Platonic Colloquia — ∆ΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ
Introduction

The present volume of the Platonic Colloquia series is devoted to Plato’s dialogue Theaetetus¹, which was already rated by the ancient philosophers among the so called tentative (πειραστικοί) dialogues, as it has been reported by Diogenes Laertius². Thrasyllos, who has arranged the Plato’s dialogues in the tetralogies, has placed Theaetetus in the second tetralogy — after the Cratylus and before the Sophist and the Politicus — and it was probably him who gave it the subtitle On the Knowledge (πεις ἑπίσκημης)³. The anonymous commentary to this dialogue mentions also that there were some thinkers among the Platonic philosophers who thought that the dialogue concerned the criterion, with which the anonymous author disagreed. The author claims that the dialogue concerns the simple and uncompounded knowledge (πεις ἑπίσκημης [...] τῇς ἀπλῆς τῇς καὶ τοῦ κατ’ ἐπιστήμην). According to the anonymous writer there were also other philosophers who thought that the subject of the dialogue was the knowledge itself, but it established what the knowledge was not, by contrast with the next dialogue Sophist, where some positive judgments about ἑπίσκημης were made⁴. The critical attitude and the lack of the

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² Diogenes Laertius, Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers III 51, 2-3 (next as DL).

³ Ibid. III 58, 5-8. See also DL II 29, 2. The grammarian Aristophanes divided the dialogues into trilogies and the Theaetetus was placed in the fourth trilogy among the Euthyphro and the Apology. See DL III 62, 3. In the contemporary literature, the following scholars are in favour of the trilogical division: F.M. Cornford (Plato’s Theory of Knowledge, New York 1957, p. 1) and D. Sedley (The Midwife of Platonism. Text und Subtext in Plato’s „Theaetetus”, Oxford 2004, p. 2.). The last one links the Theaetetus with the Sophist and the Politicus.

positive judgments were also the reason why Plato was perceived as an ancestor of the sceptical philosophy, i.e., ‘the Academician’ as the ancient put it.\(^5\)

*Theaetetus* was also placed in a very interesting way in the other divisions of Plato’s dialogues, which were made by the later ancient literary commentators of the founder of the Academy. Albinus, a representative of the middle-platonism, in his *Introduction to Plato’s Philosophy* defines the dialogue as \(\lambda\rho\gamma\omega\zeta\), which consists of the questions and answers, it concerns the political and philosophical issues and it is distinguished by the characters and an artistic style of the prose.\(^6\) Next, this \(\text{i}’\text{goc}\) is divided into what resides in the soul (\(\varepsilon\nu\nu\iota\zeta\theta\varepsilon\varsigma\zeta\)) and what is uttered (\(\pi\varepsilon\varphi\rho\varphi\varepsilon\chi\omega\zeta\)).\(^7\) This division has its origin exactly in the *Theaetetus*, in which thinking (\(\tau\delta\ \delta\iota\varphi\nu\varepsilon\sigma\theta\varepsilon\alpha\iota\)) is defined as \(\lambda\rho\gamma\omega\zeta\), which the soul addresses to itself. When the soul expresses what it has achieved in the course of the deliberations, the belief (\(\delta\dot{o}\zeta\chi\alpha\)) comes into being.\(^8\)

In the third book of his *Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers*, which is devoted to Plato’s philosophy, Diogenes Laertius proposes to divide the dialogues into the expository and the searching ones. The latter are divided into exercising and competing ones, while the former are further divided into the midwifery and the tentative one. It seems that the *Theaetetus* is a good candidate to be a midwifery dialogue, but among those were also counted the *Alcibiades*, the *Theages*, the *Lysis* and the *Laches*, whereas *Theaetetus* is found, as already said, to be the tentative one.\(^9\) It is hard to say with absolute certainty why it is done so, but one of the hypothesis says that the whole subdivision of the searching dialogues could be made with the reference to the discussed dialog. Furthermore, every element of the subdivision does not concern the whole work, but only some of its parts or some stages of its discussion.\(^10\)

There are five characters in the dialogue. One of them, Terpsion, is almost unknown to us. We know only that he came from Megara and was Socrates’ friend, who accompanied Socrates in the last moments of his life. Euclides also came from

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\(^5\) Anonymous, *Commentarius...* 54, 38-43. It is also confirmed by the anonymous *Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy*. See *Anonymous Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy* 10, 4-5, L.G. Westerink (ed.), Amsterdam 1962.


