DO ‘NEW WARS’ THEORIES CONTRIBUTE TO OUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE AFRICAN CONFLICTS? CASES OF RWANDA AND DARFUR.

OLD WARS VS. NEW WARS

Since the mid-1990s, a number of analysts and academics have argued that the world is witnessing changes in the nature of violent conflicts and therefore it is unavoidable to think in categories of the ‘new wars’. In classical, Clausewitzian terms, war was deemed “an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfil our will,”\(^1\) led by states, between states and in order to achieve state interests with use of national forces characterised by clear vertical structure and hierarchy. Geopolitics and ideology were the main reasons pushing states towards the war whereas the goal of the conflict was to strengthen power by defeating state’s enemy and gaining its territory. Today’s conflicts, according to ‘New Wars’ theories, are different, mainly due to the process of globalisation influencing contemporary politics and economy. They are based on the identity politics and are stimulated by personal or group interests and greed. Internal gratuitous violence invoked by irregular paramilitary troops and the population expulsion rather than traditional field battles between armies are the elements which characterise the new wars.\(^2\)

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Whereas a shift in nowadays warfare seems to be undisputed, the idea of a fundamental change of the war itself is not always perceived as such. As some scholars indicate (Henderson & Singer, Berdal), the description ‘new wars’ is in fact only a new name for different types (both domestic and international) of hitherto ‘old’ wars, including low intensity conflict. In 1992 Galvin wrote: “in the immediate future we will see the same causes of low-intensity conflict we have found in the past, including weak national administrations, lack of political infrastructure, economic stagnation, historic problems of disfranchisement for large parts of the citizenry, corruption and mismanagement, and difficult military–civil relationships.”3 Undoubtedly, in the above statement one can find far reaching similarities to the ‘New Wars’ theory even though the latter was conceptualized few years later. Furthermore, Berdal draws attention to the lack of a proper historical perspective in conflicts described as ‘new’ ones and to the tendency of simplifying as well as exaggerating the importance of global economy in sustaining civil wars.4 Nevertheless, despite limitations of the ‘New Wars’ ideas, they will become a basis for the further analysis.

NEW WARS AND AFRICA

Particularly, as Kaldor argues, the African context brings into consideration several other aspects. African states have to deal with the disillusion of post-independence hopes and problems of internal security such as rapid urbanisation and still present poverty and inequality. Further, the violence is a reaction of the established political elites to the declining legitimacy and growing inability to cope with problematic issues.5 Kaplan takes similar stance when he indicates that demographic shifts, urbanisation and environmental degradation, next to easy access to arms lead to violence and refugee problem in several parts of Africa.6 This paper aims to examine two African conflicts in the light

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5 Kaldor, op. cit., pp. 78-81.
of the ‘New Wars’ theories and their main assumptions in order to evaluate whether they fully explain causes, course of events and outcome of the wars. To make the analysis more sectional, as the case studies I selected the Rwanda Crisis with its culmination in 1994 (therefore before the rise of a new wars idea) and recent conflict in Darfur, taking place on the border of Sub-Saharan and Arab Africa (started in 2003, after the main works of the ‘New Wars’ theorists were published).

BACKGROUND

To start with, the ‘New Wars’ theories suggest that modern conflicts no longer have geopolitical or ideological background. Kaldor states that forward-looking ideas such as democracy, state-building or socialism are anachronical; that contemporary wars are based on identity politics, on “movements which mobilize around ethnic, racial or religious identity for the purpose of claiming state power,” but which in fact are fragmentative, exclusive and backward-looking. Consequently, political leaders apply identities to justify authoritarian policies and to mobilize political support by increasing fear and insecurity or simply to find scapegoats. “The greater the sense of insecurity, the greater the polarization of society, the less is the space for alternative integrative political values.”

