Poland and Spain in Contemporary World

Edited by
Małgorzata Mizerska-Wrotkowska
José Luis Orella Martínez
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Reviewers:
Radosław Zenderowski – full professor (Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University in Warsaw)
Álvaro Ferray – full professor (University of Navarra)

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Spain's Foreign Policy in the Years

1945-1975

MAŁGORZATA MIZERSKA-WROTKOWSKA
University of Warsaw

The aim of this chapter is to present Spain’s foreign policy after World War II, up to the death of General Francisco Franco and the beginning of democratization. It covers research into the following questions: (1) What were the causes and manifestations of Spain’s international isolation immediately following World War II? (2) How did Spain succeed in normalizing foreign relations? (3) What were the main foreign policy directions of “Franco era”? (4) Which measures were successful - and which not? This chapter utilizes the method of analysing and criticising sources and a making a comparative analysis of available information, primarily Spanish-speaking.

1. Spain on the international stage in the aftermath of World War II

In 1945 the former Foreign Minister of Spain, JF de Lequerica, was sent to Washington, where he took up the rather unusual position of Inspector of Embassies (Inspector de Embajadas). Alberto Martín Álvarez-Artajo was appointed new minister, before whom stood the unenviable task of softening the image of Franco’s regime internationally. The minister enjoyed a large degree of autonomy thanks to the aversion of leaders of many countries to the dictator, which forced General Franco to limit his personal involvement in foreign policy (Olivié 2004: 33; Huguet 2003: 500; Calduch 1994: 115-117; Pereira 1983: 185).

The so-called Big Three did not speak with one voice when it came to Spain; in Potsdam Winston Churchill, the British Premier, opposed Stalin’s idea of introducing sanctions against Spain. Churchill believed that sanctions would, rather than weaken the regime, strengthen
the relationship of Spain’s citizens with its dictator. Harry Truman, President of USA, on the other hand, initially advocated Stalin’s concept, but with the escalating conflict with the Soviet Union, he finally sided with the United Kingdom (Calduch 1994: 117-118). USA and the United Kingdom feared that intervention in Spain could lead to another civil war, handing power to a Communist government (Huguet 2003: 500).

1.1. Sanctions against Spain

On 9 February 1946 the UN General Assembly at the request of Panama (supported by Mexico, Venezuela, Bolivia and Guatemala) issued Resolution 32 (I), which included a recommendation that in relations with Spain UN Member States act in the spirit of the Declarations of San Francisco and Potsdam and not support its admission to the UN.

At the time Spanish relations with France were not going well. This was due to the actions of partisans (maquis) consisting of Spanish emigrants intent on the armed overthrow of Franco’s government. France closed its border with Spain on 1 March 1946 (Calduch 1994: 118-120). After some days, France, USA and the United Kingdom issued the so-called London Declaration, condemning the Franco regime and stating the terms under which Spain could end its international isolation (Powell 1995: 36-37; Pereira 1983: 185). On the other hand, the signatories of the Declaration assured that they did not support any form of intervention in Spain’s internal affairs (though they were not initially unanimous on this - de Gaulle had been calling for) (Huguet 2003: 501; Olivié 2004: 32-33).

Meanwhile, in the UN Security Council, on the initiative of the Soviet Union and Poland a committee was formed to determine whether the existence of the Francoist regime constituted a threat to international peace and security. On the committee sat representatives of Australia, Brazil, China, France and Poland. Its report rejected the possibility of intervention in Spain, suggesting only a severance of diplomatic relations. Upon a motion of Poland this proposition was considered by the General Assembly, which subsequently, in Resolution 39 (I) of 12 December 1946, suggested that accredited ambassadors be withdrawn from the Spanish capital, Madrid, and that Spain be excluded from all initiatives and organizations.

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1 On this period, see also: Martinez Lillo 2000; Espadas Burgos 1998; del Rio Cisneros 1965.
affiliated with the UN system (Spain was, for instance, a member of the Universal Postal Union, the International Telecommunication Union and the International Labour Organisation). A number of countries – Argentina, Portugal, Dominican Republic, Switzerland, Ireland and the Vatican – elected not to comply with these recommendations. At the same time representatives of republican exiles in Mexico were gaining attention and support. These activists not only proclaimed a plan to restore the Spanish republic, but even formed a government headed by José Giral, which until 1946, was supported by 11 countries.

Spain’s international isolation after World War II was not complete. Argentina, ruled by General Juan Peron, gave Spain commercial and financial support. On 30 October 1946, Spain signed an agreement with Argentina providing for 350 million pesos’ credit for the import of Argentinian food. Thanks to loans Spain received 700 thousand tons of wheat (Pereira 1983: 186). Additionally, the Western powers – in particular the United States - never actually reduced to zero the supply of crude oil and other raw materials and food to Spain. Spanish diplomacy with exceptional skill manoeuvred between the Cold War blocs until the country get itself out of international isolation and normalized relations with key countries (Calduch 1994: 118-120).

