PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AS A GLOBAL ACTOR OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS — ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE IN CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY

INTRODUCTION TO RESEARCH

It is a common perception that espionage is probably one of the oldest world’s profession — although it is hard to verify this statement today — equally hard is to imagine a modern and at the same time, important state in the international arena, without professional and efficient intelligence services. Naturally there is no different in the case of People Republic of China, whose intelligence, like any other, has some characteristic features and methods of action resulting from history or specific culture dominant in state. This work is a summary of the authors’ research, not only upon structures and specificity of Chinese intelligence (Adamczyk, Baraniuk, 2017b) but also about ways of international influence through media and cultural institutions (Adamczyk, Baraniuk 2017c) as well as the place and role of intelligence service within contemporary foreign Chinese policy (Adamczyk, Baraniuk 2017c). This article is not only the brimful of the informal research project conducted by the year, but also thanks to the publication in English is undoubtedly an added value in the form of promotion of research results, and more broadly the knowledge of Polish science in this field, abroad. Authors decided to answer the following research questions: what is the role of intelligence in the foreign policy of the state? What is probably the current structure of the Chinese intelligence? What are the most specific methods of action that the Chinese intelligence services use? To this end, they intend to use several research methods: institutional and legal analysis, historical method and qualitative analysis (see Chodubski, 2011, pp. 120-128). In the research, the authors used secondary research material in the form of scientific studies in Polish and English (naturally the result of their own previous research) as well as electronic reports and analyzes of leading foreign think tanks or internet portals devoted to international relations and the activities of intelligence services¹.

¹ Authors pointed to the problem related to access to reliable sources about intelligence activities earlier (Adamczyk, Baraniuk, 2017a).
PLACE OF INTELLIGENCE IN THE PRC’S FOREIGN POLICY

As the authors’ previous research has shown, the concept of foreign policy in Polish political science is generally understood as the activity of the state on the international arena in order to implement its interests (Adamczyk, Baraniuk, 2017a). State actors, pursuing this specific type of policy, set themselves goals that they intend to achieve in the predefined time horizon. The goals of foreign policy can be understood as Ryszard Zięba as the desired state of affairs to which the given country aspires (Zięba, 2005, p. 37).

It is worth mentioning that Zięba cites in his work a number of typologies functioning in science, the most useful for the analysis of Chinese foreign policy seem to be those proposed by Arnold Wolfers and Wolfram Hanrieder. First of them has distinguished category called: goals of self-extension (striving to change the existing order), self-preservation (preservence of already acquired assets) and self-abnegation (devotion for the good of the international community) (Zięba, 2005, p. 44). Hanrieder also proposed that the goals of the state actors should be divided into three categories: goals of preservation, attainment and restoration (Hanrieder, 1971, p. 116, Zięba, 2005, p. 44). It is worth adding that Roman Kuźniar proposes that the foreign policy goals should be divided according to the criterion of time in which they are to be implemented, content or meaning (Adamczyk, Baraniuk, 2017a, see Kuźniar, 2006, pp. 125-126).

In authors’ opinion, foreign policy of modern China can be divided into at least two periods: before and after taking control of power by Xi Jinping and his supporters. Chinese leaders at the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries (ie Jiang Zemin or Hu Jintao) basically remained faithful to the 24-character strategy” drafted by Deng Xiaoping in 1990, assuming maintaining a low profile” in foreign policy (Kaczmarski, 2016, p. 11 Adamczyk, 2017, p. 84, Pietrasik, Mierzejewski, 2012, pp. 8-10). As a result, officially among the main goals of China’s foreign policy to this day are mentioned only those that could be included in the aforementioned categories assuming primarily maintaining the status quo, i.e. maintaining independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity and sustaining social and economic development of the country (Adamczyk, Baraniuk, 2017a; Jakobson, 2013, p. 4, Weissmann, 2015, p. 154, Zhao, 2013, see more: Medeiros, 2009, pp. 45-60). It is worth recalling that in 2007, Steven Westley Mosher, as the three leading goals

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2 Cf. on the relationship between interests and foreign policy objectives (Zięba, 2005, pp. 39-43).

3 Under this term, authors understand PRC from the actual ending of Mao Zedong’s era, with the start of reforms done by Deng Xiaoping in the early 80s.