\(^8\) Plato, *Theaetetus* 189e 4–190a 4 and 206d 1-5; cf. also Plato, *Sophist* 206d 3-9.

\(^9\) DL III 49, 1-9 and III 51, 1-3. Together with the *Theaetetus* there were *Euthyphro*, *Meno*, *Ion* and *Charmides*.

Megara and was also a witness of Socrates’ death. He established in his native country the philosophic school called the ‘Megarian’, where a lot of attention was given to eristic and dialectic, which is why the Megarics where also called the ‘Eristics’ or the ‘Dialectics’\textsuperscript{11}. We do not know much about the Euclides’ teaching, as all information is only fragmentary and indirect. Cicero, for example, informs us about Euclides’ view on the good and the bad: „Next, it was Euclides from Megara, a disciple of Socrates, whose successors were called the Megarics, and who said that the only good was what was one, similar and the same”\textsuperscript{12}.

Theodoros and Theaetetus were the greatest mathematicians of their times. The former came from Kyrene and was probably a Pythagorean\textsuperscript{13}. Diogenes Laertius mentions that he taught Platon mathematics\textsuperscript{14}. We know from the \textit{Theaetetus} that he was Protagoras’ diciple and took up not only geometry, but also astronomy, arithmetic, music and other issues\textsuperscript{15}. He extended the range of the discoveries concerning the mathematical incommensurability. The Pythagoreans have only discovered the incommensurability of the square root of 2, whereas Theodorus proved it for the numbers from 3 to 17. But he did not presumably formulate any definition of the incommensurable number and he did not prove any general theorem concerning it\textsuperscript{16}.

Theaetetus appears in the dialogue as a young man, who looks to that degree like Socrates that the latter could look at him as if he would look at himself\textsuperscript{17}. But this resemblance concerns not only the outward appearance, but also the internal sphere, especially in the intellectual and moral aspects. Similarly to Socrates, he is at the outset nice, willing to collaboration and owns up to have no knowledge. Likewise, he has good memory and is very precise in the discussion. He is neither afraid nor ashamed to become refuted in his arguments. He uses a typically Socratic motive of ‘hearing from someone’. He is characterized by the same exceptional courage in the battle and similar love to Athens\textsuperscript{18}. Being an excell-
lent mathematician, he developed the field of knowledge especially in the theory of incommensurable numbers and his achievements are to be found in the 10th book of Euclides’ *Elements*\(^\text{19}\). We are informed about these achievements, among others, from Plato’s dialogue. It is there that the division of the numbers into square (τετράγωνοι ἄρθροι) and rectangular ones (προορίζοντες ἄρθροι) is introduced, together with the division of the segments into the units of length (μῆκος) and the possibilities (δύναμεις)\(^\text{20}\) that are incommensurable with them. Owing to his researches, he could formulate a definition of the incommensurable number and he proved that there is no one-to-one correspondence between the numbers and the points in the line\(^\text{21}\). He made also discoveries in the field of geometry. There is a reference in the book of Suda that Theaetetus built all five, so called, Platonic solids, but from the scholium to *Elements* of Euclides we learn that three of those solids were made by Pythagoreans (tetrahedron, cube, dodecahedron) and only two (octahedron, icosahedron) by Theaetetus\(^\text{22}\). Thus, we have presented the main issue which is considered in the *Theaetetus*. However, two other interpretive strategies, which were present in the Antiquity, are also worth mentioning. It is reported in the anonymous *Commentary to the „Theaetetus“* that the representatives of the so-called New Academy though that this dialogue bears testimony that Plato was a sceptic, because he rejected every theory of the wisdom as well as the theory of the number. The Anonymous author does not agree with this thesis. According to him, Plato undermined only the false theories of knowledge, as human beings can gain knowledge about themselves and the whole reality, when they cleanse their souls. It is due to the fact that body renders it difficult for the soul to recognize the truth. People, who have freed their souls and who are called the heaven dwellers have insight into the noetic sphere\(^\text{23}\).