1.2. Signs of normalization of Spain’s international situation

On 31 March 1947 the Spanish Succession Act was issued (Ley de Sucesión a la Jefatura del Estado) and in June that year approved by citizens in a referendum. According to this document, Spain became a kingdom, and Franco Regent, authorized to designate the future king. The succession procedure at the end of the dictatorship was the subject of conversation between Franco and John Bourbon at the end of August 1948 (Waclawczyk 2004: 109-110). At the same time the first symptoms were appearing of Spain’s emergence from international isolation. This had been made possible by changes in the international arena, where anti-fascism was being replaced by anti-communism (Pereira 1983: 186).

At that time, Franco decided to deepen relations with the countries of Latin America, whose representatives were sympathetic to “the Spanish question” at the UN. He had also been forced to seek new allies; quite unexpectedly, Franco turned his attention to the Arab states. It turned out that most of them, as conservative monarchies, shared Franco’s anti-
communist views. Also not without significance was the fact that Israel had refused to establish diplomatic relations with Spain because of its association with the Axis during the war. As a result, Franco supported the Arab states in the Middle East conflict, and in 1946 recognised the League of Arab States. Interestingly, the Arab states have never voiced dissatisfaction with the Spanish presence in North Africa. What’s more, Abdullah, the King of Jordan, was the first head of state to visit Spain since 1939 (his visit took place in 1949), and thanks to the Sultan of Morocco, Spain was allowed in 1952 to resume its place in the international administration of Tangier (Powell 1995: 38-39).

The US president, Harry Truman, announced in 1947 his famous “the doctrine of containment” (otherwise known as the “Truman doctrine”). The United States were now supposed to help countries at risk of communist invasion. Fortunately for Spain, finding itself under Franco’s rule, anti-communism had become they key determinant of American foreign policy, and brought the two countries closer together. In January 1948, Truman approved the suggestion of the National Security Council to normalize political and economic relations with Spain. Soon after France re-opened its border with Spain.

Spain - in marked contrast to Portugal - was not invited in 1949 to join the North Atlantic Alliance. This is even more surprising given that the regime of Antonio Salazar did not differ significantly from that of Franco. Researchers suggest, however, that Portugal’s foreign policy during World War II was characterized by greater discretion and balance in its relations with the parties to the conflict than was the case with Spain (Olivié 2004: 31; Powell 1995: 37). Still, the new circumstances, did not compromise the Iberian Pact: Spain and Portugal renewed their 1939 mutual assistance agreement.

At the same time U.S. banks (the Export-Import Bank, Chale National Bank, National City Bank) decided to grant Spain its first lines of credit after international criticism forced the U.S. House of Representatives to retreat from the idea of excluding Spain from among the beneficiaries of the Marshall Plan. A further economic assistance agreement with Portugal was concluded and trade relations with Britain and France were opened, the latter deciding to expel from its territory the leaders of the Spanish Communist Party, which supported the “maquis” (Powell 1995: 38).

2 The thinking underlying this policy was presented in 1946 by the American diplomat George Kennan, first in the so-called “long telegram” and then in the pages of Foreign Affairs.
1.3. Cancellation of the sanctioning resolutions

On 4 November 1950, the UN General Assembly, at the request of a group of Latin American countries (Brazil, Bolivia, Colombia and Peru), the Arab states, and with strong support from the United States, approved Resolution 386 (V) cancelling the sanction resolutions of 1946. This decision led to the dissolution of the Spanish government in exile (Huguet 2003: 515). Ambassadors of different countries could now return to Spain, and Spain in turn could join the UN’s specialized agencies. In 1950 Spain joined the ICAO and the FAO, in 1951 - to the WHO, UPU and ITU, and in 1952, UNESCO. Nevertheless, the obstacles remained to Spanish accession to the UN itself and to the Council of Europe. The biggest objections in this respect from among the Western bloc countries came from Norway and the Benelux countries (Powell 1995: 38). Nineteen fifty one was the year of “the return of the ambassadors”. To Madrid came representatives of the U.S. (Santon Griffis) and the UK (John Balfour). Ambassador of France was Bernard Harion, who had previously been the chargé d’affaires (Calduch 1994: 122).

In summary, it can be said that paradoxically the isolation of Spain in the international arena did not contribute to the weakening of the Franco dictatorship. Isolation awoke xenophobic sentiment in Spaniards, many of whom blamed foreigners for the situation. For many Franco personified the national interest. Moreover, while defeat of the Axis in World War II led to the international isolation of Spain, the outbreak of the Cold War proved the salvation of Franco and his system (Powell 1995: 37). Western powers turned a blind eye to the actions of the Franco regime during the war, acknowledging instead his anti-communism. Spain’s re-admission to international bodies and the assumption of cooperation was the price for keeping the country to beyond the influence of the Soviet Union.