It is not without reason that Duffield uses term ‘new barbarism’ to describe the tendency of “the anarchic and destructive power of traditional feelings and antagonisms . . . usually unleashed in times of change when overarching political or economic systems are either weakened or collapse.” In both cases, of Rwanda and Darfur, above statements seem to be justifiable, although, to be clear, identity categories used during these wars were/are strongly artificial, hardly present in the community life until they have been used as a tool for political purposes. In Rwanda, the whole population was linguistically and culturally homogenous, sharing the same Bantu language. Despite the division into three groups: the Hutu, the Tutsi and the Twa (mostly based on physical and

7 Kaldor, op. cit., p. 77-78.
8 Ibid., p. 76.
9 Ibid., p. 84.
anthropological differences and on the type of activity: Hutu were peasants whereas Tutsi cattle-herders and Twa huntsmen), they “lived side by side with each other without any ‘Hutuland’ or ‘Tutsiland’ and often intermarried.” Furthermore, long-lasting coexistence has caused the development of several social mechanisms which allowed potential antagonisms to weaken, a proof of which one can easily notice in history of the states once existing on the territory of contemporary Rwanda. However, under the rule of European colonisers the Tutsis were favoured and granted much more political power, even if the population’s majority was Hutu. In effect, the postcolonial history of Rwanda was full of violence targeting Tutsi, particularly in the 1990s when the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF; mainly Tutsi) began new civil war as a response to government’s inability to deal with economic and social problems, with its culminating point in 1994 during Rwandan Genocide when nearly 800,000 Tutsis were killed together with moderate Hutu. Nowadays, in consequence of the war, the two groups seem to constitute distinct nations, albeit they still live in one state. Similarly, the “Darfur’s historic identity has been both ‘African’ and ‘Arab’ with no sense of contradiction between the two.” All of Darfur’s ethnic groups are Muslim, all of them share strong cultural bonds, most speak Arabic and, finally, all of them share the same way of life, being both farmers and nomadic herders. The division into Arab and non-Arab groups is therefore more about political support for government in Khartoum and Arab belief of their supremacy over black population of Sudan.

Nevertheless, as Kalyvas rightfully remarks, several African rebel movements, including cases of Rwanda and Darfur, in fact “have a sophisticated political understanding of their own participation,” contrary to ‘New

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12 Wiesław Lizak, Jan Milewski (ed.), *Stosunki międzynarodowe w Afryce* (International Relations in Africa), Warszawa 2002, pp. 185-186.


15 Ibid., p. 70.

Wars’ theories they do not lack ideological agendas; they are simply not always visible for Western observers. In Darfur, two main anti-governmental forces – Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) – demand secular and decentralized state based on democracy, political pluralism and right to self-determination; ideas which supposedly are not present in the new wars era.\textsuperscript{17} Further, in Rwanda the RPF and other movements opposing the Habyarimana regime demanded democratisation and the implementation of multiparty system in order to restore human and civil rights and deal with economic crisis.\textsuperscript{18} Without doubt, the aforementioned greed can explain the massive participation in conflicts only to some extent. There is of course an element of material interest in the killings: in Darfur the Janjawiid recruit mostly from camel herders of Arab origins who “have never enjoyed traditional land rights, and who aim to gain access to the land they increasingly feel they need because of environmental pressure;”\textsuperscript{19} in Rwanda the phenomenon of looting the houses, stealing victims’ belongings or slaughtering the cattle was not the rare one. Although, as Prunier argues, these were belief and obedience to have become the main motivation to act against neighbours or co-villagers, “belief in a deeply-imbibed ideology which justified in advance what you were about to do, and obedience both to the political authority of the state and to social authority of the group.”\textsuperscript{20}

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\textbf{FIGHTING UNITS}
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In the new wars, the legitimate violence is not the state’s monopoly any longer.\textsuperscript{21} As analysts suggest, new wars are characterised by multiplicity of types of fighting units, both public and private, state and non-state. Next to regular armed forces without “clear military objectives that can be translated

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item de Waal, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 160-162.
\item Prunier, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 84-92.
\item de Waal, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 73. However, not everyone agrees with this position. For instance Morton argues that there are many aspects proving that the land and water resources are rarely the crucial causes of tension between tribes in Darfur. See: James Morton, \textit{Conflict in Darfur: A Different Perspective}, p. 9. A Resource Paper for HTSPE Limited. \textlangle http://www.htspe.com/pdfs/ConfDar.pdf\textrangle (4 March 2009).
\item Prunier, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 248.
\item Kaldor, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 115.
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into coherent strategies and tactics,” there appear also different autonomous paramilitary groups and foreign mercenaries, all lacking military order and discipline, all committing severe atrocities and being more likely to use light weapons (such as machetes) rather than heavy artillery. This kind of revolutionary warfare alters also objectives of the violent struggle, which aims to gain support of the local population instead of capturing territory from enemy forces. Finally, in conflict take part also regular foreign troops operating under the auspices of international organisations and self-defence units composed mainly of volunteers trying to defend their localities, although without adequate resources to sustain long.

