MARRI), the Regional Cooperation Council (RCC), Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA); EU Strategy for the Danube Region (EUSDR) and the EU Strategy for the Adriatic and Ionian Region (EUSAIR).

Table 1: Regional Cooperation of the Republic of Serbia - Featured initiatives.

Lp.	Name of the regional initiative	abbrev.	Serbia's membership from:	Objectives, initiatives
1.	Southeast European Cooperative Initiative	SECI	1996	- economic cooperation, - development of infrastructure, security, communications, ecology and the private sector.
2.	South-East European Cooperation Process	SEECF	2000	- strengthening cooperation and good neighborly relations, - stabilization of the region.
3.	Central European Initiative	CEI	2000	- cooperation between CEI member states, - fostering participation in European integration - speeding up the process of economic transformation.
4.	Adriatic and Ionian Initiative	AII	2000	- cooperation in the Adriatic and Ionian region (including the area of security, culture, agriculture, tourism, ecology).
5.	Southeast Europe Police Chiefs Association	SEPCA	2002	- the development of police cooperation between Member States, - police reform, - improvement of cross-border police cooperation.
6.	Migration, Asylum, Refugees Regional Initiative	MARRI	2004	- an initiative in the framework of the Stability Pact for Southeast Europe, - issues of asylum, migration, border management, visa regime and return of displaced persons.
7.	Central European Free Trade Agreement	CEFTA	2006	- abolition of customs duties on trade between Member States.
8.	Regional Cooperation Council	RCC	2008	- institutional and logistical support for SCEEP, - development of regional cooperation in the area of socio - economic development, energy and infrastructure, orchards, parliamentary cooperation, strengthening of human potential.
9.	EU Strategy for the Danube Region	EUSDR	2011	- communication, - environmental protection, flood protection, - socio-economic development and institution-building, - strengthening regional cooperation.

10.	EU Strategy for the Adriatic and Ionian Region	EUSAIR	2012	- environmental protection, - strengthening regional cooperation in the areas of transport and energy, - development of tourism.
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Source: own study based on *Regionalne inicijative*, ww.mfa.gov.rs (accessed:18.07.2016) ; *Southeast Europe Police Chiefs Association*, www.sepca-see.eu (accessed: 18.07.2016).

Bilateral relations with Russia, China, USA, Turkey

Russia, China, the USA and Turkey are among the countries that are often mentioned by politicians and documents relating to foreign policy and security of Serbia. As pointed out by James Headley, the cooperation of Serbia (as well as Montenegro) and Russia is based on the recognition of their historical bonds, which affects their modern relationships³⁹. The close cultural and religious proximity (the use of Cyrillic and belonging to the Orthodox Church), results in the fact that among the Balkan states, in addition to Serbia, Macedonia and Bulgaria also are close to Russia. It should be noted that Russia, since the beginning of the disintegration of Yugoslavia, supports the interests of Serbia and the return to an even better relationship is visible since 2008, when Russia supported Serbia's position on Kosovo. Furthermore, the Serbian minority is supported by the Russian authorities especially in BiH, Montenegro and Kosovo⁴⁰. Mutual bilateral relations in the economic area - energy and military gained new momentum since T. Nikolic's rise to power, whose first foreign visit was aimed precisely at Moscow. In turn, in 2014, Serbia was visited by President Vladimir Putin. Serbia manifested its proximity of Russia by not joining the sanctions imposed on Russia in 2014 because of the conflict in the Ukraine. Furthermore, in the area of security, in 2013, Serbia became an observer in the Collective Security Treaty Organisation, (CSTO) and signed an agreement on military cooperation⁴¹. Moreover, it is dependent on Russia for energy supplies. In 2012, the two countries signed an agreement on gas supplies for the years 2012 to 2021, and companies like Gazprom Neft and Lukoil now hold a majority stake in Serbia's

³⁹ See. J. Headley, *Russia and the Balkans, Foreign Policy from Yeltsin to Putin*, London 2008, pg. 10 and nn.

⁴⁰M. Szpala, *op. cit.*

⁴¹*Serbia's National Assembly to get CSTO permanent observer status*, <http://voiceofrussia.com>, 7.11.2013; *Serbia has been granted to become PA CSTO observer*, <http://inserbia.info/news/2013/04/serbia-has-been-granted-to-become-pa-csto-observer/> (07.11.2013); M. Szpala, *op. cit.*

Naftna Industrija Srbije (NIS) and Beopatrol⁴². In the words of S. Đukić, "Russia is the guardian of Serbia, Kosovo and Metohija in the UN Security Council, a proven advocate for the interests articulated by Belgrade in the highest bodies of world organizations." In addition, the agency TASS says, that more than 50% of the Serbian population is traditionally pro-Russian⁴³.