2. Spain’s foreign policy 1953-69

2.1. The first international agreements and membership in the United Nations

The year 1953 was a turning point for Spain’s foreign policy in the period in question. On 27 August 1953, Spain signed a concordat with

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the Vatican. Previously Church-state relations had been governed by several separate agreements and declarations. By signing the Concordat, Pius XII proved his support for the government of General Franco. The latter immediately reciprocated, granting the Church new privileges or maintaining many new ones, such as economic support for future dioceses; legal immunity for priests, creation of church assets and state financing for the Church from compensation for earlier expropriation of property, tax relief, civil validity of effect of church weddings, compulsory teaching of religion, the right to establish different levels of state schools and to request the withdrawal from circulation of the publications conflicting with to the principles of faith. As can be seen, the Concordat resulted in major concessions being made to the Church. This comes as no surprise, however, since the Church was one of the main pillars on which the Franco government rested (Pereira 1983: 187-188; Powell 1995: 39). With the Concordat the government attained is own kind of legitimacy in the eyes of Spanish Catholics, while Franco himself gained control over the church hierarchy through his right to put forward candidates for bishops.

In 1953 another important document was signed – agreements with the U.S. paving the way, for the location of U.S. military bases on Spanish soil. These agreements were concluded for ten years and consisted of three parts: the Technical Support Agreement (Asistencia Técnica), the Assistance for the Common Defence (Ayuda para la Defensa Mutua) and the Agreement on economic aid (ayuda sobre Convenio económica) for the supply of military equipment (Huguet 2003: 503-504; del Rocío Álvarez Piñeiro 2006: 178-180). It was agreed that “the time and form of the use of military force will be determined by mutual agreement” (Article 3 of the disclosed part of these agreements). Such wording could not raise objections among the public. Nevertheless, the agreement was accompanied by a secret additional protocol, giving the U.S. the right to unilaterally decide to use bases in the case of communist aggression (agresión Comunista) that would jeopardize Western security. Many scholars equate this with a loss of Spanish independence through the limitation of its territorial sovereignty. Moreover, Madrid, Zaragoza and Cadiz found themselves in real danger due to storage in close vicinity of a nuclear weapons (Pereira 1983: 189-190; Powell 1995: 40; Huguet 2003: 504). These concessions were the price Spain paid to obtain the status of

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4 On the subject of relations between Spain and the Vatican under the Franco government, see Laboa 2000; Espada Burgos 1998: 140-152; Rodriguez Nieto 2007: 171-180.
Spain’s Foreign Policy in the Years 1945-1975


The Spanish-American agreements of 1953 were decisive in Spain’s return to the international political stage. All that remained for Spain to be truly satisfied, however, was the country’s admission as a member of the United Nations. In the early 50s this was impossible, as both the United States and the Soviet Union exercised their Security Council veto to block the candidacy of countries from the opposing bloc. It was only in 1955, following the death of Stalin, that a US-Soviet agreement enabled 14 countries to join the U.N. Spain was among these countries, officially applying on 27 September that year. But still Spain remained outside the Council of Europe, NATO and the European Communities (Calduch 1994: 125-126).

Spain showed a willingness to withdraw from Morocco, but left the initiative in this respect to the French, who controlled most of that territory. Franco also advocated that negotiations be conducted separately with each of the two countries governing the protectorate. Finally, Spain recognized Moroccan independence in early April 1956 during the visit of the Moroccan sultan to Madrid. An additional protocol to that agreement contains a provision stating that Spain will support Morocco in the organization of an army. Cooperation in this respect became a key pillar of the relations between the two states. Nevertheless, a shadow was cast over Spanish-Moroccan relations during that period by the crisis in Sidi Ifni – a Spanish-controlled town in the southwest Morocco. Under an earlier agreement Spain had decided to give away all of its possessions in Morocco except for Ceuta, Melilla, Sidi Ifni and the Tarfaja region. It also retained sovereignty over Western Sahara. Offensive operations against the Spanish forces and pressure from the Rabat government calling for the immediate handover of Sidi Ifni caused the outbreak of war, lasting from November 1957 to February 1958. During the conflict Spain received significant French support.

In 1958, at the initiative of Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco, Sidi Ifni and Western Sahara were transformed into Spanish provinces. The Admiral had wanted to maintain sovereignty over the territories to help guarantee

5 On Spanish policy towards Morocco in the years prior to the granting of Moroccan independence, see Elkin 2004.
6 Spain finally withdrew from the region in 1958.
the security of the Canary Islands. However, the complete withdrawal of Spanish forces from the former Protectorate in 1961 resulted in increased pressure from Morocco to hand back Spain’s remaining possessions in North Africa. Additionally, the Moroccan state unilaterally extended its territorial waters to 12 nautical miles, thus harming Spanish fishing interests. Finally, the Sidi Ifni question went before the UN, where in December 1967 the General Assembly issued Resolution 2354 (XXII) confirming the right of Sidi Ifni to self-determination and calling for Spain to accelerate its decolonization efforts. On the basis of the Treaty of Fez (1969) Spain declared its transfer of its disputed region of Morocco. However, it failed to ratify the document within the prescribed term, forcing Morocco to file a formal complaint with the UN. Finally, the Spanish Cortes ratified the agreement and Sidi Ifni became part of Morocco (Calduch 1994: 126-128; Pereira 1983: 193; Powell 1995: 46; Huguet 2003: 508-509). Even so, Spain managed to keep the Western Sahara for a further seventeen years.

