THE PROBLEMS OF DEVELOPMENT AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE REGION OF THE SOUTHERN BALTIC

edited by T. Palmowski, S. Vaitekūnas

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Preface

The Department of Regional Development Geography, University of Gdańsk and Department of Human Geography, University of Klaipėda have been cooperating for years studying political, social and economic processes in Baltic Europe, with special attention to the role of the Baltic Assembly, Kaliningrad Oblast and northern Poland. Scientific cooperation of the two Departments significantly supports and strengthens Baltic Europe integration processes. This publication brings forward the research focused cooperation development.

The book addressed to our readers comprises three parts. The first part is devoted to general maritime issues and includes two articles. Stasys Vaitekūnas studies Lithuanian marine traditions. Rimas Žaromskis focuses on analysing the importance of ports. The second part is devoted to the impact of European Union enlargement on the states in the region. It starts with a general study by Tadeusz Palmowski. This is followed by specific studies on Polish – Lithuanian – Russian cooperation (Sylwia Dolzblasz, Andrzej Raczyk), the significance of the Kaliningrad Oblast for international cooperation (Gennadiy Fedorov, Valentin Korneyevets) and Polish Russian cooperation (Roman Szul oraz Renata Anisiewicz). This part ends with two articles devoted to demographic (Aleksandra Cicharska) and economic transformations (Tomasz Michalski, Nazar Hlynskyy) in the region. Part three reverts to maritime issues in more detail. The first two articles (by Zaucha, Katarzyna Ścibior oraz Armands Pužulis) focus on spatial development of the Polish and Latvian coast. The following two articles (by Eduardas Spiriajevas and Vadim Pštýka) show the tourist potential of coastal areas on the example of Lithuania, Russia and Poland.

We hope that the studies combining two perspectives: geographical (relating to the coastal location of the analysed region) and political (resulting from the European Union enlargement process eastwards) provide a more comprehensive look at the political, social and economic issues of the communities inhabiting the Baltic Assembly, Kaliningrad Oblast and northern Poland.

Tadeusz Palmowski, Stasys Vaitekūnas
Lithuanians: from agrarian to sea nation?  
(Historical-geographical study)

1. Geopoliticians about seas

From ancient times seas and oceans had been hugely impacting on human civilizations, economic and cultural development. Seas had been both dividing nations and creating conditions for their communication, interchange and trading, whereas, coastal areas would become first colonies of stronger nations. Ancient Greek thinkers and scientists noticed that nations, living in coastal areas, always are more proactive, countries themselves – richer, as sea remains as open routes of trading with other countries. Goods and information about new countries, their people, manufacturing tools, farming and manufacturing innovations come and go via them. Greeks had already realized that their country and surrounding islands were in extremely good geographical position, which enabled to develop and acquire extra knowledge. The latter appeared to be as important, as brought spice and silk, copper and ebony. Later French geographer K. Valua maintained that „sea is the educator of national efforts“ (la mer est éducation d’effort).

The period of great geographical discoveries changed attitude of national leaders towards seas and oceans, but shipbuilding devices and technologies of the time were not yet good enough for wholesale building of ships, though the idea of entrenchment into global waters was already alive. After improvement of shipbuilding only and introduction of steam power, modern ship engines, shipbuilding became wholesale, though economically strong countries only, very often enriched by plunder of colonial resources and their consumption, could afford it. Theoretical symbol of sea power came later – starting with 19th century, when geographers, politicians and military experts became involved in it. This period is related to the birth of a new science – geopolitics. An important role in geopolitics belonged to sea related issues. German geographer Friedrich Ratzel (1844–1904) is treated as the patriarch of geopolitics. In 1901 he singled out significance of seas among seven laws of country’s expansion. He maintained that „implementing its territorial expansion, countries have to occupy regions,
vital for their existence: seacoasts, river-basins, plains and all rich terrains“ (F. Ratzel, 1901, p. 97). Thus, Ratzel equates larger waters, even river-basins to most significant and rich territories, which makes ruling over other domains very convenient. So it is not incidentally that he also turned towards Baltic territories. Looking at eastern Baltic lands and understanding that Lithuania will never come to terms with the loss of Klaipėda region, he maintains that „value of the Nemunas river mouth is so high that ten times larger inland area can not match it“ (F. Ratzel, 1923, p. 455).

Even greater attention to importance of seas in geopolitics was expressed by US researcher and naval officer, honorary doctor of Cambridge and Oxford universities, professor of Anapolis Naval Academy Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840–1914), whose ideas made huge impact on strategy of military, economic and foreign policy of USA, Great Britain, Germany and Japan. His theory remained important during both World War II and the years of ‘cold war’. He linked the power of country to oceans and seas, maintaining that best geographical situation belongs to those countries, which have direct access to seas and possess territorial waters. Besides, this position is even more improved by indented coastline (bays and gulfs for establishment of harbours), a net of overland routes, linking harbours to rearward (hinterland) territories, a national (spiritual) character, its marine spiritual content (A. T. Mahan, 1890, p. 47). A. T. Mahan also insisted upon fast development of commercial and naval fleets in his own country, at the same time disturbing this process among potential enemies and commercial rivals. Moreover, Mahan foresaw ‘marine fate’ of USA and called it ‘A Manifest of Destiny’. It is possible to maintain that some of his ideas were familiar to ancient Greece and even ancient China. Gearóid Ó Tuathail (1996, p. 39) insists that elements of Mahan’s theory could be related even to ideas of Themistocles, Thucydides and Xenophon about seas and their importance in the life of countries. This is why early Japan had been making attempts to dig in Pacific islands, treating them as specific terrains, protecting the country, as bases to start expansion from. Capture of islands and establishment of bases in them accelerated after Great Geographic Discoveries and development of conception about territorial and inland waters. Even later marine ideas of above strategists had been actively employed. In 1917 Rudolf Kjellen (1864–1922), professor of history and political sciences in Uppsala and Göteborg universities, supporter of pro-Germanic geopolitics (he introduced the term geopolitics in 1899) maintained that mission of Germany is to save Europe, to protect its nations, whereas, the Baltic Sea has to become its ‘interior sea’ (R. Kjellen, 1917, p. 42).

In modern times theories of A. T. Mahan, F. Ratzel, J. Corbett, E. Naumann and others about ‘marine power’ remained to be a specific balance weight to conceptions of ‘continental power’, advocated by H. J. Mackinder (1904),
K. Haushofer (1931, 1941), E. Neumann (1915), A. Dorpalen, 1942, p. 23, etc.

Classic theories of geopolitics, originating mostly from Germany and USA, had been rapidly expanding in other Great Powers – Great Britain, USA, Japan (F. Gyorgy, 1944; I. Bowmen, 1922; J. Fairgrieve, 1915).

Ideas of ‘marine power’ were employed in World War I and World War II (more efficiently in latter). They remained alive in the years of ‘cold war’, when USA was building powerful aircraft carriers and USSR – nuclear submarines. Presently military and peaceful competition remains intensive in all seas and oceans. Starting with 2008 even discussions about subordination of Arctic and Antarctic waters and the oceans floor become a subject of international dialogue and potential future conflicts.

Though development of overland (roads, railways, pipelines), air (including aeronautics) transport and other means of communication is rapid from the middle of 20th century and, in particular, in 21st century, significance of seas and oceans in international economics and politics remains solid. It is proved by the fact that economic zones and international waters become a subject of relevant international negotiations, since they belong to the sphere, which is already important and ill be most important in the future. They are likely to become the only ‘Clondike’ of minerals, food and vitally important drinking-water and technological water. Besides, military strategists are talking more often not only about militarized landscapes, but also about militarization of seas and coastal areas (R. Woodward, 2004, p. 74–103). Sea and other water basins remain relevant also due to the fact that 2/3 of all national borders stretch across waters. Thus, in the future issues, related to employment of seas and development of sea-power nations, will not be less significant. On the contrary, due to processes of globalization, increase of population and ecologic problems they are to become even more relevant. In that sense a logical question arises about attitude of Lithuania’s towards sea – are we a seafaring nation and is Lithuania a sea-power country?

2. The Baltic Sea and beginning of seafaring

2.1. First messages about sea and Lithuanian (Baltic) tribes

Lithuania, situated in good geographical location on south-eastern coast of the Baltic Sea, became an object of attacks and attempts to conquer, a barrier between Mongol-Tartar in the East and Teutonic Order in the West. Lithuania was important also from the viewpoint of trading. R. Žaromskis (2008, p. 46) maintains that at the end of 10th century ‘active were relations of Gothland Vikings with Russia and Constantinople via the Daugava River or the Nemunas River and the Dnieper River’. That is
why in ancient times already Lithuanians and other Baltic tribes were noticed by Greeks, Romans and even Arab merchant pilgrims and cartographers, making first *portulanus* and charts of the Baltic Sea.

Territories, here Baltic tribes of western Lithuania had been forming, were known already in ancient times. In 4th century B.C. Greek pilgrim Piteus Masalian reached Baltic coast and described them (Lietuva..., 1999, p. 5). Archaeological findings and trading relations with Greeks and Romans point to presence of boats and their building in these coastal areas. In 1375 Jafuca Cresques, a Jewish cartographer from Barcelona, originally from Mallorca, in the so-called Catalanian Map depicted the Baltic Sea, marked Klaipėda, the Nemunas River and noted down the name of these terrains – *Litefanie Paganis* (Pagan Lithuania). Maps became more precise after introduction of maps – *portulanus*. One of the oldest is designed by Anglino Dolorto in 1339. His chart included Northern Europe and eastern coast of the Baltic Sea. An illegible inscription between Riga and Königsberg is very much like Memel (A. Samas, 1999, p. 29). Lithuanian coast and Prussia are present in the sea chart – *portulanus* of the Baltic Sea, designed in Venice back in 1562 (S. Vaitekūnas, 1998, p. 57). Vilnius (Vilna), Kaunas (Kane), the Nemunas River and the Neris River are also marked in it, though their names are not yet entered up.

Appearance of maps – sea charts is an indirect evidence of the fact that certain contacts existed between Baltic ports, including trading and military onslaughts. Swedish Vikings in their flat-bottomed boats would reach the coasts of western Lithuania, devastating its settlements. Supposedly, the castle of Apuolia was attacked by Swedes, who came overland and from the sea. Facts and archaeological findings, recorded chronicles, confirm that boats in southern and south-eastern part of the Baltic Sea used to be built in prehistoric, times, B.C. They could be small oared, very often dugout boats, suitable for navigation in rivers and coastal waters. Simplicity of boats was predetermined by technical and economical conditions of the time as well as knowledge of shipbuilding.

Constructions of boats were also dependent on local conditions of navigation – depth of waters, winds, swell, building materials. On the basis of knowledge about shipbuilding traditions of other Baltic nations it is possible to maintain that local constructions could be dugout boats, shorter and more narrow than elsewhere, with high sides and foremasts (forefoot), providing with opportunity for sailing across high waves. Such shipbuilding in Lithuanian was conditioned by vast and shallow sea shelves, shallow rivers and the Curonian Lagoon (*Kuršių marios*), absence of safe bays, protected from storms and high waves. Such boats served better for fishing, but not for distant voyages. Undoubtedly, dugout boats, mostly employed for fishing, could be used in lakes and small rivers. Existence of boats is
partly confirmed by old folk songs about their building, sailing to open seas (it is interesting that above folklore is mostly musical, coming from ancient times and easy to pass from generation to generation).

It could also be concluded that from the viewpoint of time slippage in local shipbuilding was insignificant compared to construction of navigation devices and equipment of other Baltic nations. Thus, it is possible to deny an idea out of nowhere that seas had been outlandish to Lithuanian tribes from ancient times. On the basis of comparative scientific research we have to agree with R. Žaromskis (2008, p. 37), noting that ‘inhabitants of Baltic territories started sailing very long ago, apparently in the Stone Age‘. These were mostly dugout boats. This attitude is confirmed by archaeological findings, discovered in Denmark and Poland (H. Neukirchen, 1972, p. 73). Dugout boats from burnt trunks were already made 6–8 thousand years ago. Largest of them were 9 meters in length and 1 m in width. They could hardly fit for longer voyages, when weather conditions remained unpredictable.

Boats, sailing in the Baltic Sea III–II thousand years B.C., had no sails. They were oared (Č. Kudaba, 1980, p. 16–17). Sails appeared much later. Phoenicians, Chinese, Greeks and Romans were among first ones to start employing them. There are no records about the period, when they were introduced in boats, sailing around the Baltic Sea, but it is accepted as a fact that Baltic seafaring boats – kogs (kogai) – with one single sail were already in use back in 13th century (J. Čerka, 2007, p. 460), i.e. almost at the same time, as it was in Spain or Portugal, where caravels appeared (in 1492 C. Columbus used them in his voyage). Sailers in coastal waters of Prussians and Curonians could appear even before 12th century. Piratical campaigns of Scandinavian seafarers (Vikings, Normans, Variagians) to Eastern Baltic coastal territories since 8th century (V. Žulkus, 1999, p. 53) could feed this presumption. Undoubtedly, Baltic tribes would capture or get otherwise these boats, trying later to construct them the same way and even develop.

Shipbuilding in Baltic territories was later described by German chronicles. For example, Ditleb fon Alnpeke, who is supposed to be the author of Poetical (Rhymed) Livonian chronicle (G. Latham, 1863, p. 362; S. Vaitekūnas, 1998, p. 58), maintains that Sambians, a Baltic tribe from southern coast of the Curonian Bay, together with Samogitians (žemaičiai) surrounded Memelburg castle, defended by crusaders. They besieged it in many boats, turning it into bridge, across which they could walk. Later crusaders themselves would employ that Baltic invention many times. This source enables to conclude that Lithuanians, living in coastal area of the Baltic Sea, were able to build ships and do that in big numbers.
Livonian chronicles describe another tribe – Curonians (kuršiai), who were experienced at seas..., marauding neighbouring countries, approachable by waters’. They plundered even Denmark and Sweden, and in first decade of 13th century they clashed in their piratical boats (naves piratacae) over Germans and defeated them. They also defeated Danes, depriving them of half of their ships (Scriptores rerum..., 1848, p. 525).

Existence of strong fleet among Lithuanian and other Baltic tribes is also confirmed by Swedish professor Nermann Bürger, who wrote that with his pastoral from February 16, 1229 Pope Gregory IX restricted the rights of Gothland traders. He imposed a ban on selling of goods to the heathen (like Lithuanian tribes). The ban also included ships, used by them for marauding (Svenski Diplomatarium, 1937, p. 589).

It is evident from these and other sources that Baltic tribes were in possession of different ships: their own ones, purchased elsewhere, captured in piracy or in military campaigns. This leads to another conclusion – ships could not exist without ports. Palanga, Šventoji, Juodkrantė, Nida in the Baltic Sea and the Curonian Lagoon, Rusné, Jurbarkas and other towns and settlements by the Nemunas River could serve as such ports and piers. Existence of ports in Prussian and Curonian territories is also confirmed by written sources. German researcher R. Kötzschke maintains that among others, ships of powerful Frisians also used to come to Drusin (Trusin) port in Prussian territories. Adam Bremenner wrote about a port, to which ships of Sambians (sembai), Normans, Danes, Scalvians (skalviai) were coming in 11th century (K. Pakštas, 1991, p. 221). These chroniclers and researchers noted that Prussians and Curonians alike (in those days Curonian Duchy was stronger politically and economically) had been trading with northern nations (mostly Scandinavian) for centuries. Ships with different goods (flax, honey, beeswax, ash, timber) would constantly come to Birka port in Sweden (H. Paszkiewicz, 1930, p. 246–258).

Lithuanian (Baltic) tribes were familiar with waterways around the Baltic Sea and the Curonian Lagoon, but also owned fluvial fleets. This proposition is confirmed by the fact that in 1382 duke Kęstutis reached Jurbarkas by boats and attacked the castle of Teutonic Order. Historian and historiographer Z. Ivinskis (1991, p. 18–22), who explored this period, also noted that these boats were well armed. High level of civilization among Baltic tribes is also confirmed by Finnish researcher U. T. Sirelius. In his book ‘Finnish geneology’ he wrote that in ancient times ‘contacts with Baltic (Lithuanian and Latvian) tribes contributed greatly to development of Finnish civilization. They became more advanced in stockbreeding, familiarized themselves with new species of grain, developed their constructions, improved their seafaring and sailing skills” (U. T. Sirelius, 1925, p. 37). Thus, it is safe to say that at the end of 1st
millennium and at the beginning of 2nd millennium Lithuanian tribes had a developed ‘continental’ and marine economy, which contributed to long survival of heathenism in Europe, prevented the aggregate of southern Teutonic and northern Livonian Orders. Even in hardest economic times and war periods eastern Baltic territories remained Lithuanian (Z. Zinkevičius, 1997, p. 175; 2005, p. 31). It is indirectly confirmed by medieval geographer and cartographer Gerard Mercator. In map ‘Lithuania’ from his ‘Atlas sive cosmographicae meditations’ (third edition), printed in Duisburg back in 1595, he introduces about 20 rivers and 60 settlements at the territory of modern Lithuania. On the other side of the map there is a description of Lithuania (Lietuva žemelapiuose, 2002, p. 44). In chapter Lithuania ducatus cum Samogitia, Russia et Volhinia (p. 99–100) of his successive work Atlantis novi pars I (editio ultima Amstedolami, 1638) he specifies information about the Great Duchy of Lithuania, relying, most probably, on old and updated data. Presenting etymology of the name Lithuania itself and other data, he writes: „Now I shall enumerate Lithuanian rivers. In the East Lithuania borders with Oka, Ugra and Lesser Don rivers, falling into the Don River. Lithuania also owns the Dnieper River, which starts in flat and swampy terrain, streaming further across entire Russia and falling into the Black Sea. Herodotus wrote much about that in his IV book, Marcelinus – in his XXI book; Strabonus, Mela, Solina also mention it. They note that ‘watery are Vilija and Nemunas rivers with boats and traders, bringing goods; they fall into Prussian Sea (the Curonian Lagoon – S.V.). All these rivers and lakes are rich with fish, including very good and tasty’. While writing about merchandise, G. Mercator notes that ‘major goods are fur: ermine, fox, marten and even ... sable (the latter is likely to come from Russian traders). They earn good profit, like beeswax, honey, ash, tar. They also prepare oak timber, the so-called Wagenschot (vančočas), which is used in Germany and Belgium as a material for private and public buildings, for household items and tackle; from here it is delivered to us via Baltic and German seas“ (J. Čerka, 2008, p. 100). G. Mercator, like most travellers, traders and chroniclers of that time, affirm that it is hard, sometimes even impossible to reach Lithuania, as it is full of swampy waters and forests. It is easier to reach them in winter time, when snow and ice covers swamps and lakes; then traders are coming.

2.2. First Lithuanian maps and thoughts about sea

Above attitude of foreigners was strongly opposed by Lithuanian grandees and traders. For example, in description of map, designed by Mikalojus Kristupas Radvila Našlaitėlis (1549–1616) back in 1613, the opposite is affirmed (J. Andrius, 1952, p. 439–450). It is said that ‘the Great Duchy of Lithuania is a vast and famed country. It is watered by fishy lakes, large
and watery rivers, among which most known are those fit for navigation: Chronon, now called Nemunas, Rubon, now Daugava, Boristen, usually associated with Dnieper, Bug, Pripet, Vilija, Berezina, Ščiara, Šventojį, Nevežis, Svisločė, Slučė, Lėna and others. It is abundant with wonderful woods, fit for hunting, gathering of honey. They also provide with sufficient amount of material for construction of houses and shipbuilding, for ash production. In all directions this country has good, straightforward, passable routes (contrarily to attitude of some authors...). All species of grain give good crop. Abundance of crop could be certified by notable ports of Riga and Kønigsberg, through which grain, delivered from Lithuania by ships, are taken further overseas. Therefore, Lithuanians are developing intensive trading with other countries... It is not that one item is exchanged into another (as some put it on paper). This nation spends money, purchasing different perfumes, spice, drinkables and gilded silk fabric needlework’ (Magni Ducatus Lithuaniae, 1613). Šventoji was a big port already in 12th century. It is marked in commercial routes of Hanseatic traders, sailing from Kønigsberg to Riga. In 1589 the port was expanded and started competing with Klaipėda. Besides, significance of the Nemunas River for trading increased since 15th century. At the same time Daugava remained an important trading route of Lithuania, in particular, of its northern regions (R. Varakauskas, 1982, p. 297).

Undoubtedly, description in the map of M. K. Radvila Našlaitelis aims at denial of above negative descriptions about the country, at showing Lithuania as a country, with which it is worth while trading and developing diplomatic – political relations. One thing can not be denied – like any other rare ‘writers’ of those times, both G. Mercator and M. K. Radvila supply with important facts that in 15th–16th centuries Lithuanian traders and rulers were familiar with navigation and waterways, accepting them as absolutely ordinary things. In that sense a logical question arises: were those ships built in Lithuania and where it was?

All sites of yards are not yet identified, but some facts confirm already known ones. Dugout boats (employment of planking followed later) and floaters were mainly built by coastal fishermen, living near small lakes and rivers and very often taking fish to fairs in towns (e.g., Klaipėda and Šilutė were centres of attraction for fishermen of the Nemunas River and the Curonian Lagoon, whereas, Vilnius – for those of the Neris River). These boats satisfied Prussians and Curonians, fishing in coastal waters of the Baltic Sea. Later sails appeared in those boats.

Supposedly, until 13th century Lithuanian ships were supplied with one single mast (apparel of 2,8–3,5 meters) with a quadrangle sail, whereas, Mediterranean ships already had 3–4 masts (with more advanced triangle sails (J. Čerka, 1968, p. 282). In 14th century Lithuania became the owner of
a big shipbuilding centre Kiev and Dnieper waterway. Favourable conditions were established for employment of local experience in shipbuilding and pier construction. Historic sources note that in ethnographic Lithuania (Lithuania Propria) boats, designed for transport of goods by rivers, were also built long before. Kaunas was the centre of shipbuilding. In 16th century vytinės, strugės, pergos, botai, skultai, kameros and other special kind of ships of average and small tonnage were built in Aleksotas shipyards („aleksotai“) of Kaunas. Besides, similar ships were built in upper reaches of the Nemunas river: in Stolbtsy, Masty, Luna (now in Belarus). A big yard was in Šiaudinė, a place opposite to Jurbarkas. In 15th–16th centuries mostly vytinės and strugai were used for transport of goods. The length of vytinė ranged from 20 to 65 m, beam – from 5 to 7 m, height – from 1,5 to 1,8 m. A cargo of 300 t could be carried by these ships. They had been carrying cargo, in particular, processed wood, to Königsberg, Gdansk and other Baltic ports. They were popular in Neris, Nevežis and Šventoji rivers and served for 10–15 years. At that time it was a heavy-duty ship. It is interesting to note that in 1884 six of them were still employed in Nemunas. Another situation was with strugai, which were close to vytinės with their particulars, though their dead-weight was smaller – up to 200 t. In spring they were drifting with loaded cargo down the Nemunas river and sold as firewood together with delivered timber. For example, 852 vytinės and strugai proceeded to Königsberg down the river back in 1676.

In 19th century these ships were replaced by baidokai – flat-bottomed sailers with one or two masts. They were 35–50 m in length, 5,5–7,5 m in width, dead-weight – from 150 to 300 t. In 1854 first German steamers came to Kaunas. In 1913 their number amounted to 21.

2.3. Did Vytautas the Great water horses in the wrong sea?

Analysis of shipping and navigation in the Great Duchy of Lithuania leads to conclusion that their development was planted to initiative of traders and grandees only. Rulers of State took slight interest in it or even kept out of this important branch of economy. Even nowadays the question remains open – why Vytautas (Witold) the Great, a well-known politician of European level, ruler of the Great Duchy of Lithuania was expanding his territories eastwards and southwards, abandoning for the time being Baltic coastal areas and ‘watering horses in the ‘wrong sea’, i. e. in the Black Sea instead of the Baltic Sea? It could be partly explained by several reasons. Vytautas’ campaigns to the coastal areas could attract attention of both Orders, striving for long wished wedding, capturing the entire Baltic coast. Their military union of the Teutonic and Livonian Orders would be unfavourable to Vytautas, could hardly be ready for war several powerful forces, supported by Popes and Western European countries. Besides, the
Golden (Mongolian-Tartars) Horde was approaching from east and south-east, harassment of Moscow dukes were also increasing. Probably, by expanding of his dominions and improving his economical and political positions he was planning a potential expansion in the coastal area of the Baltic Sea. This assumption is confirmed by Grünewald or Tannenberg (Žalgiris) battle (year 1410) soon afterwards. Status quo was better in the situation, though he never abandoned his vision of the coastal area. Thus, Vytautas the Great, regaining Samogitia (Lower Lithuania or Žemaitija) from the Teutonic Order after the battle, was insisting also upon old Prussian territories in between Uosa and Vistula rivers. On the basis of Torun Peace Treaty (1411) the Great Duchy of Lithuania regained Samogitia. The case of Klaipėda was different. The Teutonic Order was trying to prove that the area belonged to them, since it was established outside Samogitia (Lites as Rec Gestae..., 1892, p. 140). Duke Vytautas disagreed with it, saying that the castle of Memel, also known as Caloypede (Klaipėda), ‘with all its independence, property and wealth is erected on genuine Samogitian soil’ and has to belong to the king Jagiello and the duke Vytautas until their death. To ground this claim an attempt was made to prove that in the west Samogitia bordered with the sea and the Curonian Lagoon (Z. Ivinskis, 1991, p. 347). Thus, in 1413 Klaipėda, standing in ethnographical Samogitia (in vera terra Samogitarum est situatum), was attached for lifelong to Vytautas and Jogaila. Back in peace talks Vytautas declared: ‘Prussia is also my patrimonial land and I will claim my rights on it up to the Uosa River, as it is a patrimony of my parents’. Another interesting fact – Moscow duchess Sofia (a daughter of Vytautas) wrote a letter to the Order, maintaining that they could not demand it (Klaipėda region and Baltic seashore), as it also belonged to her as a princess of the Great Duchy (S. Vaitekūnas, 1998, p. 21).

Finally the problem of Samogitia was settled on the basis of Meln Peace Treaty in 1422. The Order renounced its rights to Samogitia and Sudovia (Sūduva, Suvalkija) (territories on the left bank of the Nemunas River), which had been almost deserted by that time. The Order retained a strip of Lithuanian territories on the right bank of Nemunas (in the lower reaches of it). Since 1819 it is called Klaipėda region. Access of Lithuania to the Baltic Sea was secured only by a narrow strip between Palanga and Šventoji.

At that time (and even earlier) different sailing devices, like boats and small ships, used to be constructed in the territories of Prussians and Curonians. In many places of Leser Lithuania (close to the Curonian Bay, the sea, on riversides and lakesides) good craftsmen had been building very special kinds of Curonian boats (Kurenkahn). It was a kind of appellative for all boats of Curonian fishermen, though on the basis of their constructions,
size and other parameters they were further divided into *bradines, kiudelines, kurnas*.

In 14th–16th centuries Dutch shipbuilders started coming and their colonies appeared in Klaipėda, Rusnė and Labguva. With respect to current, depth and winds and other climatic conditions in the Curonian Lagoon, they started building *lomes*, which were better adapted to its shallow waters. In these waters keel was not necessary (very often it was even dangerous in shallow waters), therefore, *lomes* were additionally equipped with *šliužės* – boarding shields, attached to sides for better manoeuvres and efficient employment of different winds. Lithuanians were also involved in shipbuilding. Germans gave high appreciation to the so-called Lithuanian (*Litauer*) yards. At the end of 19th century building of *Curonian boats* (*Kurenkahn*) in the so-called Lithuanian strand (*litauische Seite*) – in the strip of the Curonian Lagoon, from Lūja till the arms of the Nemunas River mouth, from Dreverna till Labguva. It is interesting that even boats, purchased elsewhere, used to be reconstructed by local fishermen, adapting them to local conditions.

Though possessing a small strip of the coastal area, Lithuania still was dangerous and prevented the wedding of both Orders and their domains. Besides, it was the only chance of Lithuania to get access to the Baltic Sea, which intersected with interests and plans of the Teutonic Order. The Order was doing its utmost to deprive Lithuania of strong positions, ports, piers and its own ships there. Grand dukes and politicians realized it very well. After his visit to Palanga in 1427 Jogaila, king of Both Republics (Poland and Lithuania), wrote to duke of Lithuania Vytautas, who still had some old obligations to the Order and was intending to present it with a piece of land, that he would better offer some Russian territories, but not Palanga. His tone was definite: ‘If you surrender Palanga to crusaders, the people of Lithuania, Samogitia and the king himself will have reason for crying’ (Codex epistolariis Vitoldi..., 1874, p. 728).

A complicated situation in the coastal area did not allow Lithuania to establish itself as a sea-power nation, though trading relations via waterways continued despite international political situation. Though it was too late, Lithuania once again took interest in seas two hundred years after the death of Vytautas.

This interest was related to increasing Swedish harassment in 17th–18th centuries. In 1624 Kristupas Radvila, military commander of Lithuanian army, gave a long speech in Seimas (Lithuanian parliament), ‘where he described situation in Livonia, emphasizing that it is necessary to start organization of Lithuanian military fleet and establishment of military school’ (navigation –S.V.) (B. Dundulis, 1977, p. 25). In times of Žygimantas Augustas, when confederate kingdom also included Livonia and 1000 km
long coastal strip was stretching up to Finnish bay, military fleet was established and Marine Committee, directly subordinate to the king, was founded. Very soon the fleet consisted of 30 ships and more than 1000 sailors. It was actively operating from Kolobrzeg and Bornholm to Revel, Narva and Wyborg (I. Ratajczyk, 1980, p. 81). The fleet captured or destroyed a few dozens of Swedish, Danish and Russian commercial and military ships.

The ports of Šventoji and Palanga were used for trading already in 16th century. After beginning of the North War in 1701 they were destroyed and never again re-established. The Dane port in Klaipėda was mainly used until the middle of 18th century.

In 14th century Vilnius became the capital and navigation in the Neris River started developing. In 1613–1616 Gilija River was reshaped into a canal, which stimulated navigation between the lower reaches of Nemunas and Königsberg. To develop the system of waterways, in 1613–1616 a new canal connected Nemunas and Prieglius. In 1697 one more canal connected Gilija and Deimena. In 1765–1784 another watercourse (from Shchiara (Ščiara), a tributary of Nemunas to Iaseida, a tributary of Dnieper) connected ports of the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea. In 1784, on the eve of the fall of Both Republics (when it was devided between Russian, Prussian and Hungarian-Austrian imperial states in 1795), Nemunas and Dnieper were connected by Ogiński canal.

In 1824 activities around Dubysa-Venta canal started, but it was not completed (L. Dargis, 1968, p. 248). Another canal (between Juodoji Ančia and Bebra) in the neighbourhood of Augustów was started in 1823. It connected the basins of Nemunas and Vistula. It became known as the system of Nemunas waterways, also connecting basins of Prieglius (Priegola), Vistula and Dnieper. At the beginning of World War I it stopped functioning.

Unfortunately, fall of the Both Republics state stopped development of Lithuanian fleet and entire economy, as invaders tried to satisfy their own interests. A characteristic regulation – in both Russian and Prussian fleets Lithuanian recruits, as untrustworthy, had not been admitted or admitted with little exceptions to service (in lowest ranks only).

### 2.4. Lithuanian Baltic coast in the hands of aliens

In 1795 three empires – Russia, Prussia and Austria finally divided Both Republics (Polish-Lithuanian state) between themselves. Užnemunė (territories on the left bank of the Nemunas river) and a part of western Lithuania (Klaipėda region) came to Prussia (later to Germany). Coastal area north to it (Palanga – Šventoji strip) was incorporated into Russian empire (Kurland gubernya) . Lithuania was deprived of the sea.
Consolidation of German territories and growth of the state was related to development of fleet. Trying to have strong positions in Klaipėda region, Prussian (later German) administration fortified wharfs of Klaipėda and Nemunas, developed ports, corresponding to navigational requirements of the time. In 1873 a 24 km long Kaiser Vilhelm canal was completed. Ships and rafts from Nemunas could reach Klaipėda via the lower reaches of Minija River, avoiding shallow waters of the Curonian Lagoon.

Besides, in 1811 the first Examination station (Prüfungstation) of navigators was opened in Klaipėda. They were licensed and could become sailing-masters (A. Brėskis, V. Smailys, V. Sencila, 1996, p. 267). On January 15, 1825 Royal Navigation school was founded in Klaipėda. A specialized structure was erected on that occasion. Captains of coasting, navigators and deckhands were trained there. In 1843 a preparatory navigation school was also founded there. Royal navigation school was functioning until 1898, when Prussian authorities decided to close it because of political events.

In 1891–1892 Russia established Palanga Nautical College in Šventoji (settlement North from Palanga). Pilots and navigators were trained in it. It was functioning until 1900, when authorities resettled it to Riga. Numbers of Lithuanians, learning in all these schools, are unknown, but it is possible to suppose that in Prussian institutions they were very low. Major reasons of that could be official language (German) and distrust of Lithuanians. Same situation was in Russian fleet.

### 2.5. Lithuanian Baltic coast under Prussia

After division of the Great Duchy of Lithuania, Klaipėda and historic Lithuania Minor (Klaipėda with narrow territory by the Curonian Lagoon, came to Prussia. At that time Klaipėda remained to be the major and oldest Lithuanian port. It was first described by Swedish author J. Månsson (1664, p. 28). He wrote: ‘It is a small town with a castle. East-south-east entrance to the port is 15 feet long. It is closed by cape in the south. It was usual to lay a barrel in outer part of the cape, north-west of white sand dunes, about a quarter of a mile from the coast. It makes entrance possible with starboard side. The coast is very steep and it is impossible to enter the harbour with lode, if beat is northern. There are mounds on port-side and when a pilot flag is raised, entrance in lode with 2 fathoms in draught is permitted. When the barrel and mounds are passed, a turn is made to south-east, along a high sandy hill, where the coastline obtrudes forward. Depth here is about 4 or 5 fathoms. Right in the east the town and the castle stand. Inside there is the Curonian Bay – 8 miles in length and 2 miles in width’. Rafts used to be drifted down the Nemunas river to Klaipėda and sawn timber was later transported to Western Europe. In 18th century capes of
the Dangė river were prolonged to make easier entrance to the river, where ships could be protected from winds, storms and swell. Klaipėda port became one of most important Prussian ports, though officially it never belonged to Hansa Union.

Trading relations of Klaipėda increased only in the second half of 16th century. Flax, grain, hemp, flax-seed, wood, pelt were transported from Klaipėda port to Sweden, Denmark, Holland and Lübeck. Under duke Albrecht's rule trade in Klaipėda increased markedly, though it had direct contacts only with Danzing (Gdańsk), whereas, relations with other trading centres were limited only by acceptance of ships, sent from these places, and through the so-called liegerius (Liegers) (J. Sembritzki, 1900, p. 81).

In 16th century largest trading ships were started in Klaipėda. In 1549 a message was announced about completion of the first ship in Klaipėda.

In 1569 m. Stephan Bruninger with then scribe Binaventura Pryser, Philip Evert and shipbuilder Jan Jacobson built a ship of 70 lasts (1 last=3–5 thousand litres or 15 Lithuanian barrels). In 1571 a ship of 150 lasts was built, in 1568 – even a ship of 250 lasts (with a Dutch captain Johann Vonte). These ships went as far as Spain (Klaipėdos uostas, 1999, p. 19). In 1884 a lighthouse was built on northern breakwater. In 17th century trading increased with many European countries, in particular, with English cities. British lifestyle became dominant in Klaipėda. In 1839 first tugboat appeared and in 1840 – another steamer. At the same time first 50 hp (AG) tugboat was also built in Klaipėda.

Shipyards experienced shortage of space, in particular, after the fire of 1854, which devastated the town. Concern was felt about establishment of a new, safer Winter Harbour. Economical and political situation was changing, so was shipbuilding and navigation itself. Historical sources tell that at the end of 19th century number of liners in waters of Lithuania Minor was increasing rapidly. Probably, it was related to economical growth of Prussia, demand for leisure in settlements of the Curonian Lagoon, desire to know better the terrain. In 1921 five liners already shuttled across the Curonian Lagoon between Klaipėda and Žiokai (settlement at the Curonian Lagoon, closer to Königsberg).

Number of steamers was also increasing. They were small, adapted for passengers (Salondampfer, Personendampfer). Presumably, about 1880 Klaipėda – ‘Coastal joint-stock shipping company’ (Memel –Cranzer Dampfschifffahrt Gesellschaft AG) was established. It owned passenger steamers Stadt Memel and Cranz (M. Purvinas, 2003, p. 458). For many years these ships were sailing between Klaipėda and Königsberg. Later, after purchase of more ships (Condor, Germania, Phœnix), they also reached Tilže (Tilsit). Liners of new company Robert Meyhöfer were working on Königsberg –Juodkrantė – Klaipėda line, also sailing to Tepliuva and Vėliuva. Ship-
owners also arranged chartered voyages to favourite places of holidaymakers and tourists.

In 1580 a sailer with capacity of 500 t was built. It was carrying cargo to Spain (most probably, also to other European ports – S.V.) (J. Žukas, 2003, p. 464). In 1689 three big sailers were built in Klaipėda (the largest – with capacity of about 240 t). After a short flounder a new impetus for shipbuilding in Klaipėda was given by … Independence war in USA. After the end of it a group of new craftsmen from and experienced shipbuilders from England and Scotland arrived to Klaipėda. Much to the displeasure of Königsberg 9 new ships were built there in 1770–1783. It rose even higher in 1786, when a workshop of woodworkers, intending to built biggest ships in all Prussia, was established in Klaipėda. However, Klaipėda could hardly compete with Danzig, Königsberg and other Baltic ports. Shipbuilding recovered once again at the end of 18th century (in 1778–1782), when about 16 ships would be built annually. One of them was a frigate with cannons. In 1840 4 shipyards were functioning in Klaipėda. In the period of 1855–1666 they built 52 ships. It was a period of prosperity in shipbuilding of Klaipėda. In the first half of 19th century local shipbuilders focused on building of smaller ships: mostly two-master brigs and schooners. Afterwards shipbuilding was gradually decreasing. Coming of metallic ships and their building in Western countries was the basic reason for that. Local shipbuilders lacked financial resources, experienced engineers, specialists of metal, etc., which made them less competitive among rich shipbuilding companies. The fact remains – in 1876 L. Eggert built the last steamer in Klaipėda.

In 1880 Richard Schneider took initiative and established Memeler Dampfschiffs-Actienverein, the first joint-stock company of steamers. In 1880–1905 it owned 8 steamers: Agathe, Königen Luise, Lithuania, Commerzienrath Fowler, Moltke, Hawarden, Borussia, Germania. In 1905 some of these ships were purchased by local company A.H. Schwedersky Nachfolger and foreign companies.

First metallic steamer was built in Klaipėda only in 1893. Impending World War I made Germany to order many ships, mostly small tonnage ones, auxiliary, transport ships and equipment also at Klaipėda shipyards. During the war local shipyards received increasing number of orders for building of new ships and repair of old or battle-scarred ones. Among biggest shipyards of that time was Kroll & Eukert. Many ships were also launched by Klaipėda shipyard and machine works Schneider & Co. (Memeler schiffsverft un Maschinen-fabrik). These and other companies were building mostly warships (reconnaissance torpedo-boats, warships for inland waters, etc.).

There are no many messages about shipbuilding in Klaipėda region in World War I. A message survived that in 1912 Fechter’s shipyard teamed
with *Union*. At that time European countries were already aware of impending war. Therefore, this shipyard before the war and during it was building warships, mostly reconnaissance torpedo-boats (*Vorpostenboote*), minesweepers, warships for inland waters. In 1920 established a shipyard – machine works (*Schiffswerft und Maschinenfabrik*). It already employed electric welding equipment and built small heavy-duty motor-boats and dredgers. In 1920, right after the war and defeat of Germany this shipyard purchased from the navy a floating dock. It is interesting to note that German administrated shipyards were functioning even after 1923, when Klaipėda region reunited with Lithuania and the port itself became its property. For the time being Germany withdrew from its claims to the coastal area, belonging now to Lithuania, but was trying to retain geopolitical interests. In 1926 the shipyard – machine works teamed with shipping company *Wischke und Reimer*. After bankrupt of *Union* it was taken over by famous Elbing shipyard *Schichau*, which came under total control of German navy in 1942 (Žukas, 2003, p. 466). On initiative of Klaipėda engineer Paul Lindenau new modern shipyards were established at that time: *Lindenau Shipyard* (*Schiffswerft Memel – Lindenau und Co*), *Eisen und Holzschiffbau, Maschinenfabrik und Giesserei*. On the basis of them *Baltija shipyard* (*Baltijos laivy statyklą*) was established in Klaipėda after World War II. Different German archives could provide with more information about shipbuilding in Klaipėda during World Wars.