When Serbia was part of Yugoslavia, its relations at that time with the US could be described as good - Yugoslavia received i.e. financial assistance from the US. Power politics, conducted since the beginning of the disintegration of Yugoslavia, had a high impact on mutual relations, namely the introduction of sanctions and NATO intervention in 1999. Thus, the activities of the Bill Clinton administration was and is perceived negatively by society. In reference to the NATO - Yugoslavia war, D. Gibas-Bush writes that "the most likely hypotheses are presented primarily by Serbian scholars, who argue that the aim of the Americans is expansion in the Balkans, in order to gain influence and weaken Russia [...]"⁴⁴. The overthrowing of S. Milosevic made mutual relations begin to undergo a slow normalization and establishing especially political and economic partnerships. But the attack on the WTC in 2001 and focus on the war on terrorism by the United States, as stated Aleksandra Joksimović, caused the initiative towards the Western Balkans to leave the EU⁴⁵. Undoubtedly, mutual relations influence different aspects of the democratization of Serbia, its cooperation with the ICTY, the status of Kosovo and relations between Serbia and Kosovo, and the rise in popularity of radical parties. In May of 2015, after the participation of Serbia in the Victory Parade in Moscow, US Vice President Joseph Biden, invited Prime Minister Alexander Vučićia to visit the United States. At the same time, Putin invited T. Nikolic, which indicates a crossroads in the Serbian foreign policy⁴⁶.

The People's Republic of China and the Republic of Serbia (formerly Yugoslavia) established diplomatic relations in 1955. In 2012, at the summit in Warsaw, a 1 + 16 cooperation between China was launched as well as with the countries of Central - Eastern

⁴² H. Von Homeyer, *Don't leave Serbia to Russia and China*, 27.03.2015, <https://euobserver.com>, (access: 12.05.2015).

⁴³ S. Đukić, *Serbia's relations with Russia: an Overview of the Post-Yugoslav(post-Soviet) Era* in: *The Challenges of Serbia's Foreign Policy – Collection of Papers*, Belgrade 2015, pg. 33, www.library.fes.de (accessed: 9.07.2016).

⁴⁴ D. Gibas-Krzak, *op. cit.*, pg. 204.

⁴⁵ A. Joksimović, *Srbija i SAD. Bilateralni odnosi u tranziciji*, Belgrade 2007, pg. 206.

⁴⁶ M. Poznatov, *Serbian army to take part in Moscow parade*, 6.05.2015, <http://www.euractiv.com> (accessed: 11.05.2015).

Europe (the CEE Albania BiH, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia and Slovenia). Subsequent meetings of states were held in 2013 in Bucharest, in 2014 in Belgrade, and in 2015 in Suzhou⁴⁷. China is the main trade partner of Serbia where the exchange of goods in 2015 amounted to 1.56 billion dollars, which are involved in projects in the energy sector, infrastructure development (i.e. bridge construction (Zemun -Borca), the construction of two highway sections in Obrenovac-Ljig, there is also an agreement signed on the construction of the Belgrade - Budapest railway line)⁴⁸. The strategic partnership between the two countries was introduced in 2009. Jasminka Simić says that, "a traditional friendship between Serbia and China has been reinforced by more intensive economical cooperation at both a bilateral and multilateral level through a 1 + 16 policy of cooperation, between China and the 16 countries of the CEE "⁴⁹. Next, the relations of Serbia and Turkey date back to the nineteenth century, where diplomatic relations were established in 1879. Turkey is one of the most important economic partners. As indicated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Serbia, in the last ten years, the exchange of goods continues to grow⁵⁰. The Turkish side emphasizes that a "strategic partnership" with Serbia is not only for historical reasons but also points towards the three-lateral cooperation Serbia - Turkey - BiH. Both of the described states abolished visas for each other. The Sandžak region treats Turkey as a "bridge of friendship" between both countries, if only because of Bosniaks with their relatives in Turkey⁵¹.

