



GENERAL ASSUMPTIONS OF PERSONNEL RECOVERY WITHIN IN THE CONTEXT OF DOCTRINAL REGULATIONS

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Introduction

By 2004 personnel recovery issues were marked in NATO doctrinal documents in two major papers: *Search and Rescue (ATP-10)*¹ and *Combat Search and Rescue (ATP-62)*². The issues were also articulated in the literature relating to the utilization of helicopters – *Use of Helicopters in Land Operations (ATP-49)*³, however it referred to limited recovery – Limited Extraction (LIMEX), which has been defined as combat recovery (CR – Combat Recovery) in later terminology. It should be noted that the ATP-10 has not distinguished the subject of search and rescue operations, and the main distinctive of criterion was the level of training and equipment of rescue units and the rescued people. The contents of another doctrine (ATP-62) were clearly dedicated to the rescue activities aimed at recovery of aircrew. It is commonly believed that they were based on an erroneous assumption that, even in a hostile environment, rescue forces will have the freedom of maneuver and possibility of implementation of procedures related to the recovery of aircrew. Besides, the description of capabilities anticipated to recover isolated personnel referred to the conduct of rescue operations in a very limited level. Another doctrine (ATP-49) containing the LIMEX concept was developed due to the fact that assumptions of ATP-62 referred only to aircrew. Hence, there was a need for drawing up a document related to the recovery of any other isolated personnel, particularly from the army.


In 2004, NATO drafted a Personnel Recovery (PR) policy and doctrine with a SERE (Survival, Escape/Evasion, Resistance, Extraction) training standard and PR Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs)⁴. The NATO PR structure is depicted in Figure 1.

¹ ATP-10 (D) Change 1. *Search and Rescue Manual*, MAS (AIR), 9th edition, June 1995.

² ATP-62. *Combat Search and Rescue Manual*, MAS (AIR), 2nd edition, November 2000.

³ ATP-49 (D). *Use of Helicopters In Land Operations – Doctrine*, Vol. 1, 7th edition, April 2003.

⁴ ATP 3.7.1 (SD-1c). *NATO Personnel Recovery Tactics, Techniques and Procedures*, 2010.



Source: NATO STANAG 7196 (SD-4), The NATO Survival, Evasion/Escapes, Resistance, Extraction (SERE) training standard, p. 3.

Figure 1. The NATO Personnel Recovery structure

The evolution of allied doctrinal solutions in the area of Personnel Recovery NATO Search and Rescue

Since the beginning of work on the development of a Search and Rescue (SAR) doctrine in NATO, there was adopted a standard way of conducting SAR operations in the absence of any international procedures. In the *ATP10* publication *NATO Search and Rescue* (November 1968) SAR is defined as: *the use of aircraft, surface craft, submarines, specialized rescue teams and equipment to search for and rescue personnel in distress on land or at sea*⁵. The final version of the paper – *ATP-10(D)* has left the definition unchanged. The review of the paper started in 2000 again but it was abandoned due to the lack of agreement between NATO Member States. In 2005, the document was published again, however it has not been ratified by most member states. A lack of consensus caused further action to be undertaken by the NATO Military Committee aimed at finding solutions. However, contents of *ATP-10* have not been changed so far. At the same time two civilian organizations – the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the International Maritime Organization (IMO), began work on development of procedures associated with search and rescue operations in the civilian dimension. As a result there was a publication entitled *ICAO and IMO Search and Rescue Manual (IAMSAR)*. It should be noted that the revised edition of the *ATP-10(D)* contains

⁵ *AAP-6. NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions (English and French)*, March 2010.

provisions harmonizing the civilian and military procedures related to search and rescue and it is based on the IAMSAR.

In 2009, a revised edition of *ATP57 Submarine Rescue manual*⁶ was drafted. As a result, the chapter on submarine rescue within ATP10(D) had to be deleted and replaced with a completely new text. As no editorial changes could be made to the existing or proposed ATP10(D), a doctrinal conflict arose. Its overcoming came with the offer of Great Britain, who proposed the cancellation of the ATP-10 doctrine and adoption of contents included in the IAMSAR manual. It seems that the current actions will aim at the cancellation of the ATP-10 doctrine and adopting, wherever it is possible, civil procedures contained in the IAMSAR. Assumptions of search and rescue operations included in the ICAO and the IMO conventions are based on the principles of sovereign responsibility of individual states with in the context of search and rescue operations. The most important are obviously civilian resources but the mentioned conventions allow the use of military assets in this kind of activities as well. Nevertheless, there is no parallel system of military chain of command nor organic forces provided for this type of task. The only exception are the resources declared for expeditionary operations conducted by NATO.

