Egypt’s Arabism: Ahmad Ḥasan az-Zayyāt: From Islam’s Community to the wide Pan-Arab Nation in the 1930s and 1940s*

The Delimitation of the Arab Nation

Az-Zayyāt often felt strong supra-Arab Islamic community emotions in topical contemporary contexts and perpetuated themes about pristine classical Islam from the old pre-World War I type of political pan-Islamism in Egypt. He carried forward Al-Afīnī’s identification with the world-wide military conquests of the early Muslim Arabs, and the universalist Islamic states (empires) that they founded almost overnight. This supra-Middle Eastern scope of the classical Arabs’ role posed problems for the rigorous territorialization of an Arab nation indispensable for a viable Arab nationalism in Egypt.

Az-Zayyāt presented the classical Arabs’ sweeping conquests as an Islamic ideological action. In regard to ‘Uqba Ibn Nāfī, halted by the Atlantic Ocean after conquering North Africa, the conquest was of the modern Arab homeland’s Maghrībi western wing and thus territorially corresponded to concepts of the twentieth century’s secular unitary Arab nationalists. However, Az-Zayyāt gave parity with ‘Uqba to Qutayba al-Bāhilī conquering far from any twentieth century Arab lands deep into Turkic Central Asia (Bilād al-Aṭrāk) towards China under a religious inspiration: “my confidence in the victory Allah confers”.¹ The model classical Arabs thus delimitied no clear territorial boundaries for a modern Arab homeland.

Az-Zayyāt’s strong sense of Muslim brotherhood and of the scope of the classical Arabs’ Islamic universal state fostered his very open, fluid conception of Arab nationality as something acquirable through adoption of a lan-

* In this article the author develops his ideas presented in “Rocznik Orientalistyczny” XLIX, 1996, pp.61-98.

language and the associated religion (Islam). He tended to regard current populations that had once undergone rule by the classical Arabs and in the process accepted Islam and Arabic as a literary, second, language, as Arab. He could identify with an Arab ethnic distinctiveness that preceded Islam but which universalistic Islamic roles thenceforth denied stable territoriality and derailed. In a 1933 article commemorating the birthday of the Prophet Muhammad, Az-Zayyât wrote that the “natural selection” of their harsh peninsular environment had made the Arabians in their paganism a race of “supermen” in “vitality, arid perfection of manhood and clarity of perception”. In their parochial peninsula, though, they had misdirected their vitality into internecine feuding; once Islam and Muhammad united them and they became world leaders of Islam without any territorial limits, other racially non-Arab populations entered the Arab nation. Conversion to Islam brought together the diverse populations who later amalgamated into the new expanded Arab nation. “The different peoples whom the personality of the Arabs melted into one and the culture of the Arabs stamped attained brotherhood and unity only by following Muhammad’s way [method, program: minhâq] and guidance”.

Steeped as he was in Arabic literature, Az-Zayyât’s discursive essays wove nationality issues under classical Islam even into his discussions of problems that beset Egypt a thousand years later. In 1941, while repudiating the multi-party parliamentarist system as divisive and malfunctioned in Egypt, he again imaged that the human composition of the classical Arab nation had been open-ended, incorporative, expansive and shifting, like the frontiers of its action. The bitter internal party-political divisions setting Egyptians at loggerheads in 1941 were culturally “inherited” (mawrût) over a millennium of history from the divisive partisan “fanaticisms” (‘ašabiyya) that had “ruined the entity of the Arabs and enfeebled the structure of Islam” in the classical period. The partisan conflicts were over interests of personal or sectional power, not valid differences over “principles to set the world right and strengthen religion”. Muhammad during his mission held in check the consistent tendency of the Arabs towards partisan division. With its resurgence upon his death, “the Arabs became divided up into Hâshimites and Umayyads, then into Qaysites and Yamanites, then between ‘Ali’s party and ‘Abbâsids, then, between Arabists and Šu‘ûbîs”. Az-Zayyât thus refused to accept the statement of the Šu‘ûbîs - those who affirmed non-Arab nationalities under classical Islam – that they (or the populations from which they sprang) were non-Arabs. He treated the dispute between Šu‘ûbîs and champions of the Arab party in the ‘Abbâsîd era as a sectional internal division

that got out of hand within the Muslim-Arab quasi-national group like the bitter party-politics dividing Egyptians in the 1940s: both conflicts although separated by one thousand years and occurring on different continents equally instanced a common “lust for power [...] divisiveness of the Arabs of all periods and lands”3. Clearly, Az-Zayyāt would find it hard to think of the Egyptians of his day and the far-extending classical Arabs as separate communities. In 1945, during the difficult negotiations for the formation of the League of Arab States, Az-Zayyāt urged the contemporary “leaders of the Arabs” to unite: he referred to the classical division between Arabists and Šu‘ūbis as one past pointless internal Arab division that had disastrous consequences4.

The high literature and societies in which the classical Arabs led overflowed into Az-Zayyāt’s analyses of the issues facing Egypt and the Middle East in his time. He registered real sustained interactions, and ensuing conceptual blurring of Arabness, under classical Islam when he accepted as part of that historical Arab nation not simply those populations that got completely Arabized, but also others, the Persians or Furs most notably, that retained separate native tongues and for whom non-Arab Šu‘ūbi poets and writers proclaimed countering non-Arab nationality in the Umayyad and early ‘Abbāsid periods5. The religion of Islam disposed Az-Zayyāt to per-


4 Az-Zayyāt, U∂kurÈ, yÇ zu’amÇ’ al-‘Arab (“Rember o Leaders of the Arabs”), 8 January 1943; “Wa…y” vol.3, p. 13.

5 Az-Zayyāt’s attitude that the use of Arabic made Persians or individuals descended from the Arabs under cclssical Islam could cite teachings ascribed in the period to the Prophet and the early Muslims. When Muhammad heard “a hypocrite” (sic!) denigrate the Arabness of his pious follower Salmān the Persian he was said to have ruled that “the Lord is One, and (your) progenitor one, none among you derives Arabness from father or mother: it is only language so that whoever speaks Arabic is an Arab”. Al-Wād’ al-Ibagai wa-ḥaq al-muhdtaṭina fihi (“Linguistic Innovation and the Right of the Moderns to Exercise It”), text of the lecture delivered to an Arabic Language Academy conference on 26 December 1949; “Wahy” vol. 3, pp. 177-178. Nicholson viewed such hadiths as concocted by that sector of ‘Abbâsid-period Persians determined to Arabize “as clients affiliated to an Arab tribe, they
ceive the classical and modern populations of North Africa and the Middle East in a unitary way in which the core Arab ethnic group blurred out into wider Muslim populations among which Arabic had currency at some point. During his 1941 treatment of ‘asabiyya, religious emotions blurred demarcation between the core “entity of the Arabs” (kiyān al-‘Arab) and the other populations comprising the classical wider religious community of the Muslims. Thus, the term umma in Az-Zayyāt’s Qur’ān-adapting characterization of the Arabs/classical Muslims (“God made them a Middle Nation, they believe in Allah and in the Last Day and command the good, forbid the bad and vie in good deeds”) could almost equally denote:

(a) a culturally and ethnically heterogeneous religious Muslim nation in which all would acquire some Arab characteristics through the religion or

(b) a nation equally Arab and Muslim to which some originally non-Arab groups had been attached and comprehensively assimilated at some time.

Such quasi-universalist religious community emotion made it harder for him to demarcate or bound the Arab or Arabic-speaking Muslims either territorially or demographically. As old Arabic works around him recounted, Iranian elites and sectional strata of various types, in Iran proper as well as amidst much larger numbers of Arabs in Iraq, had adopted and developed Arabic as their medium of administration, law, intellectual life and poetry under the ‘Abbāsids in particular. But parallel with the decline of the Arab ‘Abbāsid Caliphate, destroyed by the Mongols in 1258 the development of Persian as a literary language between the tenth and twelfth centuries made the displacement of Arabic possible in Persian-speaking lands beyond Iraq outside the sphere of religious Revelation, theology and law common to all the Islamic umma. The Iranians were the most striking instance of reversal in Islam’s late classical and post-classical age of the wide linguistic and cultural Arabization to which the Arabs had led so many nationalities - and Riza Shah attempted Atatürk-like de-Arabization of Farsi itself. Such post-class-assumed Arab names and [...] provided themselves with fictitious pedigrees, on the strength of which they passed for Arabs": A Literary History of the Arabs, pp. 279, 281.

6 Az-Zayyāt, Al-‘Asabiyya...; “Wa...y” vol. 3, p. 267. His Arabic description of the classical Arabs and Muslims was: Ga’alahum Allāhu ummatan wasatan, yu’mināna bi-Allāhi wa-#l-yawmi #l-aÆiri wa-yan-hawna ‘an #l-munkar wa-yusÇri'ēna fi-#l-ÆayrÇt, adapted from the Qur’ān’s two suras Al-Baqara (2:143) and Āl ‘Imrān (3:114).

7 The rise of a secularist Iranian nationalism that was anti-Arab in its view of history and came, to be promoted with resources of government under the Pahlavis was examined in Homayoun Katouzian, Nationalist Trends in Iran, 1921-1926, IJMES 1979, pp. 533-551 and by John R. Perry in: Language Reform in Turkey and Iran, IJMES 1985 pp. 295-311. Perry’s study stressed the limitations placed upon the drive of Shah Riza and hard-line ideologues to de-Arabize Farsi by silent obstruction from the linguists and grammarians appointed to the institutions that were supposed to transform the language.
sical diversification of Islamic cultures and literary languages did not, however, register much on the Arab-centric classicist Az-Zayyāt. Yet he sometimes hoped that the modern descendants of those Iranians might be involved in the contemporary moves for “Arab” unity that he publicized in terms of his own literature-determined assumptions.

Az-Zayyāt’s blurring of Arabs into Persian or other Muslims whose daily speech was not Arabic for his own (as well as Islam’s classical) age would be patronized as confused or atavistic by post-1952 Egyptian pan-Arabs, more secular. However, Arab states in West Asia and Muslim Iran and Turkey had been forming regional groupings that aroused interest among Liberal Constitutionalists governing Egypt: for instance, the Sa’dabad Non-Aggression Pact, signed on 4 July 1937 by Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan and Iraq, was designed to create a regional bloc to withstand Great Power interference whether from the growing Mediterranean ambitions of fascist Italy or from the traditional Middle Eastern rivalry of Britain and Russia. Three years later, in 1940, Az-Zayyāt hailed discussion among “some Arab circles” for an undoubtedly pro-Allied “Arab Alliance” (Hilf ʿArabi), immediately because such a grouping of states would strengthen the individually weak Afro-Asian member-countries against expansionist fascisms. According to the “Al-Ahrām” report as cited by Az-Zayyāt, (it seems at that stage non-Egyptian, Asian) “Arab circles” visualized that the Alliance would embrace Egypt, Syria, Palestine, Iraq and Al-Hijaz: later, however, “it might expand to cover Iran and Afghanistan”. Taking up the proposal of confederation, Az-Zayyāt tightened it into a loose state-federation somewhat wider than the Arab entity: to ward off the perils facing small states in a world of war and violence “let there be between neighboring lands such as the fourteen peoples of Islam something parallel to the united foreign policy, the common defence and the law-giving constitution shared by the forty eight United States”.

Az-Zayyāt’s community responses in the 1940 article to moves for an “Arab Alliance” were not thought through or consistent: he alternated but in other places also blended divergent Arab and wider Muslim unificatory dri-

8 George Kirk, The Middle East in the War (London: OUP 1952) pp. 489-490. One-and-a-half years after it was formed, Liberal Prime Minister Muhammad Mahmūd in 1939, war menacing, proposed to cabinet that Egypt join the Sa’dabad Pact: Baykal in his memoirs claimed to suspect that Britain was promoting that Pact, as it later supposedly promoted the formation of the Arab League, in order to hold control of the region. Muhammad Husayn Haykal, Murakkabat fī ās-siyāsa al-Miṣriyya, 2 vols. (Cairo 1951-1953), vol. 2, p. 147. For British obstruction of pan-Arabism, and the development of the Arab League. See fn. 42.

ves. On one hand, he voiced a sharp awareness of (Muslim) Arabs as a highly specific entity in the sphere of the world community of Muslims. Giving a particular impression of coherence and solidarity was his term “the Arab body” (al-ğism al-‘arabÈ) but Az-Zayyät elsewhere used the less organic-sounding “Arab world” and “the Arab nations” to describe the populations to be unified. Less directly religious factors for political community are indicated in the items: blood, lineage, the geographical continuity of neighboring (mutağawira) states and implicitly but with centrality shared (Arabic) language10. There was the potential for a delimited national Arab political community here. On the other hand, Az-Zayyät clearly hoped that the regional drawing-together of states sharing common human characteristics of Arab speech and “the link of blood” might also lead to a wider religious.Islamic political bloc or confederation. His choice for the article of the title “The Nation of Monotheism is Uniting” underscored his teleological sense of the Divine unfolding in history, particularly Arab history, that made it so hard for him to narrowly or rigorously define “the Arab world” (al-‘âlam al-‘arabi) whose unification the discussions were supposed to initiate. (The term monotheism or tawhÈd had moreover been consistently applied by Arab Muslim theologians to distinguish the belief of Muslims in one God from Christian trinitarianism: Az-Zayyät did not often even phrase his pan-Arabism to make unification palatable to Coptic and other Arab Christians). Fascist propaganda broadcasts in Arabic, he observed, held out an alliance between the Axis and “Islam” – the Arab nationalist movements opposing the dominance, colonial and overt or disguised, of Britain and Free France. In response, he denounced the Axis as an expansionist “union organized by Satan of Nazism, Fascism and paganism/idolatry (al-wa@aniyya)”: the forthcoming Arab-Muslim confederation had to stand with the Allies. In 1940, to the Satanic confederacy of pro-Fascist states and forces that have “disbelieved in God’s laws” and plunged the world into war, he opposed a pan-Arab “Union designed by Allah out of the link of blood and the lineage of the spirit”11.