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This volume comprises fourteen studies, which represent a wide spectrum of interpretations. Some of the texts concern the dialogue directly, while some discuss its reception till 20th century. The considerations have philosophical as well as philological character. The whole work is divided into three parts in accordance with the chronological order\(^\text{24}\).

The first part commences with M. Wesoły’s article *Subject, Composition and Peirastics of the Plato’s „Theaetetus”*. The author claims that just as in Plato’s early dialogues, where the Socratic inquiry concerned the essence of various virtues

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22 Suda X 93; *Scholia to Euclid’s „Elements” XIII*, 1-9.


24 This part of the introduction is based on the summaries written by the authors.
and led the interlocutors — mainly Sophists — to self-contradiction, so here too, Plato comes back in the *Theaetetus* to the Socratic dialectic, it being nevertheless neither elenctic nor aporetic, but rather peirastic and maieutic in its form. The matter of dispute, however, is not ethical or political, but is referred to the definition of what is \( \pi \sigma \tau \mu \eta \) (a science as the long-lasting cognition). Historical Socrates, as can be seen in Plato’s *Apology*, questioned the politics, craftsmen and poets about the human wisdom (\( \sigma \phi \alpha \)), whereas the later Platonic Socrates questioned mathematicians in the *Theaetetus* about the issue that is coincident this wisdom, namely about science (\( \pi \iota \sigma \tau \mu \eta \)). This dialog is an effect of so-called ‘Socratic syndrom’, that is the effect of the continuous questioning of human wisdom and knowledge, to which the Athenian philosopher devoted his whole life and for which he died. It is a sophisticated performance of a sort of squabble or a match between a dialectician and a mathematician, who is a representative of the sciences, and who can not formulate an appropriate definition of \( \pi \iota \sigma \tau \mu \eta \), it being proved in the peirasic and maieutic way. Socrates, an elenctician and aporetician, became with the time an eidetician, i.e., a man, who investigates ideas-forms. Still, in the *Theaetetus* there is no theory of ideas, because the dialogue was probably written after the *Parmenides*, in which the theory was challenged. It is crucial that one recognizes the peirastic strategy in the *Theaetetus*, which consists in the testing and verifying in the discussion the competences which those people, who are regarded as the experts in the given field, claim to possess. It is from this form of dialectic that Aristotle derived the Socratic ignorance, it being a sort of deliberate interrogation. It was appropriate then that the characterization of the *Theaetetus* in Antiquity as a \( \pi \varepsilon \varepsilon \alpha \sigma \tau \iota \chi \varsigma \) \( \pi \varepsilon \iota \iota \pi \iota \tau \gamma \mu \eta \) dialogue. The complex subject of the dialogue, its clever dramatic composition and the Socratic meaning are recognized on account of it, because *Theaetetus* is one of the most intriguing philosophical dramas with regard to the form (stylistics, composition of the arguments and sophisticated digressions) as well as the content (task’s compounding, abundance of the difficulties and aporias). The issue is taken hold of in five thematic threats:

1. ‘Socrates’ syndrom’: a contest between a mathematician and a dialectician for \( \pi \iota \sigma \tau \mu \eta \);
2. a succinct insight into the problematic contest;
3. the Socratic suppositions around \( \pi \iota \sigma \tau \gamma \mu \eta \);
4. some splendid threats and digressions;
5. Plato the Academician: a dogmatists or a sceptic?

The main subject of K. Pawlowski’s article *The Existential Dimension of Philosophical Wisdom in Plato’s „Theaetetus”. Moral and Spiritual Aspects of Socrates’ Maieutics* concerns the specific manner in which the Platonics experience reality (in all its aspects) and the kind of sensitivity that makes them able to undergo such experiences. As it turns out, this type of sensitivity that is characteristic of the Platonics, does not confine itself to some sort of intellectual capacity or nobility of mind which enable a philosopher to learn the Truth only at an intellectual level. Its indispensable component comprises moral and spiritual nobleness that naturally direct the philosopher to the supernatural values. Philosophical Truth possesses not only a rational dimension, but also some moral and spiritual ones. It
cannot be grasped by intellect alone — even though the intellect is the most capable in this area. An appropriate kind of moral and spiritual sensitivity is needed: the sensitivity to Beauty and Goodness, which are unattainable by purely intellectual means. Beauty, Goodness and Truth are inseparably intertwined. Beauty and Goodness are the moral and spiritual reverse of the Truth. The endeavor to reach the one brings us closer to the other. A philosophical investigation of the mystery of reality transforms itself at the highest level into an existential initiation (into Truth, but, at the same time, also into Beauty and Goodness), through which the philosopher not only learns the Truth by means of intellect, but also experiences it spiritually, in all depth of her humanity. This process results in the philosopher’s personal spiritual and moral development and in directing his endeavors towards what is supernatural and, thus, godly. Hence, the platonic ideal of assimilation to god, but also Socrates’ maieutics. The latter, as it seems, is nothing else than the art of awakening the natural sensitivity to the Truth, Beauty and Goodness (intellectual, moral as well as spiritual) which are distinctive for human beings.