By contrast, Equatorial Guinea’s tendencies towards independence emerged in the early 1960s, and organizations seeking to independence from Spain in the country could count on the support of the Organisation for African Unity and neighbouring countries: Cameroon and Gabon. Interestingly, during this period, two key figures in Franco’s government had differing views on the future of the province. These men were Franco’s right-hand man since 1967 and vice-Prime Minister, Luis Carrero Blanco and Spanish Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs in the years 1957-1969, Fernando Maria Castiella. While the former was for the introduction of broad political autonomy for Cameroon and maintaining Spanish economic influence, the latter advocated a peaceful movement towards independence. The situation was further complicated by traditional inter-ethnic rivalries in the Cameroon independence camp. In 1963, following a plebiscite, Spain granted Cameroon political autonomy. However, these concessions did not calm the situation and, on 12 October 1968, after the adoption of a new constitution in a state referendum, Spain agreed to grant the colony independence. This did not, however, lead to improved mutual relations. President Francisco Macias Nguema introduced a dictatorship, fighting the opposition and questioning the rights of Spanish landowners. This ultimately led to a

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7 On Spanish foreign policy while Castielli was in power, see Olivié 2004: 36-52; Espadas Burgos 1998: 222-244; Pardo Sanz 2000.
rupturing of diplomatic relations with Cameroon and the return to Spain of the Spanish colonists (Calduch 1994: 131-132; Powell 1995: 46-47).8

2.2. Relations with the Latin America and Arab countries

While Castiella was in power Spain sought to develop good relations with Latin America as compensation for its reduced activity on the European continent. Until the end of the 1950s, relations with Latin America mainly concerned culture and were realised through the Spanish Cultural Institute (Instituto de Cultura Hispánica) and the high-level visits of Latin American politicians to Spain (Pereira 1983: 193). However, in 1960s economic relations began to develop. In 1966, Latin American countries were already buying 17 per cent of Spanish exports (in 1975 the rate was 10 per cent). Spain aspired to become a bridge between the European Communities and Latin America. This potential added value for the EC of Spain’s membership was made much of right from the first application filed in 1962. At the same time, Spain stepped up its presence in the region through collaboration with the Latin American Free Trade Association (Asociación Latinoamericana de Libre Comercio), the Organization of American States (Organización de Estados Americanos) and the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (CEPAL - Comisión Económica para América Latina) (Powell 1995: 45, see also Lerma Palomares 2004).

At the same time, mainly for political reasons, Spain sought to maintain good relations with the Arab states. This was ironic in that, in the meantime, in some of these countries monarchical governments – with some of which Spain had had friendly relations -had been overthrown. In their place arose populist governments supported by the Soviet Union. In the Middle East conflict, Spain, in contrast to the United States, supported the Palestinians. Castielli’s anti-imperial rhetoric did not, however, stop him from making pragmatic decisions. During the Six Day War in 1967, Spain not only agreed to the use of its bases by the Americans, but undertook to protect Jews living in Spain. Economic cooperation agreements were only signed with Arab countries in the 1970s, including with Saudi Arabia, Algeria and Iraq (Powell 1995: 45-46; Pereira 1983: 191-192).

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2.3. Relations with international economic organizations, the United States and the European Communities

In less than a year after Castiella took office, in January 1958 he managed to gain membership for Spain of the Organization for European Economic Co-operation (OECD) and, in May 1958, of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the World Bank) (in 1963 Spain joined the GATT). Joining these organizations at a time when the Spanish economy was still autarchic in character signalled change. Spain now gained access to the technical and financial assistance needed to open its borders to the flow of capital and goods. The Stabilization Plan of 1959 (Plan de Estabilización de 1959) proved highly beneficial for the Spanish economy, this success (a balance of payments surplus) was thanks to the growth of tourism and the influx of capital from Spanish émigrés.

The crowning diplomatic event of the Spanish-American alliance was the visit of President Dwight Eisenhower to Madrid in December 1959. Bilateral relations were good at the time, though strategic differences did exist in the face of the crisis in Ifni. In 1963, Spain and the United States renewed their alliance. The new agreement provide for few changes compared to that of ten years previously. The secret clause providing for procedures for the use of military bases remained in place, the Rota base being transformed into a nuclear zone, and economic compensation for Spain being minimally increased. Important for Spain and for the further developments was the establishment of the consultative committee (Comité Conjunto Consultivo) and conclusion of a declaration (declaración Conjunta) in which the United States recognized Spain’s contribution to shaping the security of the Western bloc. This last event was considered a success by Franco’s diplomacy (España y los Estados Unidos..., Calduch 1994: 129).

In relations with the European Communities of Spain stumbled on ideological and political barriers. In accordance with a European Parliament resolution adopted at the request of the German Social Democrat Willy Birkelbach, a country wishing to apply for membership in the EC had to meet geographic, economic and political conditions. In the last of these categories, the *sine qua non* was a government enjoying democratic legitimacy (Powell 1995: 43). This was a precondition that Spain did not fulfil. It is thus no surprise that the letter sent by minister Castielli to the then President of the Council of Ministers of the EC, Maurice Couve de
Murville, declaring Spain’s readiness to associate with Communities did not receive a substantive reply.