Bilateral relations of Serbia with the post Yugoslavs

Serbo-Croatian relations despite the fact that they are proper, however, historical events affect their quality. The Republic of Serbia and the Republic of Croatia, even as the two largest operators included in Yugoslavia, clashed on a political, cultural, and economic level, then waged in the Serbo - Croatian conflict in 1991-1995. A year after the peace in Dayton, on 9 September 1996, diplomatic relations were established⁵². Undoubtedly, the

⁴⁷ J. Simić, *How far is China? w: The Challenges of Serbia's ... op. cit.*, pg. 41, <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/belgrad/12484.pdf>.

⁴⁸ *Bilateralni odnosi sa stranim državama, Kina*, <http://www.mfa.gov.rs> (accessed: 08.08.2016).

⁴⁹ J. Simić, *op. cit.*, pg. 42

⁵⁰ *Bilateralni odnosi sa stranim državama, Turska*, <http://www.mfa.gov.rs> (accessed: 8.08.2016).

⁵¹ *Relations between Turkey and Serbia*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey-and-serbia.en.mfa> (accessed: 13.09.2016).

⁵² *Размена нота о успостављању дипломатских односа између СР Југославије и Р. Хрватске* 9.09. 1996, in: *Bilateralni odnosi sa stranim državama*, <http://www.mfa.gov.rs> (accessed: 15.07.2016).

warming of mutual relations occurred under the presidencies of B. Tadic and Ivo Josipovic. In 2010, the first of them apologized for crimes committed during the war. Currently, the most significant aspects are: regulating minority rights of the Serbs in Croatia and Croats in Serbia, the return of refugees, the issue of missing persons and the recovery of private and state property. Next, unresolved border issues on the River Danube and the disputed issue of jurisdiction on the two islands - Vukovar and Staregrad. There is controversial discourse about aspects of the crimes of Croats against Serbs in the Jasenovac camp during the Second World War, while the Croats accuse the Serbs of criminal activity during the conflict in the 90s.⁵³ Serbs and Croats, who put forth accusations of genocide against each other respectively in 2010 and 1999, were finally "reconciled" by the International Court of Justice in The Hague in February 2015, who rejected the lawsuits, pointing to the other crimes committed during the conflict in the 90s. Both countries, despite their discontent, accepted the judgment. I. Dacic, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Serbia, described the first event as one of the most important events in bilateral relations, but Croatian Prime Minister Zoran Milanovic has confirmed that it will be necessary to further cooperation with Serbia in the context of missing persons and the return of cultural goods⁵⁴. A temporary souring of mutual relations occurred during the immigration crisis of in 2015, during which Hungary closed its borders and Croatia limited the movement of people and transit from Serbia.

Bosnia and Herzegovina's relations with the Republic of Serbia are complex, and diplomatic relations were established on 15 December 2000.⁵⁵ In the 90s, the FRY and BiH did not establish formal relations⁵⁶, which was a result of the conflict in the area of BiH in 1991-1995. After the peace in Dayton, BiH was divided into two entities - the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Srpska, in which more than 90% of the population is Serb. Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks belong to constitutional nations. Mutual relations were initiated in 1996, with a joint statement by S. Milosevic and the president of

⁵³ A. Jagiełło - Szostak, *Wybrane aspekty postkonfliktowych relacji chrwacko-serbskich w: Republika Chorwacji. Polityka wewnetrzna i miedzynarodowa*, ed. A. Jagiełło – Szostak, Wrocław 2014, pg. 229-243. ; M. Mladenov, *op. cit.* pg. 162.

⁵⁴ *MTS: Serbia i Chorwacja nie dopuścily się wglądem siebie ludobójstwa*, 05.02.2015, www.euractiv.pl (accessed: 18.07.2016)

⁵⁵ *Протокол о успостављању дипломатских односа између Савезне Републике Југославије и Босне и Херцеговине* 15.12.2000 in: *Bilateralni Odnosi sa stranim državama*, <http://www.mfa.gov.rs> (accessed: 15.07.2016).

⁵⁶ M. Mladenov, *op. cit.*, pg. 163.