E. Osek, in the article Self-Knowledge in „Theaetetus“, remarks that the self-knowledge appears in terms such as „examining ourselves“ (155a, 203a), „discovering by themselves“ (150d), „seizing in myself“ (145e), „showing yourself“ (145b), „learning from himself“ (198e), „containing in myself“ (210b). The reflexive pronoun in phrases like these means ‘the soul’ or ‘the self’. Knowledge, defined in generally as ‘what every soul contains’ (197d), is to be obtained only by the soul „all by itself“, i.e., ‘without any empirical experiences’, and ‘not through the body’. The Greek expression „all by itself“ (ατίτι ατίτι) contains the reflexive pronoun too. Many a time does Socrates in the dialogue argue that there is no knowledge in the perception at all, and identifies knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) with wisdom (σοφία), virtue (ἀρετή), truth (ἀλήθεια), and cognition (γνώσις). Knowledge in such an understanding is different from ‘thinking’ (τὸ διανοεῖσθαι) and ‘judging’ (τὸ διώκειν), both being described as ‘intrinsic discourse’ or ‘talking to himself’ (189e–190a), and allegorized in the literary form of dialogue between Socrates and Theaetetus, the young man being like Socrates. It is not clear why cognition (seizing knowledge) and thinking/judgment are two distinct activities of the soul and why there is no knowledge in the true judgment (δύναμις ἀλήθεις μετὰ λόγου), although the knowledge is in the calculations (ἀναλογίσματα or συναλογίσμοις). The ideal of godlikeness (176b) in the Digression and the description of Socrates’ art of spiritual midwifery (i.e. dialectics) are linked by the notion of wisdom (identified with knowledge) and by the god of Socrates. A man-like-god achieves the virtues of justice and piety with wisdom, that is, with knowledge of what is justice and piety itself. The God in the Digression and the god of Socrates’ divine mission seem to be the one and the same. Socrates, compelled by the god, examines the souls of men with his dialectics and frees them from their illusions. Socrates’ divine ability usually does not produce knowledge in the souls of the examined ones, but only purifies them so as to give them a chance for „the better embryo thoughts“ (210b), identical probably with the knowledge and the wisdom of the Digression. Another consequence of the midwifery strategy is self-consciousness of lacking knowledge (‘not to fancy you know what you do not know’, 210c), different
from the perfect knowledge, but attributed to Socrates himself. By helping others with self-knowledge Socrates accomplishes the god’s will.

P. Paczkowski in a paper, On the Picture of the Philosopher in Plato’s “Theaetetus” 172c–177c, presents, how the philosopher was seen in antiquity and the biographical tradition, which originated on this basis. An anecdote on Thales (174a–b) is used by Plato to show a certain way of life, namely βιος φιλόσοφος. This ideal way of life was also developed by Plato’s pupils in the Academy, and θεωρία, which was deprived of the practical dimension, became a characteristic feature of the philosophical life. A competing model of life came into being in the Lyceum and it was popularised in a similar way, namely by the stories about the presocratic philosophers, who accomplished it.