Spain made its next step towards the Communities in February 1964, when the Count de Casa Miranda, the Spanish representative to the Communities, sent another letter, this time expressing rather more modest expectations. The response from the Communities was positive. Negotiations began and resulted in the signing in 1970 of the so-called “Preferential Agreements” (Calduch 1994: 130-131; Pereira 1983: 191; Huguet 2003: 5-7; see also Contreras 2007: 119-138; Powell 2003; Mizierska-Wrotkowska 2013).

2.4. Relations with the United Kingdom in the context of Gibraltar

One of the most pressing issues of the times, when Castiella was Foreign Minister of Spain, was the problem of Gibraltar. The United Kingdom objected to negotiations on this matter. Spain therefore decided to publicize the “question” in the international forum. In 1963, thanks to its representative to the United Nations, Jaime de Piniésa, Spain managed to put the problem of Gibraltar before a meeting of the UN’s decolonization committee. The Committee recommended that the States that were party to the dispute commence bilateral talks, and its view constituted the basis of Resolution 2070 (XX) of the UN General Assembly on 16 December 1965.

Spanish-British negotiations began in May 1966. At the first bilateral meeting Spain presented a draft agreement to supersede the Treaty of Utrecht\(^9\). The first article of the proposed document determined the matter of Spanish dominion over Gibraltar, but later on the document spoke of far-reaching concessions to the United Kingdom. The UK would be able to maintain a military base in Gibraltar, and Gibraltar and its community to maintain political, social and economic rights. But this proposal did meet with acceptance.

In the face of fruitless negotiations, Spain began to apply certain forms of pressure. In 1965, it imposed restrictions on the movement of people from Gibraltar into Spain, and then obstacles to overland and air travel. At the same time the Spanish government passed a program of social and economic support for the Campo de Gibraltar to compensate its nationals working in Gibraltar\(^10\) for the impact of the restrictions.

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9 The Treaty of Utrecht, concluded in 1713, brought an end to the Spanish war of succession. It was on the basis of this treaty that Great Britain took over Gibraltar from the Spanish.
10 The Spanish district bordering the rocky peninsula.
On the other side of the dispute, the United Kingdom planned a September 1967 referendum on the future of Gibraltar and requested the deployment of international observers. Despite the negative view taken by the decolonization of the Committee on 1 September 1967, a few days later, the UK held a referendum (the majority of participants opting to maintain Gibraltar’s relationship with Great Britain). In response, the UN General Assembly in its Resolution 2353 (XXII) found the referendum to be inconsistent with accepted documents and urged the resumption of bilateral talks on the decolonization of Gibraltar.

In the face of silence from the UK, Spain decided to apply tougher sanctions. In 1968, Spain closed the border post, and adopted a practice of not considering Gibraltar residents as foreigners (Huguet 2003: 508). At the same time, the UK adopted a new constitution of Gibraltar (30 May 1968), in which the area was no longer regarded as a colony but as “part of Her Majesty’s dominions” (“parte de los dominios de Su Majestad”).

A Spanish reaction was not long to follow; in January 1969 Spain expanded its territorial waters, and on 8 June 1969 introduced a total blockade on land communication, then on telegraph and telephone communication with Gibraltar and liquidated the sea crossing to Algeciras. The negative effects were immediate and affected both sides. Almost five thousand Spaniards working every day on Gibraltar lost their jobs. On the other hand, the outflow of labour paralyzed the construction and hotel industries as well as trade (Huguet 2003: 508).

These actions, and those to follow in subsequent years, led to a genuine blockade of Gibraltar. However, sanctions and the support for Spain at the UN failed to bring about a resolution to the problem. The fiasco that was Spanish foreign policy on Gibraltar - the flagship strategy of minister Castielli - was one of the reasons for his speedy resignation (Calduch 1994: 132-134; Pereira 1983: 191; Powell 1995: 47, see also Anguita Olmedo 2007: 191-203).

2.5. The end of Castiella time in office

Castiella’s last years in office were marked by negotiations for new Spanish-American ties. Talks were held on the one hand in the shadow of the Arab-Israeli conflict of 1967 and the war in Vietnam, and on the other hand, under the pressure of the Spanish public’s outrage at the
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Palomares air disaster\(^{11}\). In addition, at that time there was already palpable tension between the technocrats of Opus Dei ("tecnócratas"), supported by Carrero Blanco, and supporters of ‘opening’ ("aperturistas") of which Castiella was one. In view of the difficulties encountered in the negotiations and the U.S. presidential campaign, it was decided to extend by six months the validity of the existing Spanish-American treaty, in accordance with the provisions of the 1953 deal.

The November 1968 elections in the United States were won by Richard Nixon and a meeting between Franco and the U.S. Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, took place. In June 1969, Castiella and William Rogers (the new Secretary of State) decided to further extend the defence treaty to 26 September 1970.

The conflict between Castielli and Carraro Blanco intensified. The Minister did not see the conclusion of a negotiated treaty. In October 1969 on a wave of scandal over the company MATESA\(^{12}\), he was removed from the government, along with the Information and Tourism Minister, Manuel Fraga Iribarne (Calduch 1994: 134-136).