Az-Zayyät’s thought on questions relating to ethnicities and nationhood, then, unfolded over the years within his persistently Islamic perception of current history. He was aware of secular Arab attributes such as “blood” but shared religion reinforced them within the Arab entity and could attach to it contiguous Muslim populations of mainly non-Arabic daily speech, as he saw things in the early 1940s. The thousand-years-old memories from the classical high literature fogged increased self-differentiation of Persians
from Arabs under Riza Shah. In the 1940s, Az-Zayyât felt Muslim Iran belonged in an Arab confederation; however, he gradually differentiated Persian, Turkish and Arab nationalities much more. He came to separate pan-Arab and multi-national pan-Muslim communities as different planes of political community. Nonetheless, he still proposed a wider Islamic as distinct from a narrowly Arab grouping or association of states more than once over the years. In 1947, after the League of Arab States had been formed with headquarters in Egypt, Az-Zayyât dropped the impulse for a widening-out of the Arab grouping into an alliance of – contiguous – Islamic states: instead, he proposed a simultaneous Islamic League to supplement the Arab League. Multi-national pan-Islam still pulled at his emotions but had become loose, territorially unbounded and global, distinct from the regional integration now narrowed to the contiguous areas of daily Arabic speech only. Az-Zayyât in 1947 exulted at what he rather precipitately interpreted as more distant manifestations of Islam’s “resurrection” (inbi’at): the independence movement of Indonesia and the establishment of the Islamic State of Pakistan, two examples China’s Muslims would in their turn soon follow to establish “the second-most Islamic State in strength and number”. Although Az-Zayyât sometimes showed awareness of historical, regional, cultural or racial bonds between Muslim peoples, the religious perspective is here, as elsewhere, consistent. The “pan-Islamism” of the new states is the consequence of the discredit into which “contradictory” man-made ideologies and laws had fallen: “humanity’s sense of loss for that Divine Order which can direct its steps”. With imperialist Europe (Az-Zayyât mentions Holland as well as England and France) enfeebled and discredited by the late World War, even laicist Turkey in the end “will turn (again) to the East and its politicians return to Islam: Turkey will furnish the bloc of Islamic States with spirit and aid”. On that day the believers will rejoice to see God’s word Supreme, His bond the firmest and His party victorious. Like Iran, Turkey was contiguous with some of the lands of daily Arabic speech, and from classical Islam

13 Al-Ǧâhiz offered favorable images of the intelligence and fighting spirit of Turks in order to win Turkish soldiers who had migrated into Iraq due respect as a more and more prominent component in the now ethnically diverse armed forces of the “Abbâṣid Caliphs Al-Muʾtasim and Al-Mutawakkil. Risâla ilâ al-Fath Ibn Ḫaqān fī manāqib at-Turk wa ṣummat ḡund al-ḥalfâ, available in the edition of G. Van Vloten, Al-Ǧâhiz: Tria Opuscula (Leiden 1903); a translation was offered by C.T. Harley Walker in JRAS 1915, pp. 631-697. Although this essay argued that various races had specialized functions, with military ones allocated to the Turks, Al-Ǧâhiz also suggested their capacity, given the right conditions, to intellectually and culturally equal the Arabs. “If in their part of the world there had been prophets and wise
onwards the Arabs had had multiple interactions and racial blending with Turks that proved more persistent than those with Persians. Turkey and Iran were in the Middle East region with the Arab heartlands yet here Az-Zayyât, in the post-World War II period, was slicing them off and categorizing them with far-away Muslim Indonesia and Muslim China on the other side of the globe.

Az-Zayyât’s comments about Muslims in China, whose numbers he grossly overestimated, had delusory features. However, he was not idiosyncratic in the Egyptian context. Mainstream Arabic newspapers and magazines in Egypt from the 1930s opened their columns to Turkic Muslim secessionists from Sinkiang; the Egyptian monarchy had transmitted major cul-

men [...] and they had had leisure to attend to them, they would have made you forget the learning of Al-Ba^ra and the wisdom of Greece and the crafts of China”. JRAS 1915 pp. 675-6; Tria Opuscula, pp. 37-8. Increased sexual interaction with Turkish women modified the ideals of beauty among classical Arabs. Von Grunebam, Medieval Islam, pp. 208-9. The Hiğâzi leadership group whom the British instigated to launch the 1916 Arab Revolt was linked in both language and race to the Ottoman Empire’s Turkish-speakers. The Sharif Husayn, whose second wife was Circassian, spent much of his life in Constantinople with his consequently bilingualized sons, and “in a burst of pleasure thanked [Ronald Storrs] once in Turkish and then hastily corrected himself”. Ronald Storrs, Orientations (London: Ivor Nicholson 1939), pp. 166, 191.

Often independent or autonomous, Turkic-Muslim Sinkiang was reinvaded by the Ching dynasty in 1876 which again declared it a province of China in 1884. In 1931 the Eastern Turkistanis mounted a successful rebellion against the feeble Chinese control. In 1933 an independent Islamic-Turkic state was founded, with its capital at Kâşgar. The Wafd’s particularist nationalism held that the territorial homeland welded all Egyptians, Muslim, Christian or Jewish, into one Egyptian nation. This might predispose some Wafdist to regard Muslims in China and India as components of predominantly non-Muslim Chinese and Indian nations. Nonetheless, on 2 July 1933 the Wafdist “Al-Balaţ” published a long article “The Patriotic Movement in Turkistan – How it Emerged and What are the Factors for its Success” (Al-ו%raka al-wataniyya fÈ TurkistÇn– Kayfa na‰a’at wa-nata’aiðuhu). The author was introduced as “the Turkistani, Chinese Literary Figure Mansur Jankiz Khan”. Three days later, in its issue of 5 June 1933 “Al-Balaţ” published another article by the same writer, “Chinese Sovereignty in Eastern Turkistan – the Causes of its End and its Consequences” (As-SiyÇda a^Èniyya fÈ TurkistÇn – Ashâbu zawâlihÇ wa-natat%C3%A1’iguhu). In its numbers of 1st June 1933 and 23 June 1933 p. 2 “Al-Balaţ” published pleas and arguments by Chingiz Khan to Egypt and other Arabs and Muslims to recognize and aid the new Turkic Muslim state in “East Turkistan” (Sinkiang). The Chinese Nationalists soon reconquered Sinkiang with aid from the USSR. In 1944 a new revolt achieved an independent state of Eastern Turkistan with the capital at Illi. In 1949 the Communist Chinese seized the area. (But cf. Zakî Mubârak’s Easternist interest in non-Muslim yet “spiritual” Sinic culture).
tural resources to China, stimulating the Sunnification or sectional Arabization of its Chinese-speaking Hui Muslims\textsuperscript{15}; Az-Zayyāt was wishful but had not himself dreamed up his over-estimate of the number of Muslims in China\textsuperscript{16}.

The fluid, territorially open-ended Muslim Arab political nation emerging and crystallizing in Az-Zayyāt's consciousness in the 1930s and 1940s is not to be dismissed as only a period curiosity. His blended Islamic-Arab community consciousness could help integrate into the Arab community Muslim linguistic minorities resident in the sprawling lands that were to become defined as the Arab Entity or the Great Arab Homeland. At that time, the 1930s and 1940s, Muslim Kurds could enter into mainstream Iraqi and Syrian society because Arab identity could be met by Islam and facility in Arabic as a second language acquired outside the home, without any

\textsuperscript{15} Pillsbury applies the term Sunnification to the process in which China's Muslims, after centuries of isolation and sinification, in the twentieth century re-established connection with the world mainstream of Islam. To this process of religious reform the post-World War I Egyptian particularist State contributed by providing printed materials under King Fu'ād; later, Fu'ād's son King Fārūq "donated a massive number of Islamic texts – and donated money for the purchase and translation of many more – to a Muslim library in Peking subsequently named "Fārūq Library". He also created the [...] Fārūq scholarship which paid for graduates of Muslim theological colleges in China to pursue advanced study at Al-Azhar Theological University in Cairo"; on return to China they became theologians, educators and diplomats. Barbara Pillsbury, Cohesion and Cleavage in a Chinese Muslim Minority (Ph.D thesis, Columbia University 1973) p. 26.

\textsuperscript{16} The Christian missionary Marshall Broomhall who worked in Hui (Chinese Muslim) areas had in 1911 estimated the Chinese Muslim population at seventy millions, a high estimate. “By 1937 the China Handbook, a government publication, was reporting the astonishing figure of forty-eight million Muslims, almost ten per cent of the estimated total population” and Barbara Pillsbury (1973) herself concludes that “most credible is a figure of between thirty and fifty million”. (Some estimates, however, were as low as ten million). It is relevant to Az-Zayyāt’s vision of emergence of a Chinese Muslim state ranking after Pakistan or Indonesia that “were it possible to verify the pre 1949 figure of forty eight million, then China would have had the world’s third largest Muslim population (after Indonesia and Pakistan), more Muslims than in any single country in the Islamic Middle East heartland”. Pillsbury, Cohesion and Cleavage p. 9. In 1981, Pillsbury speculated that the 1935-6 Chinese Year Book had drawn its “highly inflated” estimate of almost 50 million Muslims from high-up Chinese Muslims intent to demand “proportional “representation in the government” from the ruling Kuomintang. No census of the Chinese populations had been taken: the Chinese Communists in 1953 estimated 10 million Muslims in China. Barbara L. R. Pillsbury, The Muslim Populations of China: Clarifying the Questions of Size and Ethnicity, “Journal of Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs” (Jeddah) vol.3:2 (Winter 1981) pp. 35-8. H. Yusuf Chang estimated 20 million Chinese Muslims in 1950: ibid., p. 66.
requirement of Arab race. In the contemporary Arab world, Muslim Berbers and Sudanese who speak acquired Arabic can be accepted as full members in consciously Arab societies. In a different category, the Arab League’s extension of membership to Muslim Somalis for whom Arabic is a non-daily, acquired tongue could also fulfil incorporative, pan-Islamic open-endedness in Az-Zayyāt’s earlier, less resolved, pan-Arab identifications.

Universalist Pan-Muslim Community.

Az-Zayyāt felt a deep spiritual need to vitalize and tighten the relationship Egyptians and Arabs in general had with non-Arab Muslim populations around the globe. In practice, he failed to conceive paths to viable political or even cultural community with non-Arab Muslims. One reason was his limited Arab-centred classicist view of Islamic culture and history. Az-Zayyāt was an instance of Arab Muslims’ persistent ethnicizing “periodization” of Islam, a glaring feature of Ahmad Šāhān’s historical works. Muslim creativity is located in Islam’s earlier periods when Arabs and the Arabic language had dominance: precipitate, long-term, decline follows the Mongols’ destruction of the ‘Abbāsid State and murder of the last “Arab” Caliph Al-Musta’sim in 1258. Az-Zayyāt had the full Arab insensitivity to original intellectual and cultural creativity among Muslim Persians, Turks, Indians etc. in Islam’s post-classical period after leadership had been passed from Arab hands. In 1939 he mused that “Islam outside the land of the Arabs is a bizarre medley of the beliefs of the first Islamic generations and fake Sufism and inherited mythologies and wrong interpretations. Later this medley changed with [...] passing of time and the severing of the link and increasing non-Arabness of tongue (al-‘u’dma) to [a drug] lulling people to sleep [...] impeding them from effort [...] barring them from thought [...] dulling their awareness, of [...] the movement of the heavenly bodies. The Muslims in Albania, in Yugoslavia in the Lands of the West and in China and the East Indies (Indonesia) in the Lands of the East are distinguished from their compatriots by a doltish asceticism, a death-like ignorance and a fatalistic reliance on God that makes them a burden on people. They imagine that Islam is not concerned with this world.”

A bilingual grasp of Arabic among the educated was a precondition for a viable Islamic religious and intellectual life in non-Arab Muslim populations. Az-Zayyāt therefore proposed that Al-Azhar promote through educa-

tion the spread of Arabic as a shared second language throughout the far-flung lands professing Islam.  

The Arab-centric Az-Zayyāt, then, had scant interest or respect for original ideas about Islam among the non-Arab Muslim peoples to whom Egypt was to conduct outreach around the world. Contact with Egypt’s Islamic institutions was essential to them for their dead, nominal Islam to become the real thing. The Egyptian and other Arab Muslims, on the other hand, did not stand to gain any new information or insight about Islam from any non-Arab Muslim people, although they would fulfill an Islamic duty by enlightening them. The role of global teacher also activated in Az-Zayyāt the fundamentalist drive to simplify and eliminate rather than to blend and synthesize even for the corpus of Arab Islamic knowledge itself. He wanted Al-Azhar to condense Qur’ānic interpretations, hadiths and the prescriptions of Islamic law into a limited number of Arabic volumes that would eliminate all differences of opinion: these could then be diffused around the Muslim world to produce uniformity.

Islamic activity by Nāṣir’s Egypt, utilizing Al-Azhar, in Black Africa and the Malay world in the 1950s and 1960s, and then by Saudi Arabia in the 1970s and 1980s, fulfilled Az-Zayyāt’s 1939 teachers-destroyers paradigm of Arab outreach, to non-Arab Muslim populations.

Az-Zayyāt’s Islamic impulse to encounter and fuse with non-Arab Muslims in the Middle East and also beyond was heartfelt. Yet, the Arab-centrism inherent in the structure of his Islamic culture and thought limited his capacity to perceive the others and thus to develop reciprocal interactions and exchanges with them. Thus, Islam did not always obstruct the ethnicization of Az-Zayyāt’s attitudes that finally led him to rigorous Arab nationalism.

The Disengagement of Turks and Arabs

Az-Zayyāt’s Arab-centric culturist Islam proved most unable to sustain relationship with non-Arab Muslims in regard to Turks. Turks and Arabs had had multiple intimate interactions and relationships since the ‘Abbāsid period, in which Az-Zayyāt was steeped. As an – unconsciously ethnocentric – pan-Islamist, he protested in 1935 Atatürk’s severing of the cultural community of Turks with Arabs. Such passages, however, ironically underline Az-Zayyāt’s assumption that non-Arab Muslim peoples derived all that was pos-

18 Ibid pp. 31-2.
19 Ibid., p. 31.
itive in their culture from the Arabs. As was also the case with Muḥammad ‘Abduh in his turn-of-century polemic with Faraḥ Anṭūn, there was not much awareness of, or interest in, original additions to a general Islamic civilization by the Turks, that empathy for distinctness as well as affinity in the other essential for true relationship. Like the “Shaykh of Arabism” Ahmad Zaki Paşâ in the 1920s, in demanding in 1936 that Turkish words be purged from Arabic to be replaced by pure Arabic neologisms. Az-Zayyāt was severing a linguistic community between the Arabs and Turks like Turkey’s Westernizing Kemalists.

The linguistic dynamic within Az-Zayyāt’s culturist Arabism was bound to make Egyptians or Arabs more different from Turks. However, by itself it could not have snapped his incurious pan-Islamic emotion of almost undi-

20 Az-Zayyāt, Ila ayna yusq al-Atrāk? (To Where are the Turks Being Driven?), penned for “Ar-Risāla” on 11 March 1935; “Wahy” vol. 1, pp. 199-202, “What would remain of the Turks and the language of the Turks and the culture of the Turks if you obliterated the influence of Arabism and its religion?”, Ibid., p. 202. However, “Ar-Risāla” (1 June 1933 p. 23) published Arabic versions of poems by the Ottoman Turkish writer Isma‘īl Saḥa (1867-1901), translated by the pan-Arab ‘Abd al-Waḥḥāb ‘Aẓzām, and on 15 June 1933 the latter’s versions of poems by the early Turkish pan-Islamist Namiq Kemal (1840-1888). Kemal had been like Az-Zayyāt and the “Ar-Risāla” intellectuals in the 1930s and 1940s in his attempts to transplant Western aesthetic sensibility wholesale into Turkish – he translated Hugo, Rousseau and Montesquieu – while maintaining the pan-Islamic community rather than contracting to a Turkish people or homeland. In 1903, the Kamilist “Al-Liwā’” had offered Egyptians an Arabic version of Namiq Kemal’s lament for the Christian destruction of “Arab civilization” in Spain, which viewed the Muslim world of that age – Granada, Safawid Iran, Turania – as one whole on the world stage. Al-‘Asr al-‘āṣir al-hiḡri (The Tenth Hiḡri Era), “Al-Liwā’” 20 September 1903 pp. 1, 2. Ismā‘īl Saḥa (1867-1901), a poet, fiction writer and translator, contributed to the “Servet-i-Funun” under Abdūlhamīd, a journal that propagated the French symbolist and parnassian sensibility. During the 1897-1898 war between Turkey and Greece, Saḥa penned Islamic-patriotic poetry. Like Namiq Kemal, he knew Arabic and Persian as well as French and put Western culture and thought into the Arabized Turkish favored by “Servet-i-Funun”. Art. “Ismā‘īl Saḥa”, Türk Ansiklopedisi, vol.20, pp. 311-313; Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, (London: OUP 1961), pp. 188-9.