The main subject of J. Gajda-Krynicka’s article Plato’s „Theaetetus”: Introduction to the Theory of Judgement is an attempt to place the dialog in the so-called relative chronology of Plato’s writings on the one hand and to establish the main aspect of its content on the other. The half-hearted subject of the discussion between Socrates, Theodorus, Theaetetus and Protagoras, who is summoned from the ‘House of Hades’, is a question what the knowledge is. The discussion ends with an ostensible failure which many literary commentators assume to be due to this dialogue’s taking on an aporetic or peirastic character. The paper tries also to show that this aporeticness is constructive. It is Plato’s intentional literary effort, which is evidence to the philosophical polemic with the Protagorean concept of ἤσσοκαινεία as well as Aristotle’s nominalism and which reflects this stage of Plato’s philosophical evolution, where, having rejected the theory of ideas, he entered the so-called middle period of his literary activity. At that time, Plato still did not develop a new theory of the first being. The inquiry, what the knowledge is, could not be settled in a positive manner, because this dialogue had to be written in the period where Plato discredited the proper subject of knowledge, namely the ideas as the eternal and unchanging beings. It is the cause that the knowledge about the phenomena — the objects of the sense-perception — cannot be verified. It is only the beliefs that are stated on these kinds of objects and these are not the propositions in the sense accepted in dialogue Sophist, where the subject of the true proposition, which determines the possibility of the objectivization of knowledge, cannot be a thing, which the predicate ‘being’ does not concern. This kind of proposition — λόγος, which would not be defined until the Sophist, can be formulated only with the special dialectical procedures - λόγοι: καί λογισμοί — and its subject has to be a ‘true’ — ‘being’ object. An epistemological and methodological aspect of the Theaetetus places this dialogue after the Parmenides and before the Sophist.

The sixth article — J. Jaskóla’s „Theaetetus” — Intra-language Criterion of Truth in the Recognized World — is written in the form of a commentary to the individual parts of Plato’s dialogue. The Author believes the dialogue to express an effect of Plato’s struggle with the sophists and his own philosophy, which was still in the process of becoming. It is the one of the many attempts to go from the subjective beliefs to the objective truth. In the Theaetetus, it is said that there are some limitations of all statements. Plato set himself two targets. Firstly, to show that he is able to point out, better than the sophists, the cause of the force of the language,
because they rest on beliefs as the very principle, while he rests on the truth. But
he suffers a defeat, which he surmounts only in the *Sophist*. Secondly, to show
that the elenctic method is not a sophistic one. He concentrates on the dialectic
and it appears that the openness and peculiar incompleteness of understanding (its
indeterminacy for example) is not an evidence of its imperfection, but it is based
on reality. Its bond with that is established and a difference in the way of its being
results from the fact that an understanding is always determined by the gap. An
order of the being does not settle language’s correspondence but its difference. The
lack of the understanding that a fact causes that the language, which is to become
like things, has to be treated as the interpretation of those things, which is in turn
the cause of the paradoxes that lead to deny the rationality of being. Plato shows
that confronting oneself with the limits of language, and the dialectical solution
of the problem, which is based on its ontology, will be put forward in the later
*Parmenides, Sophist* and *Philebus*.

In the article *On Possibility of Geometry as ἐπιστήμη*. Plato’s „*Theaetetus*”
147c–148e and 152a–c, M. Janocha tries to answer the question whether the issue
of measure in geometry and the question of conditions to be the ἐπιστήμη are
mutually interrelated. He compares two fragments of Plato’s *Theaetetus*, of which
the first contains the so-called ‘lecture on squares’ and the other contains the famous
*homo-mensura* thesis of Protagoras. He also polemicizes with the Z. Danek’s theses,
which are framed in the work entitled *Myślę, więc nie wiem*..., in which the proper
interpretation of the notion ‘sensation’ plays the most important role.

The last paper, which concerns the text of the Plato’s dialogue — M. Gło-
wala’s, *Spelling a name. Clarity and λόγος in „Theaetetus” 207a–e — focuses on
some properties of spelling a name as Plato’s key example of λόγος, conceived as
διὰ στοιχείου διέξοδος (*Theaetetus* 207a–e). The properties of this example shed
important light on some key interrelated concepts of the philosophy of mind, namely
the concepts of λόγος, of an act of knowledge (ἐπιστήμη), of clarity, and, finally,
on the Greek idea of element (στοιχεῖον). The author begins with a presentation of
three properties of λόγος and λέγειν, namely:

(i) that λέγειν is some kind of actuality and activity, and so is thinking and,
especially, an act of knowledge;

(ii) that this activity consists essentially in making something clear (ἐμφανής
ποιεῖν);

(iii) that this activity consists essentially in formulating something, namely
λόγος of the thing, in which the thing becomes clear, so that λόγος itself can be
said to be some kind of clarity coming from the one who thinks or knows.