In Northern Darfur, soon after the conflict began, the Arab Janjaweed troops were transformed into semi-regularized or paramilitary forces with serious support from government. Simultaneously, Khartoum started to create militias in other parts of Darfur based on both Arab and non-Arab groups as well as began a major recruitment for the Popular Defence Forces. In effect, in Darfur there are six categories of pro-government armed groups that are, in one way or another, associated with Janjaweed: the Peace Forces, the Popular Defence Forces, the Nomadic Police, the Popular Police Force, the Um Bakha irregular forces and the Um Kwak attacker forces. They operate autonomously, albeit there is a loose tie with Khartoum command. On the opposite side of barricade there is the Sudan Liberation Army, but also several self-defence groups, mainly established on a tribal basis. In the context of the Darfur War the international presence is also very significant. In 2004 the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) was established, the goal of which was to undertake peacekeeping in the conflict area. Three years later, in 2007, AMIS forces joined UN and in effect a new mission, UNAMID, was created. The African Union itself was an active player in the peace process – under its auspices a peace agreement was signed in 2006.
Similar situation took place in Rwanda where political leaders of Mouvement Revolutionnaire National pour le Développement (MRND) created militias which then carried out attacks on civilian population. The most important among them was Interhamwe which was the first civilian militia officially created for ‘tasks of social interest’, and which later became the main perpetrator of genocide.\textsuperscript{28} Another one, Impuzamugambi, fully complies with the description of paramilitary group stated by Kaldor: autonomous unit, often established by governments ‘in order to distance themselves from more extreme manifestations of violence’, mostly composed of ‘redundant soldiers’ or ‘common criminals’.\textsuperscript{29} Impuzamugambi tended to recruit its ‘soldiers’ mostly among the poor, homeless and unemployed. For these people “the genocide was the best thing that could ever happen to them. They had the blessings of a form of authority to take revenge on socially powerful people as long as these were on the wrong side of the political fence.”\textsuperscript{30} Their main rival were forces of the Rwandese Patriotic Front. However, worth pointing out is also the role of UNAMIR peacekeeping mission undertaking efforts to protect civilian population of Kigali, despite its limited resources and doubtful military capacity.\textsuperscript{31} In both conflicts the regular state forces played rather subordinate role, leaving the field for different paramilitary and militia groups. Moreover, consistently with ‘New Wars’ theories, the main, not to say the only, victims of both wars were innocent civilians.

DOMESTIC VIOLENCE

As Snow rightly remarks, “in places . . . like Rwanda, the armed forces never seemed to fight one another; instead, what passed for ‘military action’ was the more or less systematic murder and terrorizing of civilian populations.”\textsuperscript{32} Similar situation occurred in case of Darfur. It corresponds with

\textsuperscript{28} Prunier, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 401-402.
\textsuperscript{29} Kaldor, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 93.
\textsuperscript{30} Prunier, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 231-232.
\textsuperscript{32} Snow, \textit{op. cit.}, p. ix.
shifted strategy of new wars where the authorities no longer seek popular support; instead they introduce population displacement. In other words, they create unfavourable environment for all those they cannot control. Kaldor distinguishes a few techniques of population displacement, first of which is ‘systematic murder of those with different labels,’ for instance political (oppositionists) or ethnic.\textsuperscript{33} Undoubtedly, both Rwanda and Darfur were scenes of extremely violent murders perpetrated by units mentioned above. In Rwanda, the killing of Tutsis in 1994 was directed by the administrative, political and military leaders, whose main political goal was the destruction of the Tutsi as a group.\textsuperscript{34} The Human Rights Watch depicts the scale of atrocities: “In such places as the commune of Nyakizu in Southern Rwanda, local officials and other killers came to ‘work’ every morning. After they had put a full day’s ‘work’ killing Tutsi, they went home ‘singing’ at quitting time . . . The ‘workers’ returned each day until the job had been finished – that is, until all the Tutsi had been killed.”\textsuperscript{35} Surely, genocide terms should be applied here. Only slightly different is the situation in Darfur – there, in effect of Janjawiid raids on non-Arab villages, according to the estimations of different organisations, from 200,000 up to nearly a half million people were killed.\textsuperscript{36} Second category mentioned by Kaldor is ethnic cleansing, understood as expelling of population with the use of force.\textsuperscript{37} Sudanese military and Janjawiid militia’s attacks certainly aim to clear areas of their original inhabitants – they destroy villages and victims’ livestock, they loot other belongings to make sure that there is nothing to come back to; massive displacement is not only ‘unavoidable consequence’ of the