3. Spanish foreign policy 1969-75

In 1969 Gregorio López Bravo, an Opus Dei technocrat became the Minister of Foreign Affairs\(^{13}\). In many respects he was a continuation of Castielli (concluding deals with the USA and the European Communities). Beyond strengthening the traditional focus of Spanish foreign policy (France, Latin America\(^{14}\), the Arab states), he initiated work in new areas such as relations with countries of “people’s democracy” and the CSCE process.

3.1. New deal with the USA and Preferential Agreement with the European Communities

On 6 August 1970 an Agreement on Friendship and Cooperation was signed between Spain and the United States. This agreement introduced a number of political and military modifications beneficial to Spain.

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\(^{11}\) The air catastrophe at Palomares happened on 17 January 1966. As a result of a mid-air collision between two American aircraft (a strategic bomber and a tanker) during air-to-air refuelling, four thermonuclear bombs fell on the coast causing radioactive contamination.

\(^{12}\) MATESA was an Opus Dei-run business producing textiles machinery. In 1969 the company collapsed amid a scandal over the defrauding of public funds. The scandal triggered a political crisis leading to the reconstruction of the government.

\(^{13}\) À propos the foreign policy of López Bravo and other foreign affairs ministers of the Franco era, see: Pardo Sanz 2000: 364-369; Espada Burgos 1998: 245-260; Powell 2007: 19-60.

\(^{14}\) See M.J. Henríquez Uzal 2008.
But Spain not get an express U.S. security guarantee or succeed in raising the rank of the agreement, which would have required the approval of the U.S. Senate, which was traditionally unfavourable to Franco (Powell 1995: 49). Under the new deal, Article 34, which permitted the United States to use bases on Spanish soil without first consulting the Spanish government, was cancelled. The system of bilateral consultations on defence matters was strengthened: at the government level and within the framework of the Joint Committee (Article 36). At the same time both sides agreed that their cooperation on defence was a part of the Western system encompassing the Atlantic and the Mediterranean. Also announced in Article 35 was the future regulation of formal relations within the system (which was intended to bring Spain closer to NATO). The new agreement also determined that bilateral cooperation would expand into other areas (Calduch 1994: 136-137; Pereira 1983: 192).

López Bravo, like Castiella, was an advocate of closer cooperation with organizations of European integration. Having once been Minister of Industry (in the years 1962-1968) he knew the importance of economic relations, including trade, with Western Europe. In June 1970, concluded a preferential agreement that was economically favourable to Spain (the Community significantly lowered customs duty on industrial goods in comparison with more moderate cuts by Spain). Nevertheless, the political aspirations of Spain reached much further. In 1973, primarily due to the accession to the Community of Denmark, Ireland and the UK, it was already necessary to modify the deal with Spain. On the basis of the Additional Protocol, these countries were excluded from the operation of the preferential agreement and were in practice treated as third countries (Powell 1995: 48).

3.2. Relations with France, Portugal, Morocco and the Vatican

At the same time as this was happening, the new foreign minister sought to ensure the best possible relations with its neighbours. In the case of France, this worked, in the form of two 1970 agreements, one commercial (for the purchase of 30 Mirage M-3 fighters) and one military. A further breakthrough in bilateral relations took place in the following year, when the French Foreign Minister Maurice Schuman paid a visit to Spain. At the same time, however, certain contentious issues manifested themselves. These included the operations of ETA, the problem of
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Relations with Portugal also saw their own revival of sorts: in May 1970 Franco met Marcelo Caetano, resulting in the signature of the Additional Protocol to the Agreement of 1939 (the “Iberian Pact”). However, when in March 1975, General Antonio de Spínola asked Franco for help, he refused, claiming that the provisions of the Iberian Pact did not apply in the “new circumstances” (i.e. after the military coup) (Powell 1995: 51).

During the discussed period, the Spanish government lost much sleep over the issue of Western Sahara. It turned out that Spain’s concession of giving Morocco Sidi Ifni in 1969 had only whetted the appetites of that country and its neighbours, Algeria and Mauritania. At the UN, Spain maintained its position on the self-determination of the people of the territory, but failed to put forward a concrete timetable. At the same time Spain conducted the negotiations with the countries concerned, hoping in this way to divide them by offering beneficial bilateral economic contracts. Mauritania was offered the establishment of a fishing business (thereby establishing IMAPEC, a 51 per cent stake in which Spain gave to Mauritania in 1979). Morocco was offered a financing agreement (finally signed in July of 1970). In summary, the only achievement of the López Bravo administration with respect to the issue of Western Sahara was to prevent armed conflict. The lack of success in pursuing Spanish interests foretold the country’s speedy withdrawal from the territory.