21 Iṣṭiqlāl al-luḡa (“Linguistic Independence”), 3 December 1936; “Wahy” vol.1, pp. 333-9. Az-Zayyāt cited instances of Turkish words that he wanted purged from Arabic: bāš kāṭib (chief clerk); nawbāḡi (officer on duty; comander of the guard), bostaḡi (postman), tābūr (column), yuzbāḡi (Captain), saḡ (army rank between captain and major), and amirālay (commander of a regiment: approximtely colonel). It is to be noted that Az-Zayyāt was impressed by the success of the Atatürkists in Turkey in ending use of foreign languages in commercial companies (ibid p. 338). He also saw the new secular Turkey as a model for Egypt in the extensive translation of Western literary masterpieces into the national language. See Şāḥib al-Ma‘ālī Wazīr al-Ma‘ārif, 18 December 1939, “Wahy” vol.2, p. 125.
vided cultural and religious community with Turkey. Other elements as well were needed to lead Az-Zayyāt from the pan-Islamic solidarity with the Ottomans traditional in Egypt to the contention of the Arab nationalists in West Asia that the Turks were a separate nation who became enemies of the Arabs, justifying the armed rebellion against them proclaimed by the šarīf of Makka Ḥusayn Ibn ʿAlī in June 1916. One was the parochial dislike against the local absentee Turco-Circassian landowning aristocracy long felt by many rural Arab Egyptians. The second, decisive, stimulant was the anti-Turkish world-view of Iraq’s authors and ruling pan-Arabs, into which Az-Zayyāt was socialized while in Iraq from 1929 to 1932.

In the early nineteenth century Egypt was under a Turkish-speaking oligarchy: the ruling dynasty was composed wholly of Turkish-speakers as were all officials above the rank of šayb al-balad (village headman) and all army officers of higher rank. Extensive official land grants made the “Turkish” element the most important land-owners in nineteenth-century Egypt. But with the British conquest, “the Turks” lost political power, their former predominance in the administration and army, and gradually their position as the largest landowners22. Rising rural Arab-Egyptian families that had been accumulating both Azharite and West-patterned educations, and land, over generations now in landed property came to equal or elbow aside – or intermarried with – them. Yet this thrusting, ambitious new Arab-Egyptian landowning elite continued, under the British to anachronistically talk as though they were Egypt’s wretched of the earth subjected to the kurbag and tax extortion at the hands of the Turco-Circassian “foreigners” they were replacing or incorporating. Such blended ethnic-class antipathy to Turco-Circassians was pervasive in the childhood of Haykal whose wealthy landowner father was an innovator of the latest agricultural techniques. Parents and grandparents impressed upon Arab-Egyptian children of Haykal’s rural class at the turn of the century that the era of the autonomous ‘Alid Khedives up to the British conquest was “the black past” of “the rule of the Turks”. For “our generation” though, Haykal reminisced, these “Turks” and their whips were “only an image traced in talk” since “nothing remained in reality” of that past23. However, the old ill-feeling between the Turkish-

speaking and Arab-Muslim ethnic groups in Egypt fueled the pre-1914 particularistic opposition in Haykal’s Al-Ġarīda/Umma Party setting to pan-Islamic community with the Ottoman Empire.

Az-Zayyāt had hung around that Al-Ġarīda/Umma Party milieu in youth and held anachronistic antagonism to Egypt’s vanishing Turco-Circassians at white heat decades after Egypt’s 1922 independence. In his mid-1939 article Images from the Past, he recalled that in the previous century the peasants were constantly beaten and robbed by predatory “Albanians and Circassians whose task was to collect taxes on everything at any time and by any means”, smashing into houses to search for forbidden or monopolized commodities like salt or soap acquired through other than the government24. They terrorized, beat and robbed the peasantry. After the reorganization of the government administration following ‘Urūb’s revolution (that is to say, by the British!) the role of “this species” became confined to the farms of the umarā’ (princes of the ‘Alid house) and “the country estates (chiftliks) of the Turco-Circassian lords”. Az-Zayyāt transmitted into his pastiche of ‘Abbāsid Arabic the folk-narrative from childhood of a handsome young Egyptian peasant beaten to death in the late nineteenth century with the kurbag before the eyes of “delighted Aghas” (here: Turco-Circassian officials, police or military), because he had been caught trying to steal a bunch of grapes for his village sweetheart from the garden of a Turkish muftattīs (estate overseer)26.

Az-Zayyāt in 1939 had real empathy for Arab-Egyptian peasants: he caught not just heroic suffering but how upsetting it was for them in their local world that Turkish-speaking intruders casually shot village ducks and

25 The religious reformer šayḥ Muhammad ‘Abduh had a similar ethnicity tinged vision of the price paid by the Egyptian common people in the countryside for the modernizing changes imposed by the despotic Turco-Circassian elite around Muhammad ‘Alī and later members of his dynasty: Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age (London: OUP 1962), p.130.
26 Min ǧuwar al-μāḏī (“Some Images from the Past”), 19 June 1939; ,“Waḥy” vol. 2, pp. 61-4. Although born in 1889, Az-Zayyāt does not claim that he personally witnessed acts of oppression by Circasian or Albanian aliens: the oppression entered his consciousness as vivid heresay through the talk of adults that he overheard while a small child (wa-anā šabīyyun dūna al-yafā‘a): ibid., p. 63. Nonetheless, his village and seven neighboring still had the status of lands granted in perpetuity to the family of ‘Ali Šarīf at the close of the nineteenth century. Ibid p. 61. It is to be noted, though, that the Turco-Circassian monarch Fu’ād had an Arabo-Egyptian guard flogged for picking dates from his palace garden: he built up vast estates on which he exploited the workers. Hugh McLeave, The Last Pharaoh: The Ten Faces of Farouk (London: Michael Joseph 1969 p. 49.
crows. He had recast fading collective memories from dead or dying generations of illiterate peasants into an antique neo-classical Arabic that thenceforth would perpetuate antipathy to Turco-Circassians among new generations of Egypt’s culturist elite. Such discourse in the 1930s and 1940s involved not just deprived rural strata he encountered long before in childhood or bygone Turco-Circassian strata that were melting away into the Arab Egyptians but also current elite groups. A Turco-Circassian ethnic core remained in the Egyptian establishment: the royal family of Muhammad ‘Ali whose estates in Egypt were the most notable exception to decline of land ownership by “Turks”. All members of this family spoke Turkish even in the 1940s; Fārūq was the first ruler of the ‘Alid dynasty at whose court Arabic was spoken.

In underscoring the Albanian provenance of many oppressive nineteenth-century officials, Az-Zayyāt was getting close to the Turcophone royal family whose founder, Muhammad ‘Ali, had come from there. In one 1939 attack upon Turco-Circassian elements of his own time, Az-Zayyāt characterized the group’s differences with the general Egyptian population in quasi-national (as well as social-economic) terms that included the issues of language and relationship with Turkey. Titled Peasants/Tillers and Princes! (Fāllāḥūna wa-umarā’), the article was immediately a response to the declared reluctance of the Riding Club’s Turco-Circassian President, “the noble” ‘Amr Ibrāhīm to admit autochthonous, Arabic-speaking Egyptians of standing and economic substance to membership on the grounds that they were fallāḥūn. ‘Amr Ibrāhīm, Az-Zayyāt retorted, was wrong to characterize Egyptian society as fixed in the mould of a system of static classes: “and you tell me what is the difference between your elevated class and our lowly class when the constitution to which both classes submit may make the son of a servant who cleans your shoes for you he with whom you will sit and your superior/Prime Minister?”

Disparate ethnicities defined by language sharpened but also fogged the class identifications of the two parties: Az-Zayyāt understood ‘Amr Ibrāhīm to have alluded to “Semitism and Turanism” in his haughty justificatory letter to “Al-Ahrām”. Goaded, Az-Zayyāt, too, spelled out quasi-national dimensions that a spectrum of Arabic-speaking Egyptian groups perceived to their conflict with privileged groups that happened to be Turkish-speaking. The class of “princes” believe that God created it for “ownership [...] wealth, for government and us [...] to serve and worship” although in verity “what distinguished your class from ours was that you used to hold the kurbāğ (whip), while we held the hoe, that you would eat gold while we ate...

28 Baer in Holt, Political and Social Change, p. 149.
dust [...] that you spoke Turkish while we spoke Arabic”. However, the class nature of other Arab-Egyptian figures firing from his side at the Turco-Circassians has bearing on Az-Zayyät’s egalitarian rhetoric that nominated the sons of shoe-boys to the Prime Ministership. Egypt’s Prime Minister at that time, the Liberal Constituionalist Muḥammad Maḥmūd PāSHA, denounced ‘Amr ʿIbrāhīm’s attempt to “restore the system of classes, comfortably remarking that “we here are in a democratic land”. and proudly affirming that “I am a peasant/farmer (fallāh) and the son of a peasant/farmer (fallāh)”29. Although he too had formed to some extent in the Al-Umma-Constitutionalists’ milieu, Az-Zayyät was certainly to the left of Maḥmūd, whom he well knew was no populist: his articles denouncing landlord-MPs’ use of the parliamentary system to further control and exploit the peasants in their constituencies30 clashed with Maḥmūd’s image of “democracy”. Az-

29 Fallāhūna wa-umārā’ (Peasants and Princes), 5 June 1939, “Wahy” vol.2, pp. 53-56. Prime Minister Muḥammad Maḥmūd PāSHA, who denounced ‘Amr ʿIbrāhīm’s attempt to “restore the system of classes”, had begun his political career as a leading figure in the Ḥizb al-Umma, formed in 1907, which had expressed the interests of native non-Turkish-speaking Egyptian land owners hostile to Egypt’s “Ottoman” connexions with Turkey. His comfortable remark that “we are in a democratic land” and his proud identification as a fallāh (ibid p. 54) indicate that the division, between not simply upwardly mobile but sometimes long-established and privileged Arabo-Egyptian elements and the Turco-Circassian element could be socio-economically less radical than rhetoric suggested. Az-Zayyät, however, did not expect himself to join an exclusive club determined by any criterion of “aristocracy”, be it “blood or wealth or position” (ibid p. 53). On Maḥmūd PāSHA’s death in 1949, Az-Zayyät praised him in terms of his successful blending of the best features of modern Western life with Islam in his personal and family life. However, Az-Zayyät’s language did not depict Muḥammad Maḥmūd as a man of the people: he “combined aristocracy of lineage, wealth, education and position” and maintained a courteous distance from the public. Muḥammad Maḥmūd PāSHA 9 February 1949; “Wahy” vol.2, pp. 156-9. A British observer well indicated the socio-economically inclusive nature of the egalitarian-sounding Egyptian term fallāh (“peasant” or farmer). “The fellah is a man, irrespective of class, who cultivates the land. A fellah may be a farmer or only a farm laborer. He may own but a portion of an acre or many acres or he may own but the labor he gives in return for the means of eking out an existence”. M. Travers Symons, Britain and Egypt: the Rise of Egyptian Nationalism (London: Cecil Palmer 1925) p. 64. For King Fārūq’s respect for M. Maḥmūd’s advice and rebukes, McLeave, Last Pharaoh, p. 98.

30 Yāzharu anna yawm al-intilāḥ qarīb (“It Looks as though Election Day is Near”) written for “Ar-Risālah” 14 February 1949; “Wahy” vol.3, pp. 291-2; cf. Al-Qarya amsi wa-āl-yawm (“The Village Yesterday and Today”) penned for “Ar-Risālah” 15 October 1933; “Wahy” vol. 1, pp. 57-60 “Egypt’s great cities live in the twentieth century, adopting [drawing on] its civilization, its light and its comfortable living, as though the relation between the Village and the City is that which existed between master and slave: the slave owns things but only for his lord’s benefit, produces – but what he produces passes to another”, ibid., p. 59.
Zayyāṭ’s most radical social critiques denounced Egypt’s landowner classes without ethnic differentiation. But when ethnicity concentrated his social anger against Egyptians of non-Arabic-speaking origin, it deluded him that great hereditary Arab-Egyptian landowners like Maḥmūd were the kinsmen and champions of Arab-Egyptian shoe-blacks and agricultural laborers.

Az-Zayyāṭ also fitted the Turco-Circassians, though Muslim, into the complex of factors that threatened the establishment of high literary Arabic as the medium of modern life in Egypt. In a 1950 address to a pan-Arab cultural conference, Az-Zayyāṭ presented the standard Qurʾān-preserved Arabic as having maintained the pan-Arab community down the ages but warned that the widening scope for colloquial dialects now threatened it. He then bracketed a group of clearly Turco-Circassian “great ones” (al-kubārā’) who had learned their indifferent colloquial Arabic “in their palaces” from governesses, with Christian Arab educationalists presiding over equally indifferent teaching of the literary Arabic language in foreign schools in Egypt. An Egyptian woman teacher told Az-Zayyāṭ that she had been asked by the ‘Alid Prince ‘Abbās Ḥalim to arrange education of his two sons. When she observed that they spoke Arabic with a Turkish accent and were ignorant of its elementary grammar he smilingly replied: “No, I want neither the talk of Al-Azhar nor the talk of the sons of the land”31. Popular and high literary Arab linguistic consciousness blended in Az-Zayyāṭ’s

31 Ḥādīr al-adab al-‘arabī ("The Present of Arabic Literature"), 26 August 1950: “Wahy” vol.3, p. 210. Despite Az-Zayyāṭ, ‘Abbās Ḥalim was no conventional scion of Turco-Circassian Alid royalty. He ran a paramilitary Labor Party with some following among workers: ‘Afāf Lufī as-Sayyid-Marsot assessed him as “interested in trade unions”, he was the “black sheep” of the Royal Family, not its agent, and had merged his General Union of Trade Unions with the Wafdist one in 1931 to oppose, not help, the pro-Palace Șidqî government, mustering pressure on it to regulate child labor from the IFTU. As-Sayyid-Marsot, Egypt’s Liberal Experiment, 1922-1936 (Berkeley: University of California Press 1977) pp. 119-120. But cf. the Marxoid claim of Louis Awad that the Party was Nazi-like and a device to sabotage the “liberal-democratic labor movement” in concert with the Crown: Vatikiotis, Egypt Since The Revolution, p. 49. Some Turco-Circassians in or from Egypt demonstrated identification with classical Arabic that became self-sustaining and independent even of regular residence in Egypt or a related Arab environment. Mehmed Saʿīd Ḥalim Pāšā, a grandson of Muḥammad ‘Alī resident in Turkey, was described by Niyazi Berkes as “an ardent Islamist who wrote only in Arabic” and from June 1913 served as Grand Vizir of the Ottoman Empire in conjunction with the Committee of Union and Progress who were “accused of pursuing the policy of Turkification”. Saʿīd seems to have been entrusted by the CUP with conciliation of the Arab provinces and especially Ḥusayn in Al-Ḥiḡāz: his prolonged Grand Vizirate terminated only when the šārīf Ḥusayn proclaimed the Arab revolt against Turkey. See Feroz Ahmed, The Young Turks: The Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish Politics. 1908-1914 (London, OUP 1969), pp. 137-140.
rejection of Turco-Egyptians as ‘Abd an-Nāṣir’s 1952 bourgeois-Arabist revolution drew close.

Az-Zayyāt sustained year-round ethnic hatred against the whole Turco-Circassian group far above the occasionally-activateci embers of the past in the sub-consciousness of politician-intellectuals in the Liberals-As-Siyāsa milieu nearby (Haykal, Mahmūd etc.) who had taken the monarchy as their ally against the Wāfd and had socially and sometimes sexually (e.g. Haykal) fused with the diluted minority.32 Az-Zayyāt snipped through any notion that there was a shared Islam that could ever have linked Arab Egyptians and Turco-Circassians in a humane community. The umarā’, the princes of the royal ‘Alid house whom the Prince Regent Ṭuat Muhammad ‘Alī headed as amīr al-umarā’, the Chief of the Princes, ignore religion’s social obligations because spending a portion of their wealth on the relief of the sufferings of the worker or peasant would be at the expense of Satanic activities – among which Az-Zayyāt enumerated not merely lewd feasts but money “spent without any reckoning upon Turkey the Disobedient/Transgressor”33.