\textsuperscript{34} Allen, op. cit., p. 370.


\textsuperscript{37} Kaldor, op. cit., p. 99.
war conditions. The third technique is ‘rendering an area uninhabitable’, which can be done physically (attacking civilian targets – hospitals, homes, water sources, markets), economically (forced famines and sieges) and, what is the most crucial in the analysed cases, psychologically, through systematic rape and sexual abuse or by ‘other public and very visible acts of brutality.’ During the genocide in 1994, Rwandan women “were subjected to sexual violence on a massive scale, perpetrated by the members of the infamous Hutu militia groups” and very often brutally killed afterwards. Prunier describes instances of people being forced to kill their relatives or to watch them being sexually abused. In Darfur, Janjawid attack not only villages but also camps for internally displaced, where women are beaten and raped, men are tortured and murdered. Systematic rapes became in Sudan a kind of a weapon; they are committed publicly, in presence of victims’ husbands and children, what, except humiliation and traumatic experiences, brings also social ostracism – in local culture raped women are perceived as impure and therefore they are marginalised in communities, very often being abandoned by their families.

THE SPREAD OF VIOLENCE

“The new type of warfare is a predatory social condition.” Violence spreads very easily, especially among neighbouring countries which are the most immediately affected. It has economic and political effects: the lost trade, the spread of illegal circuits of trade, the spill-over of identity politics are just few of possible consequences for the region. Moreover, minorities in one country can be majority in others as it was with Tutsi in Rwanda, Burundi and Zaire. Rwandan Genocide undermined Mobutu’s shaky authority and legiti-

38 de Waal, op. cit., p. 69; Daly, op. cit., p. 284.
40 Allen, op. cit., p. 370.
43 Kaldor, op. cit., p. 107.
44 Ibid., pp. 107-109.
macy – in Zaire, the Hutu refugee camps were used as bases for Hutu militias what in effect led to mobilization of Zairian Tutsis against the regime.\textsuperscript{45} Similarly, conflict in Darfur had its regional implications: “Eastern Chad and Northern Central African Republic (CAR) are increasingly the location of skirmishes, full-scale battles, and abuses against the civilian population…”\textsuperscript{46} What is more, Darfur Crisis caused a regular proxy war between Chad and Sudan, mainly due to Sudanese support for the Chadian opposition in order to overthrow Idriss Déby and avoid the situation when Chad would be the operating base for international forces intervening in Darfur.\textsuperscript{47} Furthermore, new wars raise another problematic issue – the burden of refugees who are generally accepted in neighbouring countries. UNHCR gave the figure of 2.1 million refugees from Rwanda by mid-November 1994; 1,244,000 of them fled to Zaire, 577,000 to Western Tanzania, 270,000 to Northern Burundi and about 10,000 to Uganda. Adding to the above circa 1,500,000 of internally displaced gave number of 3.5 million which constitutes half (sic!) of the Rwandan population in early 1990s.\textsuperscript{48} Again, in Darfur case, at the end of 2007 UNHCR noted 1,250,000 internally displaced and about 523,000 refugees in neighbouring countries, mainly Chad and CAR.\textsuperscript{49} One should remember that the burden of refugees is not only a social problem; it is a humanitarian catastrophe when people die not only due to war injuries but also because of epidemics and lack of basic resources such as food and fresh water.