### 2.6. Baltic coast – a symbol of Lithuanian power again

After World War I Klaipėda region and the town itself had to come to Lithuania. The Entente countries were delaying implementation of that, leaving it all to patronage of the Entente countries. Under their general agreement French troops were to represent them in Klaipėda. After enormous diplomatic efforts and demands of Lithuania Minor Council the region was coming closer to restored Republic of Lithuania. It has to be noted that opinion of French government was very favourable to Lithuania. French prime minister Georges Benjamin Clemenceau in Peace Conference of Versailles said: ‘The fact that Klaipėda is to a large extent Germans could not justify legacy of entire region in German sovereignty, in particular, due to the fact that Klaipėda is the only gateway to the sea’ (Jūra, 1936, p. 5).

Revolt of 1923 put a period to the problem and on the 15th of January Klaipėda region reunited with entire Lithuania. On the 15th of June Klaipėda port was taken over by ministry of Transport, though shipyards remained in the hands of German companies. Due to political situation and shortage of resources interest in the port came later. At the beginning of 20th century Jonas Basanavičius, the patriarch of reviving Lithuania wrote: ‘Excepting that part of Lithuania, which stretches along the coast and whose habitants
have seen those waters themselves, all other Lithuanians, living up-country, only heard about it mostly in ancient folk songs. Unlike songs of other nations, these ones, heard all over Lithuania, can tell little about the sea’ (J. Basanavičius, 1970, p. 170).

After resumption of Klaipėda region ‘Jūra’ (Sea) magazine wrote in its editorial in the January of 1936 that January for Lithuania is associated not only with the beginning of new year, but also with the beginning of ‘new era, marine era’. These were years, when existence of Lithuania as a sea-power nation started, since little used Šventoji port did not become its port in the full sense of the word.

After reunification of Klaipėda with Lithuania the intelligentsia of provisional capital (Kaunas) and citizens of Klaipėda were among first ones to turn public attention to seafaring affairs. In his book ‘Political Geography of Baltic Republics’, published in 1929 and immediately translated into Latvian and Polish languages, professor Kazys Pakštas from Vytautas Magnus university forcibly described perspectives in development of seafaring business. In another book (“The Baltic Sea”) he addresses the intelligentsia, whose ‘sporting gesture would be to show its nation to the world seas and promote its will to stretch widely wings in water crossroads of mankind, since Lithuanian sea-power could be achieved in its highest degree only organizing national fleet and occupying that part of traffic (navigation – S.V.), which belongs to Lithuania. This is economy. Our own fleet and flag in world seas and ports are even more important for us and our national dignity’ (K. Pakštas, 1934, p. 17). These words, pronounced more than seventy years ago, remain relevant today.

To implement these ideas, professor of geography proposed to establish immediately Maritime department, open Maritime college in Klaipėda, Maritime company, reconstruct the port of Šventoji, establish institute of Baltic hydrologic researches. It is interesting to note that Lithuanian union of seafarers, which was established in 1935, sent a memorandum to government, introducing it to basic goals and objectives for turning of Lithuania into a sea-power, which corresponded to first three suggestions of K. Pakštas.

Competition with Liepaja port in the north and very tough competition with Königsberg in the south was depriving Klaipėda of a big share of profit, the more so because the port, regained in 1923, ‘was pitiable’. Though Lithuanian government did not understand importance the port for a great while, still in 13 years it allocated 35 million litas for its development (a huge investment in those times!). Very soon the port, known before for its export of wooden material only, got ahead of Liepaja and was rapidly approaching Königsberg. Traffic of transit goods between East and West increased, when Klaipėda was linked by railroad with Telšiai and Šiauliai.
Traffic increased from 412.2 thousand tons in 1925 to 1141.2 thousand tons in 1937.

Remaining without its own fleet until 1940, Lithuania was paying annually about 20 million litas of portage to foreign shipping companies. It led to understanding of necessity to organize national fleet. Two Lithuanian shipping companies were organized. The first one was established by local businessman M. Reišys, the second one – Lithuanian Baltic Lloyd was founded in 1936. The latter was the biggest shipping company in Lithuania. Both companies also participated in inland navigation. Besides, one more company (Schwedersky & Co.), owner of three ships, was also operating in Klaipėda port. Smaller companies were operating in Vilnius and Kaunas. They owned no ships and mostly operated as brokers, cargo agents and forwarders. Shipping company Lietgar had no ships and was closed in 1932.

In the last decade of independence over 1000 ships with flags of major countries were annually calling the port (in 1938 – 1542 ships). National fleet was also increasing rapidly. In 1939 Lithuanian flag was fluttering on 12 traders; service fleet amounted to 20 ships of different type: Lithuanian Baltic Lloyd owned: „Panevėžys“ (1567 br.reg.t), „Kaunas“ (1566 br.reg.t), „Marijampolė“ (940 br.reg.t), „Šiauliai“ (940 br.reg.t), „Trakai“ (900 br.reg.t), „Utena“ (542 br.reg.t), „Kretinga“ (542 br.reg.t); Sandėlys owned:

<table>
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<th>year</th>
<th>export</th>
<th>import</th>
<th>turnover</th>
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<td>306.6</td>
<td>105.6</td>
<td>412.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>181.1</td>
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<td>191.5</td>
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<td>530.9</td>
<td>441.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>589.4</td>
<td>461.8</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>773.0</td>
<td>368.2</td>
<td>1141.2</td>
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Nida” (900 br.reg.t), „Venta” (1250 br.reg.t); Schwedersky & Co. owned: „Friesland” (1120 br.reg.t), „Holland” (980 br.reg.t), „Gotland” (980 br.reg.t). Around 600-700 employees were working in different subdivisions of port directorate (in 1934–1939 it was headed by B. Sližys). 11 policemen were keeping peace in the port.

Every year tonnage and number of ships, calling Klaipėda port, was increasing. Tonnage of 1225 ships, calling the port in 1935 amounted to 117 000. 480 ships out of these 1225 had German flag, 226 – Swedish, 116 – Danish, 95 – British, 74 – Dutch, 53 – Norwegian, 48 – Lithuanian, 35 – Estonian, 32 – Russian, 27 – Latvian, 21 – Finnish, 11 – French, etc. (S. Vainoras, 1936, p. 4). Before World War II Lithuania was linked via Klaipėda port with Great Britain, Holland, France, Germany, Belgium, South Africa, Sweden, Italy, Israel, Norway, Finland, Poland, India, Estonia, Egypt, Morocco, Argentina, Mexico, Portugal, Tunisia, China, Madagascar, Malta, Syria, Japan, Yugoslavia, Spain, Iceland and other countries. In 1921 M. Žčas established „Lithuanian Steamer Company“, which purchased modern German ships „Jūratė“ and „Kastytis“. In 1936 Lithuanian Baltic Lloyd owned 7 ships and first two of them („Utena“ and „Kretinga“) had Lithuanian crews. Lithuania also had warship “Prezidentas Smetona” (former mine-sweeper), in which tricolour with golden Vytis Cross was raised in 1934. Main objective of this ship was to accustom young people to sea. Cadets from Navigation department of Kaunas technical college would also practice on board of Finnish trading sailer Archibald Russel.

Klaipėda mostly served as a transit port for agricultural and wood production: grain, processed wooden materials, cellulose, oak planking and logs, asp, plywood, bacon, butter, grease, flax-seed, sulphur firebrand, horses, etc.

Kaunas, Babtai, Smalininkai, Jurbarkas, Birštonas, Alytus, Raudondvaris, Kulautuva, Seredžius, Vilkija, Veliuona, Raudonė, Rusnė and other places became basic river ports and piers. Rafts from Lithuanian and Belarus woods were drifted, building materials were transported via Nemunas and Neris rivers.

In 1938 Lithuania had 686.3 km of inland waterways, suitable for navigation and rafting, 2095.2 km – for rafting only. The Curonian Lagoon with its piers in Nida, Preila, Karvaičiai, Pervalka and Juodkrantė also became important for navigation.

Much attention of independent Lithuania was paid to marine propaganda. In 1926 a sea scouts organization was established. It owned sailer „Budys“ (Watcher). In 1938 Vytautas Magnus university in Kaunas gave shelter to students’ corporation „Jūra“ (‘Sea’) (by the way, in 1995–1997 writer A. Gustaitis made attempt to re-establish it in higher schools of Lithuania, unfortunately, it resulted in failure.
Table 2. Number of ships, calling Klaipėda port in 1818–1938

<table>
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<tr>
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<td>696</td>
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<td>1900</td>
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<tr>
<td>1910</td>
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<td>1920</td>
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<td>1930</td>
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<td>1936</td>
<td>1371</td>
<td>1937</td>
<td>1414</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>1542</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Jūra, 1939, p. 16-17.

Thus, stories about Lithuanians as an exceptionally agricultural nation could be treated as one of myths, aiming at their alienation from the sea, trying to persuade them that other nations are seaborne, whereas, Lithuanians are doomed to be tillers. These myths grew together with the development of capitalism, free market and competition, also following the suggestions of famous geo-politicians – deprive small nations from access to the sea, as it is an exceptional ‘privilege’ of superpowers. These myths were particularly vital in Soviet times, when in the so-called Lithuanian fleet Russian-speaking representatives of other republics mainly were working in it, taking key positions in ships and coastal subdivisions.

On August 12, 1934 Western union of Lithuania organized in Klaipėda the first Marine day. About 60 000 people from all the country arrived to it. It was also honoured by president Antanas Smetona and ministers. On that occasion K. Pakštas book „The Baltic Sea“ was published repeatedly. After two years (on May 31, 1936) Academic marine day was celebrated. Ministers, representatives of intelligentsia, students, schoolchildren from all regions and towns arrived to Klaipėda. They swore their allegiance to the sea, vowing to create seaborne Lithuania. Among speakers were minister of education prof. J. Tonkūnas, minister of communication J. Stanišauskas, rector of Vytautas Magnus university prof. M. Roemeris, chairman of Klaipėda port directorate B. Sližys, patriarch of Lesser Lithuania M. Jankus and others. Lecturer of Klaipėda pedagogical institute A. Bendoravičius was predictive in his speech, saying that Lithuania ‘will
lose its luck, if it will be alienated from the sea – its revitalizing source. It is going to wilt, if it will not make use of all mankind’s wealth – the sea’. Ideas and thoughts of prof. M. Roemeris should also attract attention of modern-day politicians. He maintained that ‘sea is the ground of Lithuanian freedom, its potential and political orientation. Baltic regional imperatives have to govern over national politics in international community’ (Jūra, 1936, p. 7).

Wise and predictive ideas of intelligentsia made little impact on the government. K. Pakštas wrote that ‘it would be a mistake to think that ministers or parliament of continental capital would immediately realize aims and objectives of seaboard country’. In 1939 Klaipėda was lost, soon followed by loss of entire independence. After German occupation of Klaipėda region flags in all Lithuanian ships were changed to German ones. On March 23, 1939 Lithuania submitted to ultimatum of Reich and signed ‘in free will’ the treaty, receiving for 99 years its piece – free economic zone (M. Brakas, 1995, p. 106), in which many people from Kretinga were working. Lithuanian customs was functioning there, rendering service mostly to port hinterland in Lithuania. All Lithuanian ships were already registered in Šventoji port. Joint Lithuanian German Company was established for management of above zone. More influential in it were Germans, as all experienced Lithuanian experts were expelled from Klaipėda (L. Dargis, 1968, p. 252). Once again Lithuania lost its seaboard and Klaipėda port.

After World War II Lithuania regained Klaipėda port and a large part of its seaboard. Unfortunatelly, for five decades Lithuanian were once again alienated from the sea, trying to persuade them being ‘a nation of tillers’. After restoration of independence a new era of Lithuania as a sea-power country started. Still the question remains, whether we are a sea-power or seaboard nation.

3. Conclusions

From ancient times seas and oceans had been playing big role in economic, military and cultural development of sea-powers. It was noticed already by ancient nations: Chinese, Greeks, Phoenicians. European colonial powers became particularly interested in seas after Great geographical discoveries. Their geo-politicians (Fr. Ratzel, A. T. Mahan, R. Kjellen, et al.) encouraged sea-powers to develop their marine potential (build ships and harbours, control sea-lanes) and prevent others from doing that, treating them as potential competitors and war time enemies. In 21st century significance of seas and oceans in international economics and politics remains solid, since they store minerals, food and drinking-water.

Diplomats closely observe actions of each other in world oceans. This attention increased particularly in the first half of 2008, when Russia
anchored its flag in waters around North pole, as if claiming its right on the Arctic Ocean.

Navigation in Lithuanian rivers, lakes and coastal waters of the Baltic Sea started already in the Stone Age. Boats, which were sailing in the Baltic Sea III – II thousand years B.C., were oared ones. They were primitive and mostly fitted for fishing and short journeys. However, in 13th century Lithuanian ships were already sailing in the Baltic Sea, reaching Gothland, bringing there amber, honey, beeswax, flax and hemp, ash. In 14th century Jauca Cresques, a Jewish cartographer from Barcelona, originally from Mallorca, in the so-called Catalanian map depicted Lithuania as a pagan land – Litefanie Paganis (pagan Lithuania), Klaipėda port and its major rivers. These and subsequent facts deny proposition that Lithuanians are tillers, but not seafarers. Navigation was developed not only in coastal waters of the Baltic Sea, but also in the Curonian Lagoon and inland waters (rivers and lakes).

For a long period of time a large part of Lithuanian costal territories was occupied by the Teutonic Order, later – by Prussia. It happened due to rapid advance of the Great Duchy of Lithuania eastwards and southwards, to the territories of modern Russia and Ukraine. In times of duke Vytautas the Great (end of 14th century – beginning of 15th century) it reached the Black Sea.

In 1795, when Polish-Lithuanian Republic was finally divided between three empires (Russia, Austria and Prussia), southern part of the Baltic Sea fell to Prussia, whereas, northern (with Palanga and Šventoji) – to Russia. This part fell into jurisdiction of Curonian governor. Several German shipping companies were established in Klaipėda port and they started building sailers. Later they began to build steamers. In 1880 first joint stock company Memeler Dampfschiffs-Actienverein was established.

In 1923 Klaipėda region reunited with Lithuania. Big Lithuanian companies started their activity, though German companies still existed. The largest company in the port was Lithuanian Baltic Lloyd with 8 traders. In 1939 Lithuanian flag was fluttering in 12 traders. Service fleet amounted to 20 ships of different type. Number of coming ships and their tonnage was rapidly growing. Before World War II Lithuania was linked via Klaipėda port with Great Britain, Holland, France, Germany, Belgium, South Africa, Sweden, Italy, Israel, Norway, Finland, Poland, India, Estonia, Egypt, Morocco, Argentina, Mexico, Portugal, Tunisia, China, Madagascar, Malta, Syria, Japan, Yugoslavia, Spain, Island and other countries. The Curonian Bay and ports of the Nemunas river (Nida, Juodkrantė, Kaunas, Babtai, Smalininkai, Vilkija, Veliuona and others) also became important for navigation.
In 1939 was forced to give over Klaipėda port to Germany and raise flags of Reich in all ships. On the basis of treaty Lithuania was granted a free economic zone in the port for 99 years, but could not make use of it, as the rest of it was occupied by USSR. After World War II the port remained in hands of Soviet authorities. The new stage of Lithuanian shipping started only after 1990, when independence was regained.

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The East Baltic sea ports and their role in the maritime areas of different countries

Introduction
The East Baltic Sea shores between the German-Polish border in the southwest and the Russia-Finland border in the northeast extend more than 2500 km. There are over 60 ports or terminals of different size, or one port per 41 km, in average, situated at these shores. In reality, the distribution of ports is very uneven and depends on environmental and economical factors. There were better conditions for ports to be established in the bays, river mouths or their lower reaches, as well as at the islands, where the ports occur in significantly greater numbers than at the open eastern shores of the central Baltic. Along the shoreline, the greatest length (over 100 km) is between the neighbouring ports of Pionersky in Kaliningrad Region and Klaipėda in Lithuania. Long distances are also between some ports at the southern shores of the Gulf of Finland. The densest port network is in Poland, where beside two major ports of Gdynia and Gdańsk, there are also many fishing and recreation harbours, especially in the Puck Bay and the Vistula Bay. Ports are also numerous in the Gulf of Rīga (Latvia) and Estonia, where the ragged shoreline and the Moonsund Archipelago isles make conditions favourable for ports to be located.

Other natural conditions also affect (limit or promote) the location of the ports. The sea north of Ventspils becomes frozen in winter. Therefore, winter navigation ensured by ice-breakers takes place only in major Latvian ports, whereas even small Polish ports lying southwards are less dependent on freezng of the harbour water areas.

The depths in the harbours and their approaches are also very important for the development of harbour network. Long time before, the trade ports sufficed the 2–4-m depths. With the ships increasing in size, such olden trade ports as Wolin, Ustka or Elbląg in Poland, Narva-Jõesuu and Pärnu in Estonia, as well as Pāvilosta in Latvia had lost their trade centre status and turned into small harbours for fishermen and, later, recreation boats. The fate of ports situated at the larger rivers was different. The natural
depths were increased by dredging, and the port hydroengineering systems
built in olden times were gradually renovated. So, Gdańsk, Riga, Ventspils,
Klaipėda, Tallinn and Saint Petersburg have grown to the giant Baltic Sea
ports. Some ports were greatly expanded or newly built recently. So, in
the 1920s Poland had built Gdynia—one of the most modern ports of that
time in the Baltic Sea. At the end of the 19th c. and the start of 1900s, the
Tsarist Russia had performed grand modernisation works in Liepāja. Some
big ports situated in the river mouths solved the harbour depth problems
by arranging deep-water terminals closer to the sea or in the sea, as it was
in Gdańsk, Ventspils or Ust Luga, as well as by constantly dredging the
harbour entrance channels, as it was in Saint Petersburg, Ust Luga, Ventspils,
Klaipėda, Gdynia and other ports. Some other ports, being in the rivers at
their lower riches or farther inland, began developing the outer ports (so-
called avanports) at the river mouths. So, Świnoujście turned into the
avanport for Szczecin or Baltiysk for Kaliningrad. Riga has also a plan to
build an avanport in the Gulf of Riga.

Beside the peculiarities of the natural environment, a very signifi-
cant role in port establishment and development is also played by the state of
the national economy and the level of its integration into the global economy,
as well as communication network and size of the port hinterland.

The ports are formed only in the case when the economy of the adjacent
area needs communication with other states and world regions (K. E. Fick,
1979). In the past, many ports held their communication with the hinterland
by inland waterways, especially rivers. In the second half of the 19th c., in
parallel to the river transport, more and more cargo had been transported by
railways. A good example of such a practice is the Port of Gdańsk (Table 1).

Table 1. Turnover of cargo transported by the Vistula River and the railway into the Gdańsk
Port in the second half of the 19th c.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Cargo turnover, tonnes</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Cargo turnover, tonnes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vistula River</td>
<td>Railway</td>
<td>Vistula River</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1855</td>
<td>43 860</td>
<td>16 207</td>
<td>1880</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1860</td>
<td>173 602</td>
<td>54 757</td>
<td>1885</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1865</td>
<td>193 650</td>
<td>70 170</td>
<td>1890</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1870</td>
<td>172 202</td>
<td>63 308</td>
<td>1895</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1875</td>
<td>125 884</td>
<td>88 260</td>
<td>1900</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: R. Winkel, 1939.

The cargo brought to Gdańsk by the railway exceeded that imported
and exported via the Vistula River only from 1880 (R. Winkel, 1939).
It should be noted that the cargo transported to Gdańsk by the Vistula is still significant in the turnover of this port nowadays. According to the river transport share in cargo delivery, the Gdańsk Port is overtaken only by Szczecin at the Oder River and Saint Petersburg at the Neva mouth. The freight traffic to other East Baltic ports by inland waterways is small.

In the 21st c. with intermodal transport prevailing, the key role in bringing cargo into the ports is played by overland transport—mainly by the railways.

Pipelines play a crucial role for the ports, where crude oil or its products are loaded. However, only few Baltic ports (mainly in Russia) receive the oil by pipelines or pump it to the land. Now only Russian ports in the Gulf of Finland use the oil pipelines efficiently. Recently Russia has completely cut the oil supply by the land pipelines into Latvia and Lithuania.

The role of the hinterland is very important for the scale of port cargo turnover and development of the ports. This role is seen well in comparison between the eastern and western ports of the Baltic Sea. The western coast has many well-arranged ports and the communication network is well-developed in the Nordic countries, the cargo turnover in any eastern Swedish port does not exceed 10 million tonnes per year (R. Žaromskis, 2008). At the same time there are ports on the eastern coasts of the Baltic Sea where their hinterland (in a broad sense) is extended deep into the Eurasian continent. The number of such ports exceeds 10, including 8 ports with their annual cargo turnover making up tens of millions tonnes.

The Ports in Poland

In Poland the length of the Baltic Sea shoreline exceeds 400 km. Except for the Bay of Szczecin in the west, as well as bays of Gdańsk-Puck and Vistula in the east, the sea shoreline is even without coves convenient for harbours. Open sea shore is not screened by islands. On the other hand, Poland has two large navigable rivers—Vistula and Oder—with the ports situated there from the olden times, and now here are the two largest Polish ports: Szczecin at the Oder River with its avanport in Świnoujście and Gdańsk at the Vistula River. Just 18 km north of Gdańsk, there is a rather young port of Gdynia (from 1924). The port of Kolobrzeg is the fifth in size in Poland and it is situated at the mouth of the Parsęta River. If all the ports and even smallest harbours and piers for fishing and recreation boats were taken into account, in average, one port is located on a 10-km shore length. This network would be even denser, if boddens and wave-protected water areas were taken into account. This indicates a rather marine mentality of this country (R. Žaromskis, 2008).

The Polish marine economy system is the best represented by the big port complexes, such as Gdańsk and Gdynia in the east, as well as Szczecin and Świnoujście in the west.
Gdańsk is located at the confluence of the Vistula River branch and the Mołtawa River, about 6 km from the sea. As the Vistula River changed its channel the port remained in its old part, therefore it has no problems with river bed-load accumulation. In the course of time, the port expanded as far as the sea. At the end of the 20th c. (in 1974.), in order to receive deep-draught ships, Gdańsk built a deepwater Northern avanport on the open seashore with terminals for bulk and liquid cargoes. The depth at the Northern port quays reaches 17 m. In 1978, the cargo turnover of this port reached 12 million tonnes. Additional 16 million tonnes were loaded in the old port as well.

At the end of the 20th c. the cargo turnover in Gdańsk was seriously affected by political events and weakening of ties with the Soviet Union. The partners of the port were changing. In 1985, the total cargo loading decreased to 18.1 million tonnes, but later it began growing and in 1992 it reached 20.4 million tonnes (M. Dutkowski, 1995). Such fluctuations in load volumes took place in later years as well. So, in 2002 the cargo turnover decreased to 17.3 million tonnes, but in 2004 it grew again to 23 million tonnes.

Over time, not only load volume but also the load structure was changing. As far as the end of the 19th c., timber, grain and other agriculture products made the main cargo. On the first half of the 20th c., the port was loading coal in increasing volumes, and the second half of the century saw the following items in the load structure: coal, metal ore, crude oil and its products. Nowadays, modern terminals for Ro-Ro cargoes, containers, timber, phosphates and soda, as well as passenger and cruise ships are operated. Cargo structure is further changing in the 21st c.: the coal share is decreasing (from 35.7% in 2000 to 29.7% in 2005), while that of crude oil and its products is growing (from 36.6% to 49.0%). Ore and grain volumes loaded are gradually decreasing. The priority among general (unit) cargoes is now going to containers.

In 2006 Gdańsk Port declared occupying 653 ha land area and 412.5 ha water area with 106 300 m³ roofed storehouses and 548 000 m³ open sites for bulk cargo. The secured depths in the Inner Port and the Northern ports are respectively 10.2 m and 15 m. The annual loading capacity of the port is even 55 million tonnes, including net 43 million tonnes in the Northern Port.

Nowadays Gdańsk is a modern and highly competitive port providing services in a rather broad hinterland expanding beyond the boundaries of Poland.

Gdynia is a rather new Polish port the construction of which started in 1924 and finished in five years. Its specific feature is that the inner port water area is as if cut into the land, while its avanport is protected from
waves by two moles and a breakwater. The depths in the port are about 6–8 m. A very dense railway network formed in the port had to play, according to the designers, the role of ‘warehouses on the wheels. Before the WWII, Gdynia was among the most up-to-date ports in the Baltic Sea. In 1939, about 9 million tonnes of cargo had been loaded. The export of coal and agriculture products from it prevailed. Poland imported industrial goods and raw materials for its own use.

Polish specialists had chosen a very convenient place for the Gdynia port: the 10-m and 20-m isobaths lie, respectively, 200–300 m and 4 km from the sea-gate. Thus, there is no necessity to have a long entrance channel. Another convenience is that the Hel sand spit screens the port from the open sea waves. Moreover, the nearshore sediment drift is not well expressed there (W. Subotowicz, 1995), therefore accumulation of migrating sediments in the port and its entrance channel is low, while other ports have to allocate significant means for dredging (R. Žaromskis, 2008).

The Gdynia port destroyed during the war was restored by 1949. Poland used it to import such commodities as ore, grain, wool, cotton and chemical wood-pulp, as well as to export coal, cement, metals, salt and other cargoes (A. Hurd, 1957). In 1979, the cargo turnover in Gdynia port reached 14.5 million tonnes with grain making up 26.2%, general cargo 24.1%, and ore and coal 21.4% in the cargo structure (Серебряков В.В., 1981; M. Dutkowski, 1995). So, by 1980s, both the volume and the structure of cargo changed significantly. If compared to the 1950s, the share of bulk cargo increased while that of general cargo decreased. Terminals for passenger ships were also being constructed.

At the turn of the century and the first years of the 21st c., the general cargo volumes began growing, especially for containers. From 2005, the container loading in Gdynia exceeded 400 000 TEU. The passenger transport also was growing, and general loading after a slump in 1980s again reached 12 million tonnes per year.

Now the port can receive ships with the 12-m draught. There is a 10-km long quay front with modern terminals for containers, Ro-Ro, bulk cargo, oil, coal etc. Gdynia is notable for its capacious grain elevators and modern grain loading facilities. However, at a certain extent, oil loading decreased because the port of Gdańsk took this function over.

Up to now the Gdańsk–Gdynia port complex does not realise its loading potential to full extent; it can satisfy the demands not only of Poland, but also of a significantly broader hinterland.

**Szczecin** is the port in the western Poland formed in the mouth of the Oder River at a distance of about 65 km from the sea. This is a well planned river port with its sea gate being Świnoujście, thus making a joint port
complex. At the end of the 19th c., Szczecin already was closely linked not only with the Baltic ports, but also with other European and American ports. In 1897, the cargo turnover reached 2.89 million tonnes with its import structure prevailed by ore, grain, iron, timber and paraffin oil, thus, making up two thirds of the turnover. The export items were flour, spirit, herring, coal, sugar and other commodities.

Before the WWII, using the well-developed inland waterways, the port could attract cargo even from the farthest Central European regions. During WWII, 95% of the port engineering facilities were destroyed. The port with 8.5-m secured depth was restored during the first post-war ten-year period. The ships were being loaded here with coal, metals, timber, sugar, cement and grain. The import prevailed with general cargo, oil, foodstuffs (A. Hurd, 1957). The port also satisfied rather large marine transport demands of the then German Democratic Republic (GDR). In 1965, the Szczecin and Świnoujście complex handled 11.49 million tonnes, including 3.056 million tonnes exported to the markets of the then Czechoslovakia, Hungary and GDR (Schip ... , 1966). This complex was expanding further and in 1972, it satisfied demands not only of Central Poland and Silesia, but also other Central European regions, reaching 18.7 million tonnes of cargo turnover, including even 6.5 million tonnes of the transit per year (K. Łominiewski, W. Mankowski, J. Zaleski, 1975). Loading volumes were growing further and in 1974 reached 23.1 million tonnes.

With the 21st c. conditions changing, the annual cargo turnover in the Szczecin and Świnoujście complex is varying from 14 to 17 million tonnes, depending on global tendencies. Such commodities as coal, general freight and ore prevail in the loading. Moreover, general cargo is gradually growing, while coal loading decreases (R. Žaromsksis, 2008). The port also handles more products of chemical industry and containers. Today the port of Szczecin is capable to handle up to 30 million tonnes, and the potential capacity of Świnoujście is up to 12 million tonnes per year. The entrance channel is dredged to 14-m depths.

Kołobrzeg is the fifth Polish port in size and significance. From the 18th c. for about two hundred years, it was developing as a military port and a fortress. Only in the second half of the 19th c., it became a modern fishing port and fish processing centre (L. Bartoszewcz (ed), 1999). In the second half of the 20th c., the port of Kołobrzeg was developed for commercial operations. In 1985 the cargo turnover made 214 000 tonnes. But later it decreased and in 1992 m reached only 99 000 tonnes (M. Dutkowski, 1995). The depth at the quays is about 6 m; therefore ships with only 4.7-m draught can be accepted. Small ferry ships come often to this port. The sandy shores of the Baltic Sea attract numerous holidaymakers in summer.
Today many fishing boats made the port of Kołobrzeg their base. Of late years, the number of small recreation boats and yachts are also increasing here.

Besides Kołobrzeg, there are two more ports in the middle part of the Polish coastline, which are capable to satisfy the demands of commercial, middle-size fishing and recreation boats. These are Darłowo and Ustka, where fishing and commercial functions had been the priority recently, but now they are increasingly reoriented towards services for recreational boats. The marina being formed in Darłowo can receive and service even 200 pleasure-boats, and Ustka manages to maintain 120 such boats. The fishing boat berths and service infrastructure will remain in both ports as well.

From the 1990s the small boat ports became a serious branch of national economy in Polish maritime area. A whole network of Szczecin Bay small boat harbours developed in the western Poland, including Nowe Warpno, Trzebież, Wolin, Kamień Pomorski and other harbours. At the open sea shore and the mouths of small rivers, small fishing and recreation boats are received in the harbours of Dziwnów, Mrzeżyno, Dźwirzyno, Rowy, Leba, Władysławowo and Hel. The Puck Bay contains small ports of Jastarnia, Puck (a 500-place marina), Górki Zachodnie and Górki Wschodnie, Świbno as well as some piers receive boats in the Puck Bay. Many leisure ports were constructed or reconstructed in the Vistula Bay. The Elbląg should be mentioned among the small ports as the first one that began reviving the small boat navigation in this region followed by Krynica Morska, Frombork, Tolkmicko, Nowa Pasłęka and other harbours. They had been mainly local fishing ports being turned over into marinas attracting yachtsmen and anglers not only from Poland.

The large and middle-size ports (including Darłowo and Ustka) are well integrated into the road network and inland waterway system with railways reaching each of them. The small ports can be reached, as a rule, only by motorways or internal waterways. The universality level of ports and communication network development depends on the width of the zone under the social-economic impact. The small Polish ports affect directly only about 20-30-km wide zones, the middle size ports influence the 50-km wide zone, while the large port complexes expand their influence zones far beyond the limits of Poland.

The Ports in Lithuania

Among the Baltic states, Lithuania has the shortest length of the shoreline (90.6 km) and a single universal port—Klaipėda. There were several attempts to form a port at the Šventoji River mouth, 4 km southwards from the Lithuanian-Latvian border. These efforts had been interrupted by various
forces: Swedish navy in 1701, nature forces in 1924-1926 and Soviet occupation in 1940–1945. The thoughts of constructing a small port with 5–6 m deep entrance channel at the Šventoji River mouth in the 2010s are still alive; the port would be designed for small fishing and recreation boats.

Beside the Klaipėda port, oil export and import operations are being performed by the Būtingė Oil Terminal situated in the open sea opposite the shore site between the Šventoji settlement and the Latvian border.

Only the northern part of the Kuršių Marios (Curonian Lagoon) belongs to Lithuania. There are harbours for fishing and leisure boats on the lagoon coast and the Nemunas River mouth. In the 19th c. and nearly all the 20th c. these harbours were mainly used by fishermen. At the end of the 20th c. they started to be reformed so that they could provide services for leisure-boating. In 2008, there were eight such harbours and quays, including some in the Klaipėda channel; some of them are thought to be gradually turned into small marinas.

The Port of Klaipėda is situated on the eastern bank of a narrow channel joining the Kuršių Marios lagoon with the Baltic Sea. For centuries, the port embankments were only in a small Danė River falling into the Klaipėda channel. Nevertheless, the port was frequently visited, since sailboats had a secure harbourage in the channel. So, in 1771 the port had been visited by 500 ships. Klaipėda received the Kulm Law—the official status of a commercial port—in 1475, but its advanced development began only in 1878, when the two parallel moles had been built and quays were fully equipped in the Klaipėda channel. In the 19th c. Klaipėda port was famous for timber export from the Nemunas River basin woods. During the Crimea war, that was the most active period in port activities, Klaipėda received even 1300 ships per year (J. Zembrickis, 2002). Timber, flax, grain and other commodities had been shipped out from Klaipėda. At the end of the 19th c., the economic life suffered a slump and revived only during the period before the WWI.

In the 20th c., when the port’s management was taken over by Lithuania, new basins were arranged, the quays expanded and reconstructed, the entrance channel dredged to 10-m depths. In 1938, the cargo turnover reached 1.53 million tonnes (R. Žaromskis, 2000).

The port damaged during the WWII was reconstructed only after approximately 10 years. In Soviet period, as far as the 1980s, the oil, metals and grain prevailed in the cargo handled in the port. In 1988, they made even 86% of the total turnover and reached the maximum of the Soviet period in 1989–nearly 18 million tonnes.

When Lithuania regained its independence and cargo transport from Russia decreased, the loading volumes declined in the port significantly,
reaching only 12.7 million tonnes in 1995. At the same time, the intensive shake-out of the port infrastructure and loading technologies was going on. In 1999, the port water area was deepened to 14.5 m, the sea-gate reconstructed, new up-to-day terminals for ro-ro, containers, grain, fertilisers etc. constructed. It should be noted that, because Russia applied policies to protect its own ports, the share of this country’s freight in Klaipėda port was gradually decreasing. So, in 2004, Lithuanian commodities in Klaipėda port made up 67% with the rest 33% being the transit, including only 5% Russian (R. Žaromskis, 2008). Nevertheless the loading volumes are growing: 19.4 million tonnes in 2000, 21.8 million tonnes in 2005, and 29.9 million tonnes in 2008. According to containers loaded, the Klaipėda port is leading among the East Baltic ports. Numbers of passengers are also growing. About 45–60 cruise ships come to this port yearly. Now Klaipėda can receive 70 000 DWT freighters, PANAMAX ships and 100 000 DWT tankers. Having a 20-km long quay front, the port can handle 35 million tonnes of cargo. There are plans to move the deep (to 17 m) terminals (oil, gas and containers) into the open sea.

Būtingė Oil Terminal is the only buoy-type port specified for oil loading in the Baltic Sea. The most modern oil loading technologies are used in it. If compared to enclosed ports, the tanker service time is shorter here, the risk of disasters related to tanker entering, mooring, filling with oil and departure from the port is lower. The disadvantages of such a terminal are such as rapid spreading of oil spilled in the case of disaster, and low integration of such a terminal into the coastal economic and social environment.

The loading capacity of the Būtingė oil terminal is 14 million tonnes of oil per year. In 1999–2005, the terminal reloaded 39.39 million tonnes of oil, or in average, about 5.5 million tonnes per year. The best year was 2003, when the terminal serviced 105 tankers and reloaded 10.7 million tonnes of oil. The Būtingė terminal is allowed to service tankers up to 150 000 DWT. (The State..., 2006).

Small Lithuanian Ports were formed as a rule in order to meet the demands of fishing in the Kuršių Marios (Curonian) Lagoon. Small leisure boats have the only special site–Pilies (Castle) Harbour arranged in Klaipėda (for 150 boats). There are two yachting harbours: in Smiltyne situated on the other bank of the Klaipėda channel and in Nida in the central part of the Kuršių Nerija sand spit. In 2008, a small port for small boats was opened in Dreverna situated on the eastern coast of the Kuršių Marios, about 25 km southwards from the Klaipėda port gates. The Nemunas River deltaic branches hide two ports– Rusné and Minija–lying not far from the lagoon for river yachts and motor-boats. The adjacent lagoon shore has a small
harbour of Šturmai at the Ventė Horn. Small boats can tie up at the piers in Juodkrantė and other small settlements.

Thus, the ports on the Lithuanian part of the Baltic Sea coast (except the environs of Klaipėda) do not play a significant role in social-economic processes of the maritime areas. The coastal areas at the lagoon of Kuršių Marios are affected by small ports, but this area is significantly narrower than that in Poland and is just 8-10 km wide. This peculiarity was determined by fishing business that prevailed here up to now and the low development of the superstructure. Navigation of small boats and expansion of ports in the lagoon of Kuršių Marios are also limited by the closed aquatic border with Russia—the fact working against the water tourism development.

The direct influence zone of the Klaipėda port covers a large part of Lithuania; and the port’s hinterland reaches Ukraine, Kazakhstan and other countries.

The Ports in Latvia

Latvia is a country of old marine traditions having a rather long sea shoreline (498 km). Although the shoreline is not ragged, the rivers falling into the Baltic Sea and the Gulf of Riga make conditions favourable to establish rather many ports. Its major ports—Rīga, Ventspils, Liepāja—are very old; they had suffered many different changes and reconstructions. Other ports are smaller with depths of 3–5 m and mainly meant for fishermen; they were formed only in the 19th c. or the first half of the 20th c. Now they are mainly reshaped to be used for smaller boats (Yacht..., 2002). Latvian ports are well integrated into the land transportation network. By mid-20th c. the Daugava and Venta rivers were used mainly for transportation, but now they do not play serious role in it. Railways go to all coastal ports, but they are important mainly for larger ports to keep links with the hinterland. Highways are more important for small ports’ links in the maritime area. Latvian ports handle a rather large part of the cargoes in the Baltic Sea with about 60 million tonnes loaded in 2005.

Rīga is the capital of Latvia and one of the most important and old ports in the East Baltic region. In 1282 the town was also the member of the Hanseatic League with numerous merchant ships and even the military navy. It had especially close relations with the Holland, as well as Germany and England. In 1497, even 795 ships visited this port. In the 18th c. the main Riga’s partner in trade was England. The port became even more significant in the 19th c., when it became one of the key ports of Russian Empire. In 1896 the port was visited by 1236 ships, and cargo turnover reached 0.841 million tonnes. Russia was exporting rye, oat, barley, wheat, hemp and flax, and used to bring in salt, herrings, metal articles, baize, wine etc. via the Riga port (Riga, 1899). In 1880–1882, the modern moles were built in
the river mouth and the entrance channel bottom just 6-m deep was dredged to reach 7.2 m by the year of 1900. The Riga port was especially fostered and maintained in the 20th c. inter-war period, when the entrance channel depths were increased to 8–8.5 m (Latvijas ostas, 1930). In Soviet times, before 1964, the depths were also slightly increased to 8.5-9 m (G. Eberhards, 2003).

In Soviet time, rolled metals, industrial articles, cotton, chromium ore, cement and other commodities were in the export list of the USSR via the Riga port. The machines, instruments, sugar and fruits prevailed in the import. For the first time in the Soviet Union, the container terminal was built here. At the start of the 1990s the freight traffic exceeded 6 million tonnes (Г. Л. Надточий, 1985).