32 For Az-Zayyāt, when the context was contemporary society and politics, the disliked Turco-Circassian out-group was only those who still spoke Turkish – ‘Alid Royalty and a few absentee landlords – rather than all of Turco-Circassian descent. For instance, Az-Zayyāt did not communalize his criticisms of, or responses to, the pro-palace Ṣalāma Muṣa, whom the Ṣidqī government squeezed out the Academy for the promotion of scientific culture. Musa, Education, p. 89. Cf. ibid., pp. 30, 43. For Haykal’s marriage to an aristocratic Turco-Circassian woman after World War I, see Smith, Islam and the Search, p. 52.

33 Yā aqīnīyā’ānā: Qālū aslanmā wa la qaqlū amannā (”O Our Rich People: Say that we have Announced our Islam but Do not say ‘We Have Believed’”), written for “Ar-Risāla” on 3 November 1947; “Waḥy” vol.3, pp. 242-3. At Kfur Naga, where Prince Muhammad ‘Alī owned 7,000 feddans, sabotage and arson provoked harsh repression. Jaques Berque, Egypt: Imperialism and Revolution (translated by Jean Stewart) (London: Faber & Faber 1972) p. 662. Az-Zayyāt in 1947 was responding to pietism from the Prince, who in 1945 denounced plans by “a small minority [of Westernizers] in the towns” calling for replacement of existing Islamic laws permitting divorce and polygamy. Apart from being God-revealed and therefore eternally valid, Islam’s laws should be preserved intact to maintain Egypt’s international position as “the leader of Islam”: Al-Amīr Muhammad ‘Alī yatahaddatū an-al-ḥalāl al-ḥukumī wa-taqqīd at-tālāq (“The Prince Muhammad ‘Alī Talks About Governmental Inefficiency and Restriction of [Islamic] Divorce”), “Al-Muqattam” 14 July 1945, p. 3. Such Islamism might have been an instrument of the Prince Regent, a Mason, to counter populist disruption by the Wāfd. Smith, Islam and the Search, p. 146. Prince Muhammad ‘Alī had been a sort of pioneer of pan-Arab unity during a 1910 tour of Syria (“Al-Garīda” 7 April p. 7 and 16 April p. 5); and from “As-Siyāsa al-Uṣbī’iyya” under the monarchy (Berque, op. cit., p. 512). However, the Prince was accommodating towards the Zionists: in 1937-1938 he lobbied both the British and the Zionists to break the Palestine impass by a Jewish Zone/quasi-state that would be a unit in a pan-Arab federation. Porath, In Search of Arab Unity, pp. 70-1.
In the early March 1935 indictment of Kemalism, Az-Zayyāt had assailed the severance of the cultural community of Turks and Arabs. Now in 1947, however, he denounced privileged Turkish-speakers resident for generations in Egypt for maintaining touristic, social and other relations with the populations of Turkey that he could have approved as links between two Muslim peoples.34

Iraq: Catalyst of Disengagement from the Turks

Az-Zayyāt’s residence in Iraq from 1929 to 1932 decisively crystallized his unitary Arab nationalism in cultural and political distinction from the wider community of Islam. It was impossible for any Egyptian professional to live in Iraq and avoid the issue of pan-Arab linguistic nationalism because it alone legitimized the leadership that the country’s still-newish only in part Iraq-born pan-Arab elite had exercised since 1921. Urged by the Arab nationalists who had built up strong anti-Turkish movements of a modern type in Constantinople and Syria (more than Iraq), the Hāshīmīt ĥāřīf of Mecca Ḥusayn Ibn ‘Alī revolted in June 1916, proclaiming himself “King of the Arab countries”. His son Fāṣāl was briefly King of an independent, Arab-nationalist Syria from September 1918 until occupation by France in mid-1920. Britain sponsored Fāṣāl as the first monarch in a quasi-independent Kingdom of Iraq; he deftly wooed Shi’ite Iraqi populations, to whom he was non-Shi’ite and a non-local, in the lead-up to his 1921 coronation.35 Once Britain had irreversibly committed her prestige to him, Fāṣāl nimbly linked up with the anti-British Iraqi “extremists” to slash his imperial benefactors control and an independent spirit now praised by Ba’āṣīt historiography, that long excoriated the Hāshīmites as stooges.36 The Iraq that Az-Zayyāt

34 Note Salāma Mūsā’s distaste, bordering on paranoia, for Turco-Circassian summer-travel to Istanbul in the pre-1918 period and the residual if much-weakened, “network of intrigues” that still linked Cairo to the Turkish capital in the 1930s and 1940s., Mūsā, Education, p. 43.
37 Dr Muhammad Muzaffar al-A’zamī, writing in early 1989 in the “Iraqi armed forces” newspaper, somewhat over-stressed Faysal’s resistance in 1922 to any imposition of a Mandate and connected Treaty by Britain, in this seeing him as closer to the semi-insurgent “extremists”, whom the British needed his aid to control. The Arabic article carried photostats of the English telegrams and correspondence between Secretary of State for the Colonies Churchill and a worn-down Sir Percy Cox, High Commissioner for Iraq. These sources showed Faysal was deeply suspi-
experienced was subordinate to British “advisers”, and Prime Minister Nūri as-Sa‘īd one of the Iraqi Ottoman officers who defected to ʿUṣayn in 1916—negotiated a 20-year treaty with Great Britain before Iraq’s formal independence in 1932. The very mixed pan-Arab elite ruling Iraq, then, had come to political power by way of armed nationalist insurrection against the Turks who dominated the Muslim Ottoman Empire. The classicist high Arab culture and some Arab-centric features of the Islam that Az-Zayyāt brought with him predisposed him to accept that Arabist rejection of political community with fellow Muslims. In addition, he projected his hostile perceptions of Turkish-tinted classes within Egypt’s Internal society out upon the separate and rather different Turkish-speaking populations and administrative classes in Turkey and Arabic-speaking Asia. During sympathetic exchanges with elite anti-Turkish Iraqis about the causes of the Arab Independence movement, “we started citing instances” of Turkish ineptitude for culture or politics or administration “from the things that happened in Iraq and Egypt”\(^{38}\).

Parallels of language show how the (by then for many Egyptians time-attenuated) historical antagonism between Turkish-speakers and the Arab majority in Egypt predisposed Az-Zayyāt to accept the West Asian Arabist anti-Turkism to be encountered in Iraq. The small, parochial old folk anti-Turkism of Arab Egyptians was thereby attached to a new macro-historical national-ideological frame lacking in strictly Egyptian consciousness. In his bitter 1939 piece on mistreatment of the Egyptian peasantry by racially alien Muslims, Az-Zayyāt had referred to the “ irredeemable ignorance” and stupidity allegedly characterizing the rural Albanian ma‘mūr (estate overseer): the aliens as tax collectors before the advent of ʿUrābī Pāšā had used “terrorization and violence”; the peasantry lived “the life of slaves”; the ma‘mūr ruled through the whip and kurbağ\(^{39}\). Similarly, he and his Iraqi/West Asian Arab friends perceived the Ottoman Turks as representing “terrorization” among the Earth’s nations by reason of the Empire’s liberal use of “poison,
the sea, prison, the sword and the whip”\textsuperscript{40}. Like Turkish-speakers in Egypt, Old Turkey’s governors over Arab provinces in West Asia used to “spread terror, reaping wealth and people’s souls through taxes and bribes and confiscation and murder”; the exceptional Turkish governor who lasted in power long enough to address himself, beyond the walls of his office, to needs of “religion, education or reform” would prove himself of dull understanding\textsuperscript{41}.

Az-Zayyāt through socialization internalized the anti-Turkish dichotomies of the pan-Arab ideologues ruling Iraq. While resident there, he used to attend the gathering of ministers, political leaders, and writers held by the then Governor of Baghdad, As-Sayyid Ṣubbī Ḍaftarīn his house every Friday. Az-Zayyāt in fact hung his observations about incompetence and ignorance of Turkish governors upon an obviously fictionalized story about such a Turkish administrator in Baghdad recounted at one of those gatherings by the Iraqi poet Ǧamīl az-Zahāwī.

Az-Zayyāt by and large accepted the Iraqi pan-Arab ideological view of past Arab-Turkish relationships: this stressed the “ignorance, degradation and poverty” that connection with Turkey inflicted on “the Arab nation” (al-umma al-‘arabīyya). His acceptance of this anti-Turkish Arabist viewpoint revalued Turkey’s claim to the Caliphate and leadership of an integrated Muslim universal State supposed to unite a variety of Islamic peoples in equal partnership: “Bygone Turkey [...] gathered in its powerful hands the margins of the Orient and the west, then wound about its terrible crown a halo of the Caliphate of the Prophet so that [...] hearts reverently submitted to its authority. But (Turkey) could not consolidate her kingdom by a strength of spirit and masterly intellect and genius for expression as the Arabs did. Thus she continued to stand before her rebellious peoples (šuʿūbihā ʿat-tāʿira) [...] arrogantly with drawn sword.”\textsuperscript{42}

In a 1947 article advocating a grouping of pan-Islamic states to include Turkey, Az-Zayyāt was again aware of the Turkish use of religion for political manipulation: for example, the use of official pan-Islamism by

\textsuperscript{40} Az-Zayyāt, Min fukāḥāt ..., p. 73.
\textsuperscript{41} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{42} Ibid. Az-Zayyāt’s argument that the Turks lacked, in contrast to the classical Arabs, the genius to enduringly reconcile to their leadership the peoples they conquered had affinities to a 1900 argument of the salafi Syrian-Egyptian Raṣīd Rīḍā, disciple of Muḥammad ‘Abduh. Rīḍā argued that the Arabs contributed more to Islam though their conquests than the Turks because they effectively propagated Islam in the lands they conquered, whereas most of the lands conquered by the Turks remained “a burden on Islam and the Muslims and are still a warning of clear catastrophe”. Sylvia G. Haim, Arab Nationalism. An Anthology (Berkely and Los Angeles: University of California Press 1962), pp. 22-23.
Abdülhamid as a bogey to deter the “vulpine” Western powers from attacking the now “senile” Ottoman State. However, in 1947 Az-Zayyāt now swung back to acceptance of the Ottoman State as at its initial foundation a serious attempt to restore the classical Arab universal Caliphal State shattered by the murder of the Caliph Al-Mutawakkil (December 861): “the Turks when they occupied the throne of the Caliphate were able to reconnect the thread but were not able to thread the beads back onto it”. The ready agreement of Az-Zayyāt and his Arabist Iraqi hosts that “war and its burdens wholly absorbed the gifts of the Turks, leaving them an insufficiency for politics and culture”, was a critical development of the military narrowness implied in his praise elsewhere of their early maintenance of Muslim sovereignty. In demonstrating a military prowess that could roll back hostile Christian Europe the Turks might have been conceived by him to have been Arab-like, but they had lacked the statesmanship to build a workable, unity-fostering, partnership between the leading element and other conquered peoples that could win enduring assent by the latter to the state. The basis for relationship therefore degenerated into simple force, in contrast to the success of the flexible, persuasive classical Arabs in reconciling the peoples they conquered to their state and then assimilating them. (In contrast, ‘Aẓzām still saw the Turks as having reconciled and cooperated with other populations better than some classical Arabs)

Alone, the irritants of negative social relations with Turkish-linked groups within Egypt or the Arab bias of Az-Zayyāt’s periodization of Islam and its civilization might not have sufficed to break commitment to wider unitary Islamic community, which so long retarded the emergence of a full Arab nationalism in Egypt. His acceptance of secessionist anti-Ottoman Arab nationalism in Iraq required that he endorse Kemal Atatürk’s parallel withdrawal of Turkey from its former close-knit community with Muslims and Arabs which Az-Zayyāt was usually so loth to accept: “the pure brave Turks slashed off the long appendage” (of the Ottoman State) “that they had dragged behind them, then surged to glory behind Kemal; as for the happy authentic Arabs they cast off that heavy burden, setting out swiftly towards a

43 Az-Zayyāt, Al-Ǧāmi’a al-Islāmiyya hiya āl-ḡāya (An Islamic League is the Aim), penned 30 June 1947; “Wahy” vol.3, p. 231. Even Fertile Crescent pan-Arabs remained ambivalent: ʿAmin Saʿīd, an “Al-Muqaṭṭam” editor in Egypt under the monarchy, stressed the consent of Arabs of Egypt, Al-Ḥiḡāz and Syria to the Ottoman Turks’ conquest and early state, because it ended the weakness of the Mamluks and warded off the Christian states: they accepted that the Ottomans had won title to the Caliphate and to lead “nationalism had no existence in that age”. ʿAmin Saʿīd, ʿĀlrat al-ʿArab fi āl-qarn al-ʿišrīn (Cairo: Dār al-Hilāl, n.d., 1960?) p.6.
44 Min fukāḥāt..., p. 73.
kingdom behind Faysal". Thus Az-Zayyāt in the end endorsed both the politically parallel movements of Arab and Turkish nationalism that shattered the last half-credible multinational Islamic state.

Support by Egyptian Muslims to the Ottoman State, as the sole substantial independent Muslim State - one with a long-term capacity to contribute to the release of Egypt from Britain’s veiled protectorate - made them oppose Arab autonomist or independence movements weakening the Ottoman Turks’ control in Asia. Iraq’s pan-Arabs, among them the Hāšimite King Fāysal, his son Gāzi, and ‘Ali son of Ḥusayn, deposed from his throne in Al-Hiḡāz by Ibn Sū’ūd, strove in their dialogues with Az-Zayyāt to meet the long-standing Islamist objections of Egyptians to Asia’s Arab nationalist tradition. Thus, in his meetings with Az-Zayyāt, King ‘Ali said that he “used to try to convince Egyptians who had chosen to treat him as an enemy for the sake of the Turks that the revolution of the Arabs against the Caliphate was right and to further Right, and that his father had advised the Turks without cease to stop insulting the honor of the Arabs, that they give up their policy of ignorance, that they stop their crimes of murder.”