BiH, Alija Izetbegović⁵⁷. In 2002, an agreement was signed on dual citizenship between FRJ i BiH⁵⁸. In 2003 and 2004, presidents of Serbia, Svetozar Marković and B. Tadic, apologized to the society of BiH for crimes committed during the war⁵⁹. However, in 2006, MTS opened a trial for crimes of genocide committed by the Serbs and contributed to by the Government of BiH. A year later, the court cleared the Serbian government with a murder charge of 8 000 people - mostly men and boys - in Srebrenica⁶⁰. Consequently, the Tribunal of war crimes in the former Yugoslavia, the UN and the ICJ in The Hague recognized the crimes of Srebrenica as genocide. It should be mentioned that after the first election in 2012, T. Nikolić said that there was no genocide in Srebrenica, and a year later apologized for the "crimes" committed by Serbs during the disintegration of Yugoslavia and in Srebrenica, not using the word genocide⁶¹. Recognition by BiH Kosovo deteriorated mutual relationships, where Serbian leaders of the i.a. Milorad Dodik, were calling for secession. In addition, relationships are affected by events related to the siege of Sarajevo, the existence of concentration camps in Prijedor, Omarskiej, Karatermie, Trnopolju and Menjačy⁶² and the unresolved question of the border on the river Drina.

Serb - Kosovo relations belong to the most problematic. Relations of the two countries can be divided into several stages: 1992 - 1998 - escalation of the Serb - Albanian conflict, then 1999-2008, where Kosovo was under the auspices of the international stage and finally, since 2008. As an independent state, Kosovo is not recognized by Serbia i.a. reasons: history (the first state of Serbia was on the territory of Kosovo, location of the monasteries (in Pec, Dečani and Gračanicy) and under the pretext of protecting the Diaspora of Serbia, which is 5% of the population of the state. Immediately after the declaration of independence by the Kosovar parliament, Foreign Minister Vuk Jeremic issued a statement that Belgrade will not maintain normal relations with countries that recognize its independence⁶³. The breakthrough came in 2008, when Serbia recognized Kosovo's borders in the framework of the signed

⁵⁷ *Зajeдничка изјава Слободана Милошевића и Алије Исетбеговића* 3.10.1996, in: *Bilateralni odnosi sa stranim državama*, <http://www.mfa.gov.rst> (accessed: 15.07.2016).

⁵⁸ Уговор о двојном држављанству између СРЈ И БиХ 29.10.2002, Службени лист СРЈ - Међународни уговори бр. 2/2003, in: *Bilateralni Odnosi sa stranim državama*, <http://www.mfa.gov.rs> (accessed: 15.07.2016).

⁵⁹ M.Mladenov, *op. cit.*, pg. 163.

⁶⁰ S.P.Ramet, *Serbia and Montenegro Since 1989* in: *op. cit.*, pg. 302.

⁶¹ *Serbian president apologises for Srebrenica 'crime'*, <http://www.bbc.com> (accessed: 12.08.2016).

⁶² See Ed Vulliamy, *Wojna umarła, niech żyje wojna. Bośniackie rozrachunki*, Wołowiec 2016.

⁶³ S.P.Ramet, *Serbia and Montenegro Since 1989* in: *op. cit.*, pg. 301.

protocol under the auspices of the EU and EULEX. Relations with Kosovo also impinge on the perception of Serbia in the international arena and its desire to join the EU. From 2011, mutual relations have improved, and two years later, Serbia and Kosovo, under the auspices of the EU, signed an agreement on the normalization of mutual relations, which allowed to start negotiations with the EU. Then, in 2015, Pristina and Belgrade signed another document relating to energy, telecommunications, freedom of movement and the establishment of an association of Serb municipalities in Kosovo⁶⁴.

Serbian - Montenegrin relations are one of the closest due to historical, cultural, linguistic and political connections. Firstly, since the disintegration of Yugoslavia, that is, in the years 1992 – 2006, Serbia and Montenegro formed a single state within the federation. Common issues or independent statehood were a point of contention, which was also compounded by the conflict over Kosovo and its declaration of independence. In the years 1992 - 2003, both parties were part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Since 1997, Montenegro, under the rule of Milo Djukanovic followed in becoming politically independent, leading to a process of democratization, a pro-European course and the change of the name of the state. In March of 2002, Serbia and Montenegro signed an agreement in Belgrade, which maintained the status quo between the republics and noted that in the case of the secession of Montenegro, Serbia would remain a succession state⁶⁵. During the years 2003 – 2006, it was part of the federation of Serbia and Montenegro. During this period, dissatisfaction with the functioning of the two countries grew, especially in the context of the harmonization of economies, which was also important for the process of association with the EU. However, the two countries do not have a common currency, a central bank and a single market. In fact, both parts operate separately. Blocking Serbia's cooperation with the EU by i.a. lack of cooperation of Serbia with the ICTY made the Montenegrin government feel like, "a hostage of Serbian politics"⁶⁶. Montenegrin politicians were strengthened by these aspects to make a decision and a referendum for independence which in 2006, at 55% attendance, half the population opted for independence. As Jelena Džankić noted, many international analysts

⁶⁴ *Historyczne porozumienie między Serbią a Kosowem*, 26.08.2015, www.euractiv.pl (accessed: 18.07.2016).