NATO Combat Search and Rescue

The NATO definition of Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) is: *the detection, location, identification and rescue of downed aircrew in hostile territory in time of crisis and war and, when appropriate, isolated military personnel in distress, who are trained and equipped to receive combat search and rescue support*⁷.

The identification of doctrinal assumptions and capabilities adequate to conduct NATO CSAR missions took place in the nineties. As a result, the ATP-62 document was published which was based principally on US doctrine. Procedures included within the document focus on the aircrews, according to assumptions that all aircraft and helicopter crews have been previously trained in SERE (Survival, Evasion/Escape, Resistance, Extraction) and were equipped with survival aids including personal location and communication equipment. It should be stressed that the latest version of the doctrine refers not only to the aircrews but also to “other trained and equipped personnel”. It follows from the fact that CSAR operations may be also conducted by special force units. It should be also noted that the doctrine was developed during the Cold War, hence the suggestion that it only applies to war and a possible crisis and does not apply in peacetime. Its contents also refer to the linear pattern of conducting combat operations with clearly defined threats, and so CSAR procedures relate to the aircrew isolated on the enemy’s side of the Forward Line of Own Troops (FLOT). Should aircrews become isolated on our side of the FLOT, it would be considered a SAR mission.

⁶ ATP-57 (B). *Submarine Rescue Manual*, 6th edition, July 2009.

⁷ AAP-6. *NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions (English and French)*, March 2010.

NATO Personnel Recovery

Work on the allied doctrine associated with personnel recovery began in 2003. Next year, the first version of the document was published. The current issue of the document is marked as *AJP 3.3.9 – Allied Joint Doctrine for Personnel Recovery (PR)* and it is based on several key assumptions. Firstly, all available resources can be used for the recovery of personnel. PR is not limited to the use of military assets to recover isolated personnel. On the contrary, any kind of resources (military, diplomatic, civilian) should be taken into account to carry out rescue operations, depending on the factors determining the rescue (time, terrain, hazards, etc.). Secondly, the swift implementation of a mission increases the chances of its success. Time is considered a key factor in recovery, and rapid recovery with less “able” forces is typically preferred over a slower execution with an appropriately equipped force. History has demonstrated that swift recoveries have resulted in a higher success rate. Thirdly, commanders are responsible for their own personnel, including recovery operations. Hence, they must know procedures for planning and realistically consider their application in a given situation. It is clear that commanders at lower levels do not have access to all recovery resources. Nevertheless, commanders are to first attempt to recover their own personnel using their own means, and only when that is not possible, support should be requested through the chain of command. Fourthly, personnel recovery is a joint responsibility and should be pursued as combined operations. Command and Control of the rescue effort should clearly define the roles of supported and supporting component commanders in order to achieve the recovery.

The present doctrine, *AJP 3.3.9*, defines five core tasks performed in personnel recovery: report, locate, support, recover and reintegrate. These tasks are very often wrongly confused with the five phases of a personnel recovery mission. Without a doubt, the location must be completed prior to recovery, but on the other hand, it should be noted that the tasks can be planned and implemented parallel. It seems reasonable to differentiate the above tasks.

Report. From a theoretical point of view all types of incidents should be reported through the appropriate chain of command. However, in practice, information arrives via a number of different channels, both formal and informal. For example, during NATO Air Operations over former Yugoslavia, a US F-117 was shot down over Belgrade at which point the pilot immediately activated his survival radio. However, due to the nature of the mission (secret) the flight was tasked on a separate Air Tasking Order (ATO) and the activation of the survival radio was not received (forwarded) to the Combined Air Operation Center (CAOC). CAOC was informed much later through the pilot’s home base in Italy. Nowadays, in the era of digitization, this information could appear first via mass media.

Locate. The preferred method of locating isolated personnel is based on using their communication systems (survival radio), although in some scenarios other

methods could work, including the use of mobile phones. Every effort should be taken not to compromise the location of the isolated personnel as this will complicate, if not render impossible, a recovery operation.