Thus, it was the inflexibility of the Turks that compelled the Arabs to rise against fellow Muslims. ‘Ali was correct that Ḥusayn had been ideologically reluctant to rise up against “the Caliphate” and was much less of an Arab nationalist than his son ‘Abd Allāh. For all the verbal tribute by both the

45 Qat’ al-‘uqda ashal min hallihā (“Cutting the Knot is Easier than Untying It”), 14 May 1934; “Wahy” vol. 1 p. 119.
46 During the First World War, respectable Egyptians insulted Sharifian (rebel Arab) officers from Al-Hiḡāz whom they encountered in a theatre. Sylvia G. Haim, Arab Nationalism, p. 47, citing the eye witness account of ‘Abd al-Fattāḥ Abū ān-Naṣr al-Ŷāfī. In an engaged account of Arab ethnic protest poetry in West Asia up to and after the Šarīf Ḥusayn’s 1916 uprising, Az-Zayyāt noted that Egyptian writers refused to join in the celebration of Arab independence, because of the English role. Faḏl al-adab ‘alā waḥdat al-‘Arab (The Contribution of Literature to the Unity of the Arabs), “Wahy” vol. 3, p. 273.
48 The šarīf Ḥusayn was slow to internalize the al political assumption of the ethnic nationalisms unfolding in the Ottoman Empire. He accepted that Abdūlhāmid and the Ottoman Empire had exercised a passable Islamic Caliphate; Ḥusayn tended to see divisive politicized ethnicity as the non-Islamic failing of his neo-Turkicizing but centralizing Committee of Union and Progress opponents. Thus, even in urging the Arabs to revolt in 1916 and 1917, Ḥusayn reproached the CUP for losing lands from the Empire in Europe and Libya. His son ‘Abd Allāh, the future king of Transjordan, was rated by Dawn as having in contrast (tardily) converted to the ideology of Arab political nationality developed prior to World War I by, for instance, the Arab community resident in Constantinople. See C. Ernest Dawn, From Ottomanism to Arabism: Essays on the Origins of Arab Nationalism (Urbana: University of Illinois Press 1973) pp. 54-86.
Egyptian Islamist and his pan-Arab hosts in Iraq to the principle of unitary Islamic community that had legitimized the Ottoman Empire, Az-Zayyât’s endorsement of the revolt by Asia’s Arabs became total. An example was a piece he wrote in mourning for Fayâl’s youthful son Gâzî on the latter’s premature death after a short reign as King of Iraq. Fayâl in his rebellion had been “the model of supreme manliness” chosen by destiny to “effect a revolution and found a state and erect a throne”. He and his comrades, the heroes of the Arab Revolution, “fought until the homeland was liberated”. The Hashimite family of Fayâl was the “solid foundation” of Iraq’s renaissance as an Arab nation-state: but it was an terms of the Hashimite dynasty’s pan-Arab enterprise, larger in scope than Iraq or any individual Arab state, that Az-Zayyât endorsed Gâzî. Gâzî represented “the youth of the Arabs” that would unite the provisional Arab entities.49

Shadows and Dissonances: the Quality of Az-Zayyât’s Relationship with Iraq

The preceding section showed that Iraq’s pan-Arab nationalists and its (in origin extra-Iraqi) Hashimite royalty greatly stimulated Az-Zayyât’s transition from pan-Islam to a pan-Arab ethnic nationalism. But the warm Az-Zayyât could not confine his wide-ranging dealings, and friendships, to that group in Iraq – the establishment pan-Arabs – that most commanded his ideological support. During his three years in Iraq, he got sufficiently off-stage to understand the disunities within the establishment and even to form close bonds with Iraqi figures very much outside its bounds. His writing well caught the elan of the new Arab nation-state of Iraq, as it restored Arab culture and identity, after centuries of Turkish rule. The Ottoman State had propagated Turkish through its limited primary and secondary schools: from the earliest post-Ottoman years when the British ruled directly, the Iraqis hired Egyptians to develop Arabic-medium education, even from primary level.50 But Az-Zayyât also conveyed political and economic shadows and dissonances in the new Iraq, and the potential for instability of so heterogeneous a land.

Az-Zayyât chose Iraq as the subject of the first book he wrote, Al-‘Irâq kamâ ra’a’aytuh (“Iraq as I Saw It”), the manuscript of which he lost before it

50 “In the summer of 1918 a Department of Education was organized and the pertinence in Iraq of things Egyptian was again recognized by putting at the head of this new department a member of the Egyptian Ministry of Education”. Henry A. Foster, The Making of Modern Iraq (Anaheim: University of California Press 1935) p. 215.
could be published. A surviving fragment printed in “Ar-Risāla” caught the relaxed and democratic relationship that the šarīf Faysal achieved with Iraqis. Sitting in a cafe by the Euphrates, Az-Zayyāt saw a shepherd drive a flock of sheep across Maude Bridge on its way to the abattoirs. Faysal happened to be returning from Az-Zahūr palace, and, unattended by any guard, patiently waited in the crowd by the bridge for the herd to pass51. While in Iraq, Az-Zayyāt often visited Faysal’s son Prince Gāzi who left a similar impression: “Gāzi’s sublime humility” so seldom found in “royal youth”; his Hāšimīte forbearance/tolerance (samāḥatuhu al-hāšimiyya) would set the pattern for a gentle regime under which “consultation” (a‰-‰Ër Ç) and democracy would flourish52. (Against his sense that the Hāšimītes were relatively democratic monarchs, Az-Zayyāt was disposed to accept that Faysal and General Nūrī as-Sa’d had been right to impose a “moderate dictatorship” on the Iraqis when they became too bitterly divided: this policy should be resumed under Faysal II, who succeeded when Gāzi was killed in an automobile accident after a brief reign)53. Az-Zayyāt, then, usually strongly supported the title of the Hāšimītes to found and lead the Arab Iraqi state: they embodied the Islamic qualities of the Hāšimīte family of the Prophet Muhammad, as Iraq’s pan-Arab leaders they were the successors of the ‘Abbāsid Caliphs who directed the Arabs’ classical golden age from Baghdad, and they commanded legitimacy among Iraqis because they embodied the authentic Arab democratic attitude that he felt Turcophone royalty and politicians glaringly lacked in Egypt54.

But Az-Zayyāt’s lost book on Iraq also critically analysed the political and social divisions in transitional Iraq. His “great friend” the (generally in opposition) Iraqi politician Yāsīn al-Hāšīmī assessed in his Cairo hotel that

51 Min Mu∂akkirÈtÈ #l-yawmiyya (“From my Diaries”), written for “Ar-Risāla” on 15 January 1940; “Waḥy” vol.2, pp. 135-9. Some foreign observers who had the patterns of European monarchies in mind, missed the mutual acceptance that Faysal and ordinary Iraqis reached. The American chargé d’affaires reported that he often saw the King pass along the main street but that only “foreigners took notice and paused to lift up their hats”. For Kedourie – alienated from all Middle Eastern nationalisms by sectarian background it indicated that “a decade of rule” had not increased the “foreign”, British-imposed Faysal’s popularity with Iraqis. Kedourie, Chatham House Version pp. 245-6.


53 Al-Malik Gāzi, p. 35.

54 Faysal had led Iraq with the intelligence of the Prophet’s son in-law, the fourth Caliph ‘Alī and the genius-like shrewdness (dahā’) of Mu’āwiya from the throne of the ‘Abbāsid Caliph Hārūn ar Rašīd; Al-Malik Gāzi, p. 33.
“it might be better for us and for you to postpone publishing the book’s political section for a while”\textsuperscript{55}. In 1924, Al-Hāšīmī’s leadership of those Iraqis opposed to the ratification of the Anglo-Iraqi treaty caused the apparently amenable Constituent Assembly that the British had fostered to veer around against it\textsuperscript{56}. Yāsīn won esteem in Egypt as a pan-Arab\textsuperscript{57}, although his group had Ottomanist twinges against establishment Iraqi pan-Arabs\textsuperscript{58}. During his stay in Baghdad, Az-Zayyāt had got on cordial terms with a circle of six discontented Iraqis prominent in the army, administration, education and politics\textsuperscript{59}. Among them was the leftist Kāmil al-Ǧādirī who placed himself on principle in the ranks of successive oppositions. Al-Ǧādirī was Yāsīn al-Hāšīmī’s right hand in the (opposition) Ḥizb al-Iḥā’ al-Wātānī (Patriotic Fraternity Party) for a time until that party also, when it compromised about Britain’s presence, won in March 1933 an invitation to form an administra-
tion. Al-Ġadiri thereupon left the Ģihā and joined the Al-Ahāli group, founded by young anti-establishment intellectuals, which from 1934 advocated the application to Iraq’s social development of ša’biyya (populism). Influenced by communism, the ša’biyya ideology explicitly rejected all nationalism because nationalism by its nature caused - or hypocritically justified - bloodshed and tyranny.

The important point is that Az-Zayyāt was granted a regular “soft seat” at the discussions of a group that fancied itself to represent “younger generation Iraq”, “the common people before the elite and Iraq before Arabism”. He was in touch with figures on the very margin of tolerated opposition to the monarchy-centred self-validatingly pan-Arab political establishment and to the British military presence. (However, because of Islam, Az-Zayyāt always opposed the Iraqi Communists, the radical opposition). Hikmat Sulaymān, a Turkophile “friend” of the “ring”, brought many of its members into the not over-Arabist government that the Kurd Chief-of-Staff General Bakr Șidqi ushered in when he briefly overthrew parliamentary government in October 1936. Șidqi, whose brutality Az-Zayyāt detested, tried to rebuild the Army on Atatürkist lines.

Az-Zayyāt’s 1940 obituary to the lately-assassinated Rustum Ḥaydar, a Syrian-born Shi’i, advisor to Fayṣal on both internal and foreign policy and frequently a minister in the Iraqi cabinets, blended sympathy and critical analysis. It vividly evoked Ḥaydar’s intelligence, application, consciously cultivated dignity and his controlled, tense vitality: invariably reserved, the minister’s quietness was that of deep water under whose cold surface thoughts and secrets eddied. Az-Zayyāt came to respect Rustum Ḥaydar, but faulted two aspects:

1. Education: as King Fayṣal’s foremost advisor on financial and economic matters, Rustum exercised his influence to restrict secondary and higher education (while expanding primary and technical education)

61 Al-Salir, “Waḥy” vol. 1, p. 330. Another Egyptian, Abd ar-Raḥmān ‘Azzān, as Egyptian Minister in Baghdad, was able to establish rapport with the Ahāli group, although they were non-Arabist, after Șidqi’s October 1936 coup. Coury, Who ‘Invented’ Egyptian Arab Nationalism? IJMES 1982, p. 267.
62 Pan-Arabism was down-graded in Iraq followig the seizure of power by the in origin Kurdish General Bakr Șidqi in 1936. Khadduri, Independent Iraq, pp. 97-8, 100. Bakr’s collaborator as Prime Minister, the elder politician Hikmat Sulaymān had been educated in the Ottoman period in Constantinople and modelled his “reformism” on Atatürkism. Ibid pp. 77-8. For Hikmat as the “friend” of the ġalqā who bestowed cabinet posts on its members after the coup, see Az-Zayyāt, Al-Salir, “Waḥy” vol.1, p. 331. Az-Zayyāt clearly detested Șidqi as “chronically ambitious” (tammāh) and murderous. Ibid.
because he feared that a growing, under-employed intelligentsia might one day challenge the power of the established political leaders in Iraq.

2. He misused the government’s allocation of lands to politically control restive tribes farming them, by grant or withdrawal of agrarian leases. When Az-Zayyāt was in Iraq in 1932, his friend Ḥasan as-Suhayl, amīr of the Banū Tamīm, opted for an opposition party: Rustum as Minister of Finance promptly ended his tenure of 15,000 feddans of land, citing specious administrative criteria to a remonstrating Az-Zayyāt63.

Kedourie over decades exaggerated communal conflict between (a) Sunni Arab Iraqis, ruling Iraq in partnership with the non-Iraqi pan-Arabs who come with the Sunni Fayṣal, and (b) the more numerous but poorer Shi‘i Arab Iraqis supposedly subordinated under the Hāšimītes64.

He argued that the pan-Arab ideology propagated by Turkicized Syrian Arab educationalist Sāṭi‘ al-Ḥuṣrī in Iraq’s schools, stimulated ill-will between Iraq and neighboring non-Arab Iran65. Persistent bad relations between the monarchical Iraqi government and Saudi Arabia were similarly contrary to Iraq’s interest of having good relations with its neighbors: the Hāšimītes sometimes dreamed they could wrest back Al-Ḥīgāz, their place

63 Amal wa-dākrah (“Hope and a Memory”), 29 January 1940; “Waḥy” vol.2, pp. 145-7. Rustum Ḥaydar, in origin a Syrian non-Iraqi Shi‘ite who came with Fayṣal and other ideological pan-Arabs to Iraq following World War I, was Fayṣal’s Chief of Royal Diwān and served as minister in various Iraqi government portfolios; at the time of his assassination on 18 January 1940, he was Minister of Finance in a cabinet headed by General Nūrī as-Sa’id. He was known as a champion of Iraq’s underprivileged Shi‘ite community. Khadduri, Independent Iraq, pp. 15, 39, 48-9, 86, 102, 121, 144-6. Cf. Kedourie’s generalization that the pan-Arabs dominant down the decades of the Hāšimīte monarchy in Iraq manipulated land-holdings to enrich themselves, punish political opposition, and to build up a “servile cliental of tribal šayḥs”. Kedourie, Chatham House Version, pp. 266-9.

64 Indicting the pan-Arab Hāšimīte Iraqi state as Sunni-supremacist, Kedourie in 1970 printed in full a communalist denunciation by a self-appointed “Executive Committee of the Shi‘ahs in Iraq”, sent on to the British Government in 1932. The “proclamation” charged that the establishment systematically seized the Shi‘is’ religious endowments and lands, discriminated against them in the allocation of ministries, and withheld from Shi‘i majority areas educational and health facilities provided to the Sunni-populated regions, “The Shi‘ah sect shall take charge of the administration”. Kedourie, Chatham House Version, pp. 283-5. In 1988 Kedourie extended his sectarian explication of Iraqi politics to the fall of pro-British PM Ṣāliḥa Ġabr, in 1947-1948 the country’s first Shi‘ite in the post (he was succeeded by another). Elie Kedourie, Anti-Shi‘ism in Iraq under the Monarchy, “Middle Eastern Studies” vol.2.4:2, April 1988, pp. 249-253. Az-Zayyāt had empathy for both Lebano-Syrian Christians and Iraq’s Shiites vis-a-vis the Sunnis traditionally dominion “the government of the Turks”. Az-Zayyāt, Anṭūn al-Ǧumayyīl written 17 October 1949, “Waḥy” vol.3, p. 157.
of origin, from the Su‘ūdis. Az-Zayyāt’s impression was that the multi-sectarian, not exclusively Sunni pan-Arabs who came with Faysal could rather flexibly interact with Iraq’s more backward Shi‘i community, and arbitrate its conflicts with Iraqi Sunni elements traditionally dominant in the bureaucracy and the military. Rustum Pāša was “mistrusted by the prejudiced Sunnis” and the “nativist Iraqi” anti-Syrian elements because he “championed the cause of the Shi‘i community.” Az-Zayyāt stressed the collaboration when Rustum Haydar’s influence on policy was paramount between palace-government on one hand and the internal Shi‘i interest on the other: “it was Rustum’s policy after reliance on the Thames [England] to rely on the Euphrates before the [Sunni-peopled] Tigris because [the populations around] the Euphrates were Shi‘ite in doctrine and on its banks were settled powerful nomad tribes”. In “strengthening his position through [alignment with the Iraqi] Shi‘is”, Rustum incidentally hoped that they would be a force to keep “Nağd”, (ie. the threatening Wāḥhabi Saudi Arabian State) at bay and to promote cordial relations with Iran. Az-Zayyāt thus perceived that the Hāšimite and pan-Arab establishment’s feud with Saudi Arabia at least sometimes dovetailed into its conciliation of local Arabic-speaking Iraqi Shi‘ites, and Shi‘ite Persia externally. Common resistance to the Su‘ūd led Wāḥhabis, whose raids had devastated shrines of twelver Shi‘ism in Iraq, provided a point for identification by Iraqi Shi‘ites with the Hāšimite-led pan-Arab Iraqi state. An anti-Saudi foreign policy provided common ground for Iraqi Shi‘ites, for the Iraqi Sunni bureaucratic and military strata once a component of the Ottoman State that had fought the Wāḥhabis, and for the Saudis’ dynastic rivals the Hāšimites. Recent historiography has stressed efforts by some Shi‘ite leaders from the 1920s to integrate a new political community with Sunni Iraqis under the Hāšimite monarchical system. These Shi‘ites projected that participation, not polarization, was the approach to raise their community to political and economic equality with the traditionally more developed, less numerous, Sunni Arab Iraqis, and to remove the British. From the outset aware of Shi‘i

65 Kedourie, Chatham House Version, p. 274.
66 Ibid., p. 272; Az-Zayyāt, though who knew King ‘Ali briefly the Al-Ḥijāz’ last Hāšimite monarch well in Baghdad, remembered him as not disorientated by nostalgia for his lost “rocky” Al-Ḥijāz kingdom from sustaining a moderating and mediatory role in Baghdad’s heated politics. Al-Malik ‘Ali, pp. 189-190.
67 Khadduri, Independent Iraq, p. 145.
68 Az-Zayyāt, Amal wa-∂ikrò, p. I46.
69 Batatu (1987) stressed that the Shi‘ite ‘ulamā’ had only feeble influence upon the tribally fragmented rural Shi‘is when the Iraq state was formed in 1921. Ğa‘far Abû at-Timmām, the Shi‘i trader from Baghdad, worked for Sunni-Shi‘i unity to eliminate the power of the British, sidestepping any sectarianization of politics. Hanna
under-privilege and ethos, Fayṣal, until his death in 1933, applied what resources his state had to educate the Shi‘is, expand their opportunities, and integrate them with Sunnis.\textsuperscript{70}

The secondment of Egyptian teachers and educationalists to Iraq after 1918 acquainted them and Iraq’s pan-Arabs with each other. Mahmūd ‘Azmī, a former “As-Siyāsa al-Usbū‘iyya” publicist, argued in a 1938 “Al-Hilāl” article that Sāṭī al-Hūṣrī, by propagating as Minister of Education in Iraqi schools an exclusive Arabism, created hostility with the Kurds within the State, and, in foreign policy with neighboring non-Arab Iran.