After Latvia regained its independence, the intensive modernisation and development of the port began. In 2002, the port was already able to receive PANAMAX ships, and its length of quays reached 14.8 km. These measures enabled to increase the cargo loading to 18.1 million tonnes. The variety of cargoes expanded significantly. From the start of the 21st c. chemicals, oil, bulk cargo (reaching 54.06% in 2004), timber, Ro-Ro cargo and containers were loaded in Riga. Now it is one of the ports most frequently visited by cruise liners. In 2008, the cargo handling in the port reached 29.56 million tonnes. In order to remain competitive the port has plans to move the deep terminals from the Daugava River into the nearshore of the Gulf of Riga. The port now experiences humanisation, i.e., small boat piers and other marine entertainment infrastructure elements are becoming more numerous in the area of the Daugava mouth and Gulf coast.

**Ventspils** is one of the ports having the highest freight potential not only in Latvia, but also in the whole East Baltic region. It is an old marine trade centre that had especially flourished in the 17th c. It was in especially close relations with Spain, Holland and England. Fishing boats nested in the ports, and there were large yards of wooden ships. Taken by the Russian Empire, the port declined substantially. Its rebirth began only at the end of the 19th c., after a railway was laid to the port in 1897. Timber, spirit, flax seeds, herring, coal and other commodities were loaded in the port. In 1900-1905, long moles were extended offshore as far as the 8.5-m depths. In 1902, the port cargo turnover was about 0.2 million tonnes. About 500 ships visited the port. In the inter-war period, about 0.25 million tonnes of cargo were handled per year. Ventspils was mainly the fishermen’s port, since the bar channel depth was just 6 m. About 100 fishing boats had their base there (Latvijas ..., 1930).

In mid-20th c., the Ventspils port was deepened to 8–9 m, and from 1962 - to 12–13.5 m. The then USSR government decided to make Ventspils a large port with its priority to export chemicals, timber and oil. After
reconstruction of moles, in 1998 the port and the entrance channel were deepened even to 17.3–17.5 m. The oil pipeline was laid from Novopolotsk and a large oil terminal was built for ships up to 120 000 DWT (Г. Л. Надточий, 1985).

After Latvia regained its independence, the cargo loaded here was diversified, although at the start of the 21st c. oil products and chemicals prevailed, making respectively 56.44% and 17.21% of the total cargo loaded in 2005. The highest volumes loaded seem to be in 2001 and reached 37.93 million tonnes. The town and port were humanised: terminals for cruise liners and ferries, as well as harbours for yachts and small boats were arranged, the Soviet time fences were replaced by nice embankments with an open view on the river and the port. The cargo volumes in the port of Ventspils are greatly depending on Russian policies. In 2002, after the oil supply by pipeline interrupted, the oil loading decreased significantly. In 2008 the port loaded only 28.57 million tonnes, at its capacity being even 80 million tonnes per year.

Liepāja is the third in size Latvian port that, under different political dependence, experienced many periods of rise and decline. If under the Livonian dukedom the port flourished, the Russian Empire period was notable for its decline. The first essential reconstruction of the port began in the 18th c., when Liepāja turned into a military port. Later, at the end of the 19th c., it was decided to develop it as powerful military, large merchant and partly recreational port. In 1894, even 2062 ships visited the port (R. Žaromskis, 2008). As far as the start of the 20th c., the port was regularly expanded and very vast hydroengineering system in the avanport was built with a 9-m depth being maintained; new warehouses were built etc. Liepāja had communication with the ports of United Kingdom, Germany, Belgium and other countries. In 1906, regular voyages to New York began from Ventspils.

During the inter-war period, the importance of the Liepāja port decreased. So, in 1919–1939, its share made only 16% of the total cargo turnover of all Latvian ports, but even 209 fishing ships based here.

In Soviet times, Liepāja became a semi-closed town and its port turned into a military navy base, although one of its basins was also used by Soviet merchant ships. The port water area formed by breakwaters got shallower. Only from 1990, the port was reshaped for civilian purposes. In 1997 and 2003, the cargo turnover reached 2 and 4 million tonnes, correspondingly. General cargo, fertilisers, grain, oil and fair amounts of Ro-Ro cargoes are reloaded in the port.

Small Latvian Ports are located mainly in the Gulf of Riga, where two small boat port areas are formed. Going north-westwards from Riga on the southern coast of the Gulf, there are small ports of Engure, Mērsrags,
Roja and Kolka, and north of Riga there are Skulte, Salacgriva and Ainaži situated. The open sea shore has small boat berths in the ports of Ventspils and Liepāja, as well as in Pāvilosta being mid-way between them. So, small Latvian ports on the open sea shores are located at a 40–70 km distance from each other, as approximately the EU standards require. A too large distance (about 90 km) is notable between the adjacent small ports south of Liepāja, i.e., in the Liepāja–Klaipėda shore-length.

Up to now the small ports serve for boats fishing mainly in the Gulf of Riga. Cargo loading is also going on in some of them. So, in 2002, Skulte, Mērsrags and Salacgriva reloaded 0.62, 0.238 and 0.149 million tonnes of cargo (J. Štrauhmanis, 2003). The above mentioned and the rest ports are increasingly putting about towards the servicing of small boats. The social and professional structure of people living on the Gulf of Riga coast had not been destroyed in Soviet times; therefore, after the independence was regained, they are easily integrating into the marine businesses. Of course, fishing does not play such serious role as it was in the past. If large Latvian ports are integrated into the vast economic Eurasian space, the impact of small Riga Gulf ports and other marine infrastructures is felt only in about 20-km wide coastal zone.

The Ports in Estonia

Estonia is a small state having a rather long shoreline stretching along the mainland part and larger islands over 3780 km (K. Orviiku, 1974). The mainland shoreline is also not short and makes 685 km. A great number of promontories, bays and islands provide a high potential for Estonians to develop marine culture, build ports and landing places.

In the inter-war period, merchant ports of Tallinn, Paldiski, Narva-Jõesuu and Pärnu were successfully operated in Estonia. In Soviet times, the ports of Tallinn, Paldiski and some others were transformed into military bases, but after restoration of independence, they were revived and expanded as merchant ones.

Today Estonia is a typical transit state. If cargo transported by sea in the Baltic region makes 1.3 tonnes per capita, that in Lithuania and Estonia makes about 7.9 and 37 tonnes, correspondingly (R. Žaromskis, 2008). The main part of the transit via Estonian ports goes to Russia, which is developing the ports of Ust Luga, Primorsk, Vysotsk and, of course, Saints Petersburg; therefore the Russian freight via the Estonian ports is gradually declining.

Tallinn is a very old town and port, that received Luebeck Law in 1230, and from 1284 it was the member of the Hanseatic League. During its long history, the administrative dependence was varying, because it performed functions not only of a port and trade centre, but also of a military bastion.
controlling the Gulf of Finland. In the 19th c. Tallinn (then Revel) was one of the main ports of Russian Empire. The key quays and basins in the port were formed in 1881–1904. A bit earlier, the railway connected the port with Saint Petersburg. Before the WWI, this military port in Russia was the fourth according to cargo turnover after Saint Petersburg, Riga and Odessa. Beside loading works, ships were being built and fish processed in the Tallinn port.

In the inter-war period, Estonian agriculture products (butter, bacon, grain and timber) were exported from Tallinn port that was closely linked to British, German, Swedish and Dutch ports. Tallinn could receive ships with 10-m draught.

Tallinn is a complex of ports located in the bay parts separated by promontories. The complex consists of Vanasadam (Old Port), Muuga, Paldiski, Paljassaare and other ports. Moreover, the above-mentioned ports, especially the Old Port and Paljassaare occupy more than one bay and consist of several rather autonomic parts. Therefore, the Tallinn port complex covers such long section of the shoreline. So, the distance from the capital to the Muuga port is about 17 km, and Paldiski is at about 50 km from it. At the end of the 20th c., the functions of the Tallinn ports changed considerably. If Paldiski was only a military port in Soviet times, now general cargo, especially metals, as well as fertilisers, peat and Ro-Ro cargoes are handled in it. In 2000, its cargo turnover reached 3.5 million tonnes. The Old Port has big warehouses, but the depth is too small to receive big vessels; now cruise liners and ferries tie up there. The largest and most up-to-date port in the complex is Muuga set in 1978, with 17.4-m depth and unlimited potential for expansion. In 2000, 17.1 million tonnes were loaded in it, while the Old Port handled only 4.25 million tonnes (V. Paulauskas, 2001). There are numerous terminals specialised for general cargoes, oil, Ro-Ro, timber, grain, containers, as well as different bulk cargoes.

From 1996 to 2002, the Tallinn port complex has gradually increased the loading from 14.8 to 37.8 million tonnes. Transit freight to Russia made the main volume in it. So, in 2000 the total cargo was 29.3 million tonnes, and even 22.5 million tonnes were transited to Russia and from it (Port..., 2000). After 2002, the loading growth slowed down, although in 2006 the port cargo turnover was still high–41.3 million tonnes. When Russia changed its economic policies towards the ports of the Baltic states, cargoes in Tallinn also decreased. Therefore, in 2008, only 28 million tonnes were loaded there.

Pärnu is a small Estonian port in the Gulf of Riga, but it doesn’t belong to the Tallinn complex. The port situated at a small and shallow bay of Pärnu, deep-draught ships do not enter it because of its depths being just
6–7 m. Fishing ships has a base there, timber, peat and other local cargoes are loaded in it. In 2000, the port reloaded 1.6 million tonnes of cargo (J. Štrauhmanis, 2003). The port is well integrated into the land transportation network, the loading volumes are not expected to rise significantly; growing attention is paid to the servicing of small boats.

**Narva**—an old port that used to be visited by Vikings and Hanseatic merchants—is situated at the Narva River that was an old trade way going towards Lake Peipus. At the end of the 19th c., there were attempts to maintain 6-m depth. Dredging was also performed here in 1924–1927. Because this river coincides with the Estonian and Russian border-line, the port is poorly used for fishing boats, and the river is used to float wood. The port quays are not in the town of Narva, but closer to the river moth in the settlement of Narva-Jõesuu. Wonderful nature, picturesque shores and good protection from sea waves create excellent conditions for a harbour of small boats.

The ports play a very important role in the Estonian coastal infrastructure. As a rule, the small ports and piers make a part of the general transportation network connecting the islands with the mainland. Such are ports of Virtsu and Värava or Rohuküla and Heltermaa located on both sides of the straits. Other small ports were formed to bring local products out and most-necessary goods in. Such are Narva-Jõesuu and Kunda to be mentioned first of all. Typical fishing ports—Veere and Narva—in the island of Saaremaa, and Lehtma in the island of Hiiumaa—also were developing; other small ports are dealing with the repair of ships (Loksa et al.). The above mentioned ports are mainly oriented towards the servicing of yachts and leisure angling boats. Among small ports, the Pirita Olympic Centre close to Tallinn is distinguishing by its infrastructure typical of the marina.

So, beside big ports, Estonia has more than 30 small ports, including 11 ones providing regular services to nearshore fishing and leisure boats. Moreover, there are also over 40 piers arranged for small ships and ferries. No other East Baltic country has such dense port network. The mainland part of Estonia affected directly by ports is at least 20 km wide, while such zone in the islands cover their whole area.

### The Ports in Russia

Russia approaches the Baltic Sea at the eastern tip of the Gulf of Finland (occupying more than 600 km of the shoreline) and in the Kaliningrad enclave (about 155 km) between Poland and Lithuania. Although the shoreline in the Gulf of Finland is rather ragged, but it becomes smooth with a shallow nearshore at Saint Petersburg. Therefore, Russian ports are located in the area of the Vyborg Bay (Vyborg, Vysotsk and Primorsk) north west of Saint Petersburg or south-westwards from it where a giant...
The port of Ust Luga is being constructed at the Estonian border. The shores dissected by bays and skerries might be favourable for ports if the bottom was deeper. There are also problems related to rather severe winters, when the gulf is covered with ice, and navigation is possible only assisted by icebreakers. Development of small ports for leisure and angling boats in Russia was suppressed by the Iron Curtain syndrome; therefore, harbours and piers for yachts are in the areas close to the city ports.

Saint Petersburg was established in 1703 in the Neva River delta. The city and the port lie at the olden trade route used by Vikings to march to South Europe, and later, during the Hanseatic period, controlled by Novgorod. The Neva waterway, important for development of Saint Petersburg, is 8–11 m deep and joins lakes of Onega and Ladoga with the Baltic Sea. This factor enables to attract cargoes from a broad hinterland. The key hydroengineering systems had been built in 1884–1914. In the 18th and 19th centuries, flax, cordage, fat bacon, wax and timber were exported from this port, and the import contained of textile, metals, dyestuffs, wine, sugar, coffee, herrings and other goods. A very important detail is that in 1851 Saint Petersburg was connected with Moscow by the railway. In 1899, the port was visited by 1930 ships. Before the WWI, the cargo turnover of the port reached 4.5 million tonnes. After the Bolsheviks took power in Russia, the economic life of the port declined: in 1931 only about 50 ships entered it, while in 1940 their number reached 100 (В. В. Понятовский, 1973).

The port severely damaged during the WWII was restored and reconstructed after it. In the 1980s, it already had 50 quays with 11.5 m depths. General cargoes, timber, metal ores, coal, fertilisers, construction materials, oil and other commodities prevailed. As far as the 1990s, the loading volumes were below the 10 million tonnes per year; but they were rapidly growing when the Baltic states separated from the Soviet Union. In 2000, 2002 and 2006, the cargo turnover reached 32.1, 41.3 and even 53.6 million tonnes, correspondingly. Such a rapid rise can be explained by political decisions made by Russian government to cut the freight traffic via Tallinn, Ventspils and other ports of East Baltic states (R. Žaromskis, 2008). Now the port of Saint Petersburg undergoes a very fast modernisation. It receives ships with their draught reaching 11 m. New specialised terminals are built to load metals, coal, oil, fertilisers, wood industry products and general cargoes. The fact that this port handles the highest number of containers in the whole Baltic region (in 2005, 1 million TEU surpassed) manifests the port update rate. Additional quays for cargo and passenger ships are also built, thus, enabling to receive and service more and more passengers.
During all history of Saint Petersburg there is one tendency that had never changed, i.e. the import via this port significantly exceeds the export.

**Primorsk** is situated in the Björkesund passage beyond the Beryozov Island. Russia obtained this area after the WWII. Before 1949, it was Finnish port of Koivisto. The depths in the nearshore at Primorsk vary and fairways are winding across the skerries area with depths at least 16 m. In the 1990s, Primorsk started to be transformed into a large oil export port. In 2001, the oil pipeline was laid to export 12 million tonnes of oil; and in 2002, the oil export reached 30 million tonnes (J. Strauhmanis, 2003). With export growing, in 2006 one more pipeline started to be laid to Primorsk that became the key Russian oil export port and the largest one in the Baltic Sea.

**Ust Luga** was a little settlement and fishing port at the Luga River mouth before the start of the 21st c. The nearshore is rather shallow here and the 5-m and 10-m isobaths are at the distance of, correspondingly, 1.3 km and 20 km from the shoreline. The development of a big port began in 2003, when the oil terminal was moved to deeper area, and a quay for passengers was built. The advantage of this site is a rather short ice cover period (about 40 days) and the nearby lying Tallinn–Saint Petersburg railway. Main construction works began in 1997. Not only oil terminal, but also quays for bulkers and new coal terminal as well as other infrastructure elements were built. It was planned to reach the level of 35 million tonnes loaded in 2008, and 50 million tonnes in 2010. The town is also being expanded with new dwelling houses, churches and streets being built. Russia cherishes ambitious plans to have the largest Russian port in Ust Luga.

**Vyborg** is about 130 km from Saint Petersburg. This is an old Finnish town that had been under different administrative jurisdiction, and after the WWII it went to Russia. The role of Vyborg as a port grew significantly from 1856, when the canal with sluice system was built to connect Finnish navigable lakes with the Baltic Sea. After the war the lower part of the canal area, including the town of Vyborg, went to the Soviet Russia; and in 1962 it rented the canal to Finland. The canal and the port of Vyborg were used to transport timber, pulp and paper, iron ore, metals, coal, and other cargoes. The port of Vyborg receives ships with 7-8 m draught. In winter, ships reach the port only assisted by icebreakers.

**Vysotsk** port is in the skerries area with a complicated fairway, where 7.5-m draught ships can navigate. There are plans to make Vysotsk a port for oil export. For this purpose, an oil pipeline from Primorsk would be built.

Beside the above mentioned Russian ports, cargo loading is also performed in the military base of **Kronstadt** situated in the island of Kotlin close to Saint Petersburg as well as in a small port of **Lomonosovo**.
Kalinigrad, alias Königsberg (before the WWII), was founded in 1254 on both banks of the Pregol River. The town used the benefits of inland waterways to communicate with Lithuania, Belarus, Ukraine and Poland. At the end of the 19th c. railways added to this communication network. With ships built bigger, the natural depths of Pregolya River were too low, and 6-m deep entrance channel was dredged at the end of the 19th c. The port was expanded greatly at the start of the 20th c. (W. Kuhrke, 1924), but the freight traffic in 1938 reached only 3.8 million tonnes. There were many cargoes transported for the war purpose, especially for construction of the fortifications in Königsberg and Pillau (now Baltiysk). Both ports were severely destroyed during the war.

The Kaliningrad port restored partly after the WWII, primarily, serviced only the navy and fishing ships. In the 20th c., the fishing ships registered in Kaliningrad provided about 10% (0.7 million tonnes) of the total fish catch in the USSR. The port entrance channel was dredged to the 8-m depth.

After the fall of the Soviet Union, Kaliningrad was developing as a commercial port, but in the 1990s the cargo loading began to decline and reached 4.1 million tonnes in 1999. The economic results of the port started to improve in 2001, when the 2K agreement, very important for Russia, was signed with Lithuania. The transit tariffs were lowered for freight traffic to Kaliningrad by the railway. So, the loading in this port increased from 4.9 million tonnes in 2001 to 12.3 million tonnes in 2003.

The efforts to update the port resulted in the regular rise in container loadings. It should be noted that as far as the 20th century, the import prevailed in this port, while now export makes 90% of the cargo loaded. Oil with its products and metals prevail in the load structure, and the share of timber nearly disappeared (В. В. Орленок, Г. М. Федоров, 2005). Kaliningrad is a very specific port the future development of which is mostly related to the demilitarisation potential. Another specific feature to be mentioned is a very numerous port staff (1119 people), and this is a general characteristic of many Russian ports.

The port of Baltiysk was always overshadowed by Kaliningrad. This was caused by its position as a navy fortress for about 200 years. The first signs of its demilitarisation appeared only after the fall of the Soviet Union. From 2002, one port basin is used for civilian purposes, and in 2004 one more basin was added. They are used by the ferry-line Saint Petersburg–Kaliningrad–Sassnitz–Lübeck. There are plans to arrange new deep terminals for oil and other cargoes. The development is restricted by the military status of Baltiysk port and not very much favourable geopolitical position of the Kaliningrad Region.
**Pioniersky** is a small fishing port on the northern coast of the Sambian Peninsula. The port is leaning against a very steep cliff, therefore its land and water areas are very small; moreover, only 4-m draught ships can enter it. At the start of the 21st c., there were attempts to adjust this fishing port for cargo loading. However, this seemed to be not expedient, since the railway cannot reach down the port. Nice nature and well-protected port are ideal conditions to reshape it into the marina.

Beside the above-mentioned ports, there are several settlements and small ports, such as **Vzmorye** and **Izhevskoye**, in the Vistula Bay and along the Kaliningrad entrance channel, where the oil terminal and offshore platform construction enterprise are situated. **Svetly** and **Primorsk** also should be mentioned; there were berths for fishing and navy ships, but now loading of cargo also is performed.

The port network within the Russian sea transport system is being restructured with special attention paid to the Baltic Sea ports. Implementing the ambitious port development programme, the problems appear with regard to weakly developed land transportation network. It is necessary to concentrate the ports in a small, basically, coastal area of the Gulf of Finland and direct the cargoes from them towards the Eurasian economic space. Under present conditions, the ports in the Kaliningrad Region also will not be able to satisfy fully the demand of Russian raw material export. The people living in the maritime area, due to the Iron Curtain policy, had been absolutely cut off the sea, and, therefore, neither fishing nor recreational infrastructures were formed, except the main cities. Russia is the only Baltic Sea country without a small port network; moreover, it makes the least efforts to promote the construction of small ports. So, in the Russian coastal zone, there is a great contradiction between the mammoth development of industrial ports with their cargo handling systems and the integration of coastal population into the marine socio-economic environment.

**Conclusions**

The environmental conditions in the area of the East Baltic states were not so very favourable for the build-up of ports due to rather even shoreline and shallow nearshore. Therefore here the ports had been mainly formed in the river mouth areas. The geopolitical conditions of the 20th century caused development of large commercial ports only. The fate of small ones was influenced by the so-called Iron Curtain regime that resulted their development in those areas, where nature conditions were more favourable and the states were less integrated into the communist system.

At the turn of the 20th-21st centuries the ports on the eastern coast of the Baltic Sea distinguished in the whole Baltic region for cargo handling
volumes and most rapid development, while their hinterlands expanded into not only Russia, but also the wider Eurasian space.

The cargo handling began to decrease significantly in Estonia and Latvia due to development of new Russian ports in the Gulf of Finland and demilitarisation of Kaliningrad enclave.

The lowest level of integration of ports into the social-economic environment of the maritime area remained up to now in Russia. The highest degree of such integration of ports is in Estonia and Poland with the Latvian Riga’s Bay area being just a bit behind them. Lithuania also struggles for development of small ports in the Kuršių Marių (Curonian) Lagoon, but its attractiveness, as well as the Lagoon of Vistula, is being limited because the Russian areas in these water bodies are inaccessible for tourism.

Taking into account the growing demand in small ports for angling and tourism, further development of their network is expected in the nearest decades even on the open coast of the Baltic Sea.

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The Concept of Baltic Europe

Genesis of Baltic Europe

The region around the Baltic Sea traditionally features strong cultural and economic ties. Trade and shipping on the Baltic Sea had developed in the past. The past has left a sense of neighbourliness and has resulted in similarity of settlement structures. The fifty year long political disruption in the region, up to the year 1989, resulted in paltry coordination of joint measures on both sides of the border. The potential for cooperation and improvement of life standard for the region’s inhabitants was wasted. Trade relations and other contacts were underdeveloped. Transport systems restricted by state borders were not suitable for cross border cooperation. Degradation of the marine environment adversely affected the fishing industry and tourism.

The end of the cold war, regaining of independence by Poland and the Baltic States, accession of Sweden and Finland to the European Union, moving of Germany’s capital closer to the Baltic Sea all contributed to rapid development of cooperation and new links. Cross border relations started their dynamic development. They are of key significance as they triggered the elimination of barriers and prejudice, the developing official and unofficial interpersonal relations, especially between local societies. Common historical heritage often means functional and structural similarities in areas, which started cooperating, as well as gradual and slow fading of the state border effect and economic revival of cross border regions. Cross border contacts facilitated the defeat of economic barriers and restrictions. This can also be noted on marine borders. Cross border cooperation in Scandinavian countries develops thanks to initiatives of local communities and embrace culture, environmental protection, medical care, transport and tourism. The Euroregional integration processes also embrace Polish borders.

The European scene is the witness of a new Baltic framework for international cooperation. During the last decade of XX century, countries around the Baltic Sea developed a strong network of institutional relations
and liaison of governmental, self governmental and nongovernmental organisations. These international structures, organisations and relations, though some are at an early stage of development, strengthen ties among entities shaping Baltic Europe.

Not so long ago the phrase “Baltic cooperation” was unheard of in Brussels. During the last two decades the Baltic region has emerged to be an important partner in implementing the European policy. Baltic cooperation has become significant in terms of security and stability on this continent. Recognition of the Baltic Sea Region by the European Union as one of its priorities, the involvement in the work of the Council of the Baltic Sea States and its commissions, the financial instruments such as PHARE, CBC, TACIS CBC, Baltic Small Project Facility (BSPF), INTERREG, etc. clearly indicate a trend in political reorientation from the south (Mediterranean Sea region) to the north, strengthening the position and image of the Baltic Sea Region. This was particularly prominent starting 1995 when the representatives of Denmark and Sweden took the lead in the Committee of the Regions, The EU Commission and EU Council defined their interest in the region in the document “Baltic Sea Region Initiative”.

A new subregion for cooperation

The Baltic Sea region is presently seen as a new developing subregion characterised by huge political and economic potential. The Baltic Sea Region surrounding the natural water basin experienced, from the end of XX century, very clear multifaceted integration processes. Following EU enlargement in 2004, the Baltic Sea has all but become an internal European Union water basin. Baltic Europe with a population of 106 million, i.e. 23% of the total EU population and generating 16% of the GDP, features a huge potential in terms of economy and innovation. This region rates among the Community leaders in terms of development dynamics. Its strong points include a relatively well educated labour force, considerable dynamics of outlays for B+R, scientific and technology centres as well as a dense network of sea and land transport links. All these factors rate the region well in many European rankings. (P. Schmitt, A. Dubois, 2008.)

Cooperation in Europe enjoys years of tradition. Following the EU enlargement on 1 May 2004 Baltic Europe reached a new stage of development. This fact no doubt contributed to closer cooperation between countries around the Baltic and led to joint Baltic initiatives in the European Union to upgrade peripheral Baltic regions. Political stability and economic development may, in a long term perspective, transform the new Baltic Europe without borders into an economic and cultural centre of Europe (N. Veggeland, 1994). However, its progress depends on successful
development of a common identity and economic policy (E. Kuriata, 1999).

Cooperation on environmental protection of the Baltic, which initiated mutual understanding, soon became one of the many significant areas of cooperation of other than governmental and self-governmental initiatives. The natural and cultural heritage will remain important prerequisites of cooperation, raising ecological and civilisation awareness of the region.

There are many good reasons justifying the opinion that the present trends are sustainable and will continue to develop in future years. Geographical proximity of these regions means special attractiveness of potential markets. The strongly rooted cultural, political and economic ties between countries around the Baltic also play a significant role (N. Veggeland, 1995).

Examples of cooperation

The present systems of regional, national and international cooperation of societies and social organisations as well as transnational Baltic relations, organisations and projects shape the picture of Baltic Europe at the end of the first decade of XXI century. Not only extensive and mature programmes shaping and tightening relations in the Baltic dimension such as VASAB 2010 – Visions and Strategies around the Baltic Sea will show clear growth but sp will sectoral cooperation.

The most important cooperation fora include CBSS – Council of the Baltic Sea States, BSSSC – Baltic Sea States Sub regional Cooperation, BSPC – Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference, Baltic Sea Forum, CPMR’s Baltic Sea Commission. Others include BaltMet – Baltic Metropoles Network, B 7 – Baltic Sea Seven Islands, UBC – Union of the Baltic Cities, in the environmental and energy sectors Baltic 21 – an agenda 21 for the Baltic Sea Region, HELCOM, ASREC – Baltic Sea Region Energy Co-operation, in the area of economic cooperation Baltic Development Forum, BCAA – Baltic Sea Chambers of Commerce Association, BASTUN – Baltic Sea Trade Union Network, in the sphere of culture and nongovernmental organisations ARS BALTICA, BTC – Baltic Sea Tourism Commission, Baltic Sea NGO forum are the leaders, whereas biotechnology and health issues are dealt with by BUP-The Baltic University Programme, ScanBalt and The Northern Dimension Partnership in Public Health and Social Well-being (NDPHS) (Journal of Nordregio, 2009)

Improvement of the technical infrastructure including roads, railway and ferry connection (including sea motorways), air links, telecommunication, energy and border crossings is a necessary prerequisite for dynamic development. Considerable significance is also assigned to working out a common concept for the development of transport corridors. The
transborder impact of transport networks affects social and economic regions adjacent to transport lines.

Projects initiated by VASAB 2010 indicate what direction and measures should be taken for regional development to benefit from transport corridors. The development of market economy, cooperation in technology, culture, education, tourism as well as information exchange accompanies further development of democracy.

INTERREG was initiated in 1989 and continued in the following programme periods as INTERREG II (1994–1999), INTERREG III (2000–2006) and is presently in the main trend of EU Cohesion Policy (Objective 3: European Territorial Cooperation) with the financial input of the Community comes from the European Regional Fund.

In the years 2007–2013, 13 transborder cooperation projects were initiated in the Baltic Sea Region. The projects promote cooperation and direct relations, supporting economic and social development as well as protection of the environment in border regions. Joint measures on transborder cooperation involve:

- Support for entrepreneurship, small and medium sized enterprises, tourism, culture and crossborder traffic.
- Protection of the natural environment and cultural goods, counteracting environmental and technology related hazards.
- Improved access to transport, information and communication networks.
- Water and waste management as well as energy systems.
- Development and common use of infrastructure particularly in such areas as healthcare, culture and education.
- Cooperation of administrations and integration of local society by implementing joint measures in terms of the labour market, promotion of equality, the development of human resources and support for research and development.

In the years 2007–2013 three transborder cooperation programmes were set off in the Baltic Sea Region, the North Sea and Northern Periphery. The latter two are targeted at cooperation with areas lying beyond the Baltic Sea Region.

Transnational cooperation programmes focus at sustainable and coordinated spatial development. The key priorities involve:

- Support for entrepreneurship.
- Better access to areas covered by the programme and in the programme area itself.
- Raising attractiveness and competitiveness of towns and regions.
- Reasonable use of the natural environment and resource management (J. Ryba, 2008).
In 1997, Finland proposed to establish the “Northern Dimension” of the European Union. The purpose of the initiative involved defining the interests of the European Union in northern Europe from Iceland to northwest Russia, from the Barents Sea to the southern coast of the Baltic Sea. The project was mainly addressed to Russia (its northwest part) Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and north-east Poland. Implementation of the “Northern Dimension” engaged not only Finland but all the other Nordic states: Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Iceland. The initiative is based on verified cooperation structures operating in this part of Europe, using aid funds allocated to this area with no need to establish new institutions (P. Lipponen, 1999).

“Northern Dimension”

The “Northern Dimension is to improve coordination of the EU policy in Northern Europe, eliminate gaps in economic development especially between EU and Russia and countries from the former eastern bloc. This dialogue platform between EU member countries and those beyond its structures is to prevent the risk of a new division of Europe in view of Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia becoming EU members and Russia remaining with no realistic perspectives of accession.

Baltic integration may in future be more effective if all the present dispersed resources are merged into a Baltic programme accessible to all interested countries. Efforts to develop a common strategy for Baltic Europe are a step in that direction.

At the end of 2007 the European Council in Brussels approved a provision that became a mandate for the European Commission to undertake work on the European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region.

The Strategy objective is to activate the potential of the Baltic Sea Region following EU enlargement in 2004. Communications of the European Commission representatives project achievement of the objective by implementing such priorities as: environmental protection, accessibility, attractiveness and security.

The European Council showed more interest in the problems of the Baltic Sea region under the influence of MPs from Baltic countries gathered in an informal Baltic Europe group. This group prepared and presented a document entitled “An EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region” to the European Commission Chairman in November 2005. This study had a significant impact on the European Parliament resolution on 16 December 2005 concerning the future of the “Northern Dimension”1 (European

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Parliament resolution... 2005). The document draws attention to the role of Baltic cooperation in the context of EU enlargement in 2004. Concurrently, it was the first proposal of adopting a separate strategy for Baltic Europe, which is an inner element of the “Northern Dimension”.

**EU strategy for Baltic Europe**

The European Parliament adopted a resolution on the strategy for the Baltic Sea Region on 16 November 2006. The resolution included a postulate addressed to the European Commission on developing a strategic framework for:

- Activating the potential of the Baltic Sea Region following EU enlargement in 2004.
- Promoting the image of the Baltic Sea Region as the most attractive and competitive area in global terms.
- Increasing efforts to improve the state of the environment in the region.

One of the Strategy objectives is competitive growth of Baltic Europe both in the context of European and that of global challenges. The document is also to promote the image of the Baltic Sea region. In particular it is to maintain and attract human capital, assure effective promotion of the region for international investments, promotion of export based on the principle “good” because produced in the Baltic Sea region, and popularisation of the region’s tourist offer. The Strategy concept for the Baltic Sea region, which was to promote the region as one of the priority areas of the European Union, was put forward by the Swedish minister of foreign affairs Karl Bildt during the session of the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS).

A successful promotion strategy for the region should stem from cooperation of the administration and self governments, environmental centres and representatives of involved economy sectors. The basic questions to answer in developing a promotion strategy for the region, according to M. Andersson (2007) include:

- What is its added value for the Baltic Sea Region as a whole and particular countries in the region?
- What are the elements common for the entire region which favour it in global terms?
- What elements (cultural, economic, geographical, historical, social, ecological) should constitute the grounds for construing the promotion strategy for the region?

Potential problems encountered in developing such a concept, according to the author mentioned above, may refer to national protectionalism, difficulties in setting rational, uniform criteria that would enable effective...
assessment of the strategy, the need to coordinate the strategy based on territorial marketing of the region with national strategies and lack of strategy coordination centre based on territorial marketing of the region.

Baltic Europe continues to be strongly diversified. The area includes the wealthiest and the most poverty stricken areas in the European Union. Other important factors include the differences in population density, income and life standard as well as economic structures. The diversified transport infrastructure hinders good transport links between particular countries. The major transport corridors in the region are not sufficiently well developed. At the same time, the region has a huge potential to become a model region of integrated spatial planning.

Improvement of the inner cohesion, requires application of traditional instruments of EU cohesion policy and the necessity to urgently develop transborder sections of the Trans-European Transport Networks (TEN-T) to provide multimodal links on land and at sea. Planning and management of sea areas should be harmonised with adjacent land areas.

Baltic Europe, though very competitive in terms of the economy of its members, continues to face many barriers that restrict further progress and maintenance of its position on the European and world markets. The most important barriers include diversification of economic development, insufficient use of the innovation potential, ominous structure and use of clusters’ potential and difficulties in developing entrepreneurship.

Therefore, the strategy under development should account for the development of cooperation on innovation policy and strengthening scientific and research cooperation of Baltic countries.

Cross border and interregional cooperation supported under the cohesion policy of the European Union features very high added value for Baltic Europe. All countries in the region have positive experience they can share with other members.

Among the three key aspects economic, social and environmental, economic development seems to be the most important. Development of economic cooperation should be seen as a significant factor contributing to the integration of countries around the Baltic on one hand and on the other to sustained development dynamics and attractiveness of the entire region.

Cooperation in the energy sector is of special significance for sustainable development of Baltic Europe. The strategy should refer to initiatives which support reduced dependence on power supply from a single direction. The present energy system of Baltic countries is to a limited degree linked with the systems of other member states. Thus, the construction of transmission infrastructure among member states is required to develop
a joint energy market and joint measures in face of crisis. Investments in energy infrastructure under TENs (Trans-European Networks), similarly as all other investments should satisfy the environmental protection requirements, contribute to the diversification of power import and bring benefit to all member states in line with EU Council conclusions of June 2006.

The preliminary position of Poland on the Strategy adopted in June 2008 specified tentative conditions that provide an opportunity to reach the set objectives. Attention has been drawn to the need for focusing on a limited number of priorities, reaching consensus by States in the region on setting the priorities, and the adverse effects of the dominating role in setting the priorities by a single state. Key elements were identified for the success of the strategy and its implementation under the Schedule, the coordination of measures undertaken under the Strategy and the “Northern Dimension” as well as participation of all players in developing the Strategy especially the world of science, business and nongovernmental organisations.

The Baltic Sea is both a challenge and an opportunity for the future. Sustainable development harmoniously linking economic, environmental and social objectives indicates the principle direction of further integration. Development should promote diversity, and respect for the individual, the natural environment, regional specifics and cultural heritage. As regional and individual preferences may vary there must be an option to develop various life styles, cultures and even economic activity. A high life standard is not possible without diversity. The diversity principle strengthens regional and local identity and enhances social flexibility (Tallin Report.,1998).

Baltic cooperation providing stability in our part of the continent is the key to full integration of Europe. Old Baltic cultural relations here revive, this is the place to cultivate good neighbourliness with Russia and it is here that we can overcome the division between the poverty and prosperity zones. The long term history of the region is an opportunity to develop a regional identity. The vision of integrated Baltic Europe, a community of objectives and strategies, seems to be the concept worth persistent efforts and a drive to reach the goal in the oncoming decades of XXI century.

Conclusions

Following the EU enlargement on 1 May 2004 Baltic Europe reached a new stage of development. The Baltic Sea has all but become an inner European Union water basin. This fact has contributed to closer cooperation between countries around the Baltic Sea. These relations are of networking nature in many areas. Strengthening of joint Baltic initiatives within the European
Union in the oncoming decades will lead to reduction of existing disproportions and the upgrading of peripheral Baltic regions. Political stability and economic development may in a long term perspective transform the new Baltic Europe without borders into an economic and cultural centre of Europe. The EU strategy for the Baltic Sea is a step towards this goal. The prepared document has become one of the three priorities under the Swedish chairmanship in the EU Council in the second half of 2009.

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Do specific conditions affect co-operation?
An assessment of cross-border co-operation under the Poland-Lithuania and the Russian Federation trilateral programme

Introduction

Institutional forms of cross-border co-operation in Poland after 1989 took various forms in particular border regions. This was caused, among other things by formal, organizational, historical and economic factors. In the north-eastern parts of Poland the first significant initiatives connected with creating cross-border co-operation did not appear until the mid 90s of the 20th century. They took on a formal character in the form of Euroregions – Euroregion Nemunas (in 1997) and Euroregion Baltic (1998) and the inclusion of this region in the Phare Baltic Sea Region CBC Programme (1995–2003). Co-operation in this period was of relatively low intensity based mainly on an administrative/self-government model and hardly reflected grass-roots initiatives. An example of this is the Euroregions, which were created as a result of top-down initiatives (in the case of Poland the initiators were Voivodes) (see Euroregions..., 1999). Thus, it was being shaped differently than in the western or southern border regions (see S. Ciok, A. Raczyk, 2007).

What needs to be highlighted is the occurrence of a number of initiatives connected with the shaping of co-operation in the Baltic Sea region e.g. VASAB (see T. Palmowski, 2000). It seems, though, that the advancement of regional co-operation is much greater than that of cross-border co-operation in this area.

One of the important factors conditioning the development of co-operation was the lack of significant financial support in the pre-accession period. Most of the programmes realized at that time were not strictly connected with the shaping of cross-border co-operation but focused on infrastructure development with a much lower budget compared to Polish-German border regions. (e.g. The Eastern Programme 1996, The Integrated Eastern Border 1997, Management and Infrastructure at the Eastern Border 1998, The Integrated Eastern Border 2000, Phare CBC Poland-the Baltic Sea Region 1995 and its subsequent editions). The real cross-border co-operation
among Poland, Lithuania and the Russian Federation actually started at the moment of European Union enlargement in 2004. Consequently, lasting structures of trans-border connections had not yet been developed and partners in the border regions are now starting to establish direct contacts and identify spheres for close operation. Therefore, co-operation is at an early stage of development. Due to specific conditions existing in these border regions the co-operation may also take on specific forms.

**Aim and scope of the research**

The basic objective of the research was to evaluate the implementation of cross-border co-operation as part of Poland, Lithuania, Kaliningrad Region of Russian Federation Neighbourhood Programme Interreg IIIA / TACIS CBC 2004-2006. The evaluation focused on the size, generic structure of the projects and institutional structure of the programme beneficiaries. The relationships between the type of beneficiary, project type as well as its location were also scrutinized. The realized projects were also analyzed with regard to their spatial distribution.

The research hypothesis assumed that projects reflect the real shape of institutional co-operation in the Polish-Lithuanian-Russian border region. However, the authors are fully aware that they do not cover the whole spectrum of this co-operation. Nevertheless, these projects constitute the important element of illustrating the actual state of trans-border co-operation and not its declarative aspect, existing only ‘on paper’. The analysis does not include informal co-operation which can greatly affect formal co-operation.

The study was conducted in the regions covered by funds from the Poland, Lithuania, Kaliningrad Region of Russian Federation Neighbourhood Programme Interreg IIIA / TACIS CBC 2004–2006 in relation to the commune level (LAU 2). The data concerning the projects was obtained from the Ministry of Regional Development.

**Specification of co-operation conditions**

Interreg III A programme was one of the four components of European Union Community Initiatives. Its aim was to finance cross-border co-operation. The Polish north-eastern border region has been supported since Polish accession to the EU in 2004. The analysed programme had trilateral character. As Interreg Initiative Programme is only available to the EU Member States (Poland and Lithuania) for the border regions of non-member countries, special programmes supporting co-operation were established. The Russian Federation (Kaliningrad Oblast) was covered by
TACIS CBC programme between 2004-2006 (community support programme for the former Soviet republics and Mongolia – excluding Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia).

