Bertrand Russell in his essay *On Denoting* [1905] expounded a theory of
description for natural language developed as a response to the theory of
semantic relations in natural language, proposed by Gottlob Frege in his
paper *Über Sinn und Bedeutung* [1892]. That Russell presents Frege’s theory
quite inadequately is a well-known and quite extensively investigated fact in
the history of analytic philosophy. Some authors have stated that it is due to
the fact that Russell was inclined to misrepresent other philosophers’ views
by forcing them into his own template [Geach 1959, p. 72; Turnau 1991,
p. 52]. Discussion of Russell’s objections to Frege’s theory takes the form of
elaborated critique of Russell [e.g. Searle 1958; Geach 1959; Kitis 1984;
Turnau 1991], as well as of Frege [e.g. Linsky 1967; Blackburn, Code 1978;
Kitis 1984; Manser 1985]. Aiming at readers who wish to become generally
acquainted with the issue of Russell’s misinterpretation of Frege, our overall
goal is to present a lucid sketch of the flaws or oversights occurring in
Russell’s *On Denoting*, in the context of Frege’s *Über Sinn und Bedeutung*,
to which Russell meant to refer. We will ground our depiction of Russell’s
flaws on the two papers themselves. In more detail, we aim at: (1) providing

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a clear survey of both papers for a reader who wishes to become acquainted with crucial ideas exposed in those difficult texts; (2) presenting and commenting on Russell’s renowned fallacy in the *Gray’s Elegy* argument; (3) presenting Russell’s second fallacy—a simplified depiction of Frege’s treatment of phrases which might denote nothing (the *Ferdinand* argument); and (4) presenting possible Fregean solutions neglected by Russell for Russell’s three puzzles. We show that Russell underestimated Frege three times over: when presenting the *Gray’s Elegy* argument, the *Ferdinand* argument, and the puzzles with solutions. We do not have the ambition to ask which of the two theories is better in general and so we will not provide any arguments taken from the perspective of contemporary philosophy for or against Russell’s or Frege’s theory as such. Readers who are primarily interested in the issue of the superiority of the one over the other will find relevant elaborated analyses in the materials we refer to.

We will first recall the most important content of Frege’s paper with respect to the questions we investigate here. Then we will examine Russell’s work in order to show the extent to which he misinterpreted and failed to appreciate Frege’s ideas: first, we will discuss Russell’s two misguided claims, which he suggested to be a part of Frege’s theory; second, we will make good Russell’s omission by trying to provide—within the pre-formal framework of *Über Sinn und Bedeutung*—potential Fregean solutions to the puzzles stated by Russell.

1. FREGE’S IDEAS IN BRIEF

Gottlob Frege developed his philosophy of language in parallel to his mathematical investigations and his works became important in both of these fields. His seminal paper in philosophy of language *Über Sinn und Bedeutung* is recognized to be a classic [Zalta 2013]. In the first part, the author presented his theory, and in the second part he tested its application in many cases of natural language expressions.

Frege claimed that one should connect a sign not only with that to which the sign refers—*reference*—but also the *sense* of the sign containing the mode of presentation of the designated object: “A proper name (word, sign, sign combination, expression) expresses its sense, stands for or designates its reference. By means of a sign we express its sense and designate its reference” [p. 27].

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1 We will provide only page numbers while referring to one of the two analyzed papers. Whether the reference is to Frege or Russell will be clear from the context.
Here is an outline of his argument for that claim: if equality is a relation between the things designated by the names $a$ and $b$, then (in the case of identity) the proposition $a = b$ seems to express the same as $a = a$, namely that an object is identical to itself. This is false, as $a = b$ is sometimes epistemologically significant whereas $a = a$ is not. We can speak of a difference between these two propositions only if “the difference between the signs corresponds to a difference in the mode of presentation of that which is designated” [p. 24].

Next, the author presented three modes of using linguistic expressions corresponding to three levels of reference: words can be used to speak of their ordinary reference; to refer to the words themselves (by enclosing them in quotation marks); and finally to refer to their sense in reported speech [p. 25]. He also stated that it can happen that a proper name or sentence, although it has a sense (meaning), may be devoid of reference [p. 28].