The growing conflict between the Spanish episcopacy and the Franco regime led to further defeat for López Bravo - failed negotiations on a new Concordat with the Holy See15. The draft, negotiated by diplomats of the regime in 1970, did not meet the expectations of the Spanish Church hierarchy, which had been expecting only minor revisions to the existing Treaty (Calduch 1994: 137-140). The conflict could not be resolved at the meeting of Pope Paul VI with López Bravo in 1973. A year later, in connection with the so-called “Añoveros case” (“caso Añoveros”), the Vatican threatened the Arias Navarro government not only with excommunication but also with the severance of diplomatic relations. Conflict was finally resolved, when the contemplated expulsion of the outspoken the Bishop of Bilbao, Antonio Añoveros, was not carried out. Añoveros had been demanding respect for the separate culture and

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15 It is noteworthy that the sympathetic Franco Pius XII died in 1958. Relations between Spain and the Vatican during the pontificate of his successor, John XXIII, were correct, but chilly (mainly due to the support given by the Pope to Spanish political exiles). Paul VI, in contrast, was openly hostile (Pereira 1983: 192-193).
language of the Basques. Such a forced exile would have been a violation of the Concordat of 1953 (Pereira 1983: 190-194).

3.3. Cooperation with Eastern Europe

A novelty in the foreign policy of López Bravo was the opening of the trade and diplomatic cooperation with the countries of Eastern Europe. The Castiella government established commercial and consular relations with Poland and Romania, and that of López Bravo with Hungary, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. But the real breakthrough came with the gradual normalization of relations with the Soviet Union. In 1970, the head of Spanish diplomacy met with USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs, Andrei Gromyko. This meeting sparked confidential bilateral negotiations, culminating in the conclusion in September 1972 trading agreement. Even it was not until 1977 that the parties decided to give each other full and complete recognition.

No less surprising was Spain’s recognition, in March 1973, of the communist government in Beijing as the sole representative of the Chinese state and its recognition early the next year of the German Democratic Republic. Interestingly, despite the opposition of the United States, Spain also maintained diplomatic and trade relations with Communist Cuba. By the end of López Bravo’s time in power, the only communist countries with which Spain did not have relations Albania, North Korea and Vietnam.

3.4. Spain in the CSCE process

A second interesting manifestation of Spanish foreign policy of the period was the nation’s participation in the CSCE process. Spain confirmed its willingness to participate in this undertaking in a memorandum addressed to the governments of Hungary and Finland on 13 December 1969. The representatives of the Spanish delegation (Nuño Aguirre de Cárcer, then Miguel Solano) enjoyed decision-making autonomy in spite of the growing crisis of authoritarian rule in Spain.

A key negotiating priority for Spain was security in the Mediterranean basin. Spain advocated maintenance of the territorial status quo in Europe (with the exception of Gibraltar), the right of every country to self-determination, and the prohibiting of intervention by other states or organizations in a country’s internal affairs. Spain supported a reduction
in military presence in Central Europe, though at the same time fearing that the centre of gravity of the prevailing tensions might shift towards the Mediterranean. Spain also advocated dialogue between East and West in areas such as migration, tourism and environmental pollution.

The seal was set on an open up of Spanish foreign policy at the CSCE Summit in Helsinki in the second half of 1975. Prime Minister Arias Navarro used this meeting to establish direct ties with many European leaders. Prince Juan Carlos was also involved in the CSCE process. In his speech at Helsinki he stressed the positive impact that the CSCE had had on Spanish foreign policy (Huguet 2003: 514).

3.5. The end of the “era of Franco”

In 1973, Franco resigned as prime minister, making way for Luis Carrero Blanco, keeping for himself the dignity of head of state and head of the armed forced. This entailed the sacking of the old government and appointment of a new. Laureano López Rodó was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs, but had held the position for only a few months. In December 1973 Carrero Blanco was killed in an ETA attack. The new Prime Minister was now Carlos Arias Navarro (Pereira 1983: 140-143).

The last foreign minister of the Franco era was professor of international law and former ambassador to Paris, Pedro Cortina Mauri. During his brief, not quite two-year tenure, three problems occupied him: Spain’s isolation in the international arena; the decolonization of Western Sahara and the consequences of rising oil prices. Furthermore, during this period anti-Franco opposition made its presence felt and the conflict between Church and government intensified. Spain also lost its close ally on its western border. In April 1974 the “Carnation Revolution” took place in Portugal, leading to the deposing of Marcelo Caetano. The democratization process in Spain’s neighbour had begun, and with it a cooling of relations with Spain, as well as suspension of cooperation in the framework of the Iberian bloc.

Relations with the United States underwent a revival. This was due to the American decision that a base must be maintained in Spain at all costs. This decision was affected by the oil crisis in 1973 and the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War. As a consequence, the eastern Mediterranean became one of the least stable regions of the world. Further, in Portugal and Greece pro-American authoritarian regimes had fallen, while in France and Italy support for the Communist Party was on the increase. Spain
was now the only country in Western Europe run by an authoritarian government (Pereira 1983: 195).

In this context, in June 1974, the government signed a joint Spanish-American declaration to lay the ground for a further renewal of the 1953 agreement. In this document, the two countries once again acknowledged that cooperation in the field of defence was an important part of Western security. Also adopted was the “Musketeers’ rule” in mutual relations in relation to any external attack or threat of attack (see *Texto de la declaración...* 1974). In 1975 Gerard Ford visited Spain President in spite of advice to the contrary from his ambassador in Spain. Neither did the objections of the opposition Democratic Party concern him. A few months later, in October 1975 the Spanish-American preliminary agreement was hurriedly concluded (Powell 1995: 50).