Therefore, Neighbourhood Programme was financed by two budgets: on the Polish side from the European Regional Development Funds (ERDF) and on the Russian side from TACIS CBC funds. Between 2004–2006 the Polish side allotted EUR 24.2 mln from ERDF for the Programme, the Lithuanian side EUR 12.3 mln, and the Russian side EUR 9.5 mln from TACIS CBC funds. This distinct asymmetry in the funds accessibility on both sides of the border constitutes a significant hindrance in the development of real connections and the realization of true trans-border projects. This may result in a situation in which co-operation programmes on both sides of the border will be realized largely ‘autonomously’ despite their joint institutional system.

A very important factor affecting the quality of co-operation was the fact that the programme was managed by the Lithuanian side. It strictly followed the European Commission guidelines for Interreg III A programme. It had a significant impact on the procedures adapted for the choice of projects and consequently on their type and quality. In this respect this programme stood out from the remaining Interreg III A programmes realized in Poland.

Another distinctive element of the programme was the participation of three partners, including two EU Member State countries and one non-member country. This situation complicated preparations and implementation of the programme. Special attention has to be paid to specificity of the Kaliningrad Oblast which is separated from the rest of the country and surrounded by EU Member States. Moreover, the country’s border is a very strong barrier in the context of the flow of people, goods and information. Therefore, establishing grass-roots co-operation proves much harder than co-operation initiated and run by supralocal institutions. All the problems connected with the functioning of a border are easier to overcome in the case of central institutions or regional self-government than in the case of local associations or particular local leaders. This is connected with the problem of centralization of the administrative system in Russia. This barrier may be further reinforced after Poland’s accession to the Schengen Agreement on 21 December 2007. The functioning of the Kaliningrad Oblast in such conditions may on the one hand deepen its isolation or on the other may stimulate its future cross-border co-operation. An important role in this choice between isolation and co-operation will surely be played by political decisions.

Poland’s and Lithuania’s accession to the Schengen Agreement and the lack of natural barriers at the Polish-Lithuanian border may result in the
acceleration of integration processes in the Polish-Lithuanian border region and their weakening in the Polish-Russian border area. As a result, the actual co-operation with Russia is very likely to be declarative to a considerable extent. In this situation the trilateral programme will only affect two partners.

Additionally, a crucial role will be played here by economic, social and historical factors. Among economic ones, the most important seem to be the disproportions concerning both development and economic structures of particular regions (see ESPON in progress, 2004). Historical factors resulting, among other things, from the change of borders following World War II and the collapse of USSR also play a significant role. They contributed to large-scale migration movements and the exchange of local population which took place mainly in the region of former East Prussia. Lack of historical continuity largely shapes the co-operation in the Polish-Russian border region. In the Polish-Lithuanian border region, however, this continuity was never completely broken. As a result, territorial identity and cultural integrity is considerably stronger there. It is also partly caused by the occurrence of national minorities- Lithuanian in Poland and Polish in Lithuania.

Moreover, the quality and intensity of co-operation depends on the level of human and social capital development in particular regions. Polish cross-border regions are characterised by a generally low level of human capital compared to the rest of the country. Social capital, on the contrary, is relatively high (K. Janc, 2006). Additionally, in both cases there are significant spatial disproportions. This may cause spatial distribution of co-operation to take on the character of “concentrated masses”, limited only to the areas characterized by the most favourable conditions for its realization.

The size of the supported regions (especially on the Polish side) is responsible for its little spatial coherence. Additionally, it is distinguished by large disproportions in the level of social and economic development as well as spatial development. On the one hand, it may result in a multi-layer co-operation. On the other, however, it may lead to varying expectations regarding potential effects of co-operation among local communities and, in consequence, difficulties in formulating joint enterprises.

The research conducted by the authors concerning other Polish border regions indicates that one of the basic factors conditioning real co-operation is the occurrence of an integrating factor, common to the regions on both side of the border. Regarding the Polish-Lithuanian-Russian border regions, the role of such a factor could be played by tourism based on precious natural and anthropogenic values (e.g. lake districts, coasts, forest complexes, monuments and non-material culture).
Co-operation specificity – project analysis

In the period under examination, within the framework of the Polish-Lithuanian-Russian programme, 124 projects were approved for implementation on the Polish side (excluding Technical Assistance projects). The total sum allocated from ERDF was around EUR 22mln. The projects analysed amounted to over EUR 20mln. It means that the programme covered a vast majority of the projects and its results can be considered reliable for the whole programme.

In the north-eastern border region the volume structure was largely dominated by small and very small projects with the subsidy value below EUR 100 000 (Fig. 1). There were no big enterprises with subsidy value exceeding EUR 1 mln. This was mainly the result of the generic structure of the realized projects.

Figure 1. The values of projects realized in the Polish part of the Polish-Lithuanian-Russian border area within the framework of Interreg III A programme

Source: own study based on the data of the Ministry of Regional Development.

The beneficiary structure was dominated by the local units of the territorial self-government (communes) (Fig. 2). However, their participation was the lowest among all the Interreg III A programmes realized in Poland (about 45%). It could have resulted, inter alia, from the following:
weaker preparation of the communes in the east of Poland for the participation in the programme and probably none at all for the utilization of the Structural Funds. This was the result of the lack of considerable previous experience in this area;

lower intensity of the contacts with partners on the other side of the border. This resulted from difficulties in maintaining contacts with Russian partners – e.g. due to strong centralization on the other side of the border which resulted in the lack of a match at a local level;

the largest nationwide participation of associations (over 21%). This was probably the consequence of formal arrangements connected with the programme promoting enterprises connected with real co-operation (the lead partner rule). Partly, it was also caused by a relatively high level of social capital development;

a relatively high participation of central administration units. Overrepresentation of these institutions in the north-eastern border regions was probably caused by the centralization of decision taking on the other side of the border (Kaliningrad Oblast) and easiness in overcoming formal obstacles in co-operation.

Poviats and regional self-government units constituted about 12% each, which was similar to other projects.

Figure 2. The beneficiaries’ structure of projects realized in the Polish part of the north-eastern and western border area within the framework of Interreg III A programmes

Source: own study based on the data of the Ministry of Regional Development.
The analysis of project type was based on intervention categories used in monitoring and reporting by the European Commission. The generic structure was dominated by enterprises from the field of tourism, culture and sport (cultural and sports events) which were mainly non-material in character – around 42% (Fig. 3). Material investments in tourism were scarce – about 6%. The main difference in relation to the other cross-border programmes in Poland was the relatively low significance of basic infrastructure which was crucial for these programmes. It covered road investment, social infrastructure, sewage system, bicycle lanes etc. (each category below 5%). Additionally, the projects connected with human capital development were important for this co-operation (jointly about 15%). A significant role was played by the projects whose objective was to create integrated crisis management systems realized by medical, police and fire services. This indicates a previous lack in this respect, especially in activities which have joint (trans-border) character. The features distinguishing the structure of projects within the framework of Poland-Lithuania-Russia programme from other cross-border programmes were mostly connected with:

- dominance of projects connected with tourism being the result of favourable natural features;
- formal requirements of the programme focusing on truly joint projects and therefore having a notable trans-border effect;
- higher participation of projects connected to human capital development;
- a much lower participation of basic infrastructure projects, above all social infrastructure, health care and sewage system;
- general dominance of soft projects.

Such structure of projects indicates a significant role of the integrating factor (natural features and local cultural heritage) which focused the programme on the development of trans-border tourism and joint cultural activities.

The formation of a particular specificity in the programme realization, despite similar rules and implementation structures nationwide seems to be a positive phenomenon as it combines the general objective of the Interreg III A programme of co-operation development with the already existing opportunity for local development. It seems that enterprises realized in the Polish-Lithuanian-Russian border regions were characterised by a more favourable generic structure. There were definitely fewer infrastructural projects, usually of low trans-border effect. A relatively bigger role was played by ‘soft’ projects, which had greater trans-border effect.
Spatial distribution of projects was also unusual (Fig. 4). They are mainly concentrated in the regions which have real potential for co-operation, e.g. located very near the border and in the greatest urban centres. In this respect the Polish-Lithuanian border region stands out the most (communes of Puńsk, Sejny). There was a definite lack of projects in subregions not directly adjacent to the Lithuanian or Russian border (Łomżyński and Słupski subregions). This questions the advisability of including the more remote regions into co-operation programmes.

**Areas of Intervention by category** (OJ L 063, 03/03/2001): 1306 Renovation and development of villages, 1307 Diversification of agricultural activities, 1312 Protection of the environment, 163 Business advisory services, 164 Shared business services, 171 Tourism, physical investment, 172 Tourism, non-physical investment, 173 Shared services for the tourism industry, 181 Research projects based in universities and research institutes, 182 Innovation and technology transfers, 183 RTDI Infrastructure, 21 Labour market policy, 23 Developing educational and vocational training, 24 Workforce flexibility, 3122 Regional/local roads, 3123 Cycle tracks, 314 Airports, 315 Ports, 319 Intelligent transport systems, 323 Services and applications for the citizen, 324 Services and applications for SMEs, 343 Urban and industrial waste, 344 Drinking water, 345 Sewerage and purification, 351 Upgrading and rehabilitation of industrial and military sites, 352 Rehabilitation of urban areas, 353 Protection, improvement and regeneration of the natural environment, 354 Maintenance and restoration of the cultural heritage, 36 Social and public health infrastructure

Figure 3. The number of projects realized in the Polish part of the north – eastern and western border area within the framework of Interreg III A programmes according to intervention category

Source: own study based on the data of the Ministry of Regional Development.
Nearly 80% of the projects were realized in rural areas. This resulted, above all, from the fact that the institutions capable of co-operation realization (e.g. associations) were located there and were characterized by sufficient development of human and social capital. The “concentrated masses” character of spatial distribution was the effect of significant disproportions in the level of socio-economic development of the supported area. Consequently, such spatial distribution resulted in a considerable spatial concentration of the projects – 10 communes concentrated around 70% of all the projects. Merely 10% of communes from the supported areas participated in the realization of projects under Interreg III A programme.

The analysis of correlation between the type of beneficiary and intervention category proved the preferences of beneficiaries (observed nationwide) regarding the realized enterprises. On the whole, central administration and local self-government units preferred basic infrastructure projects. However, associations and higher education institutions focused more on tourist, cultural and educational activities (‘soft’ projects). This indicates that the process of changing the structure of projects should be combined with relevant changes in the structure of the programme’s beneficiaries.
As regards area types it needs to be stressed that only associations and communes proposed projects in rural areas (15% and 23% respectively). This indicates the need for supporting grass-roots initiatives of local communities as they have true potential to be successful. Interestingly, there are no single activities in rural areas proposed by regional and central administration. This may mean that in their activities they do not give enough consideration to levelling off spatial disproportions.

Conclusions

Based on the conducted analysis it may be stated that trans-border co-operation in the Polish-Lithuanian-Russian border area was being shaped differently than in the other Polish border regions. This resulted from a number of specific conditions. Therefore, it seems that at present the integrating factor (tourism and culture) does not yet play its due role.

Although the programme’s beneficiary structure was dominated by communes, the role of associations was relatively high and it influenced the type of realized enterprises. They are dominated by small size projects, mostly ‘soft’ ones. Apart from the beneficiary structure, this was also the consequence of formal requirements of the programme and the integrating factor.

Stimulation of social activity and grass-roots initiative development should be connected with the change in the inhabitants’ thinking. One of the most crucial challenges seems to be the consolidation of the awareness of a joint border region which needs to be shaped in mutual consideration to the partners on the other side of the border.

The analysis showed that spatial distribution of co-operation is strongly concentrated and limited only to the regions characterised by the most favourable conditions for its realization. This means that a considerable increase in the intensity of co-operation and inclusion of a greater number of institutions will result in quality improvement connected, above all, with human as well as social capital.

On the basis of the analysis of spatial distribution it can be stated that the implementation of co-operation programmes is connected with making the choice between either the demanding requirements regarding cross-border impact and high spatial concentration or less stringent requirements and greater universality (and accessibility) of co-operation. The above-mentioned choice requires seeking an optimal solution which will consider the specificity of particular regions. The development of a universal pattern seems impossible. The analyzed programme seemed to prefer quality to accessibility. On the one hand, this situation should bring about greater effectiveness of the realized projects (measured by product and effect indicators). On the other, however, there is a threat of permanent
concentration of co-operation in spatially isolated regions (larger cities) and little activity of rural border regions. In the longer perspective it may lead to polarization within the border region, especially in urban-rural relations.

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The Kaliningrad region in the Russian-European co-operation in the Baltic Sea Region

Before the start of market reforms in the former socialist countries, the economic space of the Baltic Sea region was not homogeneous, because it encompassed two entirely different economic systems – the capitalist and socialist ones. This economic heterogeneity was caused by the fact that Germany and Denmark, unlike Sweden and Finland, were EU member countries then.

With the implementation of market reforms in east European countries and their entering the world market, the economy of the Baltic Sea region became more homogeneous. Yet, the region’s economic space remains quite diverse for a number of reasons. Firstly, Russia is not a WTO member. Secondly, Russia, unlike other eight countries of the Baltic Sea region, is not a member of the European Union. Consequently, two different economic spaces overlap in the Baltic Sea region – those of the European Union and the Russian Federation.

Another reason for such non-heterogeneity is the difference in the level of economic development between post socialist and economically advanced countries of the Baltic Sea region. This difference slows the development of equitable cooperation between the two groups of countries due to different financial resources that the parties have. This is particularly evident in cross-border cooperation, where regions of the Nordic countries and Germany traditionally play a more active role. However, after Poland and the Baltic countries’ accession to the European Union, it became possible for their regions to use the EU funds and strengthen their position in defining priority areas of cooperation. Regions of the Russian Federation are in a more difficult situation, not being able to enjoy such opportunities.

The Kaliningrad region (15 125 sq. km, 937 000 inhabitants) is a subject of the Russian Federation. It is an exclave, geographically separated from the mainland Russia. The Kaliningrad region borders on Poland and Lithuania, the countries which have been EU member states since May 1,
2004. Given the present geopolitical situation, it is important to work out a coherent strategy for the development of the Baltic Sea region. The strategy should address social, demographic and environmental issues. It is also important to sustain the regional and federal interests, while taking into account the interests of international partners. The Kaliningrad region could become a region of co-operation between the Russian Federation (RF) and the EU.

The main direction in the current development of EU-RF relations is the implementation of the concept of the Common European Economic Space. This concept is based on the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between Russia and the EU. This does not imply full integration, but rather a policy of rapprochement, i.e. implementing in Russia a system of technical control, harmonized with the European system and, partially, with the EU financial legislation. The development of the Kaliningrad region strongly depends on the EU-RF relations. Kaliningrad could be a reflection of their success or failure. A group of experts from the Immanuel Kant State University of Russia believe that the recent enlargement of the EU should stimulate greater co-operation between the two parties.

The Kaliningrad region (oblast) will increasingly become an indicator of the development of EU–Russia relations. The future of the region largely depends on the strategies that Russia and the EU adopt towards each other. The experience of relations in the Baltic Sea region shows that mutually beneficial co-operation is possible. The main threat, we assume, is insufficient understanding of the strategy of the other partner, insufficient knowledge of the situation, and a lack of mutual trust. In our opinion, the EU enlargement is a factor influencing the elaboration of the strategy for the Kaliningrad region. The “strategy for the region of co-operation” could be an example of the regional initiative to integrate the region (as a part of the RF) into the Baltic Economic Space.

The subjects of the Russian Federation, which are parts of the Baltic Sea region, substantially lag behind in the level of their economical development compared with all administrative and territorial entities of economically more advanced countries of the Baltic macroregion. At the same time, they are comparable to most administrative and territorial entities of post socialist countries, with the exception of capital-city regions, having higher GRP figures per capita. However, until recently, the regions of Russia and the three Baltic countries had much high rates of economical development (Fig. 1.).

There are two realistic possibilities for the Kaliningrad region. However, economic self-sufficiency of the Kaliningrad region due to heavy federal subsidies does not mean real development. The development of the
Figure 1. Industrial production and the dynamics of the GRP per capita in 2006

Source: The authors’ project based on the data provided by information and publishing centre “Statistika Rossii”; the Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia; the Central Statistical Office; the Federal Statistics Office; the Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Poland, 2006; the World Factbook; Statistics Denmark; Statistics Finland; Statistics Lithuania; the Statistical Office of Estonia; Statistics Sweden.
Kaliningrad region can be ensured only by implementing the optimistic strategy of the “region of cooperation”. This strategy of international cooperation is based on the creation of a free economic zone in the region. Let us look into its perspectives.

What is the free or, since 1996, special economic zone in the Kaliningrad region? From 1996 to 2005, the special economic zone (SEZ) was a duty-free zone that granted exemption from all types of payments on the import and export of goods. This measure was aimed at stimulating export, developing import-substitution, replacing old enterprises and setting up new ones, primarily with foreign capital. Goods imported for re-export to other regions of the Russian Federation are liable to all import duties. Goods are considered as produced in the SEZ only if the value added through processing or treatment is not less than 30%, or 15% in the case of electronic and household appliances.

Owing to the duty-free zone regime, the role of the region in Russia’s foreign trade (especially import operations) has dramatically increased. However, the volume of industrial and agricultural output of the Kaliningrad region largely decreased in 1991–1998. The 1990s recession was deeper in the region than in Russia on average. The volume of industrial output in Kaliningrad region in 1998 was only 29% of the 1990 level, and the volume of the agricultural production – 46%, compared to 46% and 56%, respectively, in the Russian Federation.

The idea of import substitution did not work, because there was no demand for this kind of goods in other Russian regions. The situation changed qualitatively after the financial crisis of 1998. General tendencies of the economic growth after 1999 were also noticeable in the Kaliningrad region. Since 2000, investment and industrial growth in the Kaliningrad region have been higher than the average in the RF. The industrial output has almost doubled. The situation in transport, construction and tourism also looked optimistic. The Kaliningrad region began to play a more important role in servicing Russia’s international trade (Fig. 2.).

In 2007, the income per capita in the Kaliningrad region exceeded the level of 1990. But the region could not overcome a decrease in the agricultural production: the volume of agricultural production in 2007 was only half of the volume of 1990. Many branches of the social sphere, not having received the necessary financing, continued to experience difficulties. Given a rapid development of international economic ties, the Kaliningrad region became a unique type of the region – a corridor of development connecting Russian regions with other countries.

This type of regions – corridors of development – was first described by J. Friedmann (1967) along with other types of regions – key-regions (nucleus regions, growth regions), advanced regions, regions-corridors of
development, raw material regions and depressive regions. Regions-corridors of development are rapidly developing, since they are located between nucleus regions. These rapidly developing territories actively use innovations of their own. The Kaliningrad region has its specific features as it is located between nucleus regions of Russia and those of the European Union (Fig. 3.). It is “a region of international cooperation”, integrated into the market of the Baltic Sea region, with its rapidly developing market relations, accelerated development of the service sphere, market infrastructure, and small and medium businesses.

The task of a more active involvement of Kaliningrad in the economic space of the Baltic Sea region was set up in the “Strategy of the social and economic development of the Kaliningrad region as a region of cooperation for the period until 2010” (the decree of the administration of the Kaliningrad region signed on July 15, 2003. № 392).

In the middle of the first decade of the XXI century, the discussion of the future of the law on the Special Economic Zone in Kaliningrad and the future of the region became particularly intense. By that time, the role of the region in the all-Russia production of a whole series of goods, manufactured from the imported raw materials and semifinished products,
had significantly grown. The Kaliningrad region developed into a major producer of television sets, vacuum cleaners, fish and meat canned foods, automobiles, refrigerators, furniture, carpets, meat semifinished products, and crab sticks. This caused a certain dissatisfaction of manufacturers in other Russian regions: they accused Kaliningrad enterprises of unfair competition, mainly meaning customs privileges granted to Kaliningrad producers by the law on the Special Economic Zone.

A new version of the law on the Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in the Kaliningrad region was adopted in 2006. The new law aimed at re-orientation of production from import substitution to export (the law of the Russian Federation dated January 10th, 2006, №16-ФЗ). The new law on the SEZ seeks to replace the existing duty privileges by tax privileges. An enterprise could opt for:

- tax privileges for its investor if the invested sum exceeds 150 million roubles during a three year period;
- or duty-free privileges (available only to enterprises, not to individuals) for a period of 10 years (up to 2015).

Taxation privileges have already attracted large investors to the region. At the end of 2008, there were 55 residents of the Special Economic Zone, boasting more than 30 billion roubles of investment. These residents are large industrial, construction and transport companies.

At the end of 2006, a new strategy and a new programme of socio-economic development of the region were developed, making use of the new opportunities granted by the new law on the SEZ, the accumulated positive developments in the Russian economy and new policy directions of the socio-economic development aimed at modernization.
The new strategy of export orientation, being a part of the general strategy of Russia and the Baltic Sea region countries is to ensure sustainable and dynamic development of the Kaliningrad region, which is becoming one of the growth poles of the Russian economy.

This strategy is a long-term one and covers the period up to 2031 (the decree of the Government of the Kaliningrad region signed on March 9th, 2007, № 95). A number of other documents provide more details pertaining to the future of the region: the programme of social and economic development of the Kaliningrad region for the period 2007–2016 (a law of the Kaliningrad region, dated December 28th, 2006, №115), numerous regional programmes and projects, as well as strategies and programmes elaborated by municipalities of the Kaliningrad region.

The strategy sets two major and interconnected goals for the regional development:

1. Raising competitiveness of the Kaliningrad region both nationally and internationally. This should lead to a 10–15 % rise in the GRD during a period of 10 years.
2. Improving the living standards and the quality of life of the population of the region, making them similar to the EU standards of living.

To achieve these goals, it is necessary to make maximum use of both “external” advantageous conditions (customs and tax privileges, and the favourable geopolitical location of the region) and “internal” factors (high labour and capital productivity, growth potential, a new “portfolio” of resources, available in the Kaliningrad region).

It means an effective integration of the region in the economic, industrial, technological, transport, cultural and migratory systems of the Baltic macroregion. Some time ago, the accent was put on the “special” status of Kaliningrad. Now, the major emphasis is laid to the integration of the region into macroeconomic processes. Reaching this aim presupposes making the following steps:

- the development of a single labour and capital market;
- connecting the region to the pan-European transport networks;
- forming a single energy system (on condition the EU supports the idea of “the Baltic Energy Grid”);
- developing specialization of the Kaliningrad ports in the framework of the all-Russian port strategy;
- solving the problem of non-tariff restrictions on Russian goods and services in the EU;
- coordination of cultural policy of the Russian Federation and other countries of the Baltic Sea region.

The solution of the above mentioned tasks demands concentrating limited resources of the state and investing them into priority areas, thus paving
the way for a social and economic breakthrough. Government authorities should provide for the implementation of a whole complex of procedural and institutional measures, boosting investment and entrepreneurship in the region.

It is planned that a new strategy of sustainable presence of the RF in the Baltic Sea region will be elaborated by the federal authorities. The strategy will focus on the key infrastructure branches – transport and energy. The document will also facilitate the creation of a more favourable judicial and investment environment by solving systematic problems of tariff and non-tariff restrictions in the EU-Russia trade relations.

Further development of tourism in the Kaliningrad region demands setting up a local free economic zone on the Curonian Spit. The region and its tourism branch will benefit from the construction of a gambling zone, one of the four in Russia.

The efficiency of the new strategy will depend on how much and to what extent the strategy takes into account political, economic and social peculiarities of the exclave region, meeting the federal interests while making use of the regional potential. A lot will depend on how fully the strategy meets international interests, first and foremost, the interests of the neighbouring countries and EU in general. Besides, the development strategy of the Kaliningrad region should be incorporated into the general strategy of the Baltic Sea region, coordinating steps aimed at economic, political and social development of the Baltic Sea countries and putting joint effort into the protection of the environment.

A growing number of border-crossing stations ease the development of cooperation of the Kaliningrad region with the neighbouring regions (Fig. 4.).

The cooperation between the EU and Russia did not start from scratch. In fact, being first a free, and then a special economic zone, the Kaliningrad region has become a testing ground for economic co-operation, where new integration patterns are being experimented on.

The same holds true for cross-border cooperation. The previous decade saw a number of large-scale joint projects in various spheres, including environmental protection, energy saving, education (including re-training of former military personnel), healthcare, transport and social sphere. International research projects on the Kaliningrad region mainly focused on transport, telecommunications and energy. Another big issue is the development of industrial infrastructure as an indispensable foundation for attracting investments and, consequently, establishing specialized regional industries. These projects are chiefly financed by the EU through the TACIS programme, several projects are financed by Denmark (ecology) and Sweden (anti-AIDS programmes).
The region has a lot of international contacts. International co-operation will promote the formation of an effective regional economy suitable for intense economic co-operation between Russia and the EU. But the development of co-operation in the region is hampered by a lack of federal and local legislation, regulating the overarching liberal economic development of the exclave, supporting the structural reforms in the region, and describing patterns of multifarious cooperation with the European Union. Therefore, it is beneficial for Russia and the EU to prepare and sign a special agreement on the Kaliningrad Region.

The agreement should seek to solve two major issues:

- rapprochement of the RF and the EU through the development of new mechanisms of co-operation in the Kaliningrad region and transfer of positive experience to other regions of Russia (the Kaliningrad region as a “pilot region” of co-operation);
- creation of favourable conditions for the socio-economic development of the Kaliningrad region, a Russian enclave within the enlarged EU, by promoting the region’s integration as a Russian vanguard into the Baltic Sea Region and the European market.

Figure 4. Border-crossing stations in the Kaliningrad region

Source: Author’s studies.
The agreement should include provisions for the following issues:

- ensuring free transit of cargo and passengers between the Kaliningrad region and the rest of Russia across the territories of the neighbouring EU countries by sea, air, and land in both directions (including provisions for cargo transit in emergency cases);
- maintaining (as an exception to the Schengen rules of the EU) the visa-free regulations for people from Kaliningrad visiting Poland and Lithuania;
- simplifying procedures for issuing visas and work permits for foreign citizens visiting or staying in the Kaliningrad region;
- combining the fishing quotas and fish catching zones of the new EU member states bordering the Kaliningrad region with the corresponding quotas and fish catching zones of the EU in order to avoid damage to the fishing industry of the region;
- participation of the Kaliningrad region in the “Northern Dimension” and the EU programmes aimed at regional development, cross-border cooperation, environmental protection, health protection, and cultural, educational, and scientific exchange.

Co-operation between Russia and the EU could also be stimulated by deepening their interaction in the Baltic Sea Region; the Kaliningrad region should play an active role in this process. The well-known project “The Northern Dimension of the EU” is now being transformed into a bigger project – “The Baltic Dimension”. The Baltic Dimension project includes northern countries, as well as Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. Germany can also play an active role in it. North-west Russia, including the Kaliningrad region, could be involved in this project as well. Russia’s participation in this project would allow for more effective integration with the EU (40% of Russia’s trade with the EU is its trade with the Baltic countries). Certainly, Russia is not interested in trade only. Other economic aspects of high importance include foreign investment, tourism, telecommunications, etc. Cooperation could be very useful in other spheres of the Baltic Dimension project, such as science and education, culture and sport, security and politics.

The Kaliningrad region is an active member of many organizations promoting cooperation in the Baltic Sea Region. Participation in these programmes encourages further co-operation, improves contacts, promotes different regions, and attracts investment.

Unfortunately, Russian funding of co-operation projects (including research projects) is insufficient.

The list of projects of the Baltic countries and regions that are being actively implemented includes the following ones:
“Via Baltica”, “Via Hanseatica” – the construction of motorways connecting countries of the Baltic Sea region;
“The Baltic gateway” – creating a network of motorways and ferries;
“The Baltic Energy Grid” – developing an single energy system;
programmes of co-operation between the Baltic Sea cities;
ecological programmes focused on the Baltic Sea basin;
educational programmes (“Erasmus Mundus”, “The Eurofaculty”, “The Baltic University Programme” – the Immanuel Kant State University of Russia, Kaliningrad actively participates in these programs).

Kaliningrad is involved in many projects, but often only nominally. One of the projects that might be of interest is VASAB – 2010 (“Vision and strategies around the Baltic – 2010”), which is based on such values as development, environmental sustainability, freedom and solidarity. The project consists of four spatial elements, which could be studied and implemented in the Kaliningrad region as well:

- developing cities and urban networks;
- broadening power systems and transport networks;
- investing into areas supporting dynamism and the quality of life (such as border zones as an instrument of international exchange; tourist areas; coastal zones worthy of special attention; natural and cultural landscapes of special importance);
- doing comprehensive spatial planning.

To alleviate negative consequences of the exclave position of the Kaliningrad region, it is necessary to include the region in new spatial forms of international economic integration. These new forms of integration are implemented at the sub-national level, involving regions of different states and featuring active cross-border and interregional cooperation and on-going socio-economic integration. These new forms are the so-called “large regions”, “triangles of growth”, “working communities” (associations, etc), and Euroregions. Euroregions are especially active in the Baltic Sea region. They develop joint strategies, accumulate finance for solving common problems and implementing interregional projects. The establishment of euroregions with Russia’s participation started as early as the second half of the 1990s. The participation of Russian regions in the euroregions certainly differs from that of the regions of the EU countries (since Russia is not a member of the EU, and seems unlikely to join it). Nevertheless, we hope that in the course of time, the existing differences between regions will be eliminated.

The Kaliningrad region and its municipalities are members of 5 Euroregions: Baltica, Neman, Sheshupe, Saule, Lyna-Lava (Fig. 5.). The Kaliningrad region most actively participates in the Euroregion “Baltica”. Its national secretariat is located in Baltiysk. The Council and Presidium
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Figure 5. Kaliningrad region in the Euroregions

Source: Author’s studies.
of the Euroregion have been established, and three working groups (on environmental protection, spatial planning and social issues) have been formed. Future joint projects have been planned, including the following SEB Trans-Link connecting Russia to the EU countries, projects aimed at tourist and resort infrastructure development, maintaining security in the Baltic Sea region, developing networks of analytical and information centers, and a public health service. There are projects for the reconstruction of the old town of Baltiysk and building a new international multi-purpose centre on the Curonian Spit. The implementation of the “Seagull project” (aimed at the elaboration and development of the Euroregion strategy), launched in 2001, is still in progress. This project is financed by a number of European programmes such as INTERREG, PHARE, and TACIS.

There are forms of interregional cooperation which are typical of the Baltic Sea region – the so-called “arcs”. Russian regions take part in the “South Baltic Arc”, which is being implemented in the framework of BSR INTERREG III B. The territory of the project stretches along the southern coast of the Baltic Sea from Germany across Poland, the Kaliningrad region, and Lithuania to Latvia along Via Hanseatica. 13 regions of the countries of the Baltic Sea region take part in the project.

“Growth triangles” are transnational economic zones, covering large but rather well-defined geographic territories. Differences, existing in the three (or more) countries and/or regions are used to the advantage of the participating parties – developing international trade and attracting foreign investment. Countries and regions of the Baltic Sea region differ greatly in the level of their development. This makes it possible to implement the concept of “growth triangles”.

U. Kivikari, a Finnish professor, suggested forming a south Baltic growth triangle (2001), including:

- regions of economically developed EU member states – northern regions of Poland and Germany, and southern Sweden;
- regions of the countries with transitional economy, candidates to the EU membership, or of new EU member states – northern Poland, Lithuania, and western Latvia;
- regions of the immediate neighbours of the enlarged EU – north-west Belarus and the Kaliningrad region of Russia.

The combination of these three elements could have a significant effect. This idea is quite attractive for the Kaliningrad region because the project includes its territory.

Another interesting idea is the creation of a bipolar economic system called “Trehgradie” (Gdansk-Gdynia-Sopot) – Kaliningrad. It was suggested by a Polish professor T. Palmowski (2003). The idea being developed further, one can speak about a tripolar system of urban agglomerates – Trehgradie – Sopot – Kaliningrad.
Russian scientists are looking into perspectives of the participation of Russia and Russian regions in cross-border cooperation in the Baltic Sea region. The Kaliningrad region actively participates in such kind of cooperation and has gained certain experience, which can be used by other regions of Russia. Along with Euroregions, novel forms of special cooperation are of great interest.

A more active participation of the Kaliningrad region and all other regions of Russia and their municipalities in cross-border cooperation will encourage Russia’s greater involvement in economic integration processes in the Baltic macroregion, thus creating additional advantages in competition compared with other Russian regions and Russia as a whole.

Providing the federal authorities offer their assistance to Russian regions participating in these novel forms of cooperation, the role of such regions in the Baltic Sea macroregion will significantly increase. The idea is not only to act as partners in programmes and projects initiated by western countries, but rather organise such cooperation in the areas, which are strategically important for the development of Russian regions. The participation of the Kaliningrad region in various forms of cross-border cooperation strengthens the role of Russia in economic integration processes, taking place in the Baltic Sea region and in the formation of the single Baltic economic space.

* * *

One of the peculiarities of the Kaliningrad region is its strong dependence on the provisions of the Special Economic Zone regime. At the same time, the regional economy depends on the demand for Kaliningrad goods on the Russian domestic market. Abolition of the privileges, granted to the region by the law on the Special Economic Zone, or a falling demand for Kaliningrad goods will inevitably result in a drop in industrial production. Nowadays, the economy of the region remains “vulnerable, i.e. failing to provide sustainable development of the region”, just as it was described by professor Ivan Samson (France) in his book “Kaliningrad region: the diagnosis of a crisis” (1998). The global financial crisis, which began in 2008 and is now hitting all counties including Russia, will have far more serious consequences for Kaliningrad. However, the demand for consumer goods manufactured in the Kaliningrad region (TV sets, cars, meat and fish products) will be less affected by the crisis. This will be an alleviating factor for the regional economy.

The situation with the new strategy for Kaliningrad is very complicated, because of the interests competing in the Kaliningrad region. There are federal, regional and municipal authorities, Russian (from Kaliningrad,
Moscow and other regions of Russia) and foreign businesses, very diverse population of the region, etc. It is very difficult to balance all these interests in one strategy.

The regional strategy of development must contain three compulsory components: *regional, federal and international ones*. The *regional component* is the development of market conditions in the region. Taking into consideration the geographic proximity of the EU countries with their developed market economies, this process can develop faster in this region than in other Russian regions. The enclave position of the region makes it easier to introduce new essential elements of the market economy, which can later be used by other Russian regions. The *federal component* presupposes that the development of Kaliningrad serves the interests of the Russian Federation; it is of considerable significance for the RF in respect of its international policy. This factor and the Kaliningrad’s exclave position mean that the Russian government should pay special attention to the region, which can manifest itself in exercising direct control over the key elements of the regional economy. The realization of the federal programme is now based on the SEZ mechanism and the federal task program “The development of the Kaliningrad region until 2010”, offering significant federal investments and guarantees for private investors.

The *international aspect* of the regional strategy requires both sides – Russia and the West – to acknowledge that the Kaliningrad region plays a special role in mutually beneficial co-operation. The Kaliningrad region will become a Russian contact territory in Europe, a testing ground for the mechanisms of integration and interaction between Russia and the European Union in the XXI century.

The essence of the strategy is to turn the Kaliningrad region into a “region of intense EU-Russia co-operation”, the place where new forms of co-operation are tested and from where positive experience would spread to other regions of Russia. In the framework of regional development, it is advisable for Russia and the EU to sign a special agreement on the Kaliningrad region. As a pole of international integration, the Kaliningrad region will be a catalyst for positive changes and will be able to play a more important role in the all-European co-operation (including Russia).

The Baltic Sea Region is a region of intense international co-operation (including EU-Russia). The region is gradually expanding beyond its geographical concept to become an economic, social and even political entity. The integration processes in different areas are especially active in the region, supported by the federal government as well as by the region’s administration, business community and non-governmental organizations. The EU-Russia co-operation in the Baltic Sea Region is currently under development and will certainly expand in the future.
Both the Russian Federation and the European Union, as reflected in various legal documents, regard the Kaliningrad region as a “pilot” region of international cooperation. The strategy of developing the Kaliningrad region as a region of co-operation presupposes greater co-operation between Russia and the EU as a fundamental measure for overcoming the drawbacks and for utilizing the advantages of its geopolitical location.

The realization of the outlined strategy in the sphere of cooperation would enhance the region’s economic security, which is by no means identical to self-sufficiency of the regional economy and consists of:

- effective specialization of the national economy and a high level of development in the regional market;
- reliable and cheap communications with the mainland Russia;
- mutually beneficial relations with the neighbouring countries.

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Preliminary remarks

Cross-border cooperation at local or regional level depends on both regional or local conditions on both sides of the state (national) border and on relations on higher levels – i.e. between national governments concerned and even between larger international groupings. Thus, cooperation between Polish regions and the Kaliningrad district of Russia depends on relations between Poland and Russia as well as between the European Union and Russia. Although the impact of the higher levels of relations on local/regional cross-border relations is not immediate and absolute, and the local/regional level has some autonomy, this autonomy has its limits. Therefore, when analysing the present state and perspectives of cross-border cooperation between Polish regions and the Kaliningrad district of Russia it is advisable to analyse relations between Poland and Russia and between the European Union and Russia.

This paper attempts at presenting general characteristics of the abovementioned relations after the geopolitical turn of 1989, first of all by describing evolution of attitudes of Poland towards Russia, of Russia towards Poland, of Russia towards the EU and of the attitudes of the EU towards Russia, before proposing a prognosis.

Attitudes of Poland towards Russia

After the collapse of the “Soviet block” and the communist/socialist system in Poland in 1989, attitudes in Poland towards Russia and towards Polish-Russian relations underwent a considerable evolution. One can distinguish three stages.

At the very beginning quite a popular was the idea of Poland as a “bridge” between the “West” and the “East” (or Russia and other post-Soviet states). According to this idea Poland should be a “meeting point” between the two sides, a basis for economic expansion of Western firms in the (post) Soviet markets, place of cultural exchange between the West and
the East. The assumption for this role of Poland was its presumed cultural and mental intermediary position and its knowledge of, and contacts with, both sides. This role was to give Poland both political prestige and economic gains. In can be said that to some extent this role was played by some Polish institutions, first of all academic and cultural ones. Poland was visited by representatives of Western institutions looking for contacts with possible Soviet partners, as well as by Russians trying to establish relations with the West. (The very author, as representative of the University of Warsaw, also as interpreter from German to Russian, took part in establishing of such contacts). It should be said, however, that this period was rather short and hasn’t left solid results such as Poland-based institutions operating in both Western Europe and Russia.

Afterwards a long period of Poland’s indifference towards Russia came in. Poland “turned its face” entirely to the West in its attempts to integrate with Western institutions: NATO and the European Union. Russia was perceived only in this function, as an political obstacle (as regards Polish accession to NATO) or as a “technical problem” (e.g. border-crossing regulations at the Polish-Russian border in the case of accession to the EU). Of course, this indifference towards Russia doesn’t mean lack of any contacts, but it does mean that the Polish government and the general public didn’t feel a need for special political contacts with Russia.

More or less after 2000 Poland increasingly perceived Russia as a threat. This was caused by the ever more assertive attitude of Russia in the international relations, especially in relations with its nearest neighbours – Byelorussia (Belarus), Ukraine and Georgia (e.g. using stopping of delivery of gas and energy and its prices for political purposes). Such a behaviour of Russia was interpreted in Poland as a rebirth of the old-style Russian imperialism\(^1\). This interpretation was one of the reasons of Poland’s

\(^1\) Polish writer, journalist and traveller Ryszard Kapuściński (2007, p.136–137) confirms reasons of this fear writing that Russians regarded the crisis of the state, crisis of the empire, as a temporary crisis. When I asked Russians belonging to the elite of power, if Russia is dangerous for Poland and for Europe, the answer was very characteristic: no, we are not dangerous, because now there is corruption in the army, there is disorganization in armed forces, there are problems with armaments, industry is obsolete, and so on. And this was the answer. And not that we have broken with communism, with imperialist politics, that we want to build a democratic and peaceful Russia, that there happened a fundamental change of the orientation, doctrine, philosophy and conception of the state. No, you can not hear such an answer. After the social shock and disorientation after the collapse of the USSR, since 1992 a process is under way of rebuilding and consolidation of the old positions and the old concepts. Russians mentally can not accept the loss of the position of superpower. Recent years have confirmed that Russianness in the eyes of Russians functions only in the superpower-imperialistic form. The concept of Russianness is a concept of great spaces, great expansion and impossibility of resigning from anything what was conquered. (my translation from Polish – R. Sz.)
trial to establish more intense political and strategic relations with NATO and especially with the USA and, on the other hand, to feel sympathy to political forces in Ukraine and Byelorussia considered as democratic, pro-Western and opposing Russian expansion. During the so called “orange revolution” in Ukraine in 2004/05 this sympathy turned into an open (moral and political) support by Polish public opinion and institutions (political parties, media, NGOs, etc) for the “oranges” as “democrats” and a “barrier” to re-establishing of Russian domination in Ukraine. The Polish government and the President were officially neutral in the intra-Ukrainian conflict, but their engagement (especially president Kwasniewski’s activity as mediator in Ukraine) in defence of democracy was interpreted, both in Poland and in Russia, as a support for anti-Russian forces in Ukraine.