The first part ends with a crucial postulate: every declarative sentence in which we are concerned with the reference of its words is “to be regarded as a proper name, and its reference, if it has one, is either the True or the False” [p. 29]. Frege (in accordance with Leibniz) then claimed that the reference of the whole sentence (its truth value) must remain unchanged when a part of the sentence is replaced by an expression having the same reference [p. 30]— the rule commonly known as *salva veritate*.

In the subsequent part of the paper, Frege checked whether the *salva veritate* rule applies to the two types of compound sentences that he distinguished. First, he analyzed a group of sentences in which the sense of the subordinate clause is a dependent thought. He identified three cases. The first case is reported speech, in which the reference of the subordinate clause shifts from the logical value to the sense that it would express as a separate sentence, as for instance in the sentence, “Copernicus believed that the planetary orbits are circles” [p. 32]. This case embraces especially propositions with intensional functors, commands and questions. The second case is a sentence in which the reference of the subordinate clause is neither a logical value nor a thought, but—similar to the use of proper names—an object. Here we can rank adverbial or attributive propositions, as for instance in the sentence, “Whoever discovered the elliptic form of the planetary orbits died in misery” [p. 34]. The third case is a conditional sentence, in which the sense of the subordinate clause, if taken separately, is merely a clue (a part of the thought), and is fully specified only in the context of the whole sentence, as for instance the sentence, “When the Sun is in the tropic of Cancer, the longest day in the northern hemisphere occurs” [p. 37].
The second subpart of Frege’s analysis of applicability of the *salva veritate* rule concerns sentences in which a sense of the subsidiary clause is a complete or independent thought. He showed that, in general, whether a clause can be replaced depends on whether the subsidiary thought belongs to the sense of the sentence or only accompanies it. If the clause expresses more through its connection with another one than it does in isolation, then the sense of the compound sentence is enriched by the subsidiary thought and the clause is not exchangeable, even though it expresses the independent thought separately, as for instance in the sentence, “Napoleon, who recognized the danger to his right flank, himself led his guards against the enemy position” [p. 38].

2. RUSSELL’S MISGUIDED CRITICISM OF FREGE

Now let us move to Russell’s critique. We only wish to explicate the flaws in his arguments against Frege, so we will omit the presentation and evaluation of his theory of description. We will also leave aside evaluation of his arguments in favor of his own theory.

Russell tried to make his theory plausible through a critique of the competing theses of Meinong and Frege: “I shall then discuss the theories of Frege and Meinong [in fact he gave Meinong less attention], showing why neither of them satisfies me; then I shall give the grounds in favour of my theory” [p. 480]. Alas Russell cited Frege with no reference to exact parts of Frege’s paper, which raises the suspicion that Russell’s argument against Frege’s competing theory have false or incomplete premises. We will now show why this is in fact the case.

One of Russell’s commonly discussed arguments is the so-called the *Gray’s Elegy* argument that presents an objection to Frege’s sense-reference distinction. Russell’s argument starts with an observation: “When we wish to speak about the *meaning* of a denoting phrase, as opposed to its *denotation*, the natural mode of doing so is by inverted commas” [p. 485-486]. In particular: “‘The center of mass of the solar system’ is a denoting complex, not a point” [p. 486], or “‘The first line of Gray’s Elegy’ does not state a proposition” [p. 486]. Russell then writes that if we were to speak about a sense of a certain denoting phrase $C$ (let us name this sense $s-1$), the sense of a phrase that we would use for this could not be the given meaning/sense $s-1$ which we want to speak about, but another sense $s-2$, which is a mode of
presentation of sense $s_1$ that we speak about. Next, he tried to show, that if we were not to put a phrase $C$ expressing sense $s_1$ into quotation marks, then sense $s_1$ would be a constituent of sense $s_2$ that is the mode of presentation of sense $s_1$, and a phrase expressing $s_2$ would say something about the denotation of sense $s_1$, instead of about the sense $s_1$ itself. So we have to use quotation marks. But if we do this, then “‘$C$’ and $C$ are different entities, such that ‘$C$’ denotes $C$; but this cannot be an explanation, because the relation of ‘$C$’ to $C$ remains wholly mysterious; and where are we to find the denoting complex ‘$C$’ which is to denote $C$?” [p. 487]. This mysteriousness comes from what follows. Whichever phrase we would use to refer to the sense $s_1$ must itself have its own sense $s_2$ which determines the sense we want to speak about, but it poses a problem if it can only be achieved by means of mentioning $C$ with the use of quotation marks, because such a treatment ends up in providing only a linguistic connection between “$C$” and $C$, contrary to Russell’s intuition that “[…] the relation of meaning and denotation is not merely linguistic through the phrase: there must be a logical relation involved, which we express by saying that the meaning denotes the denotation” [p. 486]—the meaning of “$C$” ($s_2$), is to be logically dependent on the denotation of “$C$” which is the meaning of $C$ ($s_1$). However, according to Russell, in the light of Frege’s conception, it remains mysterious to identify meaning $s_2$ as a function of original sense $s_1$ since “[…] there is no backward road from denotations [as object] to meaning [sense of “$C$”], because every object can be denoted by an infinite number of different denoting phrases” [p. 487].