4 “Observe calmly; secure our position; cope with affairs calmly; hide our capacities and bide our time; be good at maintaining a low profile; and never claim leadership” (GlobalSecurity.org, 2018). It is worth noting that the former Polish ambassador in Beijing, Krzysztof Szumski, describes it as the constitution of 28 hieroglyphs”, so the reader can also meet with such a definition (Szumski, 2016).
of the Chinese policy, mentioned: joining Formosa (local level), extending the country’s borders to territories before the fall of the empire (regional level) and finally undermining American hegemony (global level) (Skrzyp, 2018, p. 15). At the same time, it is clearly visible that since 2012, accelerated evolution, and perhaps even a revolution, has been taking place in China’s foreign policy. Importantly, the change of discourse initiated by chairman Xi⁵ became even more noticeable after the last 19th Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC). Still in 2017, a high-ranking official of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced at a press conference that his country is ready to take on the burden of global leadership (Adamczyk, 2017, pp. 81-82), and Chinese politicians declare bluntly that by 2049 China will become the world’s superpower (the hundredth anniversary of the creation of the PRC) (Szumski, 2016). While the 19th Party Congress is boldly talking about the upcoming ‘new era’ in Chinese politics, thanks to which the state will become confident in economic and military power (Swaine, 2018; Xie, 2017), it is in the White Book of Defense published in 2015, that we can read about the need to unite Taiwan with the rest of China and the unquestionable affiliation of islets in the South China Sea, and finally about the need to protect the security and overseas interests of the state (Adamczyk, 2017, p. 92). According to the authors, the above trend indicates that soon the goals of self-extension / attainment may start dominating in Chinese foreign policy, also in the declarative sphere⁶.

As it has been proven in earlier studies, the implementation of foreign policy goals requires the state actor to use the instruments available to him, which are essentially a collection of measures, methods and methods of conduct. Foreign policy instruments are usually divided according to the area in which they are applied: political, economic, military, psychosocial and normative, and distinctions between soft and hard measures (Adamczyk, Baraniuk, 2017a, Kuźniar, 2006, p. 127). It is worth noting that the assignment of instruments to a given area of life does not necessarily correspond to the categories of goals that are used when they are used — political instruments can be used to achieve economic goals and vice versa⁷. Incidentally, the division itself is often unclear and / or artificial in science. This reflection is important because, for example, the place of intelligence among the instruments of the foreign policy of the state seems to

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⁵ Maintaining a low profile” has been replaced by striving for achievements” (Kaczmarski, 2016, p. 11). Its probably the most characteristic manifestation is the concept of Chinese Dream” often invoked by Chinese leaders (see Gut, Wilczewski, 2015, pp. 839-859; Sørensen, pp. 53-73).

⁶ In a way they can be perceived as goals of restoration — especially when we take under consideration the discourse driven by Xi Jinping regarding “a great national rejuvenation” (Adamczyk, Rutkowska, 2017, pp. 84-85; Xie, 2017).

⁷ Detailed on the subject of Chinese foreign policy instruments (see: Adamczyk, Baraniuk, 2017a).
clude a rigid classification both according to the areas of activity and the division into soft and hard media. On the one hand, secret services collect information that (after prior preparation) is used by decision makers to take the most accurate (the factor of uncertainty is never fully eliminated) decisions regarding the use of specific instruments in foreign policy, which should result in the implementation of the national objectives. At the same time, an intelligence conducting cross-border operations may function simultaneously as an economic instrument (eg lobbying for corporations or specific agreements), psychosocial (using tools available for a given country for international influence up to a psychological war), military (even exchanging information with the services of friendly countries, training their employees or taking part in arms sales transactions or finally supporting their own armed forces or disintegrating their opponent’s forces). For the reasons given above, the intelligence services should be treated as a separate category of state foreign policy instruments — artificially reducing it to one category would have limited cognitive value and would not fully capture the specific nature of intelligence activities.