Az-Zayyāt knew and admired Al-Hūṣrī and Rustum Ḥaydar alike, evaluating each as equally “inflexible in opinion”: other non-Iraqis or pan-Arabs such as Rustum Ḥaydar limited Al-Hūṣrī’s influence on the development of Iraqi education, as well as his capacity to impose the distance that his pan-Arab nationalist ideology demanded between Arab Iraq and non-Arab Iran.\textsuperscript{71} Az-Zayyāt depicted Al-Hūṣrī much less than ‘Azmī as a nationalist ideologue intent to politicize student youth, more as an educationalist with a concern to propagate the general humanities more widely in Iraq, for their own sake, through an expansion of secondary and higher education. While Az-Zayyāt was in Iraq (1929–1932), Sāṭī al-Hūṣrī’s demand that higher humanities education be expanded to spread “pure knowledge” without regard to political or sectarian considerations was successfully blocked by a group in the establishment, led by Rustum Ḥaydar, that urged contraction of theoretical secondary and higher education.\textsuperscript{72} Rustum was determined to off

Batatu, Iraq’s Shi‘a: their Political Role and the Process of their Integration into Society, in Barbara Freyer Stowasser (ed.), The Islamic Impulse (London: Croom Helm 1987) pp . 204-207.

Batatu assessed that Fayṣal I (r. 1921-1933) and the monarchy until it sided with the British in 1941, satisfactorily brought the underprivileged Shi‘a into the government bureaucracy and, through conscription, into the army in order to integrate them with the Sunnis. Ibid p. 207.


Reeva S. Simon allows that before 1918 Sāṭī al-Hūṣrī was a liberal Ottomanist who stressed the role of the individual in society and the linguistic rights of minorities: he opposed the (Turkish) linguistic nationalism being developed by Ziya Gökalp. She also traces his opposition to Sāmī Sawkat’s drives to install a racist Arab militarism, with its Hitler youth-style paramilitary Futuwwa, in Iraqi schools. Nonetheless, Simon still views Al-Hūṣrī as, following a conversion when the Ottoman Empire collapsed, a much more single-mindedly pan-Arabist educationalist than did Az-Zayyāt. Reeva S. Simon, The Teaching of History in ‘Iraq Before The Rashid Ali Coup of 1941, “Middle Eastern Studies” (22:1) January 1986 pp. 37-39.
er more primary schools to his constituency in the Shi‘ite areas; he also wanted to limit the politicizing influence of imported Egyptian educationalists on Iraqi students. He left Az-Zayyāt in no doubt as well that many Egyptians’ support during the First World War for the centralizing, still formally Islamic, Ottoman State when its Arabs rose in 1915, still rankled with the pan-Arab establishment in the Iraqi state into the 1930s. For this complex of reasons “Rustum Ḥaydar used to turn his face away from Egypt”.

Az-Zayyāt’s relationship with Iraqi ideologues and writers continued to develop after he returned to Egypt, down decades through their contributions to his Cairo magazine “Ar-Risāla”, a crucial conduit through which these Iraqis got through to educated Egyptians. Thus it was “Ar-Risāla” in 1938 that first published the article Between Egypt and Arabism and a further article On Arab Unity in which Al-Ḥusārī polemically exaggerated motifs by the in reality Arab-centrizing Ṭāḥā Ḥusayn that Egyptians were Egyptians before anything else, were unrelated to the Arabs by blood, and had a separate history. Al-Ḥusārī deepened the impact of his argument to Egyptians by publishing collections of his articles and addresses as books in Cairo; he migrated to Egypt and in the last phase of his Arab nationalist career was director of the Institute of Arab Research and Studies that the League of Arab States established there. (Al-Ḥusārī left a persisting influence upon pan-Arab thinking among subsequent generations of Egyptians under Nāṣir, Sādāt and Mubārak: he again became widely read in Egypt as pan-Arab nationalism revived in the 1980s).

“Ar-Risāla” also extensively

73 Affirmative action in various fields had long had backing from King Fayṣal. Rustum Ḥaydar’s educational policy despite his non-Iraqi origin, was similar to that pursued by native Iraqi Shi‘i educationalists such as Muhammad Fāḍil al-Ǧamālī, who nonetheless maintained Al-Ḥusārī’s desectarianizing Arab nationalist curricula. Simon, ibid., pp.38-39. In contrast to al-Ǧamālī’s concern to offer primary and vocational education that would bring practical development to Shi‘ite areas, Al-Ḥusārī argued that the fallāḥūn should first be given a new national consciousness and then improved methods in agriculture. Ibid p 39.

74 The perspective on Rustum in this paragraph was that of Az-Zayyāt in Amal wa-ḏikrā, pp. 145-7


76 In 1985, writing at the end of a period in which “some of the Arabs extended their hands to Israel”, the Egyptian critic Raḥā’ī an-Naqqāš hailed Ṣāṭī as the Arab thinker in the 20th century who had propounded the concept of Arabism with most “depth” and “clarity”. He tended to accept Al-Ḥusārī’s self-image that he had been locked in almost lone combat with a serious “secessionist” neo-Pharaonic movement out to establish colloquial Egyptian as a particularist literary language and give Egypt a Western personality. An-Naqqāš found very attractive Al-Ḥusārī’s non-racial linguistic nationalism – an Arab was anyone who spoke Arabic and belonged
published the poems of the Iraqi poets Ġamīl Şidqī az-Zahāwī (1863-1937) and Maʿrūf ar-Ruṣāfī (1875-1945), whose friend Az-Zayyāt had become during his residence in Iraq earlier.

Az-Zayyāt had early, while in Iraq (1929-1933), become aware of the clout of British officials there. To the late 1940s, though, he depicted the Hāşimite monarchy-centred systems in Iraq and Transjordan as serving the Arab interest: spiritually fusing Iraq and Egypt, he ignored mounting rivalry between their two monarchies. Az-Zayyāt was the least concerned of all Egyptian pan-Arabs that pan-Arabism promote Egypt’s interests but even he in 1947 was finally unable to stomach the two Hāşimite States’ tacit support for Britain against Egypt in the UN Security Council. Syria and Lebanon’s support for Egypt’s complaint in the Council had “made the face of Arabism shine” in contrast to Transjordan and Iraq, held under imperialist control by Glubb, British commander of the Transjordanian army, and by Kinahan Cornwallis in Iraq. “The youth of the Arabs” were kindling “a Holy Fire” that would consume the scorpion-like fake pan-Arabs planted in their region by imperialism.

Az-Zahāwī had from the late nineteenth century been championing the emancipation of women, and modern science as he understood it, in Egyptian newspapers: he had innovated a simplified poetical language more like ordinary speech, breaking with traditional classicist poetical dic- to Arab society in his interests and future, even if he had Turkish, Berber or Negro origins. Islam was the venture in history that brought the Arabs together with many other peoples, fusing them all into a new Arab nation, “the principles of Islam” fostering “a new concept of Arabism”; but like Al-Ḥusri, An-Naqqaṣ in 1985 was careful to make room for Christian Arabs in the historical Arab nation. With the arguments Al-Ḥusri had used in the 1930s and 1940s, he tried to draw Muslim Egyptians away from wide pan-Islamism, to narrow their energies within the sphere of a pan- Arab unification, ostensibly a preliminary. Raqā’ an-Naqqaṣ, Mīḥnat mufakkir ṣarabī (“The Ordeal of An Arab Thinker”), “An-Nahār” (Sydney) 8 March 1985, p. 8. For Al-Ḥusri’s 1944 prototype of the latter argument, Ḥāim, Arab Nationalism, pp. 147-153.

77 Awliyā’ wa-a’dā’ (“Friends and Enemies”), written 3 February 1947, “Wahy” vol.3, p. 226. “Ar-Rābiṭa aš-ṣarqiyya”, magazine of the Liberal Constitutionalists-linked association of that name, in 1930 reacted coldly to Iraqi Prime Minister Nūrī as-Saʿīd’s proposal for “an Arab Alliance”. The magazine suggested that he proposed the scheme at the prompting of Britain, with which Iraq had just signed a treaty, in order to “limit French influence in Syria […] and also to combat Soviet and Italian influence in Yemen”. Husayn, Ittiḥād, vol.2, pp. 186-7. King “Faysal’s and Nūrī as-Saʿīd’s schemes of unity were rejected by Britain as impractical […] The British tried very hard not to give offence to French susceptibilities”. Porath, In Search of Arab Unity, p. 315.

tion 79. Al-ハウスrí, Az-Zahaways and Ar-Ruṣafi had all mastered Turkish, had all lived for prolonged periods in Ottoman Constantinople. They transmitted to Az-Zayyát the political tyranny and insecurity of life in Constantinople under both Abdülhamid and the Young Turcs. All had the secularist spirit that spread among educated Ottoman Turks, which Atatürk later embodied in the Turkish national state. Their lack of traditional Islamic belief disconcerted Az-Zayyát - but also gave him a much livelier, more modern vision of late Hamidian and early CUP-led Turkey, in which it became an option for intellectuals to ridicule traditional Islam in public, if at picareseque risk to their life and limb as Gamîl Ҫidq az-Zahaways found as a post-1908 Ottoman parliamentarian 80.

Ar-Ruṣafí for 11 years studied Arabic, Islamic and linguistic sciences under Iraq’s great (Arab-centric) religious scholar Ma’mûd Şukrí al-Ålësi who tried to ignite his own salafì revivalist Islamist zeal in his pupil. But, Az-Zayyát observed, Ar-Ruṣafí emerged from these studies Muslim in tongue, Şâlihi (pagan) at heart 81. Such Iraqi intellectuals’ secularism, how-

80 Although a vocal freethinker, Az-Zahaways became a director of the government press and editor of the official newspaper in Baghdad in the Hamidian era. After the Committee of Union and Progress overthrew Abdülhamid’s absolutism in 1908, Az-Zahaways became a deputy representing Iraq in the Ottoman Parliament (Majlis-i-Mab’uthan). When a large sum was to be allocated in the budget for recitations from Al-BuçgÈ’s collection of hadiths (sayings of the Prophet Muhammad) “for the blessings” that would bring navy vessels, he ironically interpolated that the money should come from the Ministry of Religious Enaowments, not from the Defense Ministry: “the ships of the fleet are propelled bi-#l-buçgÈ lÇ bi-#l-BuçgÈ (“by steam, not by Al-BuçgÈ”). Az-Zahaways had to evade fury in the chamber and riotous violence from the common people. Az-Zayyát, Ma’mûl Ҫidq az-Zahaways, written 27 March 1937; “Wa…” vol. 1, p. 360.
81 Az-Zayyát, Ma’rûf ar-Ruçfá, written 26 March 1945; “Wa…” vol.3, p. 20. While lecturing in Iraq, he had visited the poet in his house in the Baghdad prostitutes’ quarter where he would die in destitute squalor. The aesthete Az-Zayyát was prepared to tolerate the late poet’s exhibitionist rakishness and vocal but eloquent atheism: “Ar-Ruçfá – may AllÇh be kind to him was the authentic tribune of Iraq” who long articulated its drive for independence (p. 20); “as regards his belief (‘aqÈda), this is for God, not people, to decide whereas his poetical gift merits assessment by the literary critics” (p. 22). Az-Zayyát deeply responded to Ar-Ruçfá as the fearless, altruistic political poet who satirized the despot. Abdülhamid before the 1908 Young Turk revolution, recounting the ups and downs of his attempts to find a career in Hâşimite, Arab nationalist Iraq: its Mu’âwiya-like king Faysal at first placated Ar-Ruçfá’s satire with a seat in Parliament but then, inevitably, barred the honest poet from it. Ar-Ruçfá’s life-long insecurity and poverty provoked some of Az-Zayyát’s most alienated characterizations of the Hashimits, whom his language now (1945) bracketed with Abdülhamid; even King Faysal, successor of the ‘Abbásids, had not in Ar-Ruçfá’s case altogether transcended the eternal reluctance
ever, sapped a basis of the Asian Arabs’ pre-1916 political community with the Muslim Turks and now helped Az-Zayyät, also, see the bygone Ottoman State from new, less respectful – less religious – angles that registered pre-1918 ethnic conflict between its Turks and Arabs more.

Az-Zayyät was unusually totalist and undivided in his identification with other Arabs beyond Egypt and to be sure his pan-Arabism was very much shaped by the ancient books and ancient experiences separate sets of people only tenuously connected to twentieth century Arabs. Yet even Az-Zayyät, the acme of ardent and energetic Egyptian pan-Arabism, did not maintain the romanticism where it could have dangerously obscured Iraqi realities that he experienced. He did not deviate from that common sense and alertness to practicalities so salient in pre-1952 pan-Arabism in Egypt. Az-Zayyät conveyed to Egyptians Iraq’s plural reality: a real multi-ethnic and factionalized Arab country, not some ideological chimera; he analysed with critical intelligence Iraq’s pan-Arab establishment, which he in general endorsed.

Although Iraq was less developed and less ethnically integrated than Egypt and long dependent on Egyptians for its educational development, Az-Zayyät clearly respected Iraqis as equal in aesthetic matters in particular. In 1945 he equated the (he allowed, atheistical) Ar-Ruṣāfī, who had just died at seventy, - “one of the five strings of the lute of purely Arabic poetry” - with Egypt’s two greatest modern poets Ḥāfiz ʿIbrāhīm and ʿĀbd Allāh ʿUwqū. The radically secular religious scepticism of some Iraqi poets had caught the attention of even that ultra-modernist enemy of traditional Arabo-Islamic culture in Egypt, ʿAlāʾ Mūsā - dissolving his insularity even in the much more Pharaonist 1920s. Hierarchical attitudes of noblesse oblige vis-a-vis Iraq did not fatally stain the majority of Egyptian intellectuals after World War II of those who govern to subsidize any poetry except when the public’s response could affect political authority. Ibid pp. 21-22; Ar-Ruṣāfī wa-ʾAḏār Ḥān: aw az-zaʾīm al-adabī wa-ʾaḏā ʾaḏ-dīnī (“Ar-Ruṣāfī and the Agha Khan: or the Literary Leader and the Religious Leader”), written 9 April 1945, “Waḥy” vol.3, pp. 25-26.