This argument involves a misunderstanding of how to properly distinguish between sense and reference according to Frege—it should be not by quotation marks alone, but by quotation marks preceded by an intensional operator: “In order to speak of the sense of an expression ‘$A$’ one may simply use the phrase “the sense of the expression ‘$A$’” [p. 25]. Another way could be to use indirect speech, as in “Copernicus believed that $A$”. Neither the statement, nor the examples given by Russell satisfy either of these two rules. For Frege, quotation marks unaccompanied by intensional operators are used for mentioning signs, to speak of the words themselves, and not of their senses. Russell’s argument itself is internally inconsistent [for details c.f. Butler 1954, 361-363], because it fails to distinguish between use and mention of an expression [Church 1943, p.302, Searle 1958, passim] and confuses Frege’s understanding of the words meaning and reference [c.f. Geach 1959]. To partially justify Russell’s not distinguishing between use
and mention of linguistic expressions, it can be said that his logical tools forced him to refuse recognition of use-mention distinction [Butler 1954, p. 361].

There are at least three ways of identifying the proper target of Russell’s critique from the vague paragraph (p. 485-487) with the Gray’s Elegy argument. In the first footnote to his paper Russell states that his previous thesis from *Principles of Mathematics* was “very nearly the same as Frege’s” [p. 480] theory of description. Some authors claim that his critique comes to be more coherent when interpreted as a critique of his own theory, which he wrongly merged with Frege’s due to inadequate understanding of the latter [c.f. Geach 1959; Turnau 1991]. On the other hand, Blackburn and Code [1978] defended Russell’s objection to Frege by showing why it could not be interpreted as referring to *Principles of Mathematics*, and why Russell’s argument applies precisely to Frege. Their crucial assumption was that Russell’s uses of “C” and C signified senses, not linguistic expressions [p. 70].

A consequence of such an interpretation of Russell’s words [from p. 485-486] already cited would be that, although he stated that the natural way to speak of the meaning of a phrase is by means of quotation marks, he did not intend to applying them to the phrase which expresses the meaning we want to speak of. This outcome seems quirky: Is it really one of the natural ways of using quotation marks to use them not as linguistic signs forming linguistic expressions? What was Russell’s notion of *inverted commas* as applicable to a sheer sense abstracted from its linguistic expression? Or, if C was supposed to be a linguistic (or metalinguistic) expression that signifies sense, would not one speak of a sense simply by means of C itself? Alas, in his argument Russell did not distinguish or explain any different uses of quotation marks: linguistic, metalinguistic, or some other use specific for him. In consequence, Blackburn and Code’s assumption does not seem to make their interpretation of Russell’s argument more coherent or clear. What is more, Russell’s argument’s premises, as interpreted by Blackburn and Code, do not represent Frege’s ideas [to recall this go back to the first four sentences of this paragraph]. So even if Russell’s intuition was somewhat accurate, the argument, in a strict sense, does not apply to Frege. This means that if Russell’s critique was intended against Frege, it was clearly misconceived. The third view regarding the target of Russell’s critique is that there is no coherent way to understand Russell—neither as arguing against Frege’s nor as arguing against Russell’s own earlier views [c.f. Urquhart 2005]. In any case, Russell’s general intention to present his theory as superior to Frege’s [see p. 480] should follow with an explicit indication
of whose views he was criticizing in the passage under discussion. Russell diminished Frege by not providing this information: He might mislead a reader into thinking that the discussion of Gray’s Elegy applies to Frege’s theory and reveals flaws in Frege’s ideas, whereas if it applies to them at all, it misconceives them. Obviously Russell’s negligence might stem from his superficial knowledge or incomprehension of Frege’s paper. Yet, the latter seems very improbable because Frege stated his claims about the use of quotation marks explicitly. Perhaps Russell was fully aware of the paper’s content, but intended to take only a part of Frege’s theory to combine it with his own earlier claims and derive troublesome consequences from it. That would constitute negligence in his treatment of Frege’s account. Regardless of which of the above possibilities is the case, either way it can be said that Russell underestimated his adversary.