Support. Support in the area of PR should be divided into two main categories: support to isolated personnel and support to their families, relatives, etc. The first category may consist of providing essential supplies (dinghies, tents, blankets, food, etc.) being dropped from the air during a SAR mission. Support is particularly important during the CSAR mission. One such example was the rescue mission of Col Hambleton, a pilot who was shot down over Vietnam. Hambleton was supported and protected through air attacks on the approaching North Vietnamese Army and mines were air dropped to further protect him⁸. An example of psychological support may be the case of Mike Durant. Whilst being held captive in Mogadishu, Durant's colleagues flew over the city playing his favourite song (Thunderstruck by AC / DC) through powerful loudspeakers mounted on a Blackhawk helicopter⁹.

Recover. The recovery may be conducted either as a deliberate option, a contingent or improvised mission or through civil, military or diplomatic means. An example of a deliberate mission was the rescue of Dale Zelko, a F-117 pilot shot down over Belgrade. The mission was conducted with dedicated CSAR assets. Also improvised missions have their examples in history where isolated personnel were taken safely by a helicopter crew. The third type of rescue mission involves the use of civil or diplomatic resources. An example is given in the case of Mike Durant, who was eventually freed following negotiations conducted by the International Committee of the Red Cross¹⁰.

Reintegrate. A properly conducted reintegration process is very important to both recovered personnel and military hierarchy. This process is extremely important within the context of preventing or reducing the impact of post-traumatic stress disorder. Besides, it also provides a basis for gathering intelligence information on the procedures and techniques used by the enemy. On the other hand, it enables the assessment of one's own SERE training methods. Among people who had spent a lot of time in captivity the process of rebuilding family ties can last many years, so the reintegration task is particularly important.

The next assumption contained in the AJP 3.3.9 is that Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) are not a part of personnel recovery operations. NEO still remains as an essential activity of major combat operations, crisis response operations and counter-insurgency operations conducted by military. On the other hand, PR can be conducted as a subset within the framework of any of the standalone operations listed above. During an NEO, commanders have an inherent

⁸ Darell D. Whitcomb, *the Rescue of Bat 21*, Random House, New York 1998.

⁹ Michael J. Durant, S. Hartov, *In the Company of Heroes*, New American Library Caliber, New York, 2006.

¹⁰ Ibidem.

responsibility for both their own personnel and the evacuees, many of whom will be civilian and of various nationalities.

Another important distinction in the PR doctrine is the statement that Non-conventional Assisted Recovery (NAR) is a part of personnel recovery. However, the necessary information is not included to the doctrine (AJP 3.3.9) mainly due to the fact that NAR activities are usually carried out by special forces and relevant procedures, tactics and techniques should not be generally known.

Assumptions related to education and training in the area of personnel recovery are also important. Personnel, of all ranks, should get appropriate training commensurate with their position and operational role.

Considering definitional issues relating to PR, it is worth noting that the existing definitions of SAR, CR and CSAR were developed separately and in different time. For clarity and consistency they should be quoted.

Search and Rescue is *the location and recovery of persons in distress in an environment where hostile interference is not expected*¹¹. The SAR definition does not refer to isolated personnel as SAR can, and should be provided to persons not considered ones "own personnel".

Combat Recovery is *the recovery of isolated personnel from a situation where hostile interference may be expected*¹². During CR, either the recovery force or the isolated personnel, or both, have not been trained in CSAR TTPs.

Combat Search and Rescue is *the application of specific tactics, techniques and procedures by dedicated forces to recover isolated personnel, who themselves are trained and appropriately equipped to receive this support, from a situation where hostile interference may be expected*¹³.

It should be noted that there is a clear distinction between PR options, methods and elements of the personnel recovery system (Figure 2). Options include diplomatic and civil channels in addition to military options, as the use of military means (force) may not always be available, possible or desirable. The recovery methods (SAR, CR, CSAR, NAR) are referred to using the most common terminology quoted above.

There is no doubt that NATO Personnel Recovery policy may be crucial for success in many operations, in turn, its absence can cause negative impact on NATO operations. This follows from the *NATO Personnel Recovery Policy*. The first paragraph of the NATO PR policy (draft) states: *The isolation, capture and/or exploitation of NATO personnel during operations could have a significant negative impact on operational security, morale of assigned forces and public support. In addition, NATO operations rely on contract support and interaction with other non-military organisations, for which NATO may have a responsibility. The Alliance therefore requires a system to recover military and civilian personnel that*


¹¹ AJP 3.3.9 *Allied Joint Doctrine for Personnel Recovery*, study draft 8, p. 2-3.