**CHINESE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY**

According to Stratfor analysis more than 70 percent of Chinese intelligence operation are conducted not by officially affiliated to intelligence state institutions but by other governmental institutions (ie Xinhua News Agency, Confucius Institutes, various scientific institutions etc.) and Chinese-led non-governmental organizations (cf. Adamczyk, Baraniuk, 2017c). Stratfor analysts, note that what distinguishes the Chinese model is the fact that the above-mentioned “non-intelligence” institutions not only support the work of civilian and military intelligence, but also act separately and compete with each other. Verification of this assessment is difficult, although it is confirmed by other conclusions regarding supplementary aspects of the functioning of the Chinese intelligence. It seems necessary to start with the most general issues — ie official institutions. In the literature on the subject, it is most often indicated that there are two civilian special services in the PRC performing intelligence tasks — Ministry of Public Security (MPS) and Ministry of State Security (MSS). MPS tasks mainly cover the internal area of the country. It is an institution with a wide range of competences, it deals both with the supervision of police services and the conduct of domestic intelligence activities related to the surveillance of dissidents and foreigners in China. Last actions are coordinated together with MSS (Adamczyk, Baraniuk, 2017b). MSS is the appropriate service in the field of conducting civil foreign intelligence,

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8 Authors following Stanisław Koziej’s understanding, treat the term “national” (interest, security, etc.) interchangeably with “state”, at the same time being aware of the small differences of meaning existing after all (Koziej, 2011, p. 20).
although to some extent it also deals with the recognition and monitoring of internal threats. This institution was created as a result of the reconstruction of the Chinese security apparatus as part of the reforms initiated by Deng Xiaoping. One of the effects of these reforms was the redefinition of the current concept of China’s foreign policy in the 1980s and the abandoning policy of isolationism and the opening of the Middle Kingdom to the world. MSS was established in 1983 and gradually increased its significance in the structure of PRC foreign policy instruments. Its influence grew during the period of head of the ministry from 2007 to 2016 by Geng Huichang, previously acting as the head of China Institutes of Contemporary Relations (CICR). Geng’s analytical experience and knowledge of international affairs and related conditions for the functioning of the interview project influenced the process of professionalizing MSS and prioritizing tasks in the field of foreign intelligence (Adamczyk, Baraniuk, 2017b).

By 2013, the military intelligence included mainly three organizational units of the People’s Liberation Army General Staff Department (GSD) (Adamczyk, Baraniuk, 2017b; US-China Economic and Security Review Commision, 2010; Stratfor, 2010):

— II Department GSD — was responsible for the personal intelligence (HUMINT) and dealt with both strategic and tactical intelligence and probably shallow intelligence. In his areas of interest were mainly such issues regarding foreign armed forces as their Ordre de Bataille doctrines and strategies, ways of conducting combat, armaments and equipment, profiles of commanders, strengths and weaknesses, counterintelligence activities (Stratfor, 2010);

— III Department GSD — was responsible for signal intelligence (SIGINT) and was referred to as the Chinese NSA”. The service is one of the three largest of its kind in the world. Its tasks included identification and penetration of information systems of foreign diplomatic missions, business entities, armed forces, scientific institutions, and psychological interaction, interception of radio, cable and satellite communications, cryptography and conducting intelligence analyzes (Doval, 2013);

— IV Department GSD — was responsible for electronic fight (ELINT) but also for conducting electronic intelligence and electronic support measures (ESM). In addition to Department III and IV GSD, the organizational units of various types of armed forces (land, missile, air and navy) also undertook intelligence and reconnaissance activities (US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2016).

In 2015, a reform of the organization of the Chinese armed forces was carried out, which also affected the structure responsible for conducting military intelligence. The GSD’s competences have basically been divided into two institutions — Joint Staff Department (JSD) and Strategic Support Force (SSF). Details on the new shape of the military component of the Chi-
nese intelligence community are unknown. According to the assumptions of analysts from the Jane’s group, SSF is to take over the components of the Chinese intelligence dealing with SIGINT and information warfare (i.e., there were III and IV Department). These structures are to be closed in one organizational unit subordinated directly to the Central Military Commission. JSD takes over the human intelligence (formerly the II Department) and think tanks such as interalia: China Institute for International Strategic Studies and China Foundation for International and Strategic Studies. In the context of the discussed changes, the aspect of bureaucratic rivalry of the Chinese special services is significant. Quoted experts of the Jane’s group point out that their consequence may be the concept of using Chinese military intelligence in the first place to support operational troops and possibly the PLA leadership. As a result, the possibility of direct access to the state leadership with strategic intelligence information and, as a consequence, the significance of the military component of these services from the perspective of influence on foreign policy is diminished (Jane’s Military & Security Assessments Intelligence Centre, 2017).