Then, spelling a name is considered to be a peculiar kind of telling the name
and making it clear. Moreover, ten properties of spelling a name are presented as
a way of making it clear and the clarity about the name comes from the spelling
a person’s name. It is crucial that the one who spells the name makes the name
itself clear and its letters at the same time, or by one and the same clarity coming
from him; this unity of clarity is a key property of an act of knowledge. Finally,
the paper addresses the question how this example of clarifying can be applied to
other cases, especially to those indicated by Plato in *Theaetetus* 207a–c (the case of
carriage). A more systematic answer to this question requires a better recognition of the nature of the elements or the letters in the act of spelling.

Along with M. Matuszak’s article — On Potential and Actual Knowledge in Plato’s „Theaetetus” and Aristotle’s Philosophy — we touch upon the sphere of reception of the Theaetetus in the philosophical tradition. The authoress undertakes the problem of the difference between ‘to have’ (ἐχειν) and ‘to own’ (κτῆσθαι) knowledge, which is presented by Plato, when giving the example of wearing and not wearing clothes and the example of dovecote. This difference is in principle a difference between the potential and actual knowledge. The authoress tries to answer question, how this Aristotelian distinction can be related to Plato’s thought in the Theaetetus. Two opposed, yet in a way, notions are considered: κτήσις and ἔξις ἀνέργεια. The latter one is especially in the limelight, because it is related directly to the knowledge. The knowledge is a disposition (ἔξις), which after being „set in motion“ (ἐνέργεια) becomes „the knowledge in action“ or „in use“. A threefold relation of human being to virtue and the possibility of committing a mistake in Plato’s and Aristotle’s philosophy are considered afterwards. Finally, attention is given to the fact that Aristotle consistently enough distinguishes between the skill-knowledge, which concerns theory and the skill-knowledge, which forms the basis for action.

In the article Protagoras at Sextus Empiricus (PH I 216) and Plato’s „Theaetetus” Z. Nerczuk stresses that the works of the ancient sceptics are a very important source for reconstruction of this philosopher’s thoughts, whose works are now missing. It also contains the fragments and a doxographical tradition concerning the sophists and among them Protagoras. The problems, which rise during reconstruction of his thought, force to draw peculiar attention to Sextus as a source and perspective, of what was written. A comparison of Sextus’ and Plato’s reports allows to discern similarities. Similarly to Plato, Sextus lays stress on Protagoras’ homo-mensura thesis and two other matters connected with this thesis: variability of things and ‘privacy’ of perceiving. The presentations of all these questions are highly parallel to Plato, despite a typical of a sceptical work modification of notions, over-interpretation and extraction from the dialogical context. On these grounds, it can be concluded that Theaetetus was regarded in the late Antiquity as a reliable source of information on Protagoras’ thought and it does not matter whether Sextus was an author of this report or whether he has taken it from some other, earlier source, which could have a form of a crib for example. But it should be stressed that Sextus’ draft is only an interpretation of Theaetetus’ contents and it cannot be taken into consideration as an independent source, as it is practiced by many scholars.

M. Komorowski’s article Proclus on Plato’s „Theaetetus” closes the short series of papers devoted to a reception of Plato’s dialogue in Antiquity. An analysis concerns the presence of the dialogue in Proclus’ commentaries to Plato’s Parmenides and to the first book of Euclides’ Elements. There are eight places, where the author refers to the Theaetetus, but two of them are repetitions. It seems that they contribute nothing important to the disquisition of the neoplatonic philosopher. In the second commentary, there are only two such places, and both are in the first
part of the *Introduction* to this work. An analysis of both, shows that they are erudite embellishments. Taking into consideration those remarks in *Theaetetus* of other Proclus’ works it can be found that he knew this dialogue excellently, because he quoted it from memory. This splendid knowledge of the dialogue is surely based on the fact that it was required that every junior research worker in the neoplatonic school should know it. The remarks are not a sufficient base to confirm a hypothesis that Proclus wrote a commentary to the *Theaetetus*, which was lost.