In the summer of 1974 the Spanish government approved a new anti-terrorism law (*Decreto-ley antiterrorista*). In September of the following year the death sentence was carried out on two ETA members and three representatives of FRAP. This provoked a storm of protest, but above all, international isolation, comparable to that of thirty years previously. In protest the European Communities broke off trade negotiations with Spain and NATO’s Parliamentary Assembly condemned the sentences and sought to cease all activity the aim of which was to make possible Spain’s entry into the organization. At the UN, Mexican President Luis Echeverría requested the removal of Spain from the organization. In all, eighteen countries recalled their ambassadors to Spain “for consultations”. All over the world demonstrations and were organized, along with boycotts of anything Spanish. The Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc, and, independently of each other, Pope Paul VI and the International Council of Jurists, condemned the sentences, and the United States broke off negotiations with Spain (Pereira 1983: 195).

The crisis was exploited by Morocco, trying to take from Spain Western Sahara and Ceuta and Melilla. This meant a change of front, since until then all neighbouring countries, Morocco included, had agreed to respect the disputed territory’s right to self-determination. In an official letter addressed to the Minister of Cortina dated 23 September 1974, King Hassan II stated his claim to Western Sahara, citing historical evidence and proposing the dispute be resolved by the International Court of Justice. In relation to this claim, the UN General Assembly (in Resolution 3292/XXIX of 3 December 1974) asked two questions of the ICJ: (1) at the time of the Spanish colonization was the Western Sahara a

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no-man’s land (*terra nullius*)?, (2) if not, what are the legal ties between of the territory with the Kingdom of Morocco and the Mauritanian Union? At the same time Resolution 3292, called upon Spain to delay its planned referendum in the Western Sahara pending the final judgment of the ICJ.

In the face of tensions with Morocco, Mauritania and Algeria and its struggle with the Polisario Front, Spain declared its intention to withdraw from the Western Sahara before the ICJ handed down its judgement. This announcement gave rise to the threat of conflict between those neighbours. Spain reiterated its position during the visit of the UN Secretary General in Madrid. Any cancellation of the decision to immediately withdraw would depend on the fulfilment of two postulates: Morocco would have to stop provoking border incidents, and Algeria would have to support the Polisario Front. On 16 October that year the ICJ announced its judgement: that the Western Sahara could not be regarded as having been a no-man’s land at the time of its colonization by Spain. However, it judged the links between the nomadic people inhabiting the territory and the states of Morocco and Mauritania to be insufficient to legitimize the sovereignty of these countries over the disputed area.

Hassan II, able to count on the US support, and to some extent that of France, announced that he had no intention of respecting the judgement. In a gesture of protest he organized the so-called “Green March” – and 300 thousand civilians crossed the green border to enter the territory of Western Sahara. Asked by Spain to intervene, the UN Security Council did not decide to take any steps. On 7 November 1975, one week after King Juan Carlos took power from a gravely ill Franco, Morocco’s ambassador in Spain put forward a proposed settlement. A week later, Spain, Mauritania and Morocco signed the “Madrid Declaration” (*la declaración de Madrid*). In this document, the last treaty concluded by Spain under the Franco regime, it was agreed that Spain would withdraw from the Western Sahara on 28 February 1976. Until this time Spain would operate a temporary administration in the Sahara in which representatives of Morocco and Mauritania and Yema would participate - an assembly representing the Sahrawi people. The Secretary-General of the United Nations was to be informed of the results of the tripartite negotiations. The law on the decolonization of Western Sahara was adopted by Cortes on 19 November 1975, a day before the death of Franco, which marked the beginning of the transformation process in Spain (Calduch 1994: 144-148; Pereria 1983: 195, see also Oliver 1989; Criado 1977).
4. Conclusions

In summary, the foreign policy of Spain under the dictatorship of Francisco Franco was to a great extent a continuation of previous actions (Powell 1995: 52), although it was closely linked to domestic policies. Franco, joining for the better part of his reign the roles of the head of state and head of government, was formally the prime mover of the country’s external actions, but entrusted their implementation to successive foreign ministers, who were for the most part people with ties to the Falange and Opus Dei.

The turning point in Spanish post-war history was the year 1953, when the Concordat with the Holy See was concluded and relations with the US established. By entering into these agreements, which meant many concessions towards its partners, Spain paid a high price for ending its international isolation. Nevertheless, very tangible benefits were achieved by Franco himself: he guaranteed support for his regime from the Head of the Church and the world hegemon (Powell 1995: 40). This compromise enabled a continuation the opening up of Spain’s external relations: Spain joined many international organizations, paved the way for its integration with Western security structures and European integration and cultivated bilateral relations with other countries.

Nevertheless, in the period under review, Spain failed to resolve the issue of Gibraltar in its favour, or to keep its North African colonies. The deep crisis in domestic politics, which emerged after the death of Carrero Blanco, left its mark on foreign policy. It only became possible to overcoming the new wave of hostility towards Spain in the international arena after the death of Franco and the establishment of democratic government (Pereira 1983: 196-197) 16.

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