Russell’s other mistake, which has not been explicated in the literature, was made while discussing the problem of the emptiness on the exemplary conditional \textit{If Ferdinand is not drowned, Ferdinand is my only son}. He wrote: “Now ‘my only son’ is a denoting phrase, which, on the face of it, has a denotation when, and only when, I have exactly one son. But the above statement would nevertheless have remained true if Ferdinand had been in fact drowned” [p. 484]. Russell suggested that the perspective of Frege’s theory was that this conditional sentence lacks a logical value in the case where the denoting phrase \textit{my only son} has no denotation; and yet, in the case where Ferdinand actually drowned, this conditional remains in fact true. Therefore, Russell drew the general conclusion that, in order to preserve the thesis that we are primarily concerned with denotations of propositions containing denoting phrases, Frege “[...] provides by definition some purely conventional denotation for the cases in which otherwise there would be none. Thus ‘the King of France’, is to denote the null-class; ‘the only son of Mr. So-and-so’ (who has a fine family of ten), is to denote the class of all his sons; and so on” [p. 484].

Indeed, one of the solutions that Frege presented, was to assure a reference for expressions in case they would not have one, by means of assigning it conventionally in the form of the null class. However, this stipulation, as well as the elimination of proper names that do not denote anything, seems to be meant by Frege to be strictly applied to logically perfect languages—especially mathematics, to which he referred when he provided examples for the null class stipulation [p. 35-36]. We admit that Russell’s exemplary conditional is difficult enough not to be fixed to any
kind of conditional types analyzed by Frege, and it is difficult to infer how Frege would cope with it. However, Russell’s conclusion—that in the light of Frege’s theory this is a truth-valueless statement (or that Ferdinand has a purely conventional denotation)—remains too strong. As for cases of natural language compound sentences, Frege was less attached to this solution. The first of Frege’s ways of coping with a possible lack of denotation, which differs from defining denotation, is presupposing that denoting phrases have reference. For instance, in the case of “Whoever discovered the elliptic form of the planetary orbits died in misery” one must presuppose that there was someone who discovered the elliptic form of the planetary orbits [p. 34-35]. Still, Russell’s example refutes this solution, as when a presupposition fails, the sentence loses its truth-value, whereas in this case it should not. But another case where Frege’s theory did not impose a conventional definition of a denoting phrase’s reference was compound sentences in which “both clauses together form a connected whole, which as a rule expresses only a single thought” [p. 37]. Let us quote an example of a conditional clause “If a number is less than 1 and greater than 0, its square is less than 1 and greater than 0” [p. 37]. Both clauses here express, as a whole, a single thought; the presence of a denoting phrase a number deprives the antecedent alone of having an independent sense so that the antecedent separately does not stand for an object. Finally, Frege surveyed some cases of compound sentences with subordinate clauses, in which the way of establishing reference was not by choosing arbitrary objects, but by constructing references out of phrases’ meanings [p. 31–33]. As we can see, Russell’s suggestion that all there is to say about Frege’s treatment of phrases which might denote nothing is that he is defining an arbitrary object as reference, is misguided. In fact, Frege explicitly stated in his footnote (nr 15), that in some cases sentences can be regarded as having a logical value beside its part which would be without reference [p. 36].