However, proposals of such a far-reaching nature should still be treated as speculation. Peter Mattis, who is also a Fellow in the China Program at The Jamestown Foundation, also includes other entities subject to the Central Military Commission, including, for example, the Political Work Department, which is assumed to be responsible for psychological and information activities. In the network description of structures responsible for conducting military intelligence should also include reconnaissance and intelligence cells subordinate to seven military districts. Mattis notes that it will take a long time to identify and identify the consequences of these changes. (Mattis, Kania, 2016).

**IDIOSYNCRASIES OF CHINESE INTELLIGENCE**

As previously indicated, the intelligence services of individual countries have their specific character and methods of action resulting from such factors as the state system, its history, cooperation with the services of other states (and sometimes even dictation, as was the case in the Eastern Bloc during the Cold War) finally, cultural or ethnic separateness. Earlier research has shown that the so-called ‘modern’ China is Distributed intelligence” based, among others the use of inalienable and undisputed advantages in the form of large numbers of Chinese society and diaspora scattered throughout the world. Characteristic of the PRC secret services is also the use of guanxi in contacts with both the diaspora and citizens of the state in which they operate (Adamczyk, Baraniuk, 2017b).

As already signaled, in addition to the above structures, the collection of intelligence abroad is dealt with in a number of other institutions in China. In this context, Xinhua's press agency is
mentioned, a number of military and civilian institutes as well as scientific and research centers, cultural and educational facilities and commercial entities. It is not possible to mention all of them, in this place the point is to outline a holistic approach to their use. Depending on the profile of their activity, they both collect information (mainly from open sources but also through personal sources — journalists, scientists, businessmen, etc.) and process them. In this aspect, they operate in a sense independently, outside the structures officially involved in intelligence work. Nevertheless, they are also used as coverage’s for intelligence officers, dissemination of their network of contacts (Adamczyk, Baraniuk, 2017b, Adamczyk, Baraniuk, 2017c, pp. 269-283).

The above-mentioned state of affairs determines the specific approach to intelligence work. Considerable dismemberment and in fact the blurring of the structures responsible for conducting intelligence work in the PRC has its source in a specific approach to this area of activities. The Chinese specificity of the interview is often described by such terms as mosaic method”, “method of thousand grains of sand” or method of human wave”. In this approach, information about the rest of the world in China is a value in itself, which means that all kinds of seemingly low-value information are collected and, after their complete elaboration, are of importance to various segments of China’s foreign policy or economic development. Of particular importance in this aspect is the Chinese diaspora — due to its number and cultural-ethnic identity, which hinders its monitoring by counterintelligence services of Western countries. At the same time, previous studies by authors have shown that using the diaspora by the Chinese foreign intelligence is inextricably linked to the concept of guanxi (Adamczyk, Baraniuk, 2017b). There is no coincidence that a lot of guides and training for managers who want to do business behind the Great Wall are taking up the theme of a Far East (not just China) equivalent to a connection or social position. As the Chinese are a strongly correlated and collectivist nation, it is impossible to do much in this country without sufficiently developed and regularly maintained contacts (ie guanxi). For someone with strong guanxi (meaning one who has good relations with many important or wealthy people) we could say that he is an influential man. The strength of this influence lies in the fact that he can count on the virtually unselfish help of others with whom he is connected by guanxi. This help may come down to a loan in difficult time (accident or sudden illness), but also a happy moment of life (sending a child to study), help in finding a job, and protection when dealing with official or business matters. Interestingly, although the Chinese borrowing even a large sum of money from someone in his guanxi or ensuring a lucrative contract does not count on their return or a typical gratification, the other side should show its gratitude\footnote{Which we could directly call bribe” in our part of the world.}.
and if it were not a one-off case — the lack of showing gratitude should be in this case, be regarded as a serious failure of social norms and a contribution to breaking the relationship. In addition, it should be remembered that using a specific gratitude debt, whose return well-mannered Chinese will not demand straight, but when in need of going to ask for a favor to who he has helped earlier. As you can guess the refusal in this case is practically not an option. 