¹² Ibidem.

¹³ Ibidem.

have become isolated. The NATO PR Policy is to develop and maintain a system with the following objectives:

- protecting the operational security and morale of NATO personnel by providing for their recovery and reintegration, in case they become isolated;
- enhancing the PR capabilities of NATO by sharing, where possible, the lessons learnt during PR exercises and missions, and that provides:
 - applicable documentation for the preparation and conduct of PR operations;
 - a suitable infrastructure plan (including commanders, staffs and recovery forces) prepared for PR and the establishment of agreements with other organisations;
- appropriate PR training and equipment standards¹⁴.



Source: AJP 3.3.9 Allied Joint Doctrine for Personnel Recovery, Study Draft, Brussels 2008, p. 2-2.

Figure 2. The Personnel Recovery system

¹⁴ DNSA. NATO Personnel Recovery Policy, Letter Number NSA (DNSA) 0077, January 2009.

The lack of agreement on the final version of the Personnel Recovery doctrine and conclusions from exercises in the field of personnel recovery contributed to the rise of a new initiative. In 2009, the Joint Warfare Centre (JWC) proposed the implementation of new guidelines – *JPR Joint Operations Guide* as an interim solution, which would be a combination of previous work on AJP-3.3.9 and ATP-3.7.1. The main objectives of the document are based on the basic content contained in the mentioned doctrines.


As previously stated, CSAR is defined as the employment of specific TTPs by dedicated forces to recover isolated personnel who themselves are trained and appropriately equipped to receive this support. Although reference to the aircrew survival equipment is made, CSAR does not detail the type of training personnel should receive. This issue of training was raised at the September 2004 SAR Panel at which it was agreed that a standard of SERE training would prove beneficial, as training was not specified in ATP62. A validation proposal was drafted and in early 2005 the Military Committee Air Standardisation Board (MCASB) formally tasked the SAR Panel to develop a SERE training standard as Study 7196¹⁵. Work commenced with the European Air Group (EAG) acting as custodian. The resultant 2007 Study Draft (SD)5 was considered mature enough to be distributed as a Ratification Draft (RD). The MCASB however could not agree. One nation insisted on first approving a PR policy, then a PR doctrine and, once these were approved, related standards (such as the SERE training) could be sent out for ratification. This stance ignored the fact that the SERE training standard was developed from the accepted CSAR manual and not from the development of PR policy or doctrine. With the MCASB unable to reach a decision, the ratification issue was sent to the Military Committee; to date no decision has been forthcoming¹⁶.

The SERE training concept is based on three levels of training: basic training (level A), intermediate training (level B), and advanced training (level C) – Figure 3. It indicates that effective SERE training is conducted within the “cone of excellence” and that SERE training is considered a cumulative process. A SERE instructor should progress through levels A, B and C training with additional instructor training. Specialist SERE instructors are proficient in specific environmental training (e.g. arctic, desert, jungle). The SERE training package combines generic functional and doctrinal training with SERE-specific continuation, theatre and reintegration training. We can also specify Urban SERE which is the exact opposite of rural SERE. Whereas in rural survival it is preferable to avoid the local population, lay up and await recovery, isolated personnel in the urban environment may have a better chance of survival when “hiding in the crowd”. The urban populace may stumble across the isolated personnel however, the transient nature of the popula-

¹⁵ STANAG 7196(SD5). *The NATO Survival, Escape/Evasion, Resistance and Extraction (SERE) Training Standard*, March 2007.

¹⁶ *Personnel Recovery. That Others May Live to Return With Honour. A Primer*, Joint Air Power Competence Centre, Kalkar 2011, p. 21.

tion ensures that at different times of the day, different aspects of the environment permits the isolated personnel freedom of movement and a degree of impunity and safety. Therefore the ability to read these dynamics in the urban environment, and the ability to navigate through its complexities, gives the isolated personnel the best chances of evading capture.



Source: NATO STANAG 7196 (SD-4), The NATO Survival, Evasion/Escape, Resistance, Extraction (SERE) training standard, p. 2.