2 It is worth of mentioning, that Frege already proposed in his earlier writings a sort of less arbitrary looking treatment of possibly empty expressions: what Russell’s denoting phrase refers to would be, for Frege, a function that maps other objects onto logical values [Dummett 1994, p. 52-53], and in earlier papers Frege already perceived concepts to be objects different from classes [Dummett 1973, p. 209].
3. RUSSELL’S PUZZLES AND FREGE’S SOLUTIONS

The thought-experiment part of Russell’s paper deals with three linguistic puzzles that he formulated as a test of his theory’s soundness. Frege’s theory also seemed to embrace a fairly abundant group of types of linguistic expressions, yet Russell presented his own solutions as an argument for preferring his theory over Frege’s. At the same time he distorted or left without any comment Frege’s potential solutions for these puzzles—even though certain intuitive solutions seem to be easy to infer from Frege’s paper. Regardless of the value of the Fregean solutions, Russell should have explicated them for the sake of comparison to his own, especially if he treated his solutions to the puzzles as determinants of his theory’s superiority over Frege’s. And it’s not implausible to assume that he thought so: “A logical theory may be tested by its capacity for dealing with puzzles, and it is a wholesome plan, in thinking about logic, to stock the mind with as many puzzles as possible, since these serve much the same purpose as is served by experiments in physical science” [p. 484–485]. Below we examine whether Frege could have answers to Russell’s puzzles.

The first puzzle goes as follows: “If \( a \) is identical with \( b \), whatever is true of the one is true of the other, and either may be substituted for the other in any proposition without altering the truth or falsehood of that proposition. Now George IV wished to know whether Scott was the author of Waverley; and in fact Scott was the author of Waverley. Hence we may substitute Scott for the author of ‘Waverley’, and thereby prove that George IV wished to know whether Scott was Scott. Yet an interest in the law of identity can hardly be attributed to the first gentleman of Europe” [p. 485].

Russell’s solution, in brief, is that it is impossible to substitute a proper name \textit{Scott for the author of Waverley}, since through Russell’s analysis the phrase \textit{the author of Waverley} is not a part of the analyzed sentence “Scott was the author of Waverley.” Therefore, there’s nothing to be substituted for \textit{Scott}. This is due to the fact that \textit{the author of Waverley} is not a proper name, but a denoting phrase, which can be seen by looking at an analyzed form of the given sentence: “It is not always false of \( x \), that \( x \) wrote \textit{Waverley}, that it is always true of \( y \), that if \( y \) wrote Waverley \( y \) is identical with \( x \), and that Scott is identical with \( x \)” [p. 488].

Frege’s solution of the riddle could look as follows: as the given proposition is in reported speech, substituting \textit{Scott for the author of Waverley} is against the rules, because these two have different meanings (senses). To
change constituents in such a way as to preserve truth-value (the *salva veritate* rule), we would have to preserve meaning, not a material denotation, because in reported speech reference shifts from ordinary reference to meanings.

We move on to a second puzzle: “By the law of the excluded middle, either ‘A is B’ or ‘A is not B’ must be true. Hence either ‘the present King of France is bald’ or ‘the present King of France is not bald’ must be true. Yet if we enumerated the things that are bald, and then the things that are not bald, we should not find the present King of France in either list” [p. 485], so how to prevent a violation of a logical law?

At the beginning of his paper Russell pointed to a difficulty arising when a phrase lacks denotation: “One of the first difficulties that confronts us, when we adopt the view that denoting phrases express a meaning and denote a denotation, concerns the cases in which the denotation appears to be absent” [p. 483]. He suggested that a proposition containing such a phrase might be regarded as nonsense: “But this phrase [the King of France], though it has a meaning provided ‘the King of England’ has a meaning, has certainly no denotation, at least in any obvious sense. Hence one would suppose that ‘the King of France is bald’ ought to be nonsense [devoid of logical value]” [p. 483–484] and according to Russell that is wrong, because the given proposition is false. It comes from Russell’s distinction between *primary* and *secondary occurrence*. When, after analysis, a denoting phrase which has no denotation occurs in the main clause, it has a *primary occurrence* and the proposition which contain it is always false, as in the case of “The [present] King of France is bald” that after analysis will have the form: “one and only one entity has the property of being King of France and that one has the property of being bald” [p. 489–490]. If a denoting phrase with no denotation is present in the subordinate clause then it has a *secondary occurrence* and the whole proposition may be true. Now consider the second exemplary proposition (the negative one), first as saying that “The King of France is not bald.” In this case *The King of France* will be in *primary occurrence* and the proposition after analysis is to be saying: one and only one entity has the property of being King of France and that one has the property of being not bald. It is false, because there is no such entity having these two properties. Well then, in this case both propositions (the positive one and the negative one) turn out to be false, yet by comparing the analyzed forms of both propositions one will see that the negation (in the latter) is applied not to the whole form of the former, but only to one of its inner fragments, which stands for one of the properties. Thus the latter is not
a negation of the former, so these two can both be false without violating the law of excluded middle. On the contrary, if the denoting phrase in the negative proposition would be considered as being in secondary occurrence, then the negative proposition would mean “It is false that there is entity which is now the King of France and is bald”. In this case the negative proposition directly negates the positive one and is true (as a negation of false positive proposition), so there is no violation of the logical law of excluded middle.