82 Maʿrūf ar-Ruṣāfī, p. 20.

83 The far-reaching religious unbelief of the aged Az-Zahāwī electrified two extreme Egyptianist modernist secularists he met in Egypt in 1924, Ẓakī Abū ʾṢāḥī and the Cop Ṣalām Mūsā, who found the anti-religious ms. diwān he left unpublishable in Egypt. The Education of Salamah Musa, pp. 164-5. However, the meeting also brought home to Mūsā how alike all Arabic-speakers were and their common struggle to beat off the various violent imperial powers attacking them. For the pan-Arabizing aspect of Salamah Mūsā’s reaction to Az-Zahāwī in 1924 see Coury, ‘Who ’Invented’ Egyptian Arab Nationalism’?, IJMES vol. 14 (1982), p. 472. There was much Egyptian press public about Az-Zahāwī in 1924, for example, Tarḫamat faylāštuf al-ʿIrāq Ġarmil Șīqī az-Zahāwī (“An Account of Iraq’s Philosopher Ġamil Șīqī az-Zahāwī”) “Al-Muqaṭṭam” 26 June 1924, p. 2.
War I. There can be no doubt that the contribution such expatriate Egyptian intellectuals as Az-Zayyāt made to the three-tier development of education in Iraq was decisive for the new state’s modernization and integration, in the diversification of its neo-classicist Arab high culture, and in the propagation of the standard literary language as the medium of culture and modern life, and for the solidification of pan-Arab nationalism as the ideology of the largest single group of educated Iraqis. In the 1980s, eminent Iraqi Ba‘thist intellectuals and decision-makers remembered the seminal contributions of Az-Zayyāt and other compatriots in that era.

Literature and its standard language intimately linked Az-Zayyāt to Arabic-speaking Christians, in particular those in, or from, Lebanon-Syria. However, he did not transfer Muslim-Christian interaction within literature and culture over into the political community of Arabism. Az-Zayyāt’s pan-Islamism was limited by ethnicity. At best, Islam stands in his thought as a basis for effective community, cultural-Intellectual or political, between Arabs and non-Arab Muslims only where the latter wholeheartedly adopt Arabic as their standard medium of literature and government. He was sharply aware of the Arabs as historically a distinct - if incorporative - community within Islam. Az-Zayyāt’s articles had some potential to somewhat detach the Arabic language and the specific Arab culture, developing down the centuries from origins in pre-Islamic Arabia, from Islam. Could Arabic and Arab cultural patterns then become bases for political community without regard to sect – offering Arabic-speaking Christians membership in al-ummā al-‘arabīyya, the Arab Nation? Az-Zayyāt’s writings frequently made generous room for Christians as participants in at least the cultural community of Arabic in the classical but especially in the modern periods.

Appreciating the standard Arabic language for itself and not simply as the medium for Islam, he hailed the crucial role of Lebanese Christians in (a) publishing almost lost classical manuscripts and (b) adapting Arabic prose to express modern life. Az-Zayyāt’s personal friends among Christian Lebanese/Syrians resident in Egypt included Mayy (Mary) Ziyāda. The Nazareth-born Islamophile Mayy was a stylistic and intellectual innovator in Arabic literature in the 1920s particularly, conducting a salon attended by

84 ‘Abd as-Salām Muḥammad ‘Ārif, the foremost Nasserite leader in the 1958 Iraqi revolution that overthrew the monarchy, told Mūsā Ṣabrī that “Ar-Risāla” was the forum from which we received our most crucial lessons of Arab Unity, nationalism and literature”. Ma‘ al-udabā’, “Ar-Rā‘id” March 1961, p.230.
such Egyptian writers as her neo-classicist lover Mustafā Şadiq ar-Rāfi‘ī and such “As-Siyāsa” intellectuals as Tā hà Husayn. Although Tā hà was a sectionally westernist enemy of Ar-Rāfi‘ī, he also rightly was seen as partly neo-classicist himself by that milieu. Az-Zayyāt linked Mayy’s pride in her language to her pride in “Arab race” and described her as “the Arab woman Mayy who took the light of Arabism from” Cairo’s Syrian Christian-owned journals “Al-Hilāl” and “Al-Muqtafa”; he clearly felt that Arabic literature was helped to revive by the Western culture – and even the mildly Christian ethos – such Syrian Christian writers injected. Mayy introduced Az-Zayyāt in 1934 to a Lebanese Catholic, Антūn al-Γūmayyīl (1887 - 1949), editor of “Al-Ahrām”, who became his close friend. Al-Γūmayyīl in 1909

85 Giora Eliraz, The Social and Cultural Conception of Muṣṭafā Şadiq ar-Rāfi‘ī, “Asian and African Studies” (Haifa) vol. 13:2, July 1979, p. 106. Mayy’s father, İlyās Ziyāda, as editor of the Cairo “Al-Mahrūsa” had instanced Christian “Syrian” political identification with Muslim Turks and Arabs. During fighting between the Ottoman State and Greece in 1912, “Al-Mahrūsa” called for Egyptians, as Ottoman subjects, to donate to the fitting-out of the Ottoman fleet against the Greeks. صاحبا ينْحَانُ آل الوَاثَانِيَّةَ (“Conversation with a Greek the Effective Acts of Patriotism”), “Al-Mahrūsa” 15, October 1912 p. 3; cf. At-Ta’amūz fī Bayrūt (The Fighting Spirit in Bayrūt), ibid. Identification of Egyptians as Ottomans, like common Arabness, would, of course, deny that the immigrant Ottoman Christian Syrians were marginal aliens in Egypt.

86 In the milieu of Mayy’s salon, Şahā was viewed as himself an Arabo-classicist as much as Western-orientated figure, given, for example, his unbroken flow of books and articles on such non-Egyptian classical Arabs as Abū al-‘Alā’ al-Ma’arrī. Mayy correctly recognized Tā hà’s blindness as one of the common paints she no doubt saw religious doubt as another that enabled him to write with so much empathy about the blind hermit of Al-Ma’arra. Underestimating his sensitivity to his disability, she nick-named Tā hà “Abū al-‘Alā’”, drawing a reproachful letter from him. Bassām Maşūr, Ma’a iqṭirāb maw ‘id mi’aiwiyat miIād ‘amīd al-adab al-‘arabī: Mu’nis Şahā Ḥusayn: Abī kānā qimmatan fi ‘āl-ta’fā’ul wa qimmatan fi āl-yā’s (“As the Centenary of the Birth of the Doyen of Arabic Literature Draws Near: Mu’nis Tā hà Husayn: My Father Could Be the Acme of Both Optimism and Despair”), “An-Nahār” (Sydney) 19 October 1989 p. 14.

87 Bi-Munāsabat ar-ḥarā’īn: ba’d al-kālām fī Mayy (“On the Occasion of the Fortieth Day Since Her Death: Some Observations on Mayy”), 8 December 1941; “Wahy” vol. 2, pp. 312-5. Az-Zayyāt in this tribute was aware that she was educated in the ‘Ayn Tura Catholic school in Kisrawān, Lebanon. Ibid p. 313. He saw the grounding Lebanese and Syrian Christians received in Western languages in such schools, and consequent influence from secular European literature and sciences as well as the Bible, as a source of renewal for the “yellowing”, rigid Arabic literature of Muslim Arabs, such as that patterned by Al-Azhar. Ibid. Az-Zayyāt tried to leave the impression that Ar-Rāfi‘ī had only had a one-sided infatuation with Mayy at her salon. Ibid., p. 315.

88 Антūn al-Γūmayyīl, Az-Zayyāt’s speech on assuming membership in the Arabic Language Academy following Al-Γūmayyīl’s death. Written 17 October 1949;
published in Cairo his play As-Samaw’al aw wafā’ al-‘Arab (“As-Samaw’al or the Loyalty of the Arabs”). The pre-Islamic Arabian Jew As-Samaw’al Ibn ‘Ādiyā’, as the embodiment of Arab faithfulness to pledged word, refused to surrender some arms entrusted to him by Imru’ al-Qays to the latter’s enemies when they surrounded his (As-Samaw’al’s) stronghold – even when they killed his cap red son before his eyes. Az-Zayyāt was well aware of other Christian Lebano-Syrian or Egypto-Syrian writers, such as Naṣīf al-Yazīġī (1800-1871) whose revival of the integral idioms of the classical Arabs in new high literature came close to the preciousity of Muslim Egyptian neo-classicists, such as Ar-Rafī‘ī. It at once moved and amused him that Catholic Arabic scholars of Arabic he knew echoed the Muslim Arabs’ Islam-stimulated linguistic myths, about Arabic. One balance, “Wahy” vol. 3, pp. 150-160. In this speech, Az-Zayyāt traced many crucial or important contributions by both neo-classicist and West-patterned modernist Christian Lebano-Syrian writers to the renaissance of Arabic literature. Az-Zayyāt also had empathy for Christian Lebanese/Syrians as facing discrimination in the Ottoman Empire that prodded them to migrate to Egypt and elsewhere. Ibid p. 157. Az-Zayyāt contrasted Christian neo-classicists to the modernist Christian Lebanese-Syrian writers who originated for all Arabic-speakers adequate vocabularies for “the different arts and modern inventions through [their] translations, original works, theatre, press and commercial activities”. In the first, uncompromisingly neo-classicist category was the Lebanese Catholic Naṣīf al-Yazīġī (1800-1871) who in his Maḏma’ al-bahrayn (“The Conjunction-Place of the Two Seas”) imitated Al-Ḫariṭī’s Maqāmāt, and his son Ibrāhīm al-Yazīġī’s Luǧat al-ġarāʾid (“The Language of the Newspapers”) which followed Al-Ḫariṭī’s Durrat al-ġawwās. Al-Yazīġī had spent his youth in service of the Amir Bašr and became Christian Lebanon’s first leading neo-classical Arabic grammarian and writer. As Az-Zayyāt observed, he modelled his style upon classical Arab authors such as Al-Hariṭī. Ibid pp. 155-6. Abū Muḥammad al-Qāsim Ibn ʿAlī al-Hariṭī was born 1054 AD near Al-Bašr and died in the city in 1112 AD: in his 50 Maqāmāt al-Ḫāṭī Ibn Ḥammām narrates in ornate rhymed verse his repeated encounters with the vagabond and confidence trickster Abū Zayd al-Sarāqī. Al-Hariṭī’s Durrat al-ġawwās fī awhām al-ḥāwāṣ (“The Diver’s Pearl in the Errors of the Elect”) is a grammatical treatise discussing the solecisms which people of education were wont to commit; it had been edited by Thorbecke (Leipzig, 1871).

Az-Zayyāt in 1950 affectionately noted Arab Christian clergymen who somewhat shared the assumption of the classical Muslims that Arabic conferred loan words on other languages but seldom borrowed any itself. He cited attempts by his late Arabic Language Academy colleague Fr Anastas Mari al-Karmali (1866-1947) to contrive Arabic origins for such commonplace French words as “imbecile” or “garçon”. Az-Zayyāt, Al-Waḍ‘ al-luḡawī wa-haqq al-muḥḍāṭī fīhi , “Wahy” vol. 3, pp. 178-9. Az-Zayyāt was ironical in this address but the classical philologists’ restrictive identification of Arabic with Godhead, and their reluctance to allow word-coining subsequent to early peninsular Arabian Islam: he nonetheless was steeped in the classicist tradition in language that he wanted to make more flexible and saw it as having some modern Christian Arab members. “Wahy” vol. 3 pp. 175-185 passim. For the drive of classical Muslim scholars such as Abū Ḥubaydā and ʿA-
though, and something like Tāhā, he was more interested in the Fertile Crescent Christians’ more crucial installation of Western modernity within Arabic, a contribution he knew was still not quite integrated⁹¹.

Sects-neutral, secular elements of the classical Arab heritage and the common enterprise of preserving and modernizing Arabic did provide ground on which Az-Zayyāt could meet Christian Syrians, especially as fellow Arabs. The question was if this cross-sectarian cultural community did not always readily translate into a multi-sectarian political Arab community. Citing a 1896 poem by the Maronite ʿIbrāhīm al-Yāẓēyī, which called on the Arabs to awake instead of submitting to Turkish disdain, Az-Zayyāt after ʿAbd an-Nāṣr’s 1952 Revolution projected a sense of the Christian and Muslim Arabs as co-victims of the Ottoman Turks who ultimately waged a common fight for independence as a linguistic nation⁹². Anṭūn al-Gumayyīl had let ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān ʿAzzām use “Al-Ahrām” as a forum for pan-Arabism but the Islamist Az-Zayyāt failed even more than ʿAzzām to make the contemporary pan-Arab political community religiously neutral and evoke Christians in it.

Prior to the 1952 Egyptian revolution, Az-Zayyāt proved unable to himself realize the potentiality of political national community of Muslim with Ṭabarī to deny the existence of words of non-Arabic origin in the Qurʾān, Von Grunebaum, Medieval Islam, pp. 344-345. Al-Karmalī had been editor of the pioneering periodical of Arabic linguistics “Luğat al-ʿArab” and published a short history of Baghdad, Ḥulāṣat tarīḥ Baḡdād, George ʿAbd as-Sālib, 7 October 1990.⁹¹ Anṭūn al-Gumayyīl, pp. 152-3, 155-5.

⁹² (Radio broadcast?) Nahḍat al-ʿArab wa-ṭawratuhum fī āl-qarn al-ʿi‰rÈn (The Renaissance of the Arabs and their Revolution in the Twentieth Century), “Waḥy” vol. 4, p. 226. For ʿIbrāhīm al-Yāẓēyī’s part in the reawakening of Arab national consciousness under the Ottomans, Ḥourānī, Arabic Thought, pp. 276-7. Zeine N. Zeine and Sylvia Haim argued that the Arabism affirmed by such Christians as Al-Yāẓēyī was meant to sap the sectarianism of their Muslim Arab compatriots as much as Turkish rule. ʿIbrāhīm al-Yāẓēyī was a member of a group of young Christians, many of whom had studied at the Syrian Protestant College in Bayrut, who in 1880 stuck up placards in Bayrut, Tripoli and Damascus calling on Muslim and Christian Arabs together to expel the Turks. Zeine N. Zeine, The Emergence of Arab Nationalism: with a Background Study of-Arab-Turkish Relations in the Near East (Bayrut: Khayats 1966), pp. 59-65. Al-Yāẓēyī’s appeal to the slumbering Arabs was certainly anti-Turkish: “you have no State that offers you support in times of distress: you are of lowly status in the eyes of the Turks, your rights usurped at their hands”; “Waḥy” vol. 4, p. 266. In a view close to speculation by Zeine and Haim, Az-Zayyāt observed that the liberal Turkish governor of Syria Midhat Pasha “encouraged” such “warning cries” as Yāẓēyī’s ode because “he nursed the ambition to become independent in Syria as Muḥammad ʿAlī became independent in Egypt”. Ibid p. 267. Cf. Haim, Arab Nationalism, p. 5. Of al-Yāẓēyī’s group, Fāris Nimr and Yaʿqūb Ṣarrīf migrated to Egypt in 1885 where they founded “Al-Muqaṭṭam” and “Al-Muqṭaṭaf”.
Christian Arabs latent in the essentia. contributions of the latter to the modernization of Arabic and its literature. Decolonization in the Middle East in the 1930s and 1940s activated Az-Zayyāt’s traditional religious community identification. In 1936 he assured a visiting Iraqi youth delegation that Egypt would join the forthcoming Arab union because “her religion has remained your religion and her language your language”. He depicted the struggle to expel the alien” as bursting forth from congregational mosques: Baghdad’s uprising occurred in the Haydarānā Mosque, Damascus’ “anger” exploded from the Umayyad Mosque, Jerusalem’s cry from the Maṣjid al-Aqṣā, Cairo’s upsurge originated from the Al-Azhar Mosque. Az-Zayyāt depicted Islam’s survival as at stake in Arab North Africa’s independence struggles. Decadent France was exercising her authority to cut North Africa off from “its two parents of Islam and Arabism”, to compel it “to assimilate to and be lost in her, to live under a flag not its own, to speak someone else’s language and to believe in other than its (native) religion”. Az-Zayyāt’s sense of decolonization as a religious struggle against a West inimical to Islam made him unaware of Arabic-speaking Christians at the side of the Muslim Arabs struggling for independence. In 1945 Az-Zayyāt accused De Gaulle’s France of attempting to force upon “the Arabs in North Africa and Lebanon and Syria” a French nationality the price of which was relinquishment of “religion”. Az-Zayyāt’s analysis in a rough way fitted the situation of the wholly Muslim North Africans, not all of whom spoke Arabic, and for whom shared religion provided a ground on which to resist the French colonialists.