The feeling of danger coming from Russia was re-enforced and confirmed by some steps taken by Russia, especially by the project of a gas pipe-line (the North Stream project) between Russia and Germany bypassing Poland, the Russian ban on Polish meat and other food products (in 2005) (officially, the ban was caused by “technical” reasons but practically nobody in Poland doubted in its political motivations) as well as by anti-Polish campaign in Russian media and by anti-Polish diplomatic gestures, culminating in May 2005 Moscow celebration of the 60th anniversary of the victory in the WW2.

One of major elements of Poland’s policy to stop the “Russian threat” has been its suspicion towards Russian investments in strategic sectors (especially in energy) in Poland, which means, in practice, refusal of Russian investors in privatisation of big Polish firms. From the Russian perspective this policy can be considered as discrimination of Russian investors.

The new Polish government and the new President that took office in autumn of 2005 tried to take more “tough” position towards Russia by using Poland’s membership in the EU. In doing so, Poland e.g. vetoed EU – Russia commercial agreement in 2006 demanding removal of the Russian ban on Polish food products. Possibility of using the EU by Poland to press Russia was limited, among other things, by the low popularity of the then Polish government and president in the European Union and by a widespread opinion of them as “troublemakers” and “charged by the traditional Polish anti-Russianism.”.

The government that took power in Poland in October 2007, after pre-time elections, declares both more open attitude towards Russia and is evidently more popular in the European Union. This may change Polish-Russian at intergovernmental (international) level. Perspectives of such a change will be dealt with later in this paper.
Attitudes of Russia towards Poland

For obvious reasons attitudes towards Poland in Russia played a less significant role than the attitudes towards Russia in Poland. However, the former underwent a similar evolution as the latter. Until recently, three stages could be distinguished: 1) interest with sympathy, 2) ignorance, 3) hostility (or irritation).

The first stage was rather short and lasted more or less from 1989 to 1991/92. During this time Russia, being in deep economic and socio-political crisis was looking for ways out from this crisis. Poland was considered then as a successfully experimenting with democracy and free market reforms. Polish experts were often invited to Russia to share their knowledge on Polish reforms; Russian central TV frequently presented reports from Poland demonstrating successes of market reforms. As noted earlier, Russian scholars and incipient businessmen visited Poland to look for contacts with Polish and western partners.

Quite soon it became clear that the two countries developed in different directions and the Polish experience was less and less useful for Russia. Free market reforms in Russia were producing results much different from expected and from what Polish experience suggested. This caused widespread dissatisfaction among the Russian population and a need for another “model” of economy as well for another model of political system (instead of western-style liberal democracy). This new desirable model was the ‘Chinese model” – combination of political dictatorship and state control of crucial segments of the national economy with free market in other sectors. At the same time Russians (institutions of all kinds and private persons) had established direct contacts with the outside world and no longer needed any (Polish or other) intermediation. Poland as a less important and less interesting country, in comparison with Western European countries, with the USA or with tax paradises (e.g. Cyprus, Gibraltar etc.) was simply “overlooked” by Russia and Russians.

Russia started to notice Poland, again, a few year ago, this time as an obstacle and rival, if not enemy. This new perception of Poland by Russia (i.e. Russian leaders) was caused by the new – assertive – attitude of Russia towards the outside world. According to this new attitude Russia should regain its “legitimate” position as a global superpower and unquestionable leader of the post-Soviet political and economic space. Poland’s political activity in Russia’s “near abroad”, especially in Ukraine (particularly the abovementioned Poland’s engagement in solving the political crisis there in 2004/05, Poland’s political, moral and technical [Polish experts] support for democracy and pro-Western orientation in Ukraine) but also in Byelorussia (moral, political and technical support for democratic and
pro-Western forces) and Polish economic activity in Lithuania (especially in its energy sector) combined with not admitting of Russian investors in Polish energy sector, were conceived by Russia as a deliberate action to stop Russia. Poland, according to this reasoning, was an instrument of a larger “plot” and acted in tandem with Western powers, notably with the USA, desiring to stretch the US and Western domination over the ex-Soviet Union. Poland accession to NATO, its support for the US invasion of Iraq and other US-led military and political actions) only confirmed this perception. The recent American idea of locating in Poland elements of the so-called anti-missile shield and the positive (preliminary) response to this idea by the Polish government adds to this perception.

The list of Polish “sins” against Russia was much longer and included, for instance, criticism of Russian actions in Chechnya, support for Estonia in its conflict with Russia over historical monuments (symbols of Russian occupation of Estonia or symbols of liberation of Estonia by the Soviet Union), etc. The major “sin” seems to be that Poland, a Slavic nation, “betrayed” Russia – “mother of all Slavs” – by joining the West (NATO, the European Union).

The perception of Poland as an obstacle, rival and “betrayer” caused increasing irritation in Russia culminating in actions of “punishing” and/or “bypassing” Poland, such as the abovementioned ban on Polish food products, the North Stream project, restrictions on navigation in the Vistula Bay, etc. Among expressions of this irritation were verbal attacks (often full of angry, hate and disdain) on Poland by Russian politicians, media and even by anonymous Russian internet users. Poland was presented as an enemy of Russia, a “ridiculous dwarf” who tries to hurt “Great Russia”. All this formed a very unfavourable climate for Polish-Russian relations.

As mentioned earlier, the recent change of government in Poland and declarations of the new Polish government trying to improve relations with Russia found response in Russia. A concrete form of this response in the abolishment of the ban of Polish meat in Russia in December 2007. Maybe this signifies opening of a new stage relations between the two countries.

Attitudes of the European Union towards Russia

As mentioned earlier Polish-Russian relations are both influenced by and influencing relations between the European Union and Russia. For instance, Poland opposing pressure from Russia asked help from the EU and vetoed the EU – Russia commercial negotiations in autumn 2006. On the other hand Russia, in its attempt to build the gas pipeline on the Baltic Sea bottom (and thus to bypass Poland) had to invite to the project one EU country –
Germany, and to convince at least another EU countries – Estonia and/or Finland, Sweden and Denmark, in whose economic zones or territorial waters in the Baltic Sea the pipeline has to be located. For this reason it is useful to sketch attitudes of the EU towards Russia, and vice versa.

When analysing attitudes of the EU, it should be noted that the term “European Union” is very unclear one, it entails the EU institutions (like the European Commission) executing common and agreed policy, EU member states each of them caring out its own independent foreign policy as well as business, public opinion, etc. Therefore it is difficult to speak of unified attitudes of the EU towards Russia, or towards any other country or problem. Nevertheless, some common elements in the broadly conceived European Union's attitudes towards Russia can be distinguished. These attitudes also underwent an evolution. Until recently three stages in this evolution can be proposed: 1) fears of destabilisation and hopes for opportunities, 2) Russia as partner or rival in the geopolitical game, 3) Russia as a challenge.

In the first stage, which lasted the whole decade of the 1990s the European Union, as the whole “West”, was afraid of political destabilisation, economic and social crisis, etc. in Russia for its possible adverse effects on the (western) Europe, such as uncontrolled immigration, penetration of European countries by Russian mafia (including criminal groups formed by KGB agents), smuggling of weapons, radioactive materials, and loss of control on Russian nuclear arsenal by Russian authorities (nuclear arms and know-how in hands of criminals, terrorists and irresponsible governments). Russia, with its immense territory and natural deposits and on the road to market economy was also perceived as an extraordinary opportunity for European business – as market for European industry and agriculture and as a opportunity to purchase privatised factories and natural deposits. For both reasons (fear of instability and hopes for opportunities) the West (including the European Union) was interested in political and economic stability of Russia, and readily helped anybody who promised to ensure this stability. Therefore the West by all means supported president Yeltsin2.

One of consequences of perception of Russia, and of the whole post-communist area, as the area of destabilisation and troubles, were attitudes of the West (the EU and NATO) towards Poland and other central-eastern European countries). The idea emerged of “enlarging the zone of stability to the East” by closer cooperation with, and eventually accession of these countries to NATO and the EU.

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2 Motives and ways of helping Yeltsin by the West were described in details and critically assessed by J. E. Stiglitz (2002).
In its attitudes towards Russia in that time the West was quite united, despite obvious differences in the intensity of the feeling of fear and activity in capturing opportunities. In the latter respect the most active seemed to be Germany and German firms. In any case Russia in the 1990s was perceived as a territory – source of threats and opportunities, rather than a state, participant in the global political and economic game.

This perception changed considerably after 2000, when it became clear that the threat of implosion of Russia was over and when Russia (re-) emerged as a political player. Perception of Russia as a political player was different in different countries of the EU. Attitudes of individual EU countries towards Russia largely depended on their attitudes towards the USA. Those countries such as Germany (of chancellor Schröder) and France (of president Chirac), which considered the USA (of president G.W. Bush) as the major challenge tried to form a kind of anti-American alliance with Russia. On the other hand those countries, which opted for political and military co-operation with the USA (such as the UK) were not interested in such an alliance with Russia. These differences were especially evident after the 2003 American attack on Iraq. In this moment it was hard to speak of any common and agreed attitudes of the European Union towards Russia. In this atmosphere governments of some UE countries, including Germany, decided to keep as good relations with Russia as possible ignoring interests of other EU countries. The emblematic evidence of such an attitude was the German consent to build the Baltic pipeline.

The differentiated attitudes of EU-countries towards Russia are continuing. There are, however, some changes. The ever more assertive, if not aggressive, behaviour of Russia (for instance in its relations with Ukraine, Byelorussia, Georgia, Moldavia, activities of Russian secret service agents abroad, tougher nationalistic and anti-Western rhetoric of president Putin and other Russian representatives resembling imperialistic tones, etc.) and gradual limitation of democracy at home, made Western leaders and public opinion-makers more cautious in relation to Putin’s Russia. Changes of leaders of crucial EU-countries (Merkel as the new German leader and Sarkozy as the new French leader) also contributed to this more cautious stance towards Russia. As a result, European leaders became more

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3 For instance the influential weekly “The Economist” regularly sharply criticizes recent tendencies in Russia (nationalism, anti-Western rhetoric and renewed militarism) and terms the recent state of relations between the EU and Russia as “freezing”. See e.g. Putin’s people, “The Economist” August 25th, 2007.

4 An excellent analysis of changes of perception of Russia by the West (especially by the main European countries) presenting a growing concern of the West about the Russian new assertive/aggressive attitudes towards the EU and the West, is a publication issued at the same time in a French and in a German institute for foreign affaires (see: T. Gomart, 2007).
inclined to accept Polish opinions on Russian foreign policy, for instance on the Russian ban on imports of Polish food products, on the idea of the Russian-German Baltic pipeline, etc. It doesn’t mean that European leaders are ready to support any Polish initiative, for instance that of rejection of the Baltic pipeline project. It does mean, however, that they receive Polish objections as rational (and not motivated only by irrational anti-Russian sentiments) that should be addressed in a rational way. On the other hand, the growing insecurity on energy markets worldwide and the growing role of Russia as Europe’s major energy supplier presses the EU to strengthen its cooperation with Russia, and, therefore, to solve problems that hinder this cooperation. This cooperation, apart from Polish 2006 veto, encounter problem of what the EU terms as unequal terms of cooperation – Russia demands full access of its firms to the EU energy market (including retail distribution of gas) while denies access to its market to European investors.

Cooperation of the EU and Russia depend on both sides. Therefore, attitudes of Russia towards Europe should also be dealt with.

**Attitudes of Russia towards the EU**

Attitudes of Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union towards the West in general and the European Union in particular result from two sets of factors: opportunities or possibilities (determined mostly by economic situation in Russia in comparison with the West and Europe, and by Russia’s internal political situation) and values and ideas dominating in Russia. These factors made that Russia’s attitudes towards the West and the EU changed since the early 1990s and two distinct stages can be distinguished: before 2000 and after 2000, which corresponds with times of Yeltsin and Putin respectively as presidents of Russia.

In the first stage these attitudes were mostly determined by possibilities and were characterised by passive stance of Russia towards the West. Economic, political and ideological crisis in Russia, as mentioned earlier, made that Russia heavily depended on Western economic (financial) support, Western advice (in matters related to economic reforms, building of democracy and civil society, etc.) and Western technology and investments (in modernizing its industry). Decade of the 1990s was very important in shaping political idea and attitudes of the Russian people. Economic hardships of everyday life, enormous socio-economic inequalities, feeling of humiliation for the collapse of the Soviet Union and the position of Russia as a poor client and disciple of the West, frustration caused by what was considered as discrimination of ethnic Russians in post-Soviet republics, etc. were largely attributed to democracy and the West as its main promoter.
In the second stage, when Russia was recovering from the economic, social and political crisis (among other things Russia became financially independent from abroad), its attitudes towards the West were more and more determined by its values, ideas and newly defined economic opportunities. It is highly problematic to speculate whether Russia followed a deliberate and in advance in-details conceived policy in relation to the EU and the West. However, some elements of the new (or sometimes of the old) ideas in Russia’s attitudes towards the West could be detected.

The most important and the most obvious element is Russia’s desire to restore its “legitimate” position as a global superpower. The problem is what this position should mean in practice and how it should be or could be achieved. Unlike tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union, the present Russia has no universalistic idea to fight for. More clear seem to be ways and instruments to achieve this position. These were described in the concept of “liberal imperialism” developed by Russian (former) liberals (such as A. Chubays). These are: overtaking of energy infrastructure (including e.g. oil refineries) in foreign countries and making them independent on Russian supplies of energy carriers, differentiated prices of energy carriers for different clients (thus punishing or rewarding them according to their behaviour), stoppages of supplies, bans on imports, etc.

Another element easily discernible are anti-Western sentiments in the Russian society and anti-Western rhetoric of Russian authorities, media, writers etc. Victims of such an atmosphere are local NGOs, opposition parties, independent media – defenders of democracy, human rights and freedom of speech presented as agents of the West. It is, again, unclear to what extent these sentiments and rhetoric practically determines political and economic relations with the West and, in particular, with the EU.

A third factor determining Russia’s attitude towards the West is business and profits of the new class of Russian billionaires from exporting natural gas, oil and other raw materials to the West. One of major assets of this class of “global Russians” is their credibility as business partners of the West. It is problematic to what extent this class would be ready to risk its

5 more in-depth analyses of attitudes of the Russian society towards the West, among other things pointing to the growing distrust of Russian towards the West, are presented e.g. in: L. Suchanek (2004), H. Kowalska (2004). An example of anti-western attitudes of Russian intellectuals is famous writer and historian Lew Gumilow (Lev Gumilev). In his book “Ot Rusi k Rosii” (“From Ruthenia to Russia”) he presents the history of Russia as fighting of good Russians against bad West, and the time of dependence of Moscow on Tatar rulers as the time of protection of Russia from the West. Gumilow highly appreciates a historical personality (Alexander Nevsky) who having to make a choice: alliance with the West against Tatars or with Tatars against the West, chose the Tatars. According to him Russia and the West are different and inimical civilizations, Russia forming a so-called “Eurasian” civilization. Cf. L. Gumilow (2004).
credibility in order to achieve political goals (for instance by stopping supplies of energy carriers to big customers). It seems that this class is ready to follow the idea of “liberal imperialism” as long as it is both “imperialistic” and “liberal”. One of projects that seem to meet both the criterion of “imperialism” and of “liberalism” is for sure the Baltic pipeline.

In recent years active foreign policy of Russia in Europe is visible, together with different approach to different members of the EU. The most preferred partner of Russia, from the bigger EU-members, is evidently Germany, and one of the least preferred is Poland. It is, however, not clear if it is a deliberate policy of “divide at impera” or simply result of different attitudes of individual countries to the idea of cooperation with Russia. For both political and business reasons Russia tries to present its differentiated approach to different EU-countries as motivated only by economic reasons or by unwillingness of some countries (such as Poland) to cooperate with Russia.

Recent developments

The change of government in Poland in October 2007 gave an opportunity to all parts to change their mutual relations. For the new Polish government it was an opportunity to make some symbolic gestures towards Russia, so far without practical importance (e.g. withdrawal of Polish objections to Russia’s access to OECD, decision to listen to Russian arguments against the project of the American nuclear shield to be located in Poland, promise that Russian investors will not be discriminated against, etc.). This gave the Russian part the opportunity to express (for the first time for several years) positive opinions on Poland and to start to lift the 2-year old ban on imports of Polish food products. This move enabled Russia to get rid of the ban which had already started to be a problem for Russia itself as it gave rise to growing conviction among Western observers that it was in fact motivated politically, and not by technical considerations.

The latest improvement of Polish-Russian relations is somehow contrary to the general tendency in relations between Russia and the West. As mentioned earlier, some aspects of internal political and social life in Russia, Russia’s renewed attempts to strengthen its military power and presence in various parts of the world (e.g. in the Mediterranean Sea), “annexation” of a part of Arctic Sea (including the North Pole), verbal attacks on the West by outstanding representatives of the Russian state (and Russian Orthodox Church), etc. are causing increasing concern in the West. So far, however, the deterioration in the Russia – Europe relations occurs only in the “spiritual” dimension – in unofficial opinions, media comments etc.,
without material consequences (commercial exchange between Russia and the EU is still growing).

A recent event is also the access of Poland to the Schengen area (December 2007) which implies additional restrictions on crossing the Polish-Russian border. As it was planned in advance, it is not a surprise and should not dramatically influence Polish-Russian international relations. Of course, it is not going to improve the attitude of the Russian society towards the West.

**Perspectives of Polish – Russian – EU relations**

The most important questions at the turn of 2007/08 is whether the present improvement in the Polish-Russian relations can continue and whether the deterioration of the Russian-EU relations can be reverted.

One may expect continuation of improvement of the Polish – Russian relations in the “soft” sphere, such as refrain from mutual verbal attacks, removal of disputes on symbols and history from the agenda (or a more open approach to the other side’s point of view), a better presentation of the other side in media (it refers mostly to Russia whose main media are largely under governmental influence), etc. This soft sphere may evidently create better conditions for Polish – Russian international relations and, consequently for local/regional cross-border cooperation.

There remain, however, some “structural” issues in Polish – Russian relations that in the medium run may hinder improvement of mutual relations. Among those are Polish support for European aspirations of Ukraine, strategic cooperation of Poland with the USA (first of all the problem of the nuclear shield) and the Baltic pipeline. Developments in these areas will also depend on decisions and situation in third parties – in Ukraine (whether it is still interested in integration with the West and whether it needs Polish help), in the USA (whether it is still going to insist on building the shield in Poland) and in Germany and the EU (whether they are ready to understand and accept Polish objections against the Baltic pipeline and whether the EU is able to form a unified group in talks with Russia and not to leave any country, including Poland, vulnerable to Russian energy blackmail, etc.).

As regards the attitudes of Germany and the EU towards Poland, the change of the government – dismissal of the very unpopular former Polish prime minister – is evidently improving Poland’s position in the EU. One may expect, therefore, a better understanding of Polish arguments and more intense attempts to find solutions what would take into account Polish interests too.

Many things will depend on the evolution of the situation in Russia. There are two issues of extraordinary importance: anti-Western sentiments
in the Russian society and the assertive (some call it “neoimperialistic”) behaviour of Russia in international relations. The problem is whether the anti-Western sentiments are kept under control or are going to determine foreign Policy of Russia. In the latter case they would contribute to imperialistic tendencies in Russia. The recent appointment of vice-prime minister Medvedev (considered as representing the civil or more friendly forces in Russia) as Kremlin’s candidate for the position of president of Russia and his probable victory on presidential elections in March 2008, together with declarations that V. Putin would remain nr. One in Russia (this time as prime minister) after March 2008 may be interpreted as announcements that a dramatic deterioration in Russian foreign policy and Russian – EU relations should not be expected.

A lot will also depend on the European Union in its attitudes towards Russia. The problem here is whether the EU is ready to form a unified block that would stop possible Russian ambitions or on the contrary – it will be disunited giving Russia an opportunity to pick up individual countries and to punish or reward them.

The worst scenario is the “clash of civilisations” – the Russian “Eurasian” civilisation and the European civilisation. The frontline in such a clash would inevitably be the Polish – Russian border and the victim of the clash – cross-border cooperation of Polish regions with the Kaliningrad district of Russia. Let’s hope that this scenario will not come true.

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Problems of Baltic integration on the example of border traffic between Poland and the Kaliningrad Oblast

Introduction

Kaliningrad Oblast – a small, most westwards reaching part of the Russian Federation – plays an important role in building stability, trust and multifaceted cooperation in the southern part of Baltic Europe (T. Palmowski, 2007). With the enlargement of the European Union in 2004 the Oblast became an exclade on EU territory. The question of Baltic integration takes on a new dimension in view of the above.

One of the measureable aspects of accession to the EU by Poland and other Baltic States is the change in border traffic noted on the Union’s new eastern border. The resultant adjustment of border related standards introduced a new regime for border control, visa regulations, asylum, refuge related procedures (M. Trojanowska-Strzęboszewska, 2005). Further sealing of the border between EU and the Kaliningrad Oblast took place three years later with the enlargement of the Schengen zone. Both steps had their impact on the structure and intensity of border traffic between Poland and the Russian exclade.

The 210 km long border with Kaliningrad Oblast is one of the shortest sections of the of Poland’s borderline. It amounts to 6% on the country’s entire borderline. In the northern section it separates the neighbouring Kaliningrad Oblast inhabited by approximately 940 thousand residents from the southwards placed Warmińsko-Mazurskie Voivodship (with a population of 1.4 million in 2008) and a small fragment of Pomorskie Voivodship in the western part (The Vistula Spit).

Changes in border traffic between Poland and the Kaliningrad oblast

Up to the year 1990, free border traffic along this border section was not possible. Kaliningrad Oblast was closed to foreigners. Access to this military area of the Soviet Union was also limited for citizens of other republics of the Soviet Union. The small border traffic with Poland, strictly rationed by
party authorities of both neighbouring countries, was initiated in 1956 and continued with varied intensity to the beginnings of political transformation in central and Eastern Europe (E. Wojnowski, 2006). Apart from border gates and later customs office buildings at the border crossings in Bezledy and Gronowo there was no infrastructure for crossing the border. The old East Prussian access roads to the borders were in a critical condition.

Revival of relations (at the time controlled by authorities) between neighbouring regions was noted at the turn of the eighties and nineties. 1990 noted 80 thousand border crossings, exceeding many fold the traffic in earlier years.

Officially The Kaliningrad Oblast border crossings were opened in 1992 (T. Komornicki, 2008). In the same year rail passenger traffic was revived from Kaliningrad to Braniewo. A year later a line was opened from Kaliningrad to Gdynia. Work on developing the road infrastructure of old border crossings in Bezledy and Gronowo began.

![Figure 1. Passenger traffic on the Polish Russian border in the years 1990–2008](image)


In 1992, border traffic grew nearly fourfold as compared to 1991. In consecutive years further growth could be observed up to 1997 when over 5 million people crossed the border (Fig. 1). In 1995, thanks to the lobbying of local authorities a road border crossing was built in Goldap providing the residents of the eastern Polish and Russian border region, earlier deprived of the option, with a possibility to cross the border.

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1 For example in E. Wojnowski (2006).
The character of the border traffic with Kaliningrad Oblast resulted in fluctuating volumes following 1997 (Fig. 1). Most of the traffic at this border crossing, from the date of its opening, involves small trade of border region inhabitants. Both the Polish and Russian side suffer economic depression. Problems in finding a job, low salaries and the difference in prices of various products (mainly connected with excise tax) on both sides of the border are the factors contributing to this unofficial trade becoming the purpose of crossing the border to the neighbouring country. Best evidence of the dominating trade and smuggling related nature of the border traffic with Kaliningrad Oblast is the short time of stay abroad. For example, in 2002 merely about 9% of Poles cleared by customs stayed longer than one day in the Oblast. The case is similar for Russians coming to Poland where merely 10% remained in our country for more than a day (A. Doroś et all, 2005).

The dominating trade and smuggling related nature of trips abroad is strictly connected with border traffic dynamics, which reflect the changes in cross border regulations (e.g. introduction of visas) or state regulations (e.g. changing excise rates). The drop in border traffic connected with the economic crises in Russia in 1998 confirm the above, similarly as the rising excise tax in Poland in 2001, as well Poland’s accession to the European Union, the introduction of visas in 2003 and the so called Schengen visas in 2007 (R. Anisiewicz, 2008).

The falling border traffic figures in the year of change quickly bounced back in the following years as the key partakers of border traffic adapted to the new environment. The noted falling trend after enlarging the Schengen zone seems to be more permanent. In 2007, the traffic on the border with Kaliningrad Oblast dropped by over 20% as compared to the year 2006. A year later the figures fell by 34% in comparison to the year 2007 (www.strazgraniczna.pl), to approximately 1.9 million – only slightly more than in 1994.

This significant regress in border traffic resulted from not only the introduction of Schengen paid visas by EU countries and by reprisal

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2 Border poviats of Warmińsko-Mazurskie Voivodship show one of the highest unemployment rates in Poland. Official unemployment figures in Kaliningrad Oblast are very low but 35-40% of society members live below the minimum life standard with the following 35-40% of the population barely exceeding the minimum standards (A. П. Клемешев, 2007).

3 Visa charges amount to 35 EURO (express mode 70 EURO). Beside the passport, documents confirming the purpose of the visit must be submitted in the Consulate to obtain a visa. A simplified visa procedure applies to some resident groups (e.g. students, sportsmen, journalists, members of official delegations) and exemption from charges under the agreement signed by the Russian Federation and the European Union in Sochi in 2006 (A. Stachurka-Geller, 2008).
entrance visas to the Russian Federation but also the gradual opening of Western Europe labour markets for Poles. Open labour markets triggered a wave of migration for gainful employment also from the Polish Russian border regions. The option of well paid jobs in old EU member states became a worthwhile alternative to the risky smuggling business with the Oblast. The cost effectiveness of these business trips is also restricted by the gradual levelling of prices on both sides of the border and strengthened customs controls as well as more stringent penal and treasury procedures for smuggling practices.

**Structure of border traffic by the country and continent of foreign citizens**

An interesting feature characteristic of the structure of border traffic in international terms is the share of particular nationals within the entire traffic flow. The Polish and Russian border is the only section of the eastern border where Poles dominate (T. Komornicki, 2008). The above confirms the significant role of this type of ‘business trips’ in improving the difficult economic position of the inhabitants of north-east Poland – the poorest part of the eastern border regions.

In the period 1990 to 2008 the share of Polish citizens was between 51% and 62% (Fig. 2). Only the years 1991–1992 and 2000–2001 showed the prevalence of foreigners on the border with Kaliningrad Oblast. Poland’s accession to the European Union resulted in a slight fall in figures to the advantage of other nationals. The falling trend noted after 2004 slowed down the process of accession to the Schengen zone in 2007 and related visa inconveniences particularly onerous for non EU individuals. In 2008, the citizens of the Republic of Poland comprised 58% of the traffic passing across the Polish Russian border.

The most numerous group of foreigners crossing the border is the Russians, predominantly residing in the Kaliningrad Oblast. In recent years their number accounted for approximately 90% of all foreigners (R. Anisiewicz, 2008). In 2008, the share of Russian nationals in the group of foreigners entering Poland amounted to 85.4%4. The remaining foreigners (56 407 persons) represented 75 countries from six continents (Table 1). Among them, besides the biggest group of Germans (32 973 persons), there were the inhabitants of the neighbouring Lithuania and former Soviet Union Republics – Ukraine and Belarus. Several hundred citizens were

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4 Unpublished data of the Komenda Główna Straży Granicznej (Border Guards Headquarters).
also noted from Kazakhstan, Israel, Armenia, Latvia, Estonia (Fig. 3). The remaining countries were represented by a smaller number.

Residents of former Soviet Republics (without Russians), in total 19,248 persons, were jointly the second largest group of foreigners on the Polish Russian border after Germans. Their trips reflect mainly their personal relations with the Kaliningrad Oblast.

Figure 2. Structure of border traffic with the Kaliningrad Oblast according to nationality in the years 1990–2008


Figure 3. Foreigners entering Poland according to citizenship in 2008 (without Russians)

Source: own study based on unpublished data of the Komenda Główna Straży Granicznej (Border Guards Headquarters).
Table 1. Foreigners entering Poland on the border with Kaliningrad Oblast according countries in 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of persons from a given country</th>
<th>Africa</th>
<th>North America</th>
<th>South and Central America</th>
<th>Asia</th>
<th>Europe</th>
<th>Oceania</th>
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<td></td>
<td>Morocco, Mauritius,</td>
<td></td>
<td>Aruba, Chilli, Venezuela,</td>
<td>South Korea, Pakistan, Thailand,</td>
<td>Luxemburg, Macedonia, Bosnia and</td>
<td>French Polynesia, Australia</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>South Africa, Egypt,</td>
<td></td>
<td>Puerto Rico, Argentina,</td>
<td>Vietnam, India, Georgia, Sri Lanka,</td>
<td>Herzegovina, Island, Serbia, Portugal,</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Sierra Leone, Togo,</td>
<td></td>
<td>Panama, Columbia, Cuba</td>
<td>Indonesia, Iraqi, Japan, Malaysia,</td>
<td>Portugal, Ireland</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Tadzhikistan, China</td>
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<td>1–20</td>
<td>Morrocco, Mauritius,</td>
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<td></td>
<td>South Africa, Egypt,</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Sierra Leone, Togo,</td>
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<td>Tunisia</td>
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<tr>
<td>21–50</td>
<td>–</td>
<td></td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Slovenia, Croatia, Finland, Spain</td>
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<tr>
<td>51–100</td>
<td>–</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>Moldavia, Romania, Bulgaria</td>
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<tr>
<td>101–500</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>Canada, United</td>
<td></td>
<td>Uzbekistan, Kirgizstan</td>
<td>Belgium, Greece, Denmark, Italy,</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>States</td>
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<td>Switzerland, Norway, France, Austria,</td>
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<td>Great Britain, Hungary, Sweden,</td>
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<td>Slovakia, Czech republic, the Netherlands,</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Estonia, Latvia</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>501–2500</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td></td>
<td>Armenia, Israel, Kazakhstan</td>
<td>Belarus, Ukraine</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>over 2500</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Lithuania, Germany, Russia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: own study based on unpublished data of Komenda Główna Straży Granicznej (Border Guards Headquarters).
The border of the Russian exclave with Poland was generally crossed by Europeans (93.3% of the border traffic without Russians) residing in 34 countries, particularly in the western part of the continent, e.g. the Dutch, Swedes and the British. The Czechs, Slovaks and Hungarians also represented a numerous group. We may assume that in the majority of cases these were tourist trips.

Citizens of former Soviet Republics formed the dominating group (74%) among Asians crossing the border.

Foreigners from other continents numbered from several to several tens, depending on the country. These included residents of such distanced countries as Australia, French Polynesia, Sierra Leone, Togo, Mauritius, Republic of Southern Africa, Puerto Rico, Aruba. For some of the above the Polish Russian border was a stage in their drive to improve their material status in Western Europe.

In view of Baltic integration, it is interesting to see the share of Baltic Europe inhabitants in border traffic between Kaliningrad Oblast and Poland. References depict various national delimitations of borders in this part of Europe, making analysis of some aspects difficult. Assuming the area proposed by T. Palmowski (2000) covering countries and regions adjacent to the Baltic and other culturally and economically related states we must also take into account Germany (the Lands of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Schleswig-Holstein, Brandenburg), Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Belarus, Russian Kaliningrad Oblast, Leningrad Oblast, St. Petersburg and Poland.

Detailed analysis of Polish Russian border traffic in view of this national delimitation of Baltic Europe and lack of precise data on the origin of persons crossing the border, especially from Germany and Russia is difficult to perform. Having access only to aggregated data we need to include all Germans and Russians to Baltic Europe though some of them do not reside in the Baltic regions of their countries thus slightly distorting the analysis.

Taking into account all foreigners entering Poland from the Kaliningrad Oblast we can state that inhabitants of Baltic Europe constitute approximately 98% of border traffic\(^5\). By excluding Russians, who in majority are involved in border trade, from the total number of foreigners, we obtain a group of 56,407 persons with 85% residing in this part of Europe. Analysing this group of Baltic Europe residence we note the dominating number of Germans (69%) and a considerable share of Lithuanians (24%), a small number of Belarusians and a negligible number of other Baltic states.

\(^5\) Unpublished data of the Komenda Główna Straży Granicznej (Border Guards Headquarters).
representatives. Among them there was a slightly higher share of Latvians and Estonians (over 400 crossings) in 2008, whereas the region was less willingly visited by Swedes, Norwegians and the Danes (in total approximately 480 persons). The presence of Fins on the Polish Russian border was rather symbolic (40 persons).

The border traffic figures covering members of Baltic Europe and other parts of the world disclose a clearly low share of Scandinavians particularly the Finns. The Polish Russian border region, treated probably partially as the place of destination, was much more popular among Americans, the Dutch, Czechs, Slovaks, Hungarians and the British (several hundred), i.e. inhabitants of countries more distanced than the Scandinavian countries referred to above.

**Border traffic by border crossing points**

Poland’s accession to the European Union, apart from changes in formalities connected with crossing the border, also involved modernisation and development of border crossings initiated in the nineties with considerable financing from EU funds. These referred to Bezledy, Gronowo, Gołdap and Elbląg (R. Anisiewicz, 2007).

In 2009 the Polish Russian border crossing infrastructure comprised eight crossings including three road crossings (Gronowo-Mamonovo, Bezledy-Bagrationovsk, Gołdap-Gusev), and three railway crossings (Braniewo-Mamonovo, Glomno-Bagrationovsk, Skandawa-Zheleznodorozhny), as well as two sea crossings (Elbląg, Frombork)\(^6\).

Passenger border traffic takes place at all road border crossings and at the rail crossing in Braniewo-Mamonovo. There was no traffic at the sea crossings in Elbląg and Frombork after the Russians closed off part of the Vistula Lagoon for shipping in 2006. Lack of Russian approval barred pedestrian border traffic. Only the border crossing in Gołdap allows for passage of Poles and Russians by bicycle. Citizens of other EU countries could use this means of transport at all road crossings.

A completely new passenger and cargo border crossing in Grzechotki-Mamonovo II, lying along the old motorway Berlin-Królewiec, currently road no 22, is presently under construction. The date of opening the crossing, initially planned for 2005 is now projected for 2009. It is projected that due to its location in the western section of the border and better technical state of road infrastructure the crossing will in the near future take on a significant volume of West Europe oriented traffic.

Development plans for the infrastructure on the Polish Russian border also include road border crossings in its middle section in Michalkowo-

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\(^6\) State as of 30 April 2009.
Zheleznodorozhny (Kętrzyński Poviat) and Perły-Kryłowo (Węgorzewski Poviat). Local authorities are making efforts to open a tourist crossing in Rapa-Ozyorsk (Goldapski Poviat) and a river crossing on the Łyna river (Stopki-Ostre Bardo) in Bartoszycki Poviat.

The biggest volume of passenger border traffic with the Kaliningrad Oblast is at Bezledy border crossing. In 2008 it was approximately 45% of the total volume. Gronowo features lighter traffic (approximately 32% in 2008) and Goldap (approximately 22%). The railway crossing in Braniewo is of marginal significance (approximately 1.5% of traffic volume).

Fluctuating traffic volumes on the Polish Russian border were noted on all border crossings (Fig. 4). However, there were certain differences in traffic intensity. The biggest crossing in Bezledy, lying in the western sector, noted falling figures in the years 1997-1998, 2001, 2003–2004 and again in 2006. The situation is similar in Gronowo and Braniewo, where traffic volumes dropped in 1998, 2003 and starting 2005. The border crossing in Goldap after recording a slight falling trend in 1998 and 2003 showed a reverse trend up to 2006 and started falling again in 2007.

Figure 4. Passenger border traffic with the Kaliningrad Oblast according to locations in the years 1990–2008

Changes in regulations for crossing the border, connected with Poland’s accession to the Schengen Agreements, had their impact on smaller crossings, those featuring mainly regional traffic (mostly involving local trade and smuggling). The traffic volume in Gronowo and Goldap in 2007 fell by approximately 30% as compared to 2006, whereas in Bezledy traffic fell by about 12%. In 2008 the falling trend was particularly clearly seen in Goldap where the traffic fell by almost half as compared to the year before. Traffic volume dropped by nearly 1/3 in Bezledy and by approximately 25% in Gronowo and Braniewo.

A structural study of peoples crossing the Polish Russian border broken down to citizenships shows relation with the geographical location of the given border crossing. The border crossings in the western part, i.e. Braniewo and Gronowo are more popular with foreigners, with a considerable number of individuals passing in transit to Western Europe. Whereas, Bezledy and Goldap, located more eastwards, are more popular with Poles (Fig. 5).

![Figure 5. Border traffic with the Kaliningrad Oblast according to locations and citizenship in 2008](source: own study based on unpublished data of Komenda Główna Straży Granicznej (Border Guards Headquarters)).

A clearly dominating group can be noted for years in Braniewo and Goldap. The big share of foreigners among train passengers travelling through Braniewo results from the direct rail connection Kaliningrad Berlin. The border crossing in Braniewo shows relatively the smallest number of
Russians crossing the border as compared to other crossings, and the share of Russians in the total figure of travelling foreigners (Fig. 6). On the other hand, the domination of Poles in Gołdap, remaining at the level of approximately 75% (in 2008 reached 85%), results from its location in a more sparsely populated area (especially on the Russian side) and less economically advanced eastern part of the border area. Excursions to the other side of the border continue to remain the main source of income for many border residents.

Figure 6. Foreigners entering Poland on the border with Kaliningrad Oblast according to border crossing locations in 2008

Source: own study based on unpublished data of Komenda Główna Straży Granicznej (Border Guards Headquarters).

The highest figures for Russians among foreigners entering Poland is observed in Bezledy, constituting over 90% of the total volume (Fig. 6). Their share in Gronowo and Gołdap is slightly lower and is about 80%.

Foreigners, other than the citizens of the Russian Federation, choose the border crossing in Gronowo (Table 2). In 2008, 62% of the total number of foreigners (without Russians) originating from 65 countries chose this border crossing. Bezledy was less popular, with every fifth foreigner from this group choosing this location, and Gołdap (approximately 10% of persons excluding those originating from the Russian Federation). Though only every sixteenth foreigner entered the territory of Poland by rail in Braniewo this border crossing was chosen by persons from 47 countries in the world.
Table 2. Arrival of foreigners originating from other countries than Russia broken down to continents and border crossing locations in 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Continent</th>
<th>Braniewo</th>
<th>Gronowo</th>
<th>Bezledy</th>
<th>Goldap</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>countries</td>
<td>persons</td>
<td>countries</td>
<td>persons</td>
<td>countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>3 660</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>35 154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South America</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1 940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>3 390</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>3 891</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oceania</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stateless persons</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: own study based on unpublished data of Komenda Główna Straży Granicznej (Border Guards Headquarters).

Europeans predominated in all border crossings. The second distinctive group were the inhabitants of Asia, mainly from former Soviet republics – Kazakhstan, Armenia and Kirgizstan. A relatively numerous group of citizens of Israel is also present at all crossings representing the fourth, as to size, national group in Goldap.

Analysing the structure of Baltic Europe inhabitants crossing the border we can see that from its western part Norwegians, Swedes, Germans and Danes most often chose the road crossing in Gronowo to continue their journeys further westwards (Table 3). Greater variations were observed in 2008 among Fins, where at average every fourth Fin used the railway crossing in Braniewo or road crossing in Bezledy, as well as among Lithuanians and Belarusians who more often moved eastwards thus choosing Goldap or Bezledy for crossing the border. Estonians and Latvians on the other hand more often come to Poland through Bezledy and less often through Gronowo.