Now, returning to Frege, we may assume, following Russell’s suggestion from the cited puzzle [p. 485], that Frege’s account gives the wrong truth value to these two sentences (both are false) what causes a violation of the law of excluded middle. The Fregean solution to this might be to leave aside concerns about the truth value of these sentences (likewise in the case of the sentence “Odysseus was set ashore at Ithaca while sound asleep” [p. 28]). We could solve the puzzle just by saying that, as the King of France does not designate anything, these propositions do not have (either wrong or right) truth values, so they do not violate any logical law.

Now we will take a look at the third puzzle: “Consider the proposition ‘A differs from B’. If this is true, there is a difference between A and B, which fact may be expressed in the form ‘the difference between A and B subsists’. But if it is false that A differs from B, then there is no difference between A and B, which fact may be expressed in the form ‘the difference between A and B does not subsist’. But how can a non-entity be the subject of a proposition?”; “Hence, it would appear, it must always be self-contradictory to deny the being of anything” [p. 485]. Russell coped with this riddle again with the use of analysis of denoting phrases—the difference between A and B that seemed to denote non-entity is a denoting phrase that does not denote anything: “If A and B do differ, there is one and only one entity x such that ‘x is the difference between A and B’ is a true proposition; if A and B do not differ, there is no such entity x” [p. 490].

Frege could give an answer to this too, namely that the puzzling proposition expresses a particular relation between the names A and B, namely that they differ in terms of both meaning and reference. About other expressions without denotation maybe he could say in an analogous way—for instance in speaking of unicorns, the proposition „Unicorns do not exist” could take on the form “The name ‘unicorn’ certainly has no reference”. This is all the more true seeing that in his paper Frege took into account expressions that designate other expressions, and the possibility of propositions that have a logical value despite being comprised of expressions without denotation.
During the past hundred years and more, the topic under discussion has advanced greatly, and it is obvious that today one should make use of one of many advanced formal apparatuses when asking Russell and Frege a riddle. However, in accordance with what we stressed at the beginning of this paper, our aim was not to establish whose theory gives the better answer. What we wanted to show is that one can easily derive some possible Fregean answers to Russell’s riddles after becoming acquainted with “Über Sinn und Bedeutung”. Regardless of their level of correctness, profundness, precision or elegance, by not mentioning such possibilities Russell underestimated Frege.

4. CONCLUSIONS

There were significant flaws in Russell’s depiction of Frege’s theory in *Über Sinn und Bedeutung*. Russell imputed to Frege the claim that we speak of a sense by means of quotation marks, or at least he did not give enough credit to Frege’s account when criticizing the sense-reference distinction. Moreover, he wrongly suggested that all Frege does to cope with phrases which might denote nothing is define an arbitrary object as their reference. Russell also passed over the fact that Frege’s theory provides some intuitive answers for puzzles presented by Russell in his essay.

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Bertrand Russell in his essay *On Denoting* [1905] presented a theory of description developed in response to the one proposed by Gottlob Frege in his paper *Über Sinn und Bedeutung* [1892]. The aim of our work will be to show that Russell underestimated Frege three times over in presenting the latter’s work: in relation to the Gray’s Elegy argument, to the Ferdinand argument, and to puzzles discussed by Russell. First, we will discuss two claims of Russell’s which do not do justice to Frege: that we speak of a sense by means of quotation marks, and that all Frege does to cope with phrases that might denote nothing is define an arbitrary object as their reference. Second, we will show that Russell omitted the fact that Frege’s theory provided some answers for the puzzles presented by Russell in his essay.

*Summarised by Adam Paweł Kubiak and Piotr Lipski*
Słowa kluczowe: język, semantyka, znaczenie, desygnat, deskrypcja, nazwa pusta, identyczność, kompleks denotujący.

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