94 Al-Muslimūn fī mu’tarak al-ḥuṣūb (“The Muslims in the Thick of the Momentous Events”) 5 January 1948; “Wahy” vol. 2, p. 103. Az-Zayyāt was not completely accurate here. The Blum-Viollette Plan had prescribed a procedure for “assimilation” (sic) under which qualified, educated Algerians could become French. They did not have to abandon their Muslim legal status, an earlier condition, in order to acquire French citizenship, although they were expected to adopt French as their daily as well as cultural language. Irene L. Genazier, Frantz Fanon: A Critical Study (London: Wildwood), 1973 p. 122. It was only a short time before Az-Zayyāt wrote that standard Arabic started to become a competitor to French as a literary language among modernizing Algerians: French educators were as Az-Zayyāt imagined, trying to cut Algerians off from their parent Arabism. Some French inspectors of primary education in the Algiers department laid it down in 1954 that “neither dialectical Arabic, which has only the status of a patois, nor grammatical Arabic, which is a dead language, nor modern Arabic which is a foreign language, can constitute a compulsory subject of primary education”. Neville Barbour, A Survey of North West Africa (The Maghrib) (London: OUP 1959), p. 240.
However the formulation left the impression that French policy threatened the Islam as well as Arab cultural identity of “the Arabs of Lebanon and Syria” many of whom in actuality were non-Muslim Christians. The movement for independence from French rule in Lebanon was the point enterprise of the Maronite and Sunni Muslim political bosses after they concluded the 1943 National Pact. Under it, Christian leaders would not seek alliances with Western powers and Muslim Lebanese would not seek union with other Arab states. In his references to the anti-imperialist movements in Arab West Asia in the 1930s, and especially the 1940s, Az-Zayyat in general demonstrated less awareness of the actual coalitions of Arab Muslims and Christians striving to wrest independence in Lebanon, Syria, Palestine and Iraq than, for instance, the Wafdist leader Muṣṭafā al-Nāḥḥās. Az-Zayyat knew that half-Christian Lebanon and Syria with its Protestant Foreign Minister were Egypt’s main supporters when she complained to the UN Security Council in 1947, but he saw the confrontation in Islamic terms.

96 During a visit to Palestine in 1943, An-Nāḥḥās was hailed as “the Leader of Arabism” but also got hailed in the Al-Aqṣā mosque as the protector of “the Islamic umma” (nation) by its imam. Hasanayn Karrūm, ‘Urūbat Miṣr qabla ‘Abd an-Nāṣīr, 1942 – 23 July 1952 (Cairo: Al-‘Arafi 1981) vol. 1, pp. 20-25. However, during the preparatory congress for the formation of the Arab League in Al exandria in September 1944, An-Nāḥḥās did not as he did before mention religion among the factors for Arab unification: he was well aware that the Lebanese foreign minister, who spoke was Christian. Ibid pp. 41-2. For An-Nāḥḥās’ violent protests when France dismissed the Maronite Bišārā al-ŒφÈ’s government and Egyptian mobs attacked French property and nationals, ibid., pp. 29-31.

97 Following the 1947 Security Council session during which Transjordan and Iraq tacitly supported Britain, Az-Zayyat thanked Lebanon and Syria. The President of Lebanon then was the Arabist Catholic Bišārā al-ŒφÈ and the Protestant Foreign Minister of Syria Fāris al-ŒφÈ served as Chairman of that Security Council session. Yet Az-Zayyat at the time saw “the Arab nations” as “spiritually sustained” from Islam for their struggle against imperialism. He thanked his “friend” Fāris for his discreet aid for Egypt’s cause, but Egypt’s delegation derived strength from the (Islamic) crescent in its national flag, its “Book of Allah” and the states of the Arabs and Islam”. Az-Zayyat, Awliyā’ wa-a’dā’ (“Friends and Enemies”) written 3 February 1947, “Waḥy” vol. 3, p. 226; Naḥnu wa-āz-zālim amām al-qaḍā’ (“We and the Oppressor Before the Law”), written 11 August 1947, “Waḥy” vol. 3, p. 235. Fāris al-ŒφÈ was one of the most long-standing and crrunitted Arab nationalists in Syria. In youth he was among Arabist dissidents, another was the future Sunni President of Syria Šūkhri al-Œuwvatli arrested by the Turkish governor Gāmāl Pāša following the June 1916 Arab revolt in Al-Hiḡāz. Al-al-ŒφÈ served as Minister of Finance in Faysal’s March 1920 government in Damascus. Although he participated as a Minister of Education in a 1925 cabinet under the French, he was respected as a veteran nationalist statesman when in Cairo in January 1945, he signed as Syria’s Foreign Minister the Covenant of the League of Arab States. See Stephen Hemsley Longrigg, Syria and Lebanon Under French Mandate (London: UP 1958), pp. 51, 98, 100, 174.
One exception to Az-Zayyāt’s general unawareness of Arabic-speaking Christians as participants in political decolonization in the 1940s is his 1947 statement as the first Palestine war loomed that “driving the Zionists from the heart of Arabism is not a matter that concerns Palestine or the Muslims alone, but a matter concerning all the Arab countries and all the Arabs, whether Muslims or Christians, equally”. The issue is not one of religion or race but of resistance to imperialism. In Egypt, Copts had been taking part in resistance to Zionism. However, the religious significance of the land of Palestine, Islamic shrines, always strongly motivated Az-Zayyāt to resist the establishment of a Jewish state there. Az-Zayyāt’s cultural and aesthetic Arabism admitted non-Muslim Christian Arabic-speakers into an intimate partnership to preserve and extend Arabic and its literature. For him, as had been the case with ‘Abd Allāh an-Nadīm in the nineteenth century, language almost rivalled religion as a bond and definant of social groups. In the context of the Arabic language he shared with Arab Christians, Az-Zayyāt could have an empathy for their minority experience and fears rare among Muslim Egyptians. However, when the indigenous populations faced the Western

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99 After the outbreak of the Palestine Revolt 1936, the President of the Young Men’s Muslim Association, ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd Sa’īd, became President of a Supreme Committee for the Relief of Palestinian Victims that also included Dr Muḥammad Ḥusayn Haykal. The YMMA formed a special Coptic Committee, which included Coptic politicians such as Tawfīq Dus, to conduct a fund-raising campaign for the Palestinian Arabs within their community. Thomas Mayer, Egypt and the 1936 Arab Revolt in Palestine, “Journal of Contemporary History” v, 19:2 (April 1984) p. 277. Although the veteran cleric Sergius declined, the Coptic Patriarch and other Coptic religious dignitaries attended 1947 rallies against the partition of Palestine. B.L. Carter, The Copts in Egyptian Politics (London: Croom Helm 1985), p. 109.

100 In one 1938 response to the sufferings of the insurgent Palestinians, Az-Zayyāt identified the land of Palestine with ast religious revelations and shrines, and was really anti-British and anti-Jewish. Ya’ Allāh li-Filaṭṭīn (“God’s Ruth on Palestine”), penned 1 August 1938; “Wahy” vol. 1, pp. 452-4. Also to be noted is Az-Zayyāt’s characterization of the Egyptian army that was to fight the Zionists in Palestine as “the Army of Islam”. Li-Allāhī ḡaṣṣu Miṣr (“May God aid Egypt’s Army”), written 31 May 1948, “Wahy” vol. 3, p. 253.

101 In his 1949 tribute to Al-Ǧumayyil, Az-Zayyāt was sensitive to the communal insecurity that “the bloody civil war” of 1860 bequeathed in Lebanon’s Christians (he equated them here as “the Lebanese!”), motivating them to migrate from their outlying villages to Bayrut, now the centre of modern foreign education, and from there to Egypt. He compared the Christians under the Ottomans, denied access to
imperialist camp, his deepseated instinct was to evoke Islam as the rallying-point for resistance, excluding other dimensions that anti-imperialist Arab struggle had in the 1930s and 1940s. The simplistic, galvanizing Islamic dimension of Ahmad Hasan az-Zayyāt’s political pan-Arabism would turn off most Christian Arabs: in this failure his pan-Arabism resembled ‘Azzām’s.

Az-Zayyāt: Contributions and Influence

As an older-generation intellectual, Az-Zayyāt offered new generations of Egyptians in the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s the full ardor of the impulse towards wide supra-Arab pan-Muslim community released in the school of Ġamāl ad-Dīn al-Afghānī and Muṣṭafā Kāmil. He combined both the Kamilists’ ultra-politicized drives to restructure international relations by assembling a pan-Muslim bloc and the pervasive immediacy of the classical Arabs for the books-steeped Muḥammad ‘Abduh (especially vis-a-vis modernity). Continents-spanning pan-Islamism could become a mode of international politico-economic association following nationalism, if prerequisites were met. Even in the late 1940s, though, Az-Zayyāt still visualized non-Arab Muslim populations in a vaguer and more ethnicity-blurred way than had the Kamilists at the turn-of-century: their awareness of modern political and economic possibilities for Muslim integration was distinguished in comparison.

Az-Zayyāt did increasingly recognise, as the Kamilists had at last so many years before, that the Arabic-speaking inner (nation) community was to be more tightly integrated than the multi-national pan-Islamic camp: these became two separated planes of association. Az-Zayyāt’s pan-Islam bequeathed to his Arabism, though, attitudes that posed problems for actualizing a sects-inclusive pan-Arab political community.

Aḥmad Hasan Az-Zayyāt was entirely typical of acculturated intellectuals in finally feeling conflict with Europe and the West in general rather than a narrow national struggle against only Britain. As his second language that pervaded his personality, it was through French that European Westerners registered upon him aesthetically, as potential liberal partners and as racist neo-crusaders.

education and culture in the metropolis, to the mawāli. racially non-Arab clients, whom the Umayyads excluded government positions. Christians in Syria could hope for no place in “the government of the Turks”. Anṭūn al-Ḡumayyīl, pp. 152, 157. For the mawāli, Von Grunebaum, Medieval Islam, pp. 199-202. For a revisionist, Druze, ascription of the outbreak of the 1860 civil war to a Maronite offensive from 1842 see Adnan Kasaminie, The Crippling of Lebanon (University of Sydney: Research Institute for Asia and the Pacific 1989), pp. 6-17.
Az-Zayyāt’s Arabo-Islamic vision did not always cohere, and often he reacted to events with little more than banal topicality. Yet it assured the success of his pan-Arabizing role that even when mired in the atomized mundane he always had more words than ideas, was able to convey local reality in an adaption of 9th and 10th century West Asian Arabic that built up access to an earlier, wider universe beyond the present and beyond Egypt. Taken individually, the elements that Az-Zayyāt projected and synthesized were far from unique to him among intellectuals. In regard to a new written language, for instance, idioms and vocabulary from the classical Arabs colored most of Tāḥā’s writing also; Tāḥā, however, selected mainly the classical vocabulary that a sizeable audience could follow, whereas Az-Zayyāt served up classical splinters and blocks that he often had to gloss: he was content to construct only a small ultra-committed constituency with the resolve to complete the jolting journey to a semi-integral Arabic that within modernity now would fuse all ages of the Nation’s experience. Like Zakī Mubārak, ‘Alī al-ʿ Ġārim and Tāḥā to a lesser extent, Az-Zayyāt offered a form of literary Arabic to modernity that in itself embodied, was the Arab nation and its literature. It was seized as an exhilarating expansion or liberation out of a parochial particularism and failed post-1922 political order by a section of secular-educated youth. For many whom the Egyptian government schools or deculturizing French missionary girls’ schools – left with a shaky grounding in their language, Az-Zayyāt’s holistic, millennia-spanning nationalist high Arabic offered historical coherence.

Az-Zayyāt’s 1933 rejection of neo-Pharaonism was a distinguished linguistic-nationalist definition of Egypt’s identity that unified in one totalistic assault most of the points of dissatisfaction former or ongoing Liberal-Constitutionalist-“As-Siyāsa” intellectuals now felt with that identification. The carefully-aimed assault showed his acute attunedness to modern and West-patterned cultural endeavors of a group of thinkers with which he had spent more time than with any other – all the while impervious to those theses incongruent with Islam. Az-Zayyāt smashed out only the neo-Pharaonic weak link in his acculturated clique’s overall territorial-particularist ideology. He accurately read them as, in any case, even when linguistically eroded by the West, basically continuous like him with the classical Arabs’ “Arab eloquence” and thus now ripe for linguistic pan-Arab nationalism. The decisive role of the inclusive Az-Zayyāt was to combine and bring to a head the elements for a pan-Arab aesthetic personality scattered and fragmented out among individual writers.

Since he was no systemizing, Islamist ideologue like Sayyid Quṭb, the classical Arab-Islamic past Az-Zayyāt imaged had a certain openness and diverseness that could help integrate secularist, left or Christian Arabs into
pan-Arab community, also. Given the influence written language had on Az-
Zayyāt, the contribution of modern Lebano-Syrian Christians to classicist
Arabic studies and literature bonded him to them more than to the millions of
Copts in Egypt. The political context of conflict between the Arab peoples
and imperial powers, though, activated his religion-inculcated sense of the
pan-Arab nation as Islamic, making it less attractive for Christian Arabs. Az-
Zayyāt may not have been able to bequeath a precise, hard-and-fast, Islamic
or even pan-Arab ideology but he did fire a section of the secular-educated
younger generation with a resolve to restore language patterns of the classi-
cal Arabs within new modern life. The attitude of the group that all Arabs
Were one became legitimizing orthodoxy after 1952 under ‘Abd an-Nāṣir,
and Az-Zayyāt’s admirers and followers found jobs or roles in such preexis-
tent institutions as the Arabic Language Academy where, clustered around
their master for the next decade, they have ever since been a force for purism
in language development. His classicist self-perceived elite with their res-
olute, detailed ideas of what the language had to become also took their
places in university departments of Arabic, in secondary and primary educa-
tion and in the Arab Socialist, pan-Arab and Islamic research and propaga-
tion institutes that ‘Abd an-Nāṣir established. Overall, Az-Zayyāt crucially
identified, and initiated responses to, issues of social inequality, pan-Arab
integration and Arab linguistic identity that a committed mini-elite within
the elite then carried forward with steel-hard resistance under inhospitable
As-Sādāt and Mubārak, not under ‘Abd an-Nāṣir alone.