Figure 3. The NATO SERE Concept

The challenge now faced by the SERE and PR community is how to train all personnel to the required standards of urban SERE whilst maintaining rural skill sets. Urban training must evolve whilst remaining relevant and fit for purpose. Research and development is required to affect recovery from such a dynamic and challenging environment and, as some initial development work has been undertaken, there are common standards.

To sum up the development of existing concepts in NATO personnel recovery, the persistent lack of consensus on such an important issue must be a worrying fact. Assumptions of the essential documents dealing with personnel recovery require, according to the author, attention in three key areas. Firstly, it should be focused on the Allied Personnel Recovery doctrine based on content contained in AJP-3.3.9. Secondly, tactics, techniques and procedures for personnel recovery should be based on the content located in the ATP-3.7.1. Thirdly, education and SERE training procedures should be developed on the basis of STANAG 7196. It is clear that the contents of these documents require detailed findings, which should evolve into a common consensus among NATO member states.

Personnel Recovery in the context of the European Union regulations

The Treaty on the European Union established that the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) provides the Union with an operational capacity which may be used on missions outside the Union for peacekeeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security. The performance of these tasks is undertaken using capabilities provided by the Member States. To support the Member States to progressively improve their military capabilities, the European Defence Agency (EDA) identifies operational requirements and promotes measures to satisfy those requirements.

The isolation, capture and/or exploitation of personnel during an EU-led Crisis Management Operation (CMO) could have a significant negative impact on operations security, morale of personnel and public support. In order to mitigate the risks, the EU therefore requires a system to recover personnel, both military and civilian, including those of other organisations or contractors involved in EU led-CMO. When isolated personnel are captured and/or held hostage, efforts to release them would encompass diplomatic, military and civilian efforts

In June 2007 the EDA's Steering Board of Capability Directors decided that a Personnel Recovery conceptual framework should be developed. Consequently, participating Member States agreed on 4 June 2009 to develop a PR Concept for CSDP operations. This has been the initiating step for this concept to be included as part of the integrated EU military concept development process¹⁷.

The main assumptions contained in this paper are based on the content of NATO documents, hence the major findings cited below are very similar.

According to the European concept on Personal Recovery, similarly, as in AJP 3.3.9, it stated, PR involves a balance of activities between the three elements of the PR system as depicted in Figure 2: commanders and staffs, recovery forces and isolated personnel. EU and/or EU nations may exercise diplomatic, military, or civil options, or a combination thereof, to recover isolated personnel. Within the EU military option the three essential elements of PR must work together through a credible communication system and intelligence architecture. Each of the essential elements must be thoroughly trained, properly organised and equipped to perform its own unique actions, seamlessly interface with the other elements to accomplish the five PR execution tasks, which are the same as in the NATO doctrine on PR, and gain and maintain situational awareness.

There is no doubt as to whether any one service or component may conduct PR. Methods of PR included in the European concept on PR are the same as in NATO. For the EU the terms Combat Recovery (CR) and Combat Search And

¹⁷ *Concept for Personnel Recovery in support of the CSDP*, Council of the European Union, Brussels 2011, p. 4.

Rescue (CSAR) refer to the status of the isolated personnel. Historically, these acronyms are also used to refer to a specific type of mission¹⁸.

Search And Rescue (SAR) is the location and recovery of persons in distress in an environment where hostile interference is not expected. Military SAR effort is directed principally toward, but is not restricted to, the rescue of military personnel. Subject to military requirements and operational practicability, SAR assistance may also be provided to civil authorities. Additionally, some nations have parallel civil SAR assets, which can respond to military SAR incidents. EU nations' SAR services remain a national responsibility operated to meet International Civil Aviation Organisation, International Maritime Organisation and EU requirements. There is no requirement for the EU to maintain a parallel SAR organisation. In many cases, military requirements for SAR exceed those of ICAO and IMO which represent only the minimum acceptable civil standard. Thus the facilities provided within Search and Rescue Regions (SRRs) are often well in excess of those shown in the ICAO and IMO documents for the region. SAR facilities provided by nations, though usually military and military-operated, may also be civil and civil-operated. For deployed operations where no hostile interference is expected (e.g. peace support operations, disaster relief or training exercises), the EU's capability to search for and recover personnel may need to be provided by deployed assets. This capability may be either provided by dedicated SAR or other in-theatre assets¹⁹.