Guanshi of a typical inhabitant of the Middle Kingdom, is composed of several dozen or so circles that include: a broadly understood family, former co-workers, friends and acquaintances from a school or university, former superiors, closer and further friends, etc. Those relations are expanding and sustaining throughout his life (for the Chinese people there is nothing strange in the fact that a favor is asked from a long-lost friend from childhood or a family member of a former spouse), he often also inherits. Relationships are created through ritual giving gifts (money or material goods), often at the beginning through an intermediary who somehow gets to know sides with each other. Gifts can be used to establish and maintain relationships, but also to successfully settle a specific matter. Although it may be too simplistic, also reminiscent of cronyism and nepotism known to us from our country, it is a lot of righteousness in Karolina Miller’s words, which sums up her reflections on guanshi with the statement that who you know much more important than what you know (Miller, 2012).

According to the authors, the use of guanshi may be the strength of Chinese intelligence, both when we talk about the use of existing relations with members of the diaspora (or their families in China), and attempts to establish those with business representatives or state authorities in which the services operate. In the case of Chinese people living permanently or temporarily abroad, it is difficult to imagine a situation in which they would refuse to ask someone they know and appreciate or are grateful to. That “someone” can be an intelligence officer or the person he “asked” to make such a request to another person.

These favors may seem insignificant and in no case indicate a connection with intelligence activities — it may be the purchase of, for example, some technical literature or equipment available in stores. The situation is different with guanshi built in relations with officials or non-Chinese businessmen. The PRC secret services, through innocent gifts (calendars, books, stationery), invitations to dinners (in embassies, consulates and Confucius’ Institutes) or finally visits behind the Great Wall (officially serving the development of cooperation between cities or regions) can strive for a situation in which the official / businessman will feel obliged, perhaps not to provide help directly, but at least lobbying for Chinese interests or in extreme situations to refuse to coo-

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10 The Chinese maintain strong relationships even with very distant relatives. Nowadays, apart from the Confucian tradition, probably a significant influence on it, among others — no possibility of having many offspring.
perate with, for example, local counterintelligence. An opportunity for democratic states to counteract the emergence of such ties between officials and representatives of the Chinese side (sometimes not necessarily officers of the services) is what is paradoxically considered a weakness of many democracies (e.g., Poland), i.e., a frequent and thorough exchange of human resources in offices, which has place not only after the change of power, but, for example, only the minister/director.

**Conclusion**

The structure of the Chinese intelligence community is unclear, and the issue of description is further hampered by the reform of its military part. What should be kept in mind when analyzing this issue is the fact that China’s approach to intelligence is holistic. It includes not only institutions that officially deal with espionage, but also other entities, such as the media, universities or private entities. This fact should not be interpreted only as the use of these places as a characteristic for all intelligence agencies in the world cover for the work of intelligence officers (or at least not only), and the acquisition of information by these institutions on their own. The sense of the Chinese approach to the issue seems to have a deeper character and is inscribed in the strategic culture of the Middle Kingdom, in which information has a value in itself. In this assumption, any information obtained abroad can be meaningful and although, due to the way it is obtained, it does not exhaust the espionage, it still has the nature of intelligence activity. It should be emphasized that this is not only about the information obtained from open sources, but also from human intelligence sources, which do not require recruitment and do not involve breaking the law. In summary, it can be concluded that many Chinese entities operating abroad perform an information function for the state, similar to those of diplomatic missions (as part of its official activities, not as a cover for intelligence services). This issue influences the fact that by adopting a broad perspective, the activity of Chinese intelligence is referred to as mosaic intelligence. An extremely difficult task, going beyond the scope of this article, is to diagnose how to treat it from the perspective of national security and the possible work of relevant institutions dealing with combating and preventing foreign intelligence activities. For the present thesis, the key issue seems to be the importance of information in China, but it should be treated as an open question to what extent the stream of acquired data affects foreign policy. From an intelligence cycle perspective, data and information before being sent to decision makers must be analyzed. The source material available to the researcher interested in these issues does not allow to answer whether the People’s Republic of China has such an organized back-up of analytical institutions that would allow this.
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