⁶⁵ J. Džankić, *Montenegro and the EU: Changing Context, Changing Roles* in: *Europe and the Post-Yugoslav Space*, (ed.)B. Radeljić ASHGATE 2013, pg. 118.

⁶⁶ *Tamże*, pg. 120-121.

said that it was the last stage of the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia⁶⁷. Diplomatic relations between the two countries were established on 22 June 2006⁶⁸. When Montenegro recognized Kosovo, the Montenegrin ambassador in Belgrade was considered *persona non grata*⁶⁹. The issues of the national identity of Montenegrins are important for mutual relations. The process of building a national identity consists of: 1. the development of language - the constitution of 2007 first introduced the Montenegrin language and in 2009 the first Montenegrin grammar book is published. Despite this, the Serbian language, according to data from the census of 2011, is used by 42.88% of people. 2. religious aspects - emphasizing the independence of the Orthodox Church, and the multi-ethnic and multicultural tradition of Montenegro. With a population of 620 thousand, 44.98% of the state are Montenegrins, Serbs 28.73%⁷⁰.

Macedonia peacefully broke away from Yugoslavia in 1991, and a border has since been fixed by a previous administrative line between the former republics of Yugoslavia. Diplomatic relations were established in April 1996⁷¹. It was not until the declaration of independence of Kosovo that the Serbo - Macedonian relations cooled. Despite the large Albanian minority in Macedonia - which led to the conflict and the signing of the Ohrid peace in 2001 - borders between Macedonia and the new state had fluently been established also on the basis of pre-existing internal borders in Yugoslavia and did not appear to be grounds for dispute⁷². Although Serbia does not lay claim to territorial, cultural and political aspects, parts remain unresolved such as the independence of the Macedonian Orthodox Church and the recognition of Kosovo by Macedonia.

Serbian - Slovenian relations are one of the best among the post Yugoslavian. When Yugoslavia fell apart, there was a conflict between the Yugoslav Army and the Slovenian army for several days. However, FRJ quickly withdrew. In 2000, Serbia and Slovenia signed

⁶⁷ *Tamže*, pg.122.

⁶⁸ Протокол о Успостављању дипломатских односа између Републике Србије и Републике Црне Горе 22.06.2006 in: *Bilateralni odnosi sa stranim državama*, <http://www.mfa.gov.rs> (accessed: 15.07.2016).

⁶⁹ J. Džankić, *From Creeping to Sprinting: The Foreign Policy of Montenegro* in: *The Foreign Policies of Post-Yugoslav States. From Yugoslavia to Europe*, ed. S. Keil, B. Stahl, Palgrave Macmillan 2014, pg. 185.

⁷⁰ A. Jagiełło - Szostak, *Exploring the Roots of Montenegro* in: „New Eastern Europe”, No 4 /2013, pg. 103-109.

⁷¹ Споразум о регулисању односа и унапређењу сарадње Републике Југославије и Републике Македоње, 08.04.1996 г. in: *Bilateralni Odnosi sa stranim državama*, <http://www.mfa.gov.rs> (accessed: 15.07.2016).

⁷² C. Koneska, *Policy Consensus During Institutional Change: Macedonian Foreign Policy Since Independence* in: *The Foreign Policies of Post-Yugoslav States. From Yugoslavia to Europe*, ed. S. Keil, B. Stahl, Palgrave Macmillan 2014, pg. 114-115.

an agreement between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Government of the Republic of Slovenia on the establishment of diplomatic relations⁷³. In 2008, there was a deterioration of relations after the recognition of Kosovo by Slovenia. Then, the Serbian government called for a boycott of Slovenian products⁷⁴. Currently, both countries have strong economic relations and do not have border disputes.