Two other definitions related to Personnel Recovery (Combat Recovery and Combat Search and Rescue Recovery) are the same as in NATO and there is no need to quote them. Also activities conducted by special forces in the context of PR are defined in the EU similarly. Thus the description of Non-conventional Assisted Recovery is exactly the same – *recovery situations may need the assistance of non-conventional forces or other types of assistance when conventional means are not suitable. EU nations may conduct recoveries using Special Operations Forces (SOF) or other surrogate/indigenous forces trained to assist in moving isolated personnel through a network that returns them to the safety of multinational forces*²⁰.

It is very evident that the EU concept relating to Personnel Recovery is based mainly on ideas contained in NATO. In addition, individual Member States are developing their own capabilities in this field. In a situation where the majority of the European states belong to NATO, it is not reasonable to duplicate efforts. A good idea would be to focus on development of one doctrine, which would contain the necessary tactics, techniques and procedures of PR issues.

¹⁸ There are a number of other acronyms used by nations to describe specific recovery methods, e.g. Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel (TRAP), Downed Aircraft Recovery Team (DART), Deployed Search And Rescue (DSAR).

¹⁹ *European Union Concept for Personnel Recovery for European Security and Defence Policy operations*, Study Draft 2, Brussels 2009, p.7.

²⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 8.

The Future of Personnel Recovery in the context of education and training

The involvement of many actors participating in crisis response operations generates risk associated with the isolation of both military and civilian personnel. The political and media pressure will force an immediate reaction from the appropriate forces to take action related to the recovery of personnel. It is clear that current capabilities in this area have not kept pace with the requirements for PR. There are activities connected with developing relevant documents, both in NATO and the European Union, but consensus among many states on the ratification draft will be very difficult.

Once ratified, NATO policy, doctrine and TTPs should ideally be incorporated into training, education and exercise programmes. All NATO exercises should include dedicated PR events, have an appropriate PR Annex to their orders and contain Special Operation Procedures for the execution of PR. Importantly, all exercises should report lessons identified or learned in order to develop future doctrine and TTPs.

As all NATO nations agree that the IAMSAR manual is the definitive document governing peacetime SAR, ATP-10 should either be withdrawn or be rewritten. This would enable staff effort to focus on PR for deployed operations. As CSAR is a subset of PR, consideration should be given to replace ATP-62 NATO CSAR manual with ATP-3.3.7 NATO PR TTPs. With an overlap in member states it is essential that both the EU and NATO cooperate in the development of PR concepts, procedures and use of assets. Collaboration has occurred in the development of a PR management tool and in the management of Isolated Personnel Reports (ISOPREPs) however future projects should include joint education, training and exercises like the Combined Joint Personnel Recovery Standardization Course (CJPRSC).

An important aspect related to the development of PR capabilities will be the organization of the training and education process. It should be varied depending on the roles and competences of individual teams. Experiences show that a small number of professional courses of PR issues are currently implemented and they are based mainly on US doctrines. Therefore standardized courses should be organized, educating personnel from different countries in the same range.

There is also a problem with the number of PR specialists. At theater commander level the focal point for PR is the Joint Personnel Recovery Cell (JPRC), with component and sector level PR coordinated through the Personnel Recovery Coordination Cell (JPRCC). Doctrinally²¹, personnel manning the JPRC/PRCC should receive the appropriate education and training. Currently neither EU nor NATO provides a course to educate JPRC/PRCC staffs. Therefore a course needs to be developed and provided for these personnel. Such a course could be offered

²¹ According to AJP 3.3.9.

centrally (perhaps at the NATO school in Oberammergau) or distributed based on a standard curriculum. The only formal education and training opportunities available to recovery forces are the European Air Group Combined Joint Personnel Recovery Standardisation Course (CJPRSC) and the US Ex Angel Thunder. NATO had, in the past, undertaken Ex Cooperative Key, which was intended to provide Partnership for Peace (PfP) and new NATO Nations exposure to NATO air operations²².

Without doubts, it is key that PR should be considered as an integral part to all exercises. The exercise programmes allow PR concepts to be validated in addition to providing the main source of data and lessons identified, required to facilitate and improve the development of doctrine, TTPs, other related standards, education and training. With the exception of the US, no other nation has the dedicated assets to conduct full PR training and operations. For the majority of NATO nations the solution (with or without the US) would be to undertake Joint and Combined training. As most existing multi-national exercises are Command Post Exercises (CPX) at best, there is probably little benefit in linking a „field training” PR exercise to a command post exercise. A better approach would be to expand current national PR exercises to accommodate international participation²³.