Table 3. Inhabitants of Baltic Europe (excluding Russia) arriving in Poland in 2008 according to border crossing locations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Border crossings</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Braniewo</th>
<th>Gronowo</th>
<th>Bezledy</th>
<th>Goldap</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>persons</td>
<td>%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>32 973</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>74.8</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>62.8</td>
<td>33.9</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>80.8</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>86.3</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>418</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>57.7</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>457</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>34.3</td>
<td>60.5</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>11 426</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>26.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>2 139</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>40.9</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: own study based on unpublished data of Komenda Główna Straży Granicznej (Border Guards Headquarters).
Conclusions

The enlargement of the European Union followed by accession to the Schengen zone and related changes on border crossing regulations (mainly introduction of visas) were clearly reflected in the border traffic volume between Poland and the Kaliningrad Oblast. This considerably inhibited small trade and smuggling practices of border region residents. At the same time these measures obstructed the development of other forms of cross border relations, which are an element of Baltic integration.

In recent years the quality of border crossings infrastructure has improved. The infrastructure will be further enhanced by the new border crossing under construction Grzechotki-Mamonovo II. In view of the decreasing border traffic this infrastructure seems to be sufficient. There is a certain problem, especially regarding development of tourism, as there are no border crossing in the middle section of the border and no possibility of crossing the border by bicycle for Poles and Russians (except in Goldap).

A more difficult problem in further development of integration in this part of Baltic Europe is the quality of border services observed on the Russian side of the border. Long cues, unofficial fees for shortening the waiting time for crossing the border, interruptions and delays in customs clearance services, an officiating procedure pose significant barriers in developing cooperation in the region.

In long-term planning of various projects on cross border cooperation (e.g. tourism), an important element for Baltic integration, the incalculability of the Russian side creates certain difficulties. The best example of the above is the closing in 2006 – in the middle of the season – of the Russian part of the Vistula Lagoon, which terminated operation of the popular, among tourists, sea connection by hydrofoils from Elbląg to Kaliningrad.

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- Клемешев А. П., 2007, Эксклавность в условиях глобализации. Избранные публикации, Издательство Российского государственного университета им. И. Канта, Калининград.
The socio-economic and political shifts in East-Central and Baltic Europe together with dynamic transformations had influenced the demography patterns. The fall of the communist system, followed by significant changes in the national economy led to drastic population changes. This was on the one hand connected with the severe decrease in the financial situation of the majority of people and on the other with new – European hierarchy of priorities, especially as far as the youth generation was concerned. The transformations in the labor market had an effect on the birth rate since the early 90s., and consequently, on the natural and actual increase of the population (see T. Michalski, 2001). The current political events, the access of the Baltic states to the European Union (EU) intensified the migration, which led to the reduction in unemployment, but also to the drop in the number of working age people. One need to have in mind that the citizens of the Baltic States had vast influence on the history of the entire continent and recent years helped to strengthen the countries’ geopolitical position (see J. Wendt, 2006).

The area of analysis consists of the three post-soviet Baltic Republics (Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia), the time dimension includes the years 1997–2007 – the decade of complicated socio-economical changes, directly influencing the population trends and, consequently, the whole demography of the mentioned countries. The study presents the dynamics of the population change in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, the birth – and death – rates and the natural increase. The analysis also covers the net of personal migrations, the age and sex structure, the ethnic entity, as well as the education and the registered unemployment rate of the three Baltic States. The main sources of information for the study were the available publications on the demographic changes in Baltic Europe and, mainly, the online statistical databases of the countries.
Population

The changes in population of the analyzed area show a systematic decrease. The number of people registered in Lithuania in 1997 was 3.58 mio, in 2002 – 3.47 mio. whereas in 2007 – only 3.38 mio. The decline in population was also noticeable in Latvia, where in 1997 2.44 mio. people were registered, compared to 2.28 mio. in the last year of the study (2007). Similar tendencies were observed in Estonia, but with the slowest rate in comparison to the other republics. In 1997 there were 1.39 mio. Estonians registered, six years later their number decreased to 1.35 mio., whereas in the last year of the study it was 1.34 mio.

The population change rate dynamics for Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia are shown on figure 1. Dating back to 1997, which is assumed to represent 100.0%, the highest rate of change was observed in Latvia. The consequent decline was visible from the very beginning of the period of study, when in the year 1998 the index was 98.1%, in 2004 it was below 95.0%, and reached 93.3% by the end of the study (compared with the year 1997). The depopulation problem had also affected two other Baltic Republics, however in Latvia its’ effects were by far the most unfavorable (see J. Jankevics, 1998). The reason for the growing of this process were most likely the changes in the vital statistics of the population, the quality of life and, recently, the opening of the borders due to the accession to the EU, which accelerated the migration. The population dynamics of Lithuania are best described by the serious drop in the number of inhabitants in the years 1997–2001 (1998 – 99.3%, 2001 – 97.2%), followed by relatively mild modifications in 2004 leading to another severe drop after the accession (2005 – 95.5%, 2007 – 94.3%). The situation is different in Estonia, where the most dynamic changes were observed in 2002. The percentage of Estonians inhabiting their country ranged from 99.0% in 1998, through 97.9% in 2000 and 96.4% in 2004, to 95.9% in 2007. This means that by the end of the period of analysis the drop in the number of inhabitants in Latvia was 2.6% and in Lithuania was 1.6% higher than in Estonia.

The Baltic Republics are of low population density. In Estonia there are 24.4 inhabitants per 1 square kilometer, in Latvia 35.5 inhabitants, whereas in Lithuania the population density is the highest, reaching 51.6 inhabitants per 1 square kilometer. The majority of the population lives in cities. The rural areas of the Baltic Republics are inhabited by 30.0% of the population on average.
Vital statistics and its’ components

The key role in the formation of the vital statistics and the migration of the population is represented by the economic condition of a particular country, the situation on the labor market, the social policies and population trends, which do seem to have become a crucial factor in demographic indexes modeling. The place of residence is also not to be neglected, as the urban core areas enforce a different course of the demographic processes compared to the peripheral areas (see V. Daugirdias, D. Burneika, 2006). The inhabitants of large agglomerations often decide not to have offspring, or the decision is postponed due to the higher living costs in the cities, the accommodation to the many priorities of the West European models, connected with the shift in human values. The rural community, regardless of their nationality, often lead a more stabilized life, despite not being the wealthier of the two groups, this group has a higher birth rate. The situation is similar as far as the marriage and divorce indexes are concerned. In the case of the death rate a grand role is played not only by the lifestyle in general, but also by the societies’ awareness in health care issues. A considerable meaning is given to the medical services provided by the state health institutions (accessibility to the sophisticated medical equipment, the number of consultants, the number of beds in hospitals, refund of medicines) but also to the age-sex structure highly determining the parameters of the vital statistics. The factors mentioned above and the
economic condition of the state influences the behavior patterns of the population in issues such as migration, the acceleration of which became a natural process in all EU member countries located in Central and Eastern Europe after 2004.

Taking the change in birth rate in post-communist Baltic Countries into consideration, the first three years of analysis show no severe fluctuations. The highest birth rate was observed in Lithuania, oscillating around 10.0‰, whereas in Latvia the average was 7.5‰ and in Estonia 8.5 per 1000 inhabitants. In the period 2000–2004 the birth rate, both in Lithuania and Latvia, decreased gradually (in exception for the year 2003, when this index had reached 9.0‰, whereas a year earlier it was 0.4‰ lower). In the same period Estonia represented a stagnation of the birth rate index (together with a decrease in the number of performed abortions), yet the index maintained a relatively high level of 9.4‰. The last four years brought the Baltic Republics significant, positive changes in the birth rate index. The highest increase was observed in Estonia, where, passing 10.0‰ in 2004, it reached 11.8‰ by the end of period of study. The record birth rate in Latvia was also reported in 2007, reaching 10.2 live births per 1000 inhabitants, according to the Central Statistical Bureau. In the case of Lithuania, despite an increase in parity, the birth rate index is lower then in the other Baltic Republics. In 2007 the index was 9.6‰, which meant a 0.7‰ drop compared to 2005. This also show that the birth rate of Lithuania decreased by 1.0‰ in the period 1997–2007.

The death rate in the mentioned countries was stable, but still, similar to the birth rate index, there were minor distortions. In Lithuania up to the year 2003, the mortality rate was in excess of 11.0‰ (1997 – 11.5‰, 2000 – 11.1‰, 2003 – 11.9‰), which shows the lack of the compensation process. A similar situation took place in Estonia, where the death rate was 13.5 per 1000 inhabitants. At the same time the crude death rate of Latvia was between 13.0 and 14.0‰. A slightly higher values indicate different social structure, as far as sex and median age are concerned. The characteristically feature of the described decade is the recent drop in the death rate of Estonians. This considers especially the years 2005–2006, when the death rate was 12.9‰ (in 2007 it increased by 0.1‰). Both in Lithuania and Latvia this increase was most disturbing. In the first case – according to the Department of Statistics – the death rate in 2005 was 12.8‰ and after two years increased by 0.7‰. The Latvian indexes show a milder dynamic of change, but still indicate higher values. In 2005 the crude death rate in Latvia was 14.2‰, in 2007 increased to 14.5 per 1000 population, which is disadvantageous compared to other countries.

Looking at the vital statistics components’ modification in 1997 and 2007 it becomes clear that the positive direction of changes consider mainly
Estonia (fig. 2). Despite a low decrease in the death rate, an increase in the birth rate resulted in the raising of the natural increase index. Unfortunately in the Baltic Republics the natural outflow of the population is visible, but in Estonia its’ scale is by far the least alarming – this issue will be the subject of further study. The most difficult situation is in Lithuania, where there is not only a decrease in birth rate, but also an increase in death rate. This issue concerns also the Latvians, but the general outlook on the vital statistics shows that its’ took a turn in the right direction. The main reason for this is the high parity index in 2007, compared to 1997.

![Figure 2. Components of natural increase rate in 1997 and 2007 (per 1000 population)](image)

Source: author’s own study based on statistical databases particular countries.

Taking up the infant death rate, from the beginning of the period of analysis, the highest indexes were observed in Latvia. The worst situation took place in 1998, when the death rate of infants within the first year of life was 15.3‰. This index had not dropped under 10.0‰ until 2002, and by the end of 2007 it showed 8.7‰. The next inglorious – ranked country is Lithuania (1997 – 10.3‰), nevertheless this country represents a faster change pattern and in 2001 the infant death rate decreased to 7.8‰, whereas in 2007 it was 5.9‰. Yet again Estonia has the most favorable demographic situation among the Baltic Republics. At the beginning of the study – according to the Statistical Office of Estonia – the infant death rate was 10.0‰ and consequently decreased, despite minor distortions. The lowest infant death rate index was reported in 2006, when it was 4.4‰, which by the next year raised to 5.0‰. What is important in the creating of the infant death rate apart from the presence of specialized equipment in the medical institutions and the detectability of congenital malformations, is the unhealthy behavior of women.
The dominant causes of death among the citizens of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia are associated firstly with diseases of the circulatory system and secondly with neoplasms (2007). The first issue contains such illnesses as ischemia, hypertension, dysfunctions of the aorta and the carotid artery, and caused 54.6% of deaths in Latvia, 52.3% in Lithuania and 52.0% in Estonia. In the case of the circulatory system dysfunctions, apart from genetic handicaps, the standards of life are an important factor, sometimes supporting the growth of the ailment, together with everyday stress (as is the case in many illnesses). Neoplasms, a serious problem of Central and Eastern Europe, form the second group of illnesses leading to death. The discussed countries due to the similar percentage of deaths caused by neoplasms were put into one group (see T. Michalski, 2005). In Estonia the malicious neoplasms are the reason for 20.5% of deaths, in comparison to 18.1% in Lithuania and Latvia. The highest percentage are the respiratory system and stomach neoplasms. The death rate of women suffering from breast and reproductive organs is still growing.

Going back to the statistical figures modeling the natural increase of the described countries, the key role was played by the death rate. The natural increase per 1000 population showing a debit balance in the period of analysis contributes to the depopulation process. It is important to see that the current social trends in Europe, even though the demographic explosion age group is entering the reproductive age and the increase in the non-working age group, could lead to the slowing down of the economic development (see T. Michalski, 2008). As mentioned earlier, the most favorable demographic situation was present in Estonia. In 1997 the natural increase was -4.3‰, in 2000 decreased to -3.9‰, four years later stopped at -2.7‰, reaching -1.2 per 1000 inhabitants by the end of the study period. The diminution in Lithuania was originated with a -0.9‰, which after minor fluctuations up to 2000 (-1.3‰) started to decrease systematically (-3.0‰ in 2003) and established a -3.9‰ in 2007. The negative demographic transitions and difficult situation of the population is confirmed by the natural decrease, which already in 1997 was -6.1‰. In later years the index improved (-5.6‰ in 1999, -5.0‰ in 2004) finishing at -4.3‰ in 2007.

In order to describe the dynamics and the direction of the socio-demographic changes within the three analyzed countries (treated in this case as a unified post-communist part of Baltic Europe) the natural increase trajectories were presented (fig. 3). The yearly data are an average value of the parameter noted in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. According to the established model and hence the previously described birth and death rate indexes one can see that the natural increase index in the years 1997–2002 was undulating, whereas in the years 2003–2006 the natural increase components were quite similar in all of the three countries. The variation
of 2007 owes its’ presence mainly all of the positive demographic shifts in Estonia – the country in which the depopulation process is not as visible as in the other Baltic Republics.

![Figure 3. Model of natural increase trajectories in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia [per 1000 population]](image)

Source: author’s own study based on statistical databases particular countries.

The social and regime transformations followed by the access to the EU led to serious modifications in the migration balance. Despite numerous post-access privileges, such as the freedom of movement and freedom of employment abroad, the negative effects, influencing the demographic situation were noticed. Intensified migration is named as one of the back draws of the accession to the EU (see L. Šimanskienė, 2006). This concerns all the new EU member states. The reason is the outflow of the working age group (usually under 35 years of age), which has become the leading force in Europe’s economy growth. It is worth mentioning that the people deciding to change their place of residence are highly qualified construction workers, as well as nurses, doctors and students willing to graduate and work abroad.

Furthermore, the analysis of the migration balance index must take into consideration the fact that the statistical data referring to the end of the period of study are to be treated with cautiousness. The reliance of the data after 2004 suffers due to the lack of actual knowledge about the outflow of people to Western Europe and Scandinavia, which is the main beneficent of the migration. The problem with the judgment of the scale of this
The phenomenon affects in the same manner Poland, The Czech Republic, Slovakia or Hungary, as the other countries. The estimated data do not reflect the official indexes and the actual scale of the migration might not be seen until a few years. The reasons’ may be connected with governmental procedures, residential issues etc. What is more it is difficult to estimate whether the emigrants will decide to return to their mother land because of the world financial crisis. Taking the official migration parameters into consideration, the case of Lithuanian compensation after 2000 is most interesting. At the start of the period the migration balance was -6.2‰ and had not change rapidly for the next three years, when in 2001 it had shown only -0.7‰. In the year 2004 the outflow intensified and reached -2.8‰, whereas in 2007 it decreased to -1.5‰. The situation was similar in Estonia, where the migration balance in 1997 was estimated at -3.5‰, -1.1 per 1000 population in 2002 and -0.5‰ by the end of the period of analysis. The statistics of Latvia are the most favorable. The migration balance index oscillated within -0.5‰ during the whole period of analysis. For example, in 1997 it was -0.4‰, five years later -0.1‰ and in 2007 (like in 2003 and 2005) the immigration was greater than the emigration. The second degree regression equation and the corrected determination index confirm that the changes of the migration balance in Latvia were mild (tab. 1). Higher modification of the general trend were noticed in Lithuania, where the R² index was 0.5171, whereas Estonia was characterized by the highest dynamics of change in the years 1997–2007 which indicate an average value of the determination parameter.

Table 1. The regression equations of the migration balance in the years 1997–2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Regression equation</th>
<th>Corr. R²</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>( y = -0.0846x^2 + 1.5354x - 8.5382 )</td>
<td>0.5171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>( y = -0.0523x^2 + 0.8705x - 4.9234 )</td>
<td>0.6916</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>( y = -0.0035x^2 + 0.0729x - 0.4127 )</td>
<td>0.5087</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: author’s own study based on statistical databases particular countries.

Based on the graphic presentation of the changes in the migration balance and natural increase by Webb (fig. 4.) the significant span and the intensity of modifications of the actual increase in Lithuania and Estonia is visible, together with the less dynamic processes in Latvia. The correlation between the migration balance and the natural increase (or, as in this case – natural decrease) is a key element in the of the populations’ analysis, as it enables to estimate the actual increase of a particular country. The actual population status in Lithuania, being the sum of both components, oscillated between
Demographic changes in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia

-7.1‰ in 1997, -3.8‰ in 2002 and -5.4‰ at the end of the study. In Latvia the outflow was not as big, reaching -6.5‰ in 1997, -5.3‰ in 2000 and -4.3‰ in 2007. Despite a record natural decrease in Estonia in 1998 (-10.0‰), the following years brought a change (mainly due to the migration) through -5.3‰ in 2003, to -1.7‰ at the end of the analyzed decade.

Figure 4. Components of real increase rate in 1997–2007 [per 1000 population]
Source: author’s own study based on statistical databases particular countries.

The social trends, the effects’ of which are mostly visible in the birth rate or migration balance, are also stimulating the number of marriages contracted and dissolved. The scale of both indexes is influenced by many factors, such as the popularization of concubinages, social pathologies and the shift in youth generations’ values. The correlation between the number of divorces or civil marriages and the societies’ religiosity is also worthwhile. Undoubtedly, the economic and political transformation, followed by the social changes in this part of Europe had an impact on the contracted and dissolved marriages index (see R. Anisiewicz, 2006).

The marriage index in the Baltic Republics indicates an increase. In Estonia this index grew from 4.0‰ in 1997, through 4.3‰ in 2002, to 5.2 per 1000 population at the end of the study. Only in the years 1998, 2000 and 2003 the index dropped slightly. In Latvia the contracted marriages index decreased only by 0.1‰ during the years 1997–2001, reaching 3.9‰. In later years it raised from 4.2‰ in 2002, through 5.5‰ in 2005, to 6.8‰ in the last year of study. The Lithuanian marriage index showed a constant decrease (1997 – 5.3‰, 1999 – 5.1‰, 2001 – 4.5‰), but in recent years the
situation turned around and the index raised to 6.8‰ in 2007. The data given above present the connection between the birth rate and the marriage index. Both indexes increased recently in the post-soviet Baltic Republics.

The dissolved marriages index in Lithuania was stable during the period of analysis. There were only minor oscillations. In 1997 the dissolved marriages index was 3.2‰, compared to 3.1‰ in 2002 and 3.4‰ in 2007. In Estonia the fluctuations were more visible, especially at the beginning of the period of analysis (3.8‰), later the index continued to stabilize around 3.0‰ and dropped to 2.8‰ in 2007. None of the repetitive or compensating characteristics were noticed, thus making it difficult to establish the current social trends in Estonia. In Latvia there was a significant increase in the dissolved marriages index in 2006–2007, when it showed 3.3‰, whereas during the first eight years of the analysis it had been almost 1.0‰ lower. One needs to have in mind that there are many factors influencing the decision of dissolving a marriage, including the economic situation and the increasing role of globalization.

**Structure of the population**

The structure of the population, apart from representing the current trends and the economic situation, has a direct impact on the vital statistics and migration indexes of a particular society. A crucial element is the number of females per 100 males, which had grew in the Baltic Republics since the beginning of the period of study. In 2007 it was 115 in Lithuania and 117 in Latvia and Estonia. Such an advantage in the number of women may suggest an advanced ageing process of the society (due to the higher death rate of older men). Together with the growth in feminization, the percentage of post-working age people increased, as well as the citizens of the post-communist Baltic Republics median age and the life expectancy, which forced some modifications in the social policies of these countries.

Focusing on the age and sex structure in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, the data from 2007 were used (fig. 5) to form the age-sex structure pyramid presenting the percentage of men and women in specified age groups in reference to the whole population. The characteristic feature of the age-sex pyramid is a high percentage of people 70 years of age or more. The women of this age group form 7.3% of the population of Lithuania, 8.0% in Latvia and 8.1% in Estonia. Among the oldest inhabitants of the three countries the excess of females over males is the most visible. To compare – in Lithuania and Latvia, males who finished their 70 years of age or older make 3.4% of the whole population, while in Estonia this index shows 3.6%. What is interesting, there is a considerable advantage of people between the age of 5 and 19 in Lithuania, compared to the other countries.
The situation is similar in age groups 40 to 49 (see S. Vaitekūnas, 2008). For instance, in Lithuania teenagers of 10 to 14 years are 6.4% of the population, whereas in Estonia only 5.1%. Taking into consideration the youngest inhabitants (under 4 years of age) the excess of boys over girls is visible. The highest percentage of this group lives in Estonia, covering 5.1% of the population, whereas in Latvia 4.7% and in Lithuania only 4.5%.

![Figure 5. The age-sex structure in 2007 (in percentage)](image)

Source: author’s own study based on statistical databases particular countries.

The ethnic structure of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, since the fall of the communist regime, has shown a decrease in the population of such minorities as the Russians, Ukrainians, Belarusians, as well as Poles and Jews. Needless to say is that such complicated political transformations in the discussed part of Europe had a direct effect of the social status of particular ethnic and national groups. Both in Lithuania and in Latvia the Russians had become an unwelcomed group, which they often felt. The sense of discrimination was justified, hence the many cases of social degradation, terminating of employment and isolation of the Russians (see P. Eberhardt, 1998). These type of problems were most probably caused by high national awareness of the Latvians and Lithuanians and their natural will to cut off from the difficult past. The same situation took place
in Estonia, where the large Russian, Ukrainian and Belarusian minorities had to assimilate in the newly formed country or leave to their homeland, which they often did. The socio-political transformation had an influence on the demographic processes, especially on the migration of former Soviet Union minorities. The decrease of the population in Eastern Europe caused a serious drop in the birth rate and in the natural increase (see P. Eberhardt, 1997).

Focusing on the current ethnic structure of the three countries (tab. 2), one can see that the highest percentage of citizens declaring Russian nationality lives in Latvia (28.3%) and Estonia (25.6%), whilst in Lithuania only 5.0%. In turn, along with the historical conditionings there is a 6.2% of Poles living in Lithuania currently, whereas in Latvia and Estonia 2.4% and 0.1% respectively. Characteristically, the percentage of Belarusians living in Latvia is quite high (3.7%), as well as the percentage of Estonians declaring Finnish citizenship (0.8%). A relatively high percentage of Ukrainians live in Latvia and Estonia (2.5% and 2.1% respectively) and 2.1% of the Lithuanian population have been ethnically undefined.

Table 2. The ethnical structure of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia in 2007 (percentage)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Lithuania</th>
<th>Latvia</th>
<th>Estonia</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Lithuania</th>
<th>Latvia</th>
<th>Estonia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lithuanians</td>
<td>84.3</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvians</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>59.0</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>Tatars</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonians</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>68.6</td>
<td>Germans</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>Romany</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poles</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>Finns</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarusians</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainians</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>Not indic.</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

– No data available
Source: author’s own study based on statistical databases particular countries.

The wide socio-economical transformations in the East European countries together with the necessity to adapt to the new realities of free economy had affected the structure of the labor market. The modification of the labor structure led to changes in the education of the society. Tighter competition in the human resources market and the need for well educated personnel reflected in the willingness of young people to take up third level education, while the older decided to improve their education as well (sometimes the only chance of keeping their positions). As a result, the
number of people possessing higher education in the analyzed countries increased. For instance, in Lithuania in 1998 9.2% of the population had higher education, whereas in 2002 this index showed 11.4% and in 2007 raised to 15.3%. The number of people with secondary education had also changed during this period. In the same years the index was 34.3%, 32.8% and 31.7%, whereas Lithuanians who only completed the first level of education were 5.8% of the population (2.5% more than in the last year of study). The situation is similar in Latvia, although when comparing the data of Estonia, some oscillations are visible. What is important is that the Estonian statistics represent the percentage of graduates from a specific year in comparison to the number of graduates occupying a certain analyzed territory, therefore the data are not directly comparable. For instance, the 41.5% of Estonian citizens had primary education in 2007, but can continue their education in the following years. The number of high school graduates was stable in the past decade (around 28.9%), whereas the percentage of trade school graduates ranged from 19.8% in 1997, through 27.0% in 2002, to 18.0% in the last year of study (the index includes both trade schools and vocational secondary schools). In Estonia an increase in the number of people with higher education can be visible. At the beginning of the analyzed decade they were 8.8% of all graduates, five years later 21.3% and in 2007 a remarkable 29.0%. Worth mentioning is the fact that the majority of these graduates possessed a Bachelor’s Degree. In 2007 they represented 52.1% of all college graduates. Furthermore, in the post-soviet republics an increase in the number of science doctorates was noted. For example, the number of graduates with doctor’s degree in Estonia was 153 in 2007, compared to 48 in 1997. The will to possess higher education is therefore becoming more common and in the near future will become a natural stage of development and a leap forward in taking up a beneficial occupation.

The shifts on the labor market mentioned above had an impact on the labor structure of the national economy, as well as on the employed percentage in a regional scale. In the discussed article the focus is fully on the unemployment within the post-soviet Baltic Republics (fig. 6). Taking a look at the percentage of unemployed citizens one can see an increase of this index in Lithuania and Estonia half way through the period of study. This especially considers the years 1999–2001, where the unemployment rate in Estonia was 13.6%, meaning a 4.0% increase compared to 1997. In the following years this index dropped (2003 – 10.0%, 2005 – 7.9%, 2007 – 4.7%), what is presumed to be the result of the intensified migration due to the free flow of people and trade policy, within the EU. This had a similar effect on the three republics. What is more, the ageing process within the society played an important part, together with the emerge of new
investments, creating employment opportunities. In Lithuania, during the worst period, the registered unemployment rate was 11.1% in 2001, thus increasing over a half in comparison to the start of the period of analysis. In Estonia the last years brought a decrease in the unemployment rate with them, from 6.8% in 2004 to 3.2% in 2007. In Latvia this index had shown only slightly distortions. Except for the years 1999 and 2000 the index decreased successively. Despite being the highest of the countries (1997 – 15.4%, 2002 – 12.1%), by the end of analysis the index achieved a respectable 6.2%. The relatively mild course of the process in Latvia is supported by the modified corrected R² which was 0.9800, whereas in Estonia it was 0.8856. The Lithuanian regression equation indicates higher dynamics, thus the determination index of 0.8122, which represents the lowest match to the trend lines among the three countries.

![Graph showing unemployment rates in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia from 1997 to 2007](image)

**Figure 6.** The registered unemployment rate in the years 1997-2007 in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia (percentage)

Source: author’s own study based on statistical databases particular countries.

**Conclusion**

The socio-political transformation in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia had a significant effect on the demography of these countries. The analyzed decade featured intensive modifications in the actual increase and the structure of the population. A systematical drop in the population of the countries was seen, which, together with the modernization of the society and socio-economic changes, had an influence on the natural increase. Taking the birth rate into consideration, at the beginning of the period of
analysis, the most favorable situation was in Lithuania, yet by the end of the study the Estonian statistics showed the greatest improvement. One needs to have in mind the high number of extramarital births. The oscillation in the death rate are similar in all the countries, however in Lithuania the most serious worsening of this index took place, as well as a slight decrease in Estonia. Latvia had a high infant death rate. The main causes of death were illnesses of the circulatory system and neoplasms, which became a problem of entire Europe and its’ eastern part in particular. Due attention must be paid by health organizations, as well as the local authorities on the issue of informing the society and popularization of periodical examinations, especially for the risk groups, together with the funding of specialized investigations. Otherwise, these inglorious statistics (from the demographical point of view) will deepen the ageing process of the society and, consequently, to the setback in economic development. A crucial factor of the analysis is the migration issue, yet the indexes concerning this topic are to treated with some reserve. The reason is that the actual scale of emigration is currently unknown. One can only talk about the registered departures or the experts’ estimates. In Lithuania, as well as in Latvia and Estonia the marriage rate index has increased in recent years, mainly because the people born during the last demographic explosion have entered the marital age. However, this index could be improved if not for the growing number of informal relationships. The highest divorce rate index among the post soviet republics was observed in Latvia, which reflects the unfavorable social trends.

In the analyzed countries an intensified ageing process has been taking place, together with the growth in the number of pensioners, the average age of the population and feminization index. However, the percentage of people between the 15 and 24 years of age is considerable. A characteristic feature of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia is undoubtedly the national and ethnic structure, highly influenced by the geopolitical changes. This considers especially the Russians, previously living in the Baltic Republics, who eventually felt isolated and contributed to the migration outflow. The most unified ethnic structure is in Lithuania, whereas the other countries (especially Latvia) are considered to be multicultural. This definition may sound rash, although when taking into account the Central and East European countries, the Baltic States are definitely not monocultural. The new realities had an impact on the educational structure. A significant increase in the percentage of people with higher education took place. People most often tend to have a Bachelor’s Degree, which could give them better options on the labor market. The problem of unemployment had made its’ mark especially half through the analyzed decade. The high unemployment was the result of an economic crisis and the fact that
graduates from the demographic explosion entered the labor market. Recently, the percentage of unemployed people decreased. This was most probably due to the outflow of people within the EU policies (open borders policy, free market policy), however this is not visible in the official migration statistics. Another reason was the ageing process within the society and handing over the positions to the younger generation by the people who reached the pension age. Also not to be neglected are the foreign direct investments which created new work places.

At this stage it is difficult to project the demographic processes in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. It is risky mainly because the current social trends are not easy to describe and assess. This is strictly connected with the migration flows after the accession to the EU and the unawareness of the migrants’ plans for the future. The coming back of emigrants could lead to economical revival but would also increase the registered unemployment. Having in mind the age and sex structure of the society and the changes of the natural increase index, a further increase in the birth rate and in life expectancy is highly probable.

References:

Demographic changes in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia


Sources:
- http://www.euro.who.int/ (World Health Organization Regional Office for Europe)
Economic transformation disparity in European post-Soviet countries in the period of transformation

Introduction

The study analyses economic transformations in six European post-Soviet countries (Belarus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Ukraine) in the period 1990–2003, i.e. the period of transformation (see T. Michalski, 2006). The chosen area of reference is that of the former coloniser, i.e. Russia (Fig. 1). It is common knowledge that three of the studied countries (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) are since 2004 members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU). The remaining states (Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine) remain under the influence of Russia which is reflected, among others, by their membership in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). These countries also remain under a more or less direct military pressure exerted by Russia. In the case of Belarus it takes the form of the Union State of Russia and Belarus, in Moldova the “independent” Transnistria, whereas in Ukraine – the “usufruct” of the navy harbour in Sevastopol.

For the needs of this study two variables are applied in describing the wealth status: GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$)¹ and GDP per capita, PPP (current international $)². The collected data are taken from the World Development Indicators issued in 2007 on a CD (WDI, 2007). The two

¹ “GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by midyear population. GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. Data are in constant U.S. dollars” (WDI, 2007).

² “GDP per capita based on purchasing power parity (PPP). PPP GDP is gross domestic product converted to international dollars using purchasing power parity rates. An international dollar has the same purchasing power over GDP as the U.S. dollar has in the United States. GDP at purchaser’s prices is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. Data are in current international dollars” (WDI, 2007).
variables were chosen as the first allows for international comparison of wealth level, and additionally its structure accounts for the impact of inflation. Whereas thanks to the second variable we can better analyse the wealth level taking into account the domestic conditions of the particular countries.
Analysing these two groups of variables we must take into consideration the fact that some of these countries, particularly Moldova and Ukraine feature an extensive grey zone, which means that in reality the situations is better than would seem reflected by the data given above.

**Gross domestic product per capita (constant 2000 US$)**

The disparity in GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$) in the period 1990–2003 is presented in Fig. 2. and shows a clear division of the studied states into two groups. The first group comprises Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus. These countries feature a low average GDP per capita which assumes the following values: 389, 786 and 1206 constant 2000 US$, respectively. Furthermore, Moldova and Ukraine are characterised by lack of stability (with the coefficient of variation exceeding 30.0%).

![Figure 2. The disparity in GDP per capita level (constant 2000 US$) in the period 1990-2003](source)

Source: own study based on WDI, 2007.

On the other hand we have Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia boasting a considerably higher wealth level. Geometric mean from GDP per capita
Economic transformation disparity in European post-Soviet countries in the period of transformation

read respectively 2973, 3214 and 3519 constant 2000 US$. Additionally, these countries showed a relatively stable situation considering their size and implementation of serious reforms (the coefficient of variation remained in the range of 18.1–20.7%).

The situation in Russia ranged in between with an average GDP per capita of 1861 constant 2000 US$. Nevertheless, visiting this country the situation (apart from Moscow, Sankt Petersburg and a few resorts) seems little better than in Belarus or Ukraine.

Additional insight is provided by analysing the trend in GDP per capita constant 2000 US$. By applying the correlation matrix, supplemented by the Mc Quitty method, two types of countries were identified (the breakpoint at coefficient of correlation ≤0.80). The results obtained are given in Fig. 3.

![Figure 3. The similarity of changes in GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$) in the period 1990–2003](image)

Source: own study based on WDI, 2007.

The common feature for all countries was the drop of GDP per capita constant 2000 US$. The disparity involved the depth of the drop and the moment of emerging growth trend and the growth volume. Type A states (Fig. 3.) include Baltic Assembly members and Belarus. Their transformation processes are illustrated in Fig 4. The turning point from the dropping trend to the upward trend in these countries was observed in the years 1993–1995. The briefness of the GDP dropping trend in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania resulted from the courage and decisiveness in undertaking economic reforms to overcome the effects of USSR disintegrations as quickly as possible and to reform the centrally managed, inefficient economy. However, in the case of Belarus the turn resulted from reverting to an economic policy and principles nearly identical to those reigning in the communist period. Though in this case the move brought benefits, nevertheless these are short term benefits and the country continues to face thorough reforms.
In the case of type B countries (Fig. 5.) this transformation took place as late as in 1998 (Ukraine) and in 2000 (Moldova). This group also includes Russia\(^3\) where the breakthrough point from the falling to rising trend appeared in 1998. Although these countries started implementing economic reforms, these were conducted ineffectually and consequently led to a longer period of economic recession and impoverishment of society. In the case of neighbouring Russia a process similar to that in Belarus took place, i.e. the neglecting of liberal economic reforms and partial restoration of old practices (see A. Цупко, 2004).

**Gross domestic product per capita based on purchasing power parity (PPP)**

The disparity in GDP per capita (constant 1990–2003 US$) in the period 1990–2003 is presented in Fig. 6. and shows a clear division of the studied states into three groups. The first group includes Moldova, which shows very low average GDP per capita PPP reading merely 1603 current international $, and continued fluctuation (coefficient of variation read 32.8%). The second group comprised Belarus and Ukraine with an average

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\(^3\) The coefficient of correlation was highest for Ukraine (0.93) and Moldova (0.90) therefore the Russia regression line was placed together with the lines of these two countries.
Economic transformation disparity in European post-Soviet countries in the period of transformation

Figure 5. GDP regression equation per capita (constant 2000 US$) in the period 1990–2003 for type B countries and Russia

Source: own study based on WDI, 2007.

Figure 6. The disparity in GDP per capita, PPP (current international $) in the period 1990–2003

Source: own study based on WDI, 2007.
of the studied GDP amounting to 7278 and 4683 current international $, respectively. However, these differed in terms of fluctuating conditions with the coefficient of variation in Belarus reading merely 18.7% and in Ukraine 23.9%. All three countries in the Baltic Assembly belong to the third group where geometric mean GDP per capita PPP amounted to 6788 current international $. in Latvia, 7936 in Estonia and 8087 in Lithuania. The latter three countries represented a similar level of stability (the coefficient of variation remained in the range 20.6%–28.5%). The reasons underlying such disparity in the spatial gross domestic product per capita based on purchasing power parity (PPP) are similar to those described in the analysis of gross domestic product per capita (constant 2000 US$). The impact of high prices for goods and services in Estonia and Moldova constitute a new element that means a relatively deteriorating situation for the inhabitants.

According to figures, the situation in Russia was very good as GDP per capita PPP amounted to 6930 current international $, i.e. close to that noted in the Baltic Assembly states. However, we should keep in mind that Russia is a huge country with big differences between particular regions.

Additional information flows from analysing the trends in GDP per capita, PPP (current international $). By applying the correlation matrix supplemented by the McQuitty method once again two types of countries were identified (the breakpoint at coefficient of correlation ≤0.80). The results obtained are given in Fig. 7.

Figure 7. Similarity in change of GDP per capita, PPP (current international $) in the period 1990–2003
Source: own study based on WDI, 2007

The initial drop in GDP per capita, PPP (current international $), noted in all the analysed cases, showed an upswing. The intensity of the drop and the year of the upturn differed from country to country. Type A (Fig. 8.) again comprised Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia and Belarus. A similar process of change was also noted in Russia4 which was quite surprising.

4 The coefficient of correlation was highest for Ukraine (0.86) and Moldova (0.83), therefore the Russia regression line was placed together with the lines of these two countries. For Moldova it read merely 0.56 and for Ukraine 0.75.
GDP per capita PPP (current international $) transformations in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania as well as Belarus resemble the GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$) case. Similar factors also affected the process of change. Only two serious differences occurred. The first difference is a better situation in Lithuania than in Latvia in the second part of the studied period. The second involves a smaller difference between Belarus and the Baltic Assembly States. In both cases it results from the difference in costs of living. Comparing the transformations in GDP per capita PPP (current international $) in Russia with that in Baltic Assembly states we can see that though the situation in Russia at the beginning of the studied period was better (except for Lithuania), in 2003 all three countries overtook their former occupant (Latvia as the latest in 2003).

Moldova and Ukraine belong to type B countries (Fig. 9.). The characteristic feature of these countries is the fact that their situation at the end of the studied period was worse than at the beginning. This predominantly resulted from the big economic crises (which can be seen in the changes indicated in Fig. 5.), but not only, the lack of a constructive economic policy, the high inflation and the galloping costs of living contributed to the situation.
Figure 9. GDP regression equation per capita PPP (current international $) in the period 1990–2003 for type B countries

Source: own study based on WDI, 2007.

Summary

According to the two GDP indicators the assessed spatial diversification of the wealth status in the analysed societies is similar. The most significant difference is the worse economic situation of the residents of Estonia and Moldova when applying gross domestic product per capita based on purchasing power parity (PPP), as compared to gross domestic product per capita (constant 2000 US$), which results, above all, from the relatively high prices of goods and services in these countries.

We can also clearly see that the life standard of the populations in Moldova, Ukraine and partially Russia (measured according to gross domestic product per capita based on purchasing power parity (PPP)) were at the end of the analysed period worse than at the time of disintegration of the Soviet Union.

Thus, we could state that society in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania benefited from the disintegration of the USSR whereas the residents of the remaining countries either benefited marginally or even lost in terms of prosperity. Due to the size of the country there are big regional differences in terms of wealth status in the case of Russia. No doubt Kaliningrad Oblast
is a beneficiary of these changes as it takes on its new role “bridging” the European Union with the Russian Federation (see B. П. Гутник, А. П. Клемешев (eds.), 2006; А. П. Хлопецкий, Г. М. Федоров, 2000).

Unfortunately, the economic crises today showed that the economic success of Baltic Assembly States had in part rather feeble foundations and the near future should verify the optimistic assessments of growing wealth of its inhabitants.

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Jacek Zaucha, Katarzyna Ścibior

Maritime spatial planning – pilot maritime plan in Poland

Introduction

Polish marine waters (Fig. 1.) include 1991 km² of the marine internal waters and 8682 km² of the territorial sea (12-nm zone) which together form the national sea, and the rest is covered by the Exclusive Economic Zone (22634 km²). South of Bornholm there is a disputed area with unresolved claims from Denmark and Poland.

In the name of the State, sea areas are managed by the Minister responsible for matters of maritime economy (nowadays it is Minister of Infrastructure) and by his regional administration, i.e. the Directors of Maritime Offices¹.