Protection of the Serbian diaspora

An important part in the foreign policy and security of Serbia is to protect the Serb population. An office was created within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Cooperate with the Diaspora and Serbs in the region (UPRAVA for saradnju s diasporas and Srbima regionu). This aspect is regulated by three documents: the Declaration of the Government of the Republic of Serbia for the proclamation of the relationship between homeland and diaspora, as the most important national and state interest in 2006. (Deklarācija Vlade Republike Srbije about proglašenju odnosa of najvećeg državnog and nacionalnog interesa), the Law on the Diaspora and Serbs in the region of 2009 (Zakon o dijaspori and Srbima u regionu), and the strategy of strengthening and maintaining relationships of the homeland and diaspora and the homeland and Serbs in the region of 2011 (Strategija očuvanja and jačanja odnosa Matičné države and Srba u regionu). In the Law of 2009, in Article 2, the diaspora is defined as: the citizens of the Republic of Serbia, who live abroad and members of the Serbian nation, emigrants from the Republic of Serbia and the region and their descendants. The second point of the second article defines the Serbs of the region as: members of the Serbian people who live in the Republic of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Macedonia, Romania, Albania and Hungary⁷⁵. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs estimates that the Serbian diaspora has 4.5 million people, of whom 1.5 million are citizens of Serbia which also hold dual citizenship. In addition, the ministry says that there are approx. 1,300 Serbian diaspora associations in the world - the largest number of them located in the EU, USA and Australia⁷⁶. Among the main goals of Serbia towards the diaspora and Serbs in the region are: the preservation of national and cultural identity, protecting their interests and rights,

⁷³ *Споразум између Савезне Владе Савезне Републике Југославије и Владе Републике Словенје о успостављању дипломатских односа* 9. 12.2000 in: *Bilateralni Odnosi sa stranim državama*, <http://www.mfa.gov.rs> (accessed: 15.07.2016).

⁷⁴ M. Mladenov, *op. cit.*, pg.164.

⁷⁵ *Закон о дијаспори и Србима у региону* from 28. 10.2009, www.dijaspora.gov.rs (accessed: 19.07.2016).

⁷⁶ *Dijaspora*, www.mfa.gov.rs (accessed: 19.07.2016).

strengthening economic, scientific, cultural, sports relations between the home state and the Diaspora and Serbs in the region, financial support, ensuring rights and obligations abroad through the provision of consular services⁷⁷. Article 13 of the Act establishes a Day of the Diaspora and Serbs in the region on June 28 or Vidovdan⁷⁸. In institutional terms, Article 15 of the Act says that the Parliament (Skupština) of the Diaspora and Serbs in the region (Skupština dijaspore i Srba u regionu) is the highest representative body, while Article 27 establishes Council for relations with Serbs in the region (Savet za odnosi za srbima u regionu) and Article 38 - Council for the Diaspora (Savet za dijasporu)⁷⁹.

Summary

Foreign and Security Policy of the Republic of Serbia depends on the orientation of the political elite and remains at a crossroads. On the one hand, the EU is one of the most important political and economic partners and donors, while on the other hand, NATO is perceived negatively because of historical events. In addition, the USA withdrew from active politics in the Balkans for the EU. A "rebirth" of a cultural, military and political influence from Russia and a strengthening economic cooperation with China is visible. It should be noted that Serbia does not have a strategic document defining hierarchies of directions and priorities in foreign policy. In bilateral relations, there are many unresolved issues: political (the recognition of Kosovo's statehood), problems concerning national minorities (protection of the Serbian Diaspora, aspects of the border (i.e. Serbo - Croat, Serb - Bosniak) and numerous problems arising from the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia (i.e. the return of refugees, reconciliation, recovery of property, etc.). However, the most important aspect of bilateral relations is Kosovo, which, according to SBN, has been identified as the greatest threat to Serbia and BiH. Despite the existing misunderstandings and continually tense relationship, there are attempts for bilateral cooperation and multilateral support by regional initiatives such as AII, CEFTA, SEECF, MARRI (usually in the area of socio-economic cooperation, economic transformation, support of the participation of Serbia in European

⁷⁷ *Tamže.*

⁷⁸ Vidovdan – a religious holiday celebrated in honor of the Battle of Kosovo, which took place on 28 June in 1389.

⁷⁹ *Закон о дијаспори и Србима у региону* from 28. 10.2009, www.dijaspora.gov.rs (accessed: 19.07.2016).

integration, reform of security forces), which will lead to greater stability in the Western Balkans.

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