Summary

There is no doubt about the importance of Personnel Recovery in contemporary operations led by NATO or the EU. Both NATO and the EU have military ambitions which cause differences in their approach to many issues. There is also not a common mechanism in the area of PR ensuring the same concepts. Consequently, it may lead to inefficiencies and potentially dangerous situations. Therefore, the establishment of a Center of Excellence (CoE) related to PR with links to both NATO and the EU would be a milestone.

A PR CoE would cover a combination of four areas: concepts; managements of documents; education and training; advice and assistance (Figure 4). Within the conceptual area, the PR CoE may be tasked to develop operational concepts from the tactical to strategic level. Particular attention should be paid to integrating existing multinational (national) concepts, lessons identified and emerging technologies into the new concepts.

²² *Personnel Recovery. That Others May Live...*, op. cit., p. 33.

²³ *Ibidem*, p. 35.



Source: Personnel Recovery. That Others May Live to Return With Honour. A Primer, Joint Air Power Competence Center, Kalkar 2011, p. 36.

Figure 4. Personnel Recovery Centre of Excellence responsibilities

The PR CoE could also be tasked to develop and maintain the policy, doctrine and TTPs documentation for international organisations, to ensure standardisation of training and interoperability for deployed Joint and Combined operations. As the organisation that develops the concepts, it would perhaps be appropriate for the PR CoE to train and educate on the subject. It would give the CoE the opportunity to present emerging concepts to the relevant audience and, in return, receive feedback to help validate the developed concepts. The target audience could be: general staff officers to receive an appropriate level of situational awareness regarding PR; specialist staff officers (JPRC and PRCC personnel) to qualify in the planning, coordination and conduct of PR at the operational staff level; senior leadership to inform them of the operational and strategic importance/implications of PR and a lack thereof. In addition, instructors could also provide lectures to a variety of national, NATO and EU courses/training events.

A CoE which delivers documentation and courses could provide additional support to nations, the NATO and EU command structures regarding the: development of national PR concepts; development of national education and training programs; assistance in assuring that national documents, education and training are in accordance with (international) standards; development of requirements for PR related equipment; development of the PR aspect of operations plans for opera-

tions and exercises; provision of presentations during conferences on lessons identified during operations and exercises.

It seems that the above proposal would improve NATO/UE capabilities in the context of Personnel Recovery.

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STRESZCZENIE

Uczestnictwo sił zbrojnych państw członkowskich NATO oraz Unii Europejskiej w operacjach reagowania kryzysowego, również we wrogim (niesprzyjającym) środowisku, zwiększa niebezpieczeństwo odizolowania personelu, zarówno wojskowego jak i cywilnego. Nikogo nie trzeba przekonywać, że utrata własnych żołnierzy lub pracowników cywilnych może skutkować daleko idącymi następstwami, włącznie z wycofaniem sił wojskowych z rejonu operacji. Stąd, niezwykle ważnym jest utrzymywanie odpowiednio zorganizowanych i wyszkolonych zasobów, zdolnych do odzyskiwania personelu w czasie pokoju, kryzysu i wojny. Świadomość istnienia takich jednostek wśród żołnierzy i innych aktorów uczestniczących w operacji, niewątpliwie zwiększa ich morale.

Problematyka odzyskiwania personelu w NATO i UE ma swoje odzwierciedlenie w zapisach stosownych dokumentów normatywnych. Niestety, brak jest pełnego konsensusu pomiędzy poszczególnymi państwami, co do zapisów i kształtu doktryn

odnoszących się do procedur, taktyki, technik oraz szkolenia w przedmiotowej problematyce.

Niniejszy artykuł przedstawia ewolucję zasadniczych uregulowań doktrynalnych odnoszących się do odzyskiwania personelu w NATO i UE. Charakteryzuje również ogólne założenia sojuszniczej doktryny AJP-3.3.9 oraz unijnej koncepcji w obszarze odzyskiwania personelu. Ważnym elementem pozostaje także problematyka edukacji, szkolenia i treningów z omawianego obszaru.