Figure 1. Polish marine waters

Source: Maritime Institute in Gdańsk.

¹ There are three Maritime Offices: in Gdynia, Slupsk and Szczecin.
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At present, besides the Long Term Strategy for Coastal Protection, and the paper Guidelines towards an ICZM strategy, Poland has no policy or strategy seriously considering the sea area or the land-sea interactions. On the national scale this will be changed by the currently developed National Spatial Development Concept. It will contain indications and guidelines concerning the use and development of the Polish sea areas, including map of suitable zones.

Despite lack of necessary strategies, Poland is one of the forerunners in introducing MSP legislation among all EU countries. Since 2003 there is a legal possibility to create maritime spatial plans in Poland. Responsibility for planning is uniform over all sea areas (i.e. internal sea waters, 12-nm zone and EEZ). Regulations concerning spatial planning of sea areas are contained in Chapter 9 (articles 37a and 37b) of the Act on Maritime Areas of Poland and Maritime Administration of March 21st 1991. They have been added to the Act in 2003 and slightly amended in 2005. The Act stipulates:

a) a body approving spatial development plans of the maritime areas of internal waters of the territorial sea and the exclusive economic zone; this function is carried out by a competent Minister for Spatial Layout and Construction, in co-operation with competent Ministers of Maritime Economy, Fishing, Environment Protection, Internal Affairs, and of National Defence;
b) mode of approving the plan in a form of an ordinance of a competent Minister for Spatial Layout and Housing;
c) a list of issues resolved by the plan;
d) a body working out the draft of the plan, i.e. the head of a relevant Maritime Office;
e) the requirement of providing the Environmental Impact Assessment (OSS) as an immanent element of a planning process;
f) an entity financing the construction of the plan: it is either the State Budget or an investor carrying out off-shore investments;
g) the requirement of issuing by a competent Minister for Spatial Layout and Housing an ordinance defining the required scope of the development plans for the maritime areas of internal waters of the territorial sea and the exclusive economic zone, with a text and graphic parts with particular regard to requirements concerning planning materials, types of maps, applied signs, nomenclature, standards and the mode of documenting planning works.

The sea use plans decide about:
• the destined use of the sea areas;
• prohibitions or limitations in the use of the sea areas, taking into account the requirements of nature protection;
distribution of public investment;
- directions of development of transport and technical infrastructure;
- areas and conditions of protection of environment and cultural heritage.

Costs of preparing a maritime spatial plan and its environmental impact assessment are covered by the state budget, or by an investor – if determinations of the plan are a direct consequence of the realisation of his/her investment.

The existing legal regulations, however, are far from perfect and require significant changes since still some "planning" of (or rather encroachment on) the sea space might be done according to Polish law by ordinance of the sectoral ministers and authorities i.e. closed military areas are enforced by the Navy, and Natura 2000 areas are enforced by the Minister of Environment outside the planning system/regime. This is contradictory to the idea of integrated, comprehensive planning and management.

**Pilot maritime spatial plan carried out by the Maritime Institute**

The first Polish maritime spatial plan was prepared between November 2007 and March 2008 by the Maritime Institute in Gdansk by order of the Maritime Administration (Maritime Office in Gdynia). Despite the lack of a relevant ministerial ordinance it has been decided to apply the 'learning-by doing' approach. The aim was to intensify the merit-based discussion on MSP and provide methodological experience as input into the planned new legislation.

The pilot plan was never perceived as a merely conceptual exercise, but it was designed to become a statutory document, regulating the different maritime uses in this conflict-ridden, and at the same time strategic for the whole country area.

The plan covers a part of the internal sea waters of the Gulf of Gdańsk (Fig. 2.). It is a 291,400 hectare area situated west of the line linking the cape of the Hel Peninsula with the border between Gdynia and Sopot municipalities, excluding the breakwater enclosed harbour area of Gdynia, Puck, Jastarnia and Hel, encompassed by shore boundaries. The area is situated at the hinterland of one million inhabitants large conurbation (according to ESPON 1.1.1) of the Tri-city (Gdańsk-Sopot-Gdynia). The draft of the plan was drawn in the scale of 1:25 000, in the domestic set of co-ordinates “92”, with a possibility of easy transformation into maritime mapping. Besides its sea part, the map also covers a land part that is not an element of the Plan, which is a certain breakout in maritime mapping, in Poland at least.
The character of the Plan is different from the plans worked out on land. Because of different ownership relations on the sea, smaller number of stakeholders (and higher level of their institutionalisation) and a high level of ignorance on the current status of the sea space, the plan has both a quasi-strategic character and at the same time carries out some functions that are reserved on land for the local land use plan. The plan is just a tool for balancing various interests of sea space use, and links the national planning (National Spatial Development Concept) with the local/detailed use plan (on the sea); it also links the on-shore and off-shore planning. On the one hand it is a plan of a structure, as it diagnoses spatial conditions of development, defines composition elements of a spatial system and their interrelations, pointing to their desirable form over a vast sea area (a surface of 2-3 municipalities), on the other hand however, through the system of zoning, the plan is decisive for certain specific limitations in using the space (just like land use plans are).

The goals and priorities of the National Spatial Development Concept (under preparation) in regard to Polish marine waters were the starting point, yet they have been expanded by the principal (Maritime Office in Gdynia) so as to include:

a) provisions for sustainable and permanent development of coastal communities;
b) provisions for good condition of marine and on-shore – off-shore ecosystems;
c) provisions for safe, sustainable and permanent use of the sea;
d) thrifty use of space, leaving possibly much room for future ways of utilising the sea, including currently unknown uses;
e) provisions for preserving on and protecting of historical values;
f) and – where applicable – applying stipulations referring not only to space but also to time.

Taking into account that the whole area is covered by the bird Directive Natura 2000, and its significant part by the habitat Directive, and that it is situated close to the one million inhabitants conurbation and the areas of intensive tourist management on land (Hel Peninsula), the key challenge faced by the authors of the Plan was the identification of problems and working out solutions acceptable for all stakeholders, that would provide both for protection of nature and environment, and providing a decent living standard of coastal communities.

The starting point for preparing the plan was the inventory of present and possible ways of sea use. Information about nature environment was the most important factor in obtaining a picture of status quo. Luckily, the area of the plan had been examined before in this respect, and there was detailed information about macrophytes, macrozoobenthos and avifauna (obtaining this kind of information is very expensive, but creating the plan without it would be impossible). The problem was that there was no spatial information on marine species of considerable mobility, i.e. ichthyofauna and sea mammals and their susceptibility to any changes in even one segment of the space they need in their annual or life cycles. As a result, because of a lack of necessary knowledge it was impossible to define sea ecological corridors, i.e. so-called blue corridors. Another problem was that information about cultural sea heritage was imprecise, but not as much in relation to shipwrecks (they were identified rather precisely) as to coastal and land buildings and structures which are now under water. However, there were no big problems with inventoring navigation routes, anchorages, dumping sites, sites for acquisition of sand for coastal protection or with getting a picture of land development. Now it is clear that the plan failed to contain the inventory of maritime landscapes.

The current Polish regulation on MSP does not require broad public participation. In spite of that, the approach used in the Gulf of Gdańsk pilot plan has been actively participatory from the beginning. This was important in order to work out an opinion about future status of the area of the plan from the point of view of stakeholders. Over 50 central, regional and local authorities, economic and social stakeholder organisations and NGOs have been directly informed and asked for proposals to the plan.
The information about the pilot plan preparation has been published on the website of the Maritime Office in Gdynia.

Large number of stakeholders submitted claims and comments and took part in the preliminary stakeholder meeting on 24th of October 2007. This meeting, although kept in a constructive working atmosphere, revealed some very divergent visions, goals and demands of each stakeholder. For instance, the regional environmental authority and the representatives of NGOs demanded consideration of NATURA 2000 management plans, with special focus on conservation measures for certain endangered species (in addition to a general ecosystem approach).

The Hel Marine Station of University of Gdańsk urged that fish conservation measures should become an integral part of the plan. Fishermen association demanded additionally the protection of fishermen as a social group. The Maritime Museum in Gdańsk wanted to extend the archaeological conservation zone and many of the coastal municipalities aimed at the extension of its own economic activities towards the sea (marinas, untreated sewage discharge etc.). At the same time, all municipalities and the regional authority sees tourism as a main development sector of the area.

Some other stakeholders however, were rather poorly prepared to the discussions. Even where it seemed the future plan should be specified clearly, e.g. in the environmental protection issues, it turned out that there were no protection plans (of the landscape park Nadmorski Park Krajobrazowy) or management plans for Natura 2000 areas. Also, coastal municipalities interested in tourism development could not specify their needs as far as sea space was concerned, and their planners only mentioned their readiness to build piers and marinas or open new beaches. Even port authorities did not have a specified vision of long-term development in the context of demand for sea space. Because of the short time (about 6 months) for preparing the plan, it was impossible to start a strategic dialogue with the Polish Navy concerning the waters they need for defence purposes.

Despite these information deficiencies and sometimes contradictory demands, the participants of the stakeholder meeting were able to agree on the following guiding goals of the plan:

a) sustainable development of coastal communities;

b) good condition of coastal and marine ecosystems;

c) safe and sustainable use of marine resources;

d) economical management of sea space, leaving enough place for unknown uses;

e) conservation of historical heritage;

f) if possible, regulation of zones under not only space but also time aspects.
All the preliminary claims and comments of the stakeholders were, as far as possible, taken into account while preparing the draft spatial plan. In preconditions chapter also all the existing and drafted spatial development documents and policies of the Pomorskie region and coastal municipalities were taken into account.

As a result of inventorying, the following types of current and future sea uses were identified:

- waters for water transport, sea roads, roadsteads and anchorages;
- waters for sports and recreation;
- waters for fishing;
- waters for locating surface superstructures and artificial islands, and for location of underwater structures;
- waters for location of line facilities and technical infrastructure networks;
- waters under nature preservation;
- reed fields;
- waters significant for ichthyofauna welfare;
- waters under cultural heritage protection;
- the other waters of sea space used for dumping waste, silting or military purposes.

Inventorying and identification of the future demand of stakeholders for the use of sea space allowed for drafting basic spatial conflicts. In order to solve them it was necessary to use a bundle of priorities of sea space use defined for the National Spatial Development Concept. Because of the expected growth of sea navigation on the Baltic, as described above, the most important priority is concurrent functioning and development of technical infrastructure, navigation included, in proportion to transport needs. At the same time, making use of planning documents of regional level (Voivodship plan), it was assumed that the existing harbour system within the planning area is ultimate, and new marinas will require dredging water routes. A similar rank was given to the issues of defence as they were regarded as imposed and final (in fact there was no discussion about it). The second equally important priority was protection of habitats and species, which seems to be a natural thing with regard to protected areas of both Natura 2000 and the landscape park Nadmorski Park Krajobrazowy. However, because state authorities outlined the borders of Natura 2000 areas rather thoughtlessly, it was decided that reliable research on macrophytes, macrozoobenthos and avifauna justified grading restrictions in uses of sea space included into these areas, actually in line with the spirit of the EU directive. The third priority was cultural heritage protection, both under water and on shore, including cultural landscape of fishing
villages. Therefore, wherever possible (in fact excluding water routes and bird winter habitats) fishing was allowed. The development of maritime tourism (different from coastal tourism of sea, sun and sand type), permitted wherever it did not collide with navigation, fishing and environment protection received the fourth place in the priority ranking list. The development of line infrastructure became the fifth priority, however, raising surface and underwater structures were treated in a restrictive way, limiting their location (to selected sites) and functions (harbour functions only, one artificial island for scientific research, and tourist infrastructure wherever it is absolutely necessary and does not interfere with environmental protection).

Zoning

The third stage of working out the plan was the delimitation of functional sub-areas (Fig. 3.). In maritime planning this is a very important stage decisive of the success which does not occur in local land use plans based on the grid of existing plots and those outlined by ownership relations. Although sea space from the legal point of view constitutes a common property, it is in fact divided by a number of functional processes, constituting the internal cohesion of some of its parts. Therefore there is a need for understanding the dynamics of these functional links. Transport (maintenance of water routes frequently means their dredging) and nature links were assumed to be vital in the planned area. Therefore it was assumed that the spatial grid in the planned area would constitute the areas of valuable habitats (so-called areas of outstanding natural value) and transport corridors either with particular traffic or in need of dredging. A network of military areas and existing dumping sites was projected on the grid. Through delimitating the areas of outstanding natural value and those for transport use, it was possible to outline the area of general multiple use. In this area the zones of natural development of economic functions (port activities mainly) were outlined together with necessary corridors of line infrastructure for handling these functions. After delimitation of these functions the rest of the area was earmarked for recreation (of various intensity depending on the proximity of the areas of outstanding natural values) and fishing (although the latter one was permitted on many areas of outstanding natural values).

2 Construction of e.g. wind farms was banned because of close vicinity of shore, and the KPZK’s expert opinion on the existence of more suitable maritime areas for constructing such farms. Here were also other bans on construction of other structures due to their colliding with functions of sea fishing and tourism.
Thus 30 water areas-zones (akweny) have been demarcated because of their dominating function, including 12 waters of outstanding natural values (protected sea habitats), 6 waters for sea tourism and fishing (on one of them construction of an artificial island was permitted), two corridors for line infrastructure, two areas for constructing port infrastructure, for water and access routes to the ports together with anchorage (on one area adjacent to the port tourist infrastructure development was allowed), one dumping area, one silting area and two restricted areas (for the Army).

Their lead functions have been represented by capital letters according to the following categories (Fig. 4.):
K – waterways, harbours, anchorages;
S – sport and recreation;
R – fishing;
B – artificial islands;
P – underwater constructions;
L – cables and linear infrastructure;
O – nature protection;
D – heritage conservation;
I – fish protection;
T – reed fields;
Z – sand extraction sites;
A – other (unknown) uses.
During stage four, using the experts’ knowledge and experience of other countries, the authors formulated appropriately selected (with due respect paid to the 3-D nature of the sea space and the time factor) limitations and permits connected with sea uses for this outlined grid of basic water areas. The decisions of the plan concerned the water surface, water column, sea bottom and the air above. It introduced zoning solutions for safety zones and permanent and periodical limitations of use.

Another problem was a transgression of the basic water areas outlined this way, such as military areas or navigation zones with areas of outstanding natural value. What is more – this transgression could occur at various dimensions of the 3-D maritime space. In situations like these, one of the water areas was treated as superior (it was usually an area of outstanding natural value), and within its reach a sub-area of additional limitations or use permits (resulting from the needs of maintenance of navigation

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Figure 4. Set card example for functional area “Rewa Mew”

Source: Maritime Institute in Gdańsk.
infrastructure, such as dredging permit for the water route within the area of protected habitat) was outlined.

A similar method of outlining sub-areas was applied for the other forms of sea space use. The areas of protected underwater cultural heritage, reeds, ichthyofauna welfare, Natura 2000, and Nadmorski Park Krajobrazowy were projected upon the basic grid. And as it was in the previous case, this allowed for formulating additional limitations to using the sea space at the selected parts of the basic water areas.

A separate set of resolutions was prepared for each of the 30 spatially-functional zones in form of zones’ set cards. Each zone set card contains: a map section showing the zone, code, location, name, area, lead function, complementary functions of the zone, as well as the suitable and restricted activities within this zone, including potential rules and limitations of use. The list was wide, starting with erecting sea superstructure and infrastructure and activities aimed at changing the shape of the sea bed and ending with issues regulated by other laws on land (e.g. speed limit of traffic), applicable on the sea only through using spatial plans, due to competence clash, yet important from the spatial order’s point of view.

Moreover, a set of universal resolutions could be met for the entire planning area, as summarised below:

**Nature and environmental protection:**

- Since the planning area is entirely covered by the NATURA 2000 network, All activities which might significantly deteriorate the state of habitats and species protected by both NATURA 2000 directives are generally forbidden. Restrictions are put on tourism, hunting and other economic activities having potential negative environmental impact.

- Following activities are generally *not* restricted due to the NATURA 2000 status: maintenance of shore and flood protection facilities and all economic activities such as agriculture, forestry, fishing etc. which do not endanger the good ecological state of the NATURA 2000 protected habitats and species.

- All plans and projects which might have significant impact on the NATURA 2000 area (except NATURA 2000 area management plans, and plans resulting from them), require a special NATURA 2000 impact assessment procedure.

- In the 2001 *Act on Water Law* typology of Polish waters, the Gulf of Gdańsk has been classified as coastal waters. According to the ratified by Poland in 2004 Water Framework Directive (2000/60/EC) this class results in the strictest possible water quality standards – until year 2015 the best ecological status has to be achieved.

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3 The Polish law does not contain the expression “marine protected areas” and legal foundations for establishing such areas. Efficient management of sea protected areas is hampered by clash of competences of maritime and land administration.
The spatial plan of Western Gulf of Gdansk assumes spatial conservation of the endangered sea mammal and fish species, as well as commercial fish by designing protective zones for their spawning, feeding and resting.

Waste dumping and untreated sewage discharge is forbidden in the whole planning area. Discharge is only allowed for sewage treated according to newest rules of Ministry of Environment and EU directive 98/15/EC.

No areas for aquaculture are foreseen by the plan. Certain biotechnological practices are however recommended as a means of species reintroduction and natural regeneration. Protection areas are moreover foreseen for the regeneration of reed habitats.

All reed habitats, as well as the “Rewa Mew” (zone 6), which is a periodically flooded sandbank crossing the Gulf, popular resting and breeding ground for water birds and mammals (grey seals), are protected by a separate resolution of the draft spatial plan. Trespassing, as well as sand extraction and waterways’ deepening is strictly prohibited in these areas.

According to the Long Term Strategy for Coastal Protection, sand extraction is generally forbidden in within 5 km from the shore and water depth below 20 m.

Another resolution resulting from the above mentioned Strategy is the rule of minimising the negative hydro-morphological processes affecting the shore line of the Gulf. All planned ecological networks and structures are to maintain their historical and functional continuity.

Heritage conservation:
Underwater heritage objects such as ship wrecks are subject to conservation. Whereas some of the identified objects will be made available to the tourists, the rules for their exploration and restrictions of other objects are set by the special resolutions of this plan.

Scientific and other investigations of the area are only possible with a permission of the suitable level of maritime administration.

Investment:
The spatial plan is a basis for all decision on localisation of the socially particularly significant investments, called in Polish law inwestycje celu publicznego.

Final decision on these investments is in the competence of the Maritime Office in Gdynia, which also maintains a register of all investments.

Navigation:
The plan guarantees a generally free passage to the harbours and marinas within its borders by the use of customary waterways settled by the plan. All commercial and passenger vessels, except those following
a touristic route permitted by the maritime administration, are expected to follow the settled routes.

- The passage of yachts, fishing and paddle boats as well as surfing is generally unrestricted in the planning area, except in some protection zones. Motor boats are prohibited in large parts of the area, or are otherwise subject to speed limitations.

The above restrictions do not apply to rescue brigades, water police, fishery inspectorate, maritime administration and scientific vessels, nor any vessel in direct life danger situation.

Technical infrastructure:
- The existing technical infrastructure is intended for further exploitation.
- New installations, however, should be realized within the zones designated by the spatial plan, e.g. corridors for linear infrastructure such as cables and pipelines.
- Exemption: marine defence infrastructure, as well as temporary infrastructure required for nature protection or scientific research is permitted also outside the designated zones, provided that it fulfils special requirements of particular protection zones.
- Within the planned navigation routes it is possible to install technical infrastructure for the facilitation of navigation safety.
- Disregarding their purpose, the construction permit for all underwater and above water installations can only be issued after presenting up-to-date habitat sensitivity maps and a local spatial development plan in scale of 1:1000.
- All new installations both under and above-water have to follow the space saving rule (economical management of sea space) and have to apply best available technology (BAT).
- Protective infrastructure (against flood, storm and shore erosion) is realised on the basis of the Long Term Strategy for Coastal Protection.
- The location choice of all marine infrastructure must moreover consider development preconditions of the neighbouring land areas. The depth of their location in the sea bottom should depend on morpho-dynamic conditions.
- The use of flashing lights, unless they are necessary for navigation safety, is prohibited in the planning area.

Economic activities:
- The tourist or other economic activity in the planning area can only be limited after proving if its negative impact on the valuable natural or heritage resources. These resources have to be protected by law and precise rules of protection (management plans).
- No offshore wind energy farms or oil platforms are foreseen within the planning area.
• Artificial islands and other installations are permitted only in zones designated for the particular activity (lead function), except the protective infrastructure which can be localised anywhere.
• Temporary wooden jetties are permitted in bathing areas after consultation with the Maritime Office.
• All above-water installations have to apply protection measures against storm waves and global sea level rise. Minimum technical parameters here for are settled separately for each zone.
• Commercial signs and advertisement require permission of the Maritime Office in Gdynia.

Another problem was a transgression of the basic water areas outlined this way, such as military areas or navigation zones with areas of outstanding natural value. What is more – this transgression could occur at various dimensions of the 3-D maritime space. In situations like these, one of the water areas was treated as superior (it was usually an area of outstanding natural value), and within its reach a sub-area of additional limitations or use permits (resulting from the needs of maintenance of navigation infrastructure, such as dredging permit for the water route within the area of protected habitat) was outlined.

A similar method of outlining sub-areas was applied for the other forms of sea space use. The areas of protected underwater cultural heritage, reeds, ichthyofauna welfare, Natura 2000, and Nadmorski Park Krajobrazowy were projected upon the basic grid. And as it was in the previous case, this allowed for formulating additional limitations to using the sea space at the selected parts of the basic water areas.

Once the draft plan was ready (February 2008) it has been distributed to the stakeholders who already took part in the preliminary stakeholder meeting, some of which (especially the ecology experts) were directly involved in the plan drafting as consultants. At the moment the secondary claims and comments have been collected and in next step each of them will be discussed in the process of creation of the final Version of the plan.

The finalised spatial plan for the Western Gulf of Gdańsk cannot become effective unless approved as a legal act by the responsible Minister of Infrastructure. The chances to become such are very good, partially because of the close collaboration of some of the plan makers with governmental activities in the field of maritime policy.

Summary
Summing up, the pilot spatial plan in the Western Gulf of Gdansk allowed for identification of:

a) Scope of information necessary for plan development: (i) in any cases this information is unavailable or not precise enough in its spatial aspect
(ichthyofauna), and getting it is very expensive, which enhances the uncertainty factor during development of maritime plans, (ii) information about both sea areas and encompassing land is necessary, (iii) much more attention should be given to geomorphological information than it has been done in the plan under discussion;
b) delimitation of water areas constituting the spatial grid of maritime plans method – it seems that the suggested approach utilising functional links allows for the most precise relating of space to limitations and permits of its use;
c) dialogue with stakeholders concerning sea space use – it seems that there is a need of particular focusing on making the stakeholders ready for carrying out this type of dialogue and voicing their strategic interests in this respect where still a dominating approach to maritime space (at least in Poland) is that it belongs to everybody without any limits whatsoever, thus the lack of interest in the analyses on conditions of development of municipal or ports availability of sea space of appropriate quality. Educational tasks in this respect ought to be carried out by both the maritime administration and the regional planning services;
d) institutional conditions for creating the plan – it seems that: (i) there is a need for an interdisciplinary centre that would reconcile the traditional planning knowledge (land use planning) with a knowledge of hydrobiology, geomorphology, thermohydrodynamics, hydrochemistry, marine meteorology, lithology, hydrography, and hydrooptics, (ii) there is a need of coordinating maritime and land Voivodship (Regional) plans, e.g. a system of mutual participation/consultation;
e) scope of lacking and available information – it turned out that: (i) there is no systematically collected information on the planned paths of development of future sea use by the stakeholders (municipalities, ports, the Navy) – there is no strategic concept and even the long-term development plans of sea ports poorly reflect their demand for water areas, (ii) intensification of habitat mapping is needed – although very expensive, yet it is absolutely vital for appropriate work-out of maritime spatial plans, (iii) there is no information on mineral deposits under the sea bed – however, similar limitation occurs on land, (iv) there is little information on the demand for adequate quality maritime space for sea mammals and ichthyofauna in particular, (v) information on avifauna, wind potential and geomorphological issues is well-developed, (vi) information on coastal development is easily available, yet information on planned changes is often outdated.
The Baltic coastal area from boundaries to management. Latvian example

1. Ontological models of boundaries – an example of coastal area
There is no single united understanding of what boundaries are. A different explanation of boundaries is provided for different purposes in different fields of science. Basing on that position we can not talk unequivocally on the theory of boundaries. Researches in ontology show us several concepts which help us understand the formation of boundaries and their qualities.

Any space could be wiewed as the whole explored by different sciences and forming space structure for particular demands (structured whole). Geography has always dealt with territorial aspects of spatial objects and phenomena as significant. Smith stresses that geographers are interested in the relationship between an object (nation) – city, parcel and its physical territory; the dependence of these objects on boundaries, or the representation of boundaries (B. Smith, A. C. Varzi, 1999) In this context a special place is given to the investigation of specific parts of geographical space. Each such part has its boundaries which characterize the very object or phenomenon. Geography usually focuses either on investigating the characteristics of a territory without paying heed to boundaries themselves, or on the study of a boundary influence on separate stages of a human activity, e.g. language, culture, economy, and various processes such as migration and other implications.

In this article we have explored the main concepts based on the Baltic Sea coastal area in Latvia as a model territory. According to ontology the coast is a vague object which has a field impact. It has been determined by the vagueness of a representation process (de re) the reference of a geographical concept is not strictly defined (de dicto) as well. In the first case the sea coast determination is an objective oriented and thus is unclear. In another case it is linked with our thinking process which could be different in each occasion forming own unique understanding of the object concept. It is not possible often to define boundaries of the object or events precisely (A. C. Varzi, 1999).
The main problem is a definition of boundaries of the sea coast as a spatial object and the ensurance of conformity of inner structure to proposed objectives. Based on that understanding the sea coast could be modelled grounded on several concepts. To define boundaries – both outer and inner ones, the boundaries will be mainly artificial boundaries for artificial objects or fields. Forming such artificial territories objects or fields with natural or artificial boundaries has been formed (Table 1.).

Table 1. Characteristics of the representation of coastal areas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Representation object or field</th>
<th>Natural/artificial object/field</th>
<th>Natural/artificial boundaries</th>
<th>Specific/unspecific</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>land/sea</td>
<td>natural object</td>
<td>natural boundaries</td>
<td>specific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>shelf/deepwater</td>
<td>natural object</td>
<td>artificial boundaries</td>
<td>unspecific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>beach/steep bank</td>
<td>natural object</td>
<td>artificial boundaries</td>
<td>unspecific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>seashore</td>
<td>natural object</td>
<td>natural boundaries</td>
<td>specific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vegetation/biotopes</td>
<td>natural object</td>
<td>artificial boundaries</td>
<td>unspecific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>construction area</td>
<td>artificial object</td>
<td>artificial boundaries</td>
<td>unspecific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>protection belts</td>
<td>artificial object</td>
<td>artificial boundaries</td>
<td>specific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sea/coastal area impact zones</td>
<td>artificial field</td>
<td>artificial boundaries</td>
<td>unspecific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>territories at risk</td>
<td>artificial field</td>
<td>artificial boundaries</td>
<td>unspecific</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s table.

What is important to point out that objects forming coastal areas are unspecific and they could have natural or artificial boundaries? On the contrary, artificial objects or fields are with artificial boundaries and characterised as specified or unspecified. Partly such boundaries are formed with force to particular territory known as force dynamic boundaries (B. Smith, 1999), which could be changing and transforming and having impact on the space. Protection belts could be used as an example. All these qualities have an influence on the management of coastal areas.

A coastal area could be viewed as the agglomeration of particular territories and processes and between them the legal aspects of management are more important. In this case we understand agglomeration as the whole of particular interrelated and territory impacting processes or specific territories and their structures which are linked with the set of processes (SNAP and SPAN ontology) (P. Grenon, B. Smith, 2004). Coastal areas as agglomeration include interrelated territories which form our perception of them as the territory. The aggregation of processes and events connects those territories in time perspective and forms their history. Besides that with agglomeration the outer setting or coastal areas linkage with other
agglomerations could be perceived, like urban areas, suburban areas, functional urban areas which they are interrelated with. The awareness of agglomeration links and the definition of boundaries could help in solving management problems in the territory.

To create the inner spatial structure, especially in the field case, where territories are not clearly separated, gradation and conceptualisation are being used. The inner structure of The Baltic Sea and the Gulf of Riga protection belt could be used as example in which gradients are represented as demands and constraints but concepts – as special definite territories. We can find typical field elements (B. Plewe, 1998) – a core area as the direct seashore, for example, the 150–300 m coastal protected zone, a buffer zone as a rest protected zone – for example, the zone of restricted economic activity, and outer space – an impact area which stretches in different distances. Gradation and conceptualisation substitute the coastal area as a field.

The coastal area could be explored from the view of a niche concept which could be perceived as a place, space, an ecological niche with its owner, surrounding (medium) and dividing boundary (B. Smith, V. C. Varzi, 2001). In our case the coastal area which is considered as a niche or living space is a narrow belt near the sea with wide surroundings. The niche boundaries are handled by legal acts and planning instruments. At the same time a notable discordance between legal regulations and niche space in practice resulted as an occupation of space. In the meaning of previous concept in the last years` observable a change of niche owners – local are replacing by newcomers. Such changes are connected with not only the structure of inhabitants but also with their spatial behaviour and territoriality – the relationships between an individual and the group and a structured field or space volume, which an individual or a group wishes to protect from others (other groups) (R. D. Sack, 1986). The niche territory changes itselfs – it widens embracing or eliminating other niches, thus wrecking the former territorial identity and forming a new one.

2. Coastal area – territory of interests and planning response

Perceptions of coastal area are various and equivocal. In the sense of spatial planning, it involves a territory in the sea and on land, the boundaries of which are defined by mutual influences and interests.

Latvia has “rediscovered” its coastal area after regaining its independence in early 90s. The limitations present in the Soviet times, among them the closing of expansive territories from public, thus forming an “iron curtain” along the entire coastline of the open Baltic Sea, preserved a natural environment practically untouched by economic activity, which thus became attractive for further invasion of private interests.
In a short period of time, the limitations of “reclaiming” the seaside territories had lifted, therefore causing private interests to clash with those of the public. It is possible to outline two types of private interests – those of upstarts and prosperous middle-class representatives, who along with the change in social status are no longer satisfied with living in city boroughs – “banlieue”, and are ready to pay for a space near the sea; and those of indigenous coastline inhabitants and their legatees, who have regained their land estate and are ready to live and manage their activities in the coastal area. Among the first, it is worth to separately view those who use the coastal area for building summer cottages, i.e. utilize it for seasonal recreation. Public interests are associated with the availability of the sea and the preservation of values for the existing and future generations.

In order to balance these interests, corresponding legislation acts were used traditionally in Latvia. Avoiding extended historical discourse, let us note that, after regaining independence, initially Soviet period legislation acts were used (Telpiskās ..., 2009), with modifications. Only in 1996, new rules on protective zones were adopted, and in 1997, the Protection Zone Law was established, which has been amended and is still in force.

In 90s of the last century, a new planning system based on principles of market economy was forming in Latvia. Although 3 levels of planning were brought forward, namely, national, regional (composed of regional and district levels), and local, the system itself developed gradually, without taking a unified shape. Development of national planning began with “The Conception of National Planning in Latvia” (Telpiskās ..., 2009) approved by the Cabinet on January 27, 1998; however, it was not implemented. Content of documentation at the regional planning level was determined in 2005 (Regulations for ..., 2005), status of the region itself – in 2006 (Grozijumi ..., 2006), however, the future shape, functions and territorial scope of the regional management level have still not been made clear (Telpiskās ..., 2009). Districts as a remainder of the Soviet management system have been abolished since the municipal elections of 2009. Responsibility regarding matters of territorial development and physical planning of a territory has been shifted to the local level of planning, at which 12-year territorial plans and detailed plans for separate territories are being developed. (Regulations regarding ..., 2004).

Development of Latvian coastal area in the independence period cannot be evaluated unequivocally; it has not been in pace with goals set in the legislation acts and planning documents. The existing situation, then, and the circumstances that have brought it about, is therefore the object of our further research. In Latvia, broader scientific research has not been carried out in this field; therefore the working experiences of the author, as well as unpublished materials have been used in this paper.
3. Boundaries of coastal area

3.1. Conceptions of coastal area

Does coastal area exist as a geographical or a mental concept? There is no unified understanding of coastal area as a territory. To pinpoint the spatial usage of the concept of coastal area, the spatial boundaries of this conception must be defined. Coastal area is used in an everyday sense based on materials read, the economical activities carried out by, or the geographical understanding of an individual, which may be different from person to person. Often the concept is non-specific – it indicates the beach, dune area, a wider inland area – a result of “common simplification” of the interpretation of legislation acts – or the sea shelf. A common interpretation produces a common action.

What is located on the other side of the coastal area, or – does the coastal area end with the coast? Boundaries of the conceptual understanding of “coastal area” have to do with the border of sea and land. The shore between sea and land practically delimits two objects that are mutually interrelated and have a different “weight” that can change depending on the specific place of action.

Coastal area is more likely to signify a frontier region with the properties of a physical field (impacts). A field has no defined boundaries, its impact decreases gradually. For such territories, boundaries are defined relatively, according to certain criteria. The criteria, in turn, are dependent on goals to be achieved by defining such a territory (see concepts of boundaries in A. Pužulis, 2008). Another conception of a frontier region is related to the unstable positioning of the frontier itself. Day and night tides, coastal processes etc. determine coastline migration within certain boundaries, a phenomenon which may become significant when regulating land utilization in this area.

Conceptions of a coastal area are formed in various branches of science – geology, geography, ecology. Here we will focus mainly on conceptions defined in legislation acts, which significantly influence the development processes of a territory.

Coastal protection zoning as an instrument for regulating territory utilization in the coastal area is not employed everywhere in Europe. In places where protection zones have been determined, the width of coastal areas differs in relation to the policy goals and various instruments of each country.

The land utilization database Landcover interprets coastal territory as an area 10 km inland from the coastline, which is divided further into a 1 km coastal strip, hinterland and inland – remaining state territory. Sea
territory encompasses a 10 km zone, just as in Natura2000 coverage analysis. Various synonyms are being used – coastal zone, coastal area, coast, coastal space and coastal systems (The changing …, 2006).

The HELCOM recommendation 15/1 defines the formation of protection zones outside of cities and settlements, taking into consideration the natural and scenic values in the coastal area, but at least 100-300 m from the average waterline both towards land and sea. Separate exceptions have been envisaged for approval in territorial plans. Starting from the waterline, at least 3 km of land have been defined as a coastal planning area. (Helcom …, 1994).

3.2. Coastal area boundary conceptions

Definition of coastal area boundaries has a significant role in further policymaking. Are the existing boundaries efficient and serve the purpose they were initially designed for? In Latvia, there have as of yet been no attempts to answer this question. No particular research has been carried out in this field. It can be evaluated indirectly, on the basis of e.g. social activities, press publications, breaches of legislative acts etc. The matter is complex and related to the spatial planning system in general as well as separate documents, the practice of application and supervision of construction legislation, the activities of law enforcement institutions, and property rights. In this case we will focus on coastal area boundaries as they have been investigated in laws and territorial plans.

The legal conception has so far generally focused on the land side of the coastline. In the Civil Law of Latvia, coastal area has been defined as a state-owned territory to the place reached by the highest waves (Civil Law …, 2000–2009). Considering that the highest point reached by waves is a fluent variable, in the conception that concerns registering the coastal area of the Baltic Sea and the Gulf of Riga in the Land Register, the boundary of coastal area is defined as the border of the last estate next to the coastal area (Koncepcija …, 2008).

The Protection Zone Law of Latvia defines the protection zone of the Baltic Sea and Riga Gulf coastal area, the conception of which is not clear under the law. Law divides it into 2 areas – coastal dune area, the width of which changes from 150 m in cities and villages to 300 m outside populated areas. It must be noted that the values given are minimum values and may be extended to include biotopes and coastal dune areas. A zone of limited economic activity is defined conditionally up to a width of 5 km, the main condition being dry forests, upon the absence of which the area can be reduced (Fig. 1).
Protection Zone Law in regard to the coastal zone is intended to decrease the impact of pollution on the Baltic Sea, to preserve the protective capacity of the forest, to prevent the development of erosion processes, to protect coastal sceneries, and to provide the conservation, protection, balanced and lasting exploitation of the coastal nature resources, resources necessary for recreation and tourism, and other socially important territories. (Protection ..., 1997) This means nature protection from the impact of human economic activity.

In the case of Latvia, state regulates coastal area development by means of Protection Zone Law and other specific laws. It is important to note that law provisions are generally linear. They form uninterrupted or fragmented linear structures along the seashore. In such a situation it is impossible to consider the uniqueness and individual characteristics of separate territories.

Laws are used together with territorial plans, which have a great impact in the territorial localization of these provisions. Presently there is no National plan for the coastal area; regional plans provide certain requirements in separate sectors of the coastal area, while their impact on local municipalities is insignificant (Telpiskas ..., 2009). Local territorial planning refers to zoning of land utilization, which takes into consideration the many requirements of normative acts and policy guidelines, interpreting them spatially and forming a structure of linear segmented sectors (Fig. 2).
4. Coastal area development – situation and its evaluation

4.1. Conception of development

Development is an aggregate of processes that has no singular definition. It is often associated with economic indicators, and its placement is significant. Demand for real estate in the coastal area is high (State …, 2006). By itself, it cannot be viewed as a development indicator, but can be interpreted as an aspect of territorial distribution of real estate speculations. Local municipalities, wishing to attract more taxpayers, aim to increase the area of construction, thus causing construction volumes to be likened to development. In the long run, such narrow interpretation of development causes a number of undesirable consequences for territorial development (Pārskats …, 2009).

Development can also be understood more widely by taking in regard social, psychological and environmental indicators. Here we shall focus on specific problems of coastal municipalities and their reflection in the planning documents.

4.2. European data scale

In EU level documents, development analysis is based on available or comparable data. In this case the data do not always adequately describe...
local or regional characteristics. Building-covered areas in the European Environment Agency are viewed according to CORINE data at the NUTS3 level (The changing …, 2006) However, here it must be noted that such a view can only provide a superficial comparison, as it does not offer a decoding for the land utilization of smaller territories (less than 5 km²). The peculiarity of Latvia is that it has many small villages and country estate clusters.

Analysis of coastal dynamics does not always reflect the real situation; for instance, in the 2006 overview by the European Environment Agency, as related in the EUROSION database, the greatest part of Latvian coastal area has been depicted as an accumulation shore (The changing …, 2006), which, according to KALME project research, is basically an erosion shore (G. Eberhards, J. Lapinskis, 2007). The given length of coastal line is also imprecise, which in Latvia’s case differs by 148 km (actual 645 km are given as 497), which causes doubts as to the applicability of such data.

4.3. Structuring of coastal area territories

Territorial structuring is used to implement different policies in separate territories. Although natural conditions of coastal areas are not much different from place to place, the role of separate coastal territories in development processes varies. It is determined by placement of economic activities, environmental differences, as well as the direction and volume of processes.

In the document of Baltic Sea spatial planning – VASAB 2010 PLUS Programme of Action – separate coastal territories have been outlined for which different action is necessary. The coastal zone of Riga Gulf is described as an unregulated construction area, Riga vicinity – as a dynamically growing area, whereas the greatest part of Latvian territory is defined as a dune and beach territory with a small proportion of protection territories. (VASAB …) This again is only partly true, because in the coastal area protection zones incorporate as much as 45% of the entire seashore length (Statement …, 2006). There are also a number of protection biotopes.

In Latvia, coastal area structuring for the needs of planning has been carried out as a practical applications and suggestions for territorial planning. For sustainable development in management of the Baltic Sea and Riga Gulf coastal area, spatial priorities are suggested as an option – priorities would be based on specially protected territories, protection zones, functionality of settlements, construction, land utilization and natural resources. (Priekšlikumi …, 2009) Within the life-nature project “Protection and management of coastal habitats in Latvia”, functional zoning of the coastal area was carried out in the interest of nature protection (Protection …, 2006).
Below, suggestions for coastal territory classification have been listed, according to planning necessities (Table 2).