WAR ECONOMY

“The effects of these new conflicts are even more devastating than in the case of traditional cross-border wars. They strike at the very heart of a nation’s social fabric . . . threatening its political and economic development.”\textsuperscript{50} In the new wars environment, when the states are disintegrated, markets are shut

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\item[46] de Waal, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 173.
\item[47] \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 173-175.
\item[48] Prunier, \textit{The Rwanda...}, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 312-313.
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Do ‘new wars’ theories contribute to our understanding…

down as a result of fighting or blockades imposed by outside powers, the production is physically destroyed or economically collapsed, both governments and military groups have to find another sources of funding their activity. They have several options, the most common of which is loot, robbery and extortion, but also levying of taxation and tribute.\(^{51}\) Rwanda and Darfur can serve as ideal examples of the above; in both cases rich people were killed as the first ones and their valuables were stolen, the cattle and livestock were raided by militiamen. In Rwanda “the use of machetes often resulted in a long and painful agony and many people, when they had some money, paid their killers to be finished off quickly with a bullet rather than being slowly hacked to death…”\(^{52}\) However, the war effort would not be able to sustain without external assistance in forms of remittances from abroad to individuals, direct support from the Diaspora living abroad, assistance from foreign governments and humanitarian aid.\(^{53}\) In other words, the economy of new wars is decentralised and highly dependent on foreign resources, support of which is not based on geopolitics any more, but on ideology and/or ethnic and religious identity.\(^{54}\) Again, Darfur and Rwanda bring justification for these claims. In early 2003 the Darfurian rebels were supplied militarily by Eritrea and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army, albeit “most of the weapons and all the vehicles used by the rebels were seized in attacks on police and army posts in Darfur itself, brought by deserters or acquired through Chadian and Libyan networks.”\(^{55}\) Significant support was also provided by the Fur and Zaghawa business communities and Diaspora Darfurians. At the same time it is commonly known that because of its economic interests China supports Sudanese government, including military shipments despite the UN arms embargo. In Rwanda crisis, the Rwandan Patriotic Front found its ally in Uganda which was providing weapons, ammunitions and other military supplies.\(^{56}\) The RPF could also count on support from their ‘nationals’ holding

\(^{52}\) Prunier, The Rwanda..., op. cit., pp. 255-256.
\(^{53}\) Kaldor, op. cit., pp. 103-104.
\(^{55}\) de Waal, op. cit., p. 147.
\(^{56}\) Adelman & Suhrke, op. cit., pp. 42-43.
power in Burundi as well as temporarily use Tanzanian military bases situated close to the border with Rwanda.\textsuperscript{57} On the other hand, there was noticed ambiguous France’s involvement on Habyarimana regime’s side.\textsuperscript{58} Hence, it is right to state, after Kaldor, that in the new type of globalised war economy, external flows are its integral part.

**CONCLUDING REMARKS**

To conclude, the ‘New Wars’ theories contribute to the analysis of modern conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa on a large scale. They not only describe patterns of war environment but also aim to explain phenomena taking place in globalised wars, altered causes, goals and strategies implemented during these conflicts. Keen’s statement that nowadays war “is not only simply a breakdown in a particular system, but a way of creating an alternative system of profit, power and even protection”\textsuperscript{59} very remarkably corresponds with the reality of Rwanda of 1994 or Darfur after 2003. Rightfully ‘New Wars’ theorists depict human rights abuses and population displacement as defining features of contemporary conflicts; however cruel may it sound, the reasons of such atrocities provided by the theories help to understand why these processes are taking place in the world of 21\textsuperscript{st} century. Moreover, extremely important for the analysis is the claim about breakdown of the monopoly of legitimate violence and thus rise of multiplicity of types of fighting units, such as ethnic militias or private armies. Similarly, the new wars’ concept of the bureaucracies’ failure as a form of state governance and, as a result, the political mobilisation taking ethnic form help to see the problem in a new perspective. Nonetheless, the ‘New Wars’ theories disregard few aspects of conflicts set in African context. Unlike Europe, the Sub-Saharan Africa still lacks democracy and political pluralism, therefore the ideological agenda is still present in violent struggles led in this unstable part of the world, particularly in analysed Rwanda and Darfur. Furthermore, not diminishing the role of ethnic and cultural mobilisation, it cannot

\textsuperscript{57} Lizak & Milewski, *op. cit.*, p. 189.
\textsuperscript{58} Adelman & Suhrke, *op. cit.*, p. 157-158.
be perceived as a factor causing the war; it is rather its symptom or tool to intensify the scale of atrocities. However, on the whole, it is justifiable to call wars in Darfur and Rwanda the new ones.

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