Together with A. Noras’ paper *Plato’s „Theaetetus” according to Paul Natorp* the burden of discussion is transferred on the presence of Plato’s dialogue in modern philosophy. Researches into Plato were one of the most important issue in the so-called „Marburg school”, which was found by among others Paul Natorp. It was so, because the philosophers of the school regarded the issue of founding cognition as the most important philosophical question. Natorp’s fundamental work concerning Plato is *Platos Ideenlehre. Eine Einführung in den Idealismus*, which was complemented by *Metacritical Supplement* and *Notes* in its second edition. Deliberations in *Theaetetus* are in close relationship to Plato’s *Gorgias* and *Phaedrus*. Four groups of issues can be distinguished in the analyzed dialogue:

1. a problem of ideas,
2. a criticism of senses,
3. a new notion of cognition,
4. dogmatism of ‘true representations’.

From the realm of German philosophy we travel to Polish philosophy. T. Mróz’s paper *Plato’s Dialogue „Theaetetus” in the Dispute between Stefan Pawlicki and Wincenty Lutosławski*. The dispute on *Theaetetus* between Pawlicki and Lutosławski, two most eminent Polish Platonic scholars at the turn of the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries, is one of the aspects of personal conflict between them: their competition for the University chair in Cracow, different methods in investigating Plato’s philosophy and diverse visions of philosophy as such. They were among the first in Poland to undertake methodological reflection on the history of philosophy. Their works on Plato’s philosophy are of great erudition; Pawlicki had a wide knowledge of the culture of Antiquity, and Lutosławski was an expert on the literary output of the dialogues of that time. The dispute on *Theaetetus*, which together with *Phaedrus* rose many controversies, touched upon chronological questions and the methods of establishing dialogues’ chronology. Pawlicki considered *Theaetetus* to be written ca. 394-391, while Lutosławski regarded it as a mature work, written in 367 or some time later. This conclusion was an effect of his research on the language statistics, which Pawlicki rejected. Lutosławski ascribed to Plato the priority over Aristotle in creating a system of categories, he also emphasized the importance of the soul in the late Platonic philosophy. Pawlicki criticized Lutosławski’s interpretation and traced all the misinterpretations and faults made by Lutosławski. They also disagreed on the aim of Socratic defense of Protagoras. The later development of Platonic studies proved Lutosławski’s chronological conclusions to be correct. On the other hand, Pawlicki was right in criticizing some

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interpretative speculations of his countryman. Their works represented the highest level of that time; they were perfectly acquainted with the writings on Plato. Even though Pawlicki repeatedly underestimated more recent investigations. They represent two opinions on the dialogues. The same opinions are expressed also nowadays: genetic-evolutionary and the so-called unitarian.

Though Misiek’s paper *The Beginnings of Mathematics* deals with the early history of mathematics it is included in the present volume as an appendix because it pertains to the interpretation of Plato’s philosophy and thus to the main topic of the volume. His main idea is that the concept of mathematical sense should be applied as a tool in an analysis of historical sources pertaining to this discipline. This means that the results of historico-philological research on the history of mathematics should be evaluated as to whether they have mathematical sense or not. Concerning the concept of sense Misiek applies knowledge from the discipline usually called the foundations of mathematics, which lies on the borderline between mathematics and philosophy. Starting from this knowledge he argues that development of mathematics passed through three fundamental stages: the pre-mathematical stage of calculus, the stage of finitistic mathematics and finally, the stage of infinitistic mathematics. Thus he obtains a pattern of development of mathematics which is independent of historical sources. Every stage has its own peculiarities. For instance, the concept of sense is different at every stage and broader at higher ones. It is also shown that classical logic emerges only within infinitistic mathematics when objects of this science are understood as non-physical ‘platonic’ objects. This characteristic of all stages makes it possible to assess in many cases to which stage particular source belongs and even to discover that some well known texts pertain to the history of mathematics, even if they were generally considered as non-mathematical. Such an approach, if correct, leads to serious corrections in the field of the history of early mathematics. Indirectly it also sheds new light on philosophical problems which have an affinity to early mathematics. Thus Misiek’s paper opens new areas of discussion and reconsidering issues that seemed to have been decided long ago.