Table 2. Criteria of coastal territory classification

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criterion</th>
<th>Example</th>
<th>Spatial localization sea/land</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coastal processes</td>
<td>Erosion, Accumulation, Dynamic balance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development processes</td>
<td>Development “pressure”, Balance, Depression</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural values</td>
<td>Dune forests, Low meadows, Wet forests, Sea biotopes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Placement</td>
<td>Central, Medial, Outlying</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attraction of the place</td>
<td>Interpretation depends on goal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land utilization type</td>
<td>Agricultural land, Forest land, Settlement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resources</td>
<td>Human potential, Spatial capacity, Financial resources</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risks</td>
<td>Economic, Social, Environmental</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s table.

The above criteria have been given as an example, on the basis of which territories with different sets of characteristics can be defined. Such territories need different planning solutions. Criteria may be changed depending on territorial placement and planning goals, and they may overlap.

4.4. Development or a “development bubble”

In the case of Latvia, no development planning supervision system has been formed that would analyze the changes in specific target territories (Rigas …, 2008). As a temporary alternative for analyzing development processes, we may use indirect proof, such as analyzing municipal territory planning that “reacts” to development pressures and provides for corresponding land utilization (for construction or infrastructure). Such tendencies are especially pronounced in Riga vicinity and decrease in the
Changes in population numbers of coastal municipalities over the last 10 years have shown a pronounced increase in Riga vicinity, a relative stability in other coastal cities and a decrease in the periphery.

Figure 3. Change in population numbers in coastal municipalities, 1998–2009 (%)

Source: Calculation from Latvian Population register data (Latvian…).

In Latvia, planning evaluation has not been done in the development context. There are a number of methodical solutions, data obtained by which may be mutually incomparable. The problem is posed by the chosen unit of comparative analysis – it may be a border of land estate, a backyard, or the allowed size of parcel division in construction legislation acts. However, even such approaches may be insufficient, if territories vacant from buildings have to be considered, such as parks, protection territories, beaches. Approaches may differ depending on the purpose and users of data. Such an approach is more characteristic of development potential.

When analyzing the provisional population number of construction areas in relation to increases in population in coastal villages and cities, it must be concluded that, in effectual territorial planning, the scheduled size of construction territories considerably exceed the ability to cover the area with buildings. For example, in the city of Ainaži 32% of the city territory has been scheduled for new construction. Considering the sizes
of parcels and the average size of inhabitants – 3 persons – can be predicted in 12 years period a population increase of 3000, which exceed current population 2 times. In the last 10 years, the population has decreased by 19%. (Latvian …) A similar situation is observable in other populated coastal areas as well, where population sizes are increasing.

Meanwhile, in direct vicinity of Riga, building construction is invading agricultural territories and partly the forest zone (Rīgas …, 2008).

4.5. Values and development

Evaluation of development depends on socially accepted norms of values. In Latvia, the social value of a coastal territory is characterized as an environment with little signs of intervention, scenery of coastal dune forests, sand beaches. An important aspect is the accessibility of these values to the public. (Latvijas …, 2008) Often social values, territorial planning and practice could be compared to a three-horse carriage, where each horse is trying to run in a different direction.

The coastal area is not to be unequivocally interpreted – space is mentally indefinite. On the other hand, coastal processes have a clear geographical localization. Coastal processes take place in a very limited territory within a few hundred meters, and most building intentions are localized in a territory along the sea shore within a few meters from the waterline, which is evidenced by perspective land utilization in territorial planning. Such localization is either naturally defined, or a result of a “sorting out” of spatial uncertainties by the use of territorial zoning and borders.

The validity issue of legally defined borders has been topical ever since these borders have been approved. The requirements in the Protection Zone Law are regularly being changed, which proves the nonconformity of political practice with socially accepted values. Inner zoning boundaries of the coastal area in territorial plans also vary, tending to direct “development” towards the seashore.

Planning of land utilization and practical utilization are two opposites – development versus protection. The territorial limitations of NATURA are exceedingly strict, but at the same time, too mild regarding areas outside these territories. Thus coastal areas become fragmented – economic activity is squeezed out of NATURA territories, but outside those territories, maximum abandonment of limitations is sought (Pārskats …, 2009).

Validity of zoning may be evaluated from the point of view of zoning border definiteness and provisions that influence development. In 2008, an analysis of coastal dune protection zones was carried out, and it was found that often the area has been defined mechanically, without regard to biotope boundaries. The methodically “ideal” protection zone proposal essentially differs from existing practice. Such discrepancies are clearly
caused by a lack of methodology, which makes for varying interpretations in planning (Piekrastes …, 2008).

Limiting the economic activity to 5 km from the shore has little effectiveness in populated areas, as land utilization limitations generally affect only forest areas. The lack of strictly defined criteria causes a reduction of limited areas to 150–300 m. On this background, a question arises of the practicability of such a measure.

Protection zones are one of the most widely disputed planning issues in Latvia. In the website of one among the leading Latvian daily papers, “Diena”, there are 898 articles on the problems associated with protection zones (Portal…). A protection zone tends to limit development, and it exists within sectoral defined limitations. For an illustration, the greatest limitations are faced by NATURA territories in coastal dune protection zones, where economic activity is practically prohibited, but the least – in limited economic activity zones in agricultural territories.

**4.6. Changes and tendencies**

In the years of independence of Latvia, along with a decrease in population and economic activity, the scale of building construction has increased in coastal territories, while the environment load has been focused in specific territories, and in other areas access to the sea has become more difficult, which is against social values (Pārskats …, 2009). This is partly a result of the state planning policy. There is a need for unified criteria in defining settlements (villages) and their boundaries.

On the other hand, this has been brought about by the provisions in Protection Zone Law in regard to the width and limitations of the protection zone. A reduced protection zone inside villages and cities allows for approaching the seashore. This in turn gives rise to a tendency to define unreasonably large village territories, merging construction areas and planning the expansion of villages along the seashore.

Planning and development programmes do not serve as instruments for development. Until 2006, most municipalities still had not passed their territorial plans. Now only one coastal municipality fails to provide an effectual plan. Evaluating the correspondence of local planning to the regional planning, main discrepancies are related to the distribution of population, sceneries, and the preservation and development of local identity (Pārskats …, 2009). Planning in this case serves not a means for coordinating long-term interests, but rather as a method of legitimating short-term local interests. The existing planning system has not helped realize the main goal – to find that method which would ensure a mutual cooperation of the various documents and development instruments.
As a result of climate changes, the frequency of violent storms increases along with coastline erosion processes. Although present forecasts reflect no great threat for the coastal infrastructure in the following decades, it must not be forgotten that the situation may rapidly change (Piekrastes …, 2008). In Latvia there is no unified system of monitoring coastal processes, prognosticating risks and planning protection measures.

In coastal municipalities, there is a strong need for the development of infrastructure objects, which would organize flows of population, prevent degradation of environment and serve as a basis for territorial development. The development of such infrastructure has partly been hindered by strict limitations in the protection zones.

The sea aquatorium is still underestimated as the space for various economic, cultural, or ecologic development potentials. There are a lack of normative regulations, scientifically commercial research and state financial support for the development of sea aquatorium projects.

However, the most relevant factor of change is the economic situation of the state, which defines the income level and regulates market demand. Starting from 2007, a decrease in economic activity is observable, which is especially pronounced in 2008–2009. Economic crisis has had an impact also on the pace of construction projects, purchase of new housing etc., which in the nearest future may affect the planning situation in the coastal areas.

There is a tendency to soften the requirements in Protection Zone Law on the grounds of development process support. Such an approach is justifiable only in the presence of strict state supervision of construction processes.

4.7. Integrated Coastal Zone Management or other solutions

As a solution for regulating the complex development of coastal areas in the European Union, the Integrated Coastal Zone Management (ICZM) is provided, which includes the mutual interaction of sea and land, the human dimension in coastal processes, and the integration of various sectors and participants in order to avoid conflicts that may result in undesirable development processes (Recommendation …, 2002). The recommendations are not of a binding character.

In Latvia, there is no unified integrated management mechanism of the coastal area. In Latvian report regarding implementation of EU recommendation 2002/413/EC, legislation acts and planning policy documents with impact on coastal area development and management have been listed (Statement …, 2006). At the same time it must be noted that these documents are not specifically aimed at complex coastal area development.
In Latvia there has been no specific development policy for coastal areas. The existing policy goals and documents are related to environment protection. There have been a number of projects in Latvia that focus on preparing suggestions for integrated development and its supervision, but their further practical implementation has been limited.

Considering the existing practice, there is a need to develop a coastal area development document of a national level, which had force of law and corresponding implementation and supervision instruments.

5. Conclusions and directions of further research

In the future development planning supervision should be patterned, providing for research of spatial development impacts of coastal area regulation. Issues should be addressed regarding the indicators and methodology of such research.

The sectorial view of coastal area should be revised – coastal area cannot be identified with the protection zone. Considering the vagueness of the concept, the territory in question is linked to a specific purpose and its borders may differ with the purpose. Economical coastal area development territory includes various aspects and as such is an object with properties of a field, for delimiting which gradation is used.

Comparing the social, economic and environmental factors of development, it must be concluded that the defining aspect of coastal area development is the economic factor, but localization is determined by state and municipality legal regulations, which are expressed in the form of setting concrete boundaries and territories. Planning and defined structural boundaries have a significant impact on the coastal area development processes; therefore such a structuring should be retained.

By using the protection zone as an instrument of territorial planning, its conceptual interpretation and goals should be expanded, defining also goals of territorial development and protection from natural risks. Approach must vary by territory. Coastal dune protection zone must be retained, but the methodology and criteria for its delineation must be defined more accurately.

The planning of population distribution in the existing planning structure is inefficient. It should be formed as a national priority, providing for regulations and instruments of a national scale.

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The impact of tourism on the development of the South-East Baltic coastal regions: the economic geographic approach

Introduction
Nowadays tourism as a socioeconomic process has a global territorial distribution. In many countries and their economies tourism is being perceived differently. Also, the impacts of tourism as a complex of processes for regional development in scientific theoretical and applied researches are determined or estimated in different economic geographic approaches.

Tourism is also a geographic phenomenon and due to its substantiality it generates a significant impact for economy and it is being paid an increasing attention by governments and scientists (E. Kriauciunas, 2003).

Analyzing the most important theoretical and applied researches of tourism, there was determined an insufficient asset and role of human geography in performance of tourism researches in Lithuania, Poland and Kaliningrad region (Russia) The statistical data of second sources are still not sufficient, reliable and trustworthy.

The tourism geography is named as one subsystem within human geography (R. J. Johnston et al., 2003). Altogether tourism and geography both are appropriate for socioeconomic complex and its complexity, and tourism researches are interdisciplinary with other sciences. The complexity and interdisciplinary of tourism geography they both enable to look for a wider scientific, also economic geographic approach for performance an analysis of tourism geographical, i.e. spatial impacts that are affecting the processes of regional development.

Problem and topicality of research. The territory for researches is selected due to its geographical and historical retrospectivity and retrogressive territorial division, that became geopolitically actual after the year of 1945, when historically former region of East Prussia was divided and adjoined to Poland and Russian Federation. In the beginning of 1990’s Lithuania regained its independency together with Klaipėda region. Scilicet,
since the beginning of 1990’s began the processes of geopolitical and political fragmentation in the South – East Baltic coastal regions. Kaliningrad regions became an exclave of Russia. The newly changed situation augured socioeconomic disjuncture between Lithuania and Kaliningrad region for more than 10 years. Also, during that time began a new cultural, social and political dialogue between Poland and Kaliningrad region and implemented activities of trans-boundary cooperation generated a plenty of obvious results, i. e. started the movement of inhabitants, goods and investments, economic cooperation of SMEs and transit, increased intensity of international tourism trends. Especially, since 1996 when Kaliningrad region was proclaimed as a special economic zone (SEZ) that encouraged to start more intensive trans-boundary co-operation between Lithuania and Kaliningrad region in the field of culture and entrepreneurship firstly. Lately, the federal law on SEZ was renewed in 2006.

Recently, Lithuania is recognized as a strategic partner for Kaliningrad region’s economic development, including the development of tourism system too. Overall, due to the consequences of historical events the new economic and social structures were formatted, that are still remaining weakly interrelated regionally. The traditional socioeconomic and cultural interactions are extincted between North – South and South – North directions, and at the same time existing interactions between East – West and West – East are not confirming sufficient socioeconomic and cultural interaction and development within the South – East Baltic coastal regions in general. An attractive natural and cultural landscape, increasing trend of tourists, developing tourism infrastructure and services, all this requires economic geographical researches more in detail.

The estimation of geographic impacts for development of the South – East Baltic coastal regions are being determined according to author’s generated methodology, which is appointed to perform the economic geographic analysis and synthesis, determining the propriety of region’s socioeconomic conditions for tourism development.

The analysis of geographic tourism impacts are performed according to:

- methods of human geography, when territoriality is related to structure, clusterization and peripherality;
- the geographical analysis and synthesis of region’s tourism sector, human resources, territorial and socioeconomic clusters, criteria of peripherality that all used to determine tourism impacts, their levels of intensity and territorial distribution of them within the regions;
- the delimitation of researches encompasses the South – East Baltic coastal regions that face to the Curonian and Vistula lagoons, also the Baltic sea. All these areas are distinguished for the homogeneity of natural environment, differentiation of socioeconomic and cultural environment,
The impact of tourism on the development of the South-East Baltic coastal regions:

problem-oriented geographical and geopolitical space, topicality of boundaries of states.

**Purpose of research** – to determine the geographic types of tourism impacts and their territorial distribution for the regional development of the South–East Baltic coastal regions.

**The tasks:**
- to determine the impacts of tourism sector’s structure for regional development;
- to determine the structure and employment of human resources’ impacts for regional development;
- to determine hierarchical levels of impacts according to segregated group of territorial clusters;
- to determine integral levels of impacts according to tourism sectors’ and socioeconomic criteria of regional peripherality.

The statements formulated in this research can be used to form and evaluate the joint policy of regional tourism development in the South–East Baltic coastal region’s space.

**Research review**

Analyzing various scientific annals of tourism researchers was determined that economist were the first ones who paid attention to tourism generated value added. It was expressed in quantitative meanings. Only at the end of XXth century there were performed the first sets of tourism researches related to analysis of tourism social impacts. Nevertheless, it is already agreed on socioeconomic importance of tourism for regional development, but the methodology of impacts’ researches are still remaining insufficient and opened for discussions.

In the context of social sciences the perception of „tourism impact” is noted as permanently changeable phenomenon which depends on the changes of economic activities in recreationl and touristic territories, also in entrepreneurship of locals, economic ties between tourism sector’s structures and elements of public infrastructure, motivation of behaviour between locals and visitors. The impact of tourism is appropriate for a wide socioeconomic territorial distribution, but according to the sources of previous researches, there was determined an insufficiency of researches about analysis of tourism impacts’ geographical factors in theory and practice as well.

The studies and researches of tourism economic impacts take an important role in the entire system of social sciences. Apparently, tourism is perceived as one of the key factors in the processes of regional development, wherein as a factor is being approached for many solutions related to development to border and peripheral areas.
The economic impact of tourism is being recognized as a factor for regional development and as a consequence of development itself, because tourism development is directly related to the increase of incomes, employment, development of tourism infrastructure. According to these mentioned criterions, the generation of economic value added is named as tourism impact for regional development.

The potential impact of tourism as an economic system is widely described and argued in many scientifical researches. The thesis of E. De Kadt (1992), A. Mathieson, G. Wall (1982), S. Britton (1996), G. Shaw, A. M. Williams, (1994; 2000), these authors mention tourism value added and its impact for regional development. D. G. Pearce (1989) argued that the role of tourism is perceived as constituent factor firstly. It also depends on factors of sociocultural and natural environment. Particularly, tourism development is being chaotic structurally and territorially, and it is not adjusted according to conditions of economic, social, cultural and natural needs.

In the researches of R. Butler (1980) there are segregated the following factors that are affecting the generation of positive and negative economic impacts of tourism: the change of economic entities in the region, structural change in region’s labour market, the impact of region’s economic multiplier for employment and deployment of incomes, tourism as a diverseness of region’s economic activities. Particularly, the first analysis of tourism economic factors is done more in detail by B. Archer, Ch. Cooper (1994). It was analyzed tourism economic impact for the structure of incomes and expenditures of locals in touristic and rural areas. Also, the advantages and disadvantages of tourism economic impacts were researched by J. Bryden (1973) and later by B. Archer, Ch. Cooper (1994). All these researchers argued that the development of inbound tourism depends on the progress of local and national tourism on regional level.

The economic impact of tourism is efficient in the regions that have limited possibilities for economic development. Tourism is very important for strengthening of local entrepreneurship, because tourism related economic activites are formatting impacts for better living standards in the area. Thus, the bigger intensity of tourism economic impact and its territorial distribution both are appropriate for rural and peripheral areas in general.

The consistent patterns of tourism geographic impacts in border and peripheral areas were researched by R. Butler, C. M. Hall, J. Jenkins (1998), which determined that border regions are often appropriate for a double peripherality. The geographic remoteness of border areas are being characterized by socioeconomic indicators mainly, and it is rather difficult to determine and evaluate an economic impact of tourism in border areas.
The processes of trade tourism and its economic impact in Europe’s border regions were researched by C. H. Hall, C. J. Page (1999), D. J. Timothy (1999; 2001). All these researchers argued that tourism has an appropriate impact for diversification of economic activities in border regions. Many economic enterprises are servicing the needs of locals and visitors in touristic areas. Therefore, tourism sector might be divided into basic sector (servicing the needs of tourists) and satellite sector (servicing the needs of tourists and locals), the structural share 1/3 : 2/3, i.e. structurally sustained tourism sector exists when tourism satellite sector is twice bigger than tourism basic sector (E. Spiraïjevas, 2003, 2004).

The social impact of tourism is being perceived as a result of social relations between locals and tourists. The interaction of these relations it is the key factor, that is expressed as impact. Such social impact notes the understanding or defiance of social processes themselves.

The sociocultural impact of tourism is running in the interaction between locals and tourists (J. Ap, J. Crompton, 1993; R. Sharpley, 1994). This interaction is impacting the social change between different societies and cultures.

Tourism development is formatting a lot of social benefits, like improvement of living standards and transport services (L. Turner, J. Ash, 2003). In the issue, as much as bigger benefits of tourism, particularly are bigger positive impacts of tourism and an attitude of locals for servicing visitors.

In the theoretical and practical researches of tourism social impacts, there are mentioned different methodologies about the impact itself, its analysis and evaluation. In the methodology of determination of tourism social impacts are used the stereotypes of social behaviour of locals, behavioral stereotypes between locals and tourists too.

Analyzing territorial distribution of recreational and tourism resources, that the biggest saturation of recreational and tourism resources are located in peripheral areas, i.e. in the areas that are situated nearby the borders. Some places of border areas are significant for bigger potential for tourism development in general. Relatively, it is very important not to overestimate the impact of tourism for the economies in peripheral and border areas but to find a proper place and sustainable pace for tourism in the processes of regional development (E. Spiraïjevas, 2004). Tourism as an activity is prompting development of economies in border regions and integrating them to the system of common economy. In many peripheral areas there are running the processes of diversification of economic activities, like ecological agriculture, implementation and running of business innovations. The border and peripheral regions are those territories that have a high attraction for tourism development, because the development itself is based
on integration of social ties to the main structures of economy, but at the same time the processes of tourism are facing with an insularity of market, insufficiently evaluated needs and suggestions, also a lack of proper and precise statistical data about processes in tourism market.

Recently, the development of coastal tourism is changing touristic space in Europe. Such process enables the formation of different approaches towards economic geographic understanding of coastal regions. This understanding depends on integrated processes that are running in coastal areas. At the end of the XXth century it was started the development of strategy of coastal development in Europe. This strategy is also based on regional tourism and the objectives that are to attract the investments to tourism sector, to compose and maintain economic specialization of coastal areas, to develop the system of public infrastructure, to improve accessibility of coastal areas.

**Methodology**

The border regions of the South – East Baltic coast are located in Lithuania, Kaliningrad region (Russia) and Poland. The lines between the regions of the states are delineated according to the following factors of geographic location: seashore, lagoon and boundary.

The determination and territorial distribution of geographic types of tourism impacts are conducted by author’s own created methodological model applying the approach of human geography. On the base of methodological model there were distinguished structural, hierarchical and integral geographical impacts of tourism (Fig. 1.). Impact of tourism as an impact of socioeconomic factor for:

- structure of region’s tourism sector;
- human resources (structure, change and employment);
- formation of territorial tourism and socioeconomic clusters;
- impact for integration of peripheral areas.

These four geographic (spatial) types of tourism impacts they are affecting the processes of regional development in the context of tourism and it’s system’s development in general.
The impact of tourism on the development of the South-East Baltic coastal regions:

The methodological matrix of tourism geographical impacts, it indicates the way of presence how the impacts are grouped, determined and analyzed (Fig. 2.).

The sets of methods were applied for the determination of each type of geographical impact. The analysis and synthesis of structural impact of tourism sector they were conducted applying the methodological approach of tourism satellite account, the methods of systematic, structural and comparative analysis, the retrospective and retrogressive approaches, the method of location quotients and method of calculation of regional peripherality indices.

The analysis of formation of territorial groups of tourism and socioeconomic clusters were performed applying the method of hierarchical analysis by clusterization using the programme of SPSS (version 13). The integral impacts were calculated and determined according to types, indices and criteria of regional peripherality.

The coefficients of locational quotients (LQ) are calculated according to formula:

\[ LQ = \frac{X_j / X}{Y_j / Y} \]
Where $X_j$ is a number of certain entities in an area, $X$ is a number of all entities in the area, $Y_j$ is a number of certain entities in the region, and $Y$ is a number of all entities in the region (R. J. Johnston et al, 2003).

There were used indices of regional peripherality of working age inhabitants. For the calculation used the following formula:

$$P_i = \sum_{j=1}^{n} \frac{M_j}{D_{ij}}$$

Where $P_i$ is an indice of peripherality in $i$ area, $M$ is a mass of conomic variable, $D_{ij}$ is a distance in kilometers between $i$ and $j$ areas (R. J. Johnston et al, 2003). Also, in all above mentioned cases the cartographic method for data mapping was applied.

Also, there were collected data from the national systems of registers about the types of economic activities of enterprises in each territory on the base of methodological approach of tourism satellite account (E. Spiriajevas, 2003).

Results

The territorial disparities of tourism sector structures they note the distribution of certain services in the administrative territories (coastal areas). The biggest parts of tourism structures (services) (Fig. 3) are located in Klaipėda, Kaliningrad and Elbląg cities that are the core areas in each region.

![Figure 3. The territorial disparities of structures' of tourism sector in the regions](image)


The distribution of services is uneven neither territorially nor structurally. Therefore, the different levels of tourism impacts are being formatted in each region too.
The structure of tourism sector has quantitative and qualitative differences in each administrative territory (Fig. 4).

Figure 4. The territorial disparities of relations between tourism basic and satellite sectors in the regions

Source: Author’s research, 2007.
The existence of these differences depends on economic development level, variety of economic activities, level of development of public tourism infrastructure, intensity of visitors’ and tourists’ trends, also on political approach towards tourism development in general. The structural line between tourism basic and satellite sectors it notes the level (1/3 : 2/3) of sustained structural development of tourism economy itself (Fig. 4.). The most touristic areas are the municipalities of Neringa and Svetlogorsk, wherein tourism basic sector is developed mostly, but the satellite tourism sector is economically weak what is appropriate for touristic areas in general. The sustained structure of tourism sector, that is close to the structural line of sustained structural development, it is appropriate for Polessk and Zelenogradsk, and improvement of quality of tourism services is more essential for these coastal areas.

The quantitative development of tourism sector it is appropriate for Klaipėda city, Klaipėda and Šilutė districts, also for the districts of Slavsk and Polessk, Guryevsk and Zelenogradsk. In these areas the presence of impact is not efficient enough, neither for regional development structurally nor economically. The qualitative development of tourism sector is appropriate for Svetlogorsk, and quantitative development for Pionersk and Jantarny. In particularly, the processes of tourism development of Svetlogorsk, they are impacting the regional development just partly. The quantitative development of tourism sector is under the process in the Vistula lagoon coastal region, wherein the impact itself is more related to structural economic impact. Relatively, the small part of tourism basic sector and bigger part of tourism satellite sector they note potentially high level of tourism role and its impact for regional development.

In comparison to the LQs’ meanings of territorial disparities of tourism basic sector (Fig. 5.), the bigger impacts for regional development are significant for the territories in the Kaliningrad region, in the areas that are located along the coast of the Curonian lagoon. Rather similar saturation is also appropriate for Lithuania’s and Poland’s regions, wherein the biggest impacts of tourism are being generated in Neringa and Gd. Nowodworski municipalities. Therefore, these territories are populated rarely, low territorial saturation of economic activities and the geographical factor of border’s location is essential too.

The population is an important economic element in the entire tourism system. The impacts of tourism for the changes of population and its structure they are being estimated and approaching to specific social and demographic situation in the regions.

The structural changes of population that are caused of tourism development, they are impacting the development of smaller areas, wherein the processes of socioeconomic impact are under running. The territories
are located in border and coastal regions that have an economic specialization in tourism and, thus they are appropriate for mobile and geographic variable labour market. Such reasons are forcing the processes of migration, changes in employment, level of urbanization and rural development.

The inhabitants employed in agriculture sector they are one of the most essential economic geographic factor that determines lower living standards in the coastal border regions (exception are the regional centers), and employment in agriculture sector is still remaining an important source of incomes in Lithuania’s and Poland’s coastal regions (Fig. 6.). In comparison to neighboring regions, the employment in agriculture sector is also structurally significant an economic activity in the Kaliningrad region too, but the agriculture itself it not very productive and therefore, it generates less incomes. The involvement of labour market of agriculture and adoption of labour force for the servicing of touristic needs, it composes qualitative development of separate tourism services in rural coastal areas mostly.

The coefficients of LQ’s of employment in agriculture sector (Fig. 6), they mean a rather high level of employment in Klaipėda and Šilutė districts, Slavsk and Guryevsk, Elblong and Gd. Nowodworski districts, in the municipalities of Svetly, Ladushkin and Mamonovo. Therefore, the level
of tourism impact is rather low for regional development in these territories. Besides, all these municipalities have still unused tourism potential, but due to a high economic dependency of labour force on agriculture, the generated value added of tourism is also low economically.

![Map of Europe showing location quotients of employment in agriculture sector](image)

**Figure 6.** The territorial disparities of location quotients of employment in agriculture sector

*Source: Author’s research, 2007.*

In Polessk district the LQ of employment in agriculture (1,0–1,5) (Fig. 6.) notes an average labour force’s dependency on agriculture, what is a cause of formation of medium level of impact for regional development. The territorial disparities of LQs’ of employment in agriculture sector they mean a rather high economic dependency of labour force on traditional agricultural activities too, especially in Lithuania’s and Poland’s regions. Therefore, the potential of tourism for regional development is still unused properly.

The biggest territorial saturation of employed in services it is appropriate for Lithuania’s and Poland’s regions (Fig. 7.), also for the Vistula lagoon coastal region (Kaliningrad region part). The lowest territorial saturation of employed in services it is appropriate for Slavsk and Polessk districts and therefore, the development of tourism will determine the establishment of new working places in service sector potentially.
The biggest meanings of LQ of employment in service sector they are appropriate for Klaipėda city, Neringa municipality, Kaliningrad city and Svetly, Baltyisk, Elblong and Bagrationovsk district, what notes the biggest territorial concentration of labour force in service sector. Although, Svetlogorsk is recognized as a resort of federal status, but the meaning of LQ (0,5>) of employment in service sector it is the lowest one in the South – East Baltic coastal regions. The daily shuttle migrations of labour force they are the main reason for a low meaning of mentioned LQ. Also, the lower meanings of LQs are appropriate for Slavsk and Polessk districts, and it notes a rather low impact of tourism as a set of services for regional development.

The different groups of territorial tourism clusters are composing different types of impacts, that are formatting territorial and structural differentiation of socioeconomic value added generated by tourism. Some groups of territorial clusters are outlined as regional centers, that have the biggest potential for socioeconomic development, and these centers are encompassed by a high level of tourism impact. Other municipalities are attributed to the groups of clusters, that have lower socioeconomic potential,
what is an issue for a lower level of impacts for regional development. The
groups of distinguished territorial tourism clusters they note territorial
hierarchy of tourism impacts in the regions (Fig. 8.). In Lithuania’s region
there are two groups of clusters, in Kaliningrad’s region there are
distinguished six groups of clusters, where Zelenogradsk district,
Kalinigrad and Mamonovo are attributed to separate group of clusters,
wherein the tourism sector is developing more absolutly. In Poland’s region
there are distinguished two groups of clusters too.

Figure 8. The territorial groups of tourism clusters
Source: Author’s research, 2007.

The territorial distribution of tourism clusters they have a shape of
territorial symmetry. Those territories are located according to the criteria
of geographical location as lagoon coast, marine coast, border and transport
in general. According to the mapped results of research, the biggest
differentiation of clusters is appropriate for the Kaliningrad region and
that is a cause of formation of different levels of tourism impacts for regional
development. Rather homogenous situation is in Lithuania’s and Poland’s
regions, where separate group of clusters is in touristic areas of Neringa
and Gd. Nowodworski municipalities.

In comparison to the groups of socioeconomic territorial clusters (Fig. 9.),
there are distinguished two groups in Lithuania’s and Poland’s regions,
and six groups in Kaliningrad regions. Such differentiation notes an uneven territorial distribution of tourism impacts in the South – East Baltic coastal regions. The biggest differentiation of socioeconomic impacts is appropriate for the Vistula lagoon coast (part of Kaliningrad region). Therefore, the generated economic value added by tourism is unevenly distributed too, but the less territorial unevenness of impacts it is appropriate for Lithuania’s and Poland’s regions mostly.

![Figure 9. The territorial groups of socioeconomic clusters](image)

Source: Author’s research, 2007.

The factor of peripherality is tightly related to territorial and integral factors. The impacts of peripherality for territorial integrity, they are being perceived as an external types of impacts and they force to formulate the hierarchy and mutual integrity according to various criteria of peripherality, in general.

The biggest regional peripherality of working age inhabitants is distinguished in Lithuania’s region, but relatively the smaller peripherality is appropriate for regions of Poland and Kaliningrad (Fig. 10.). Besides, the level of peripherality in the border areas are rather similar in each region too. Therefore, on the both sides of the borders there are formatting integral types of impacts that are attributed the development of border areas.
Also, a high level of peripherality of employed in service sector is distinguished in Poland’s region, and relatively smaller level is for Lithuania’s region. Particularly, the low level of peripherality is appropriate for border areas.

According to the average of monthly incomes, a high level of peripherality is appropriate for Lithuania’s and Kaliningrad’s regions, and smaller level of peripherality is determined in Poland’s region. Therefore, on the both sides of the border areas are formatting similar intensity of integral types of impacts.

The high level of regional peripherality is distinguished for Poland’s region, and relatively lower level for Lithuania’s and Kaliningrad’s regions. The smaller disparities of peripherality are appropriate for the Vistula coastal areas, and bigger disparities for the Curonian lagoon coastal areas, wherein are being formatted different integral impacts and their intensity for regional development. The development itself is not seamless territorially, and according to above mentioned criteria, the mutual territorial integration is not in a process yet.
Conclusion
The utmost socioeconomic differences between the territories that are closer to central places of the regions, and relatively the less differences of socioeconomic development among the border territories. Therefore, the biggest intensity of tourism geographical impacts are encompassing coastal border territories mostly.

Determined territorial distribution of impacts induce the development of the South – East Baltic coastal regions and their interterritorial integration from North to South, and from South to North. Therefore, the geographic impacts of tourism for development of coastal regions are rather positive relatively.

References:
The impact of tourism on the development of the South-East Baltic coastal regions:

Development of the boating infrastructure in the Kaliningrad Region

Introduction
Because of developed system of seaports, the rivers and gulf s of the Kaliningrad region are a transport knot which can provide tourist streams between the European countries and Russia. Yachting is very popular in Europe, it gathers pace in Russia, but it has no place yet in the Kaliningrad region. Here you can swim on a boat on the river or a gulf, but this kind of entertainment is very rear in our region and, therefore, it is not enough to attract tourists.

In the Kaliningrad region there are no yacht-clubs. Hence, even when all the problems with our legislation are solved, foreign tourists will still not be able to visit our region on their yachts and boats, as they simply will have nowhere to stop. The same problem exists for the inhabitants of the Kaliningrad region who can afford a purchase of yacht, but who have no berth to moor this yacht, have no checked up routes in the Kaliningrad and Kurshsky gulf s, where it is possible to sail. Just few people with all their hearts devoted to sails, who have yachts, build slipways and put out to a gulf.

Projects of the infrastructure of boating
Despite all the possible geographical and economic profits of the yachting, we, unfortunately, have only projects now.

One of the most grandiose projects to create a yacht-club in the Kaliningrad region is «the project of Pionersky». Shall we consider this project as the most perspective in our region?

There is a strong reason for Pionersky to develop sailing (yachting), and this reason lies in the fact that the basic line in the strategy considers the development of the port as a yacht marine. Now the government of Kaliningrad accepts and approves the program of reconstruction of the port of Pionersky in a high-grade modern yacht-club for 950 vessels. Existing constructions allow already placing 350 vessels, and construction
of a new mole between already existing East mole and a mouth of a small river “Salmon” will give the opportunity to place 600 more yachts. Each anchorage of the new port will be provided with the advanced systems of communications (TV, the Internet, electricity and water supply). The modern system for refueling of big yachts will be created; for vessels of smaller tonnage a filling station will be also constructed. At last, the huge shipyard can offer yacht owners all possible technical services in maintenance and transportation of vessels. At a coastal zone near Pionersk shopping complexes, slipways, a marine passenger’s terminal, underground car park and a mooring line for 950 yachts will be built. Terraces with exits to the top bench will stretch out along the sea. On this top bench the amphitheatre will be constructed. Buildings of modern hotels will descend stepwise to the beach. The open access to the Baltic sea, certainly, will make the port of Pionersky attractive to fans of yachting.

Moreover, the development of “Amber coast” — a united recreational infrastructure of the Kaliningrad region is being planned. The successful realization of the project depends not only on building of the modern harbor with the terminal for passenger vessels, but also on construction of new attractive buildings, and especially revival and restoration of already existing sights of our region which could attract passengers (tourists), including passengers of cruise liners, and, therefore, contribute to the development of accompanying branches. For example: during a cruise in each port 2–3 various excursions are offered; taking into account that the passenger capacity for a modern cruise liner is 2500 passengers, we can say that local tour operators should provide not less than 30–40 couches. If visiting of the main sights of our city during the excursion is planned, we should provide the tourists with the convenient couch parks. If excursion is for the whole day, we should arrange meals in the city, but this problem requires a special approach. And what if there are several cruise liners at the port at the same time?

It would be desirable to introduce this project not only for foreign cruiser companies, but also for the Russian tour operators, and, moreover, to make the terminal and harbor a starting point for cruising liners from Russia to Europe and further.

Also there is a large project of development of the infrastructure of boating in Mamonovo. The people there resolved to bring into life a courageous project. Local authorities have conceived to construct the whole tourist complex which will resemble a ship anchor from above. There will be two hotels for 80 guest rooms, an aqua park, a bar, a restaurant, a solarium and a fitness centre. All this is necessary not only for foreign tourists, but also for the inhabitants of our region who can rest with their
families in the harbour. Three hectares are already allocated for a building site. While the documents are being conformed, there are searches for a serious investor.

In addition to the grandiose complex, there is an intention to create infrastructure in Mamonovo for a transit of small vessels between Poland and Lithuania through the Kaliningrad region. Erection of “Krasnoflotskaya gavan” with border entry points for a water transport will be the first step of Mamonovo in the development of boating. Another interesting plan is nurtured in the Museum of the World Ocean in Kaliningrad. They have decided to build a mooring for yachts. They have even found a place for it: the moorage for boats and motor boats will be built on a site between a building of the maritime administration and the double-level bridge.

In summer 2009 a full-scale international exhibition of boats and yachts with a participation of domestic-owned and foreign firms is planned for 7–10 days in Kaliningrad. It was originally supposed to hold the exhibition in «Fish village»; participants of the exhibition from the European countries were supposed to come to Kaliningrad by sea. However for such a full fledged exhibition the infrastructure in the area of «Fish village» is still not ready. It is not reasonable to hold a full-scale international exhibition of boats and yachts in summer 2009 in Kaliningrad. Pionersky has better provisions for carrying out of the given event, than «Fish village» in Kaliningrad. Pionersky has a possibility to accommodate with a place not only mooring of yachts, but also their sales, demonstration of possibilities of yachts with their putting out to the Baltic sea, carrying out of sport competitions, etc. This is a very entertainment and interesting event.

Tourist routes and the legislation of foreign countries limit night transitions of yacht owners, especially those on boats. The most widespread (average) class of a vessel could not run the distance of 200 miles from Gdansk or Elblong to Klaipeda in the day time. Therefore, they will have to put in to the territory of the Kaliningrad region. But today they can not do it because of the absence of yacht harbours.

It is possible to get to more than 20 countries on the yacht from Kaliningrad. One can go round the Netherlands, Denmark, Germany, and Poland within a week. Or, if you bear north, you can visit Iceland. Routes are very interesting.

The registration data given by the State small boat inspection (SSBI) say that only in the previous year (2008) the number of boats registered was as much as that for all the preceding years. At the same time, there are more yachts in Poland, then in Russia. And chiefly they are “kids” and midsized ones (6–10 metres).
Here are the main obstacles in popularization of yachting:

1. Yachting is an entertainment which is not mass and not cheap.

2. There is no developed infrastructure for service of yachts of various classes, including the economy class.

3. The infrastructure should have a differentiated character with respect to the price and be focused on various classes of the population.

4. Bridges in the city of Kaliningrad are the next problem. Bridge spans are rather low, bridges can not be drawn. Unfortunately, many motor boats and yachts, cannot pass further than double-level bridge.

5. An eternal problem – absence of a modern filling station for motor boats and yachts. Everything is done in the old way: motor boats and yachts are filled up from oilcans.

6. Closeness of Kurshsky and Kaliningradsko-Vislinsky gulfs for foreign citizens. Despite the agreement signed in December, 2007 between Russia and Lithuania which concerns navigation on the Kurshsky gulf and the river Neman, there still no frontier point in Rybachiy. Water tourists can get a frontier crossing stamp only in Sovetsk. If a water tourist has come into the Kurshsky gulf and has passed the frontier control at the equipped check point (which in reality does not exist still), he or she can not move further as it is forbidden by the current legislation. The tourist can go neither to Zelenogradsk, nor to Polessk, he or she can stay only in the water area of the Kurshsky gulf.

7. The same rule exists for movements of foreigners by internal water routes of our region. The solution of these problems lies in the sphere of the world policy; therefore it goes ahead very slowly.

There are some improvements in the resolution of the questions of navigation in internal waters of the Kaliningrad region; there are even the preliminary agreements on the first steps towards opening of these water spaces. Representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia work assiduously. The big interest in the solution of these problems is shown also by the representatives of diplomatic departments of the border countries. There is a hope that in 2009 the solutions will be found. A lot of other questions, such as opening of sea check points (SCP) depend on them, as well as the organization of work of boundary and customs services. Such a check point already exists in Baltiysk. It is also necessary to open SCP in Mamonovo and Polessk. All this will allow attracting a considerable quantity of water tourists to the region.

Conclusion

Despite all the difficulties, the market supply of small floating craft grows steadily in the Kaliningrad region, and so does the demand; the
infrastructure for small floating craft is being built in the Kaliningrad region. Forecasts are very optimistic!

Child’s sailing develops rapidly in spite of the fact that regional and municipal budget means for this purpose are very modest. Generally, the development goes by means of enthusiasts.

In Yantarny the child’s section of sailing develops with an active participation of the head of the urban district. There is a hope that there will be a further development in the child’s section in Baltiysk — a city where it is possible to open school of preparation of an Olympic reserve yacht sportsmen for Russia.

Yachting, in the full-grade kind should finally start to function in the Kaliningrad region. While there are any defects in the legislation, yachting will be fixed in the local market, will gain popularity, success, constant clients, it will train yacht skills of a considerable number of people and will be completely ready to an input into foreign waters with its head high. With the formation and the development of yachting in the Kaliningrad region, boating will have possibility of development and attracting of foreign visitors to our region.