The Transformation of Nationalism in Central and Eastern Europe

Ideas and Structures
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edited by Karl Cordell & Konrad Jajecznik

Warsaw 2015
Für Tante Dore

Karl Cordell
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Acknowledgments

The editors are owe a debt of gratitude to Professor Levente Salat of Babeș-Bolyai University in Cluj-Napoca for his comments on the text, which were of great help in the preparation of this volume. We are grateful also Dr Przemysław Biskup from the University of Warsaw for his comprehensive support at every stage of the project. This volume constitutes an element of the research project Transformation of Nationalism at the Beginning of the 21st Century realised within the young researchers support programme at the Faculty of Journalism and Political Science, University of Warsaw. Publication was supported also by the University of Warsaw Foundation.
Introduction

Ever since its appearance on the political stage in the latter part of the eighteenth century, nationalism has come become an all-embracing ideology that has been decisive in shaping the contours of the European state system. Indeed, the ideology of nationalism gave rise to a new type of state, the nation-state and also, it may be argued, actually stimulated the formation and growth of modern nations (Guibernau & Hutchinson 2004). Nationalism may well be regarded as being ubiquitous, yet its effects have been controversial. Its articulation is often regarded as being an expression of nativist violence and the desire to create communities that are in some way exclusive in their orientation. Yet nationalism is not necessarily and intrinsically violent, neither it is necessarily exclusionary. A nation may be defined in terms of shared cultural characteristics and a (presumed) common history, but equally it may be formed around a set of common values. What these two doctrinal variants have in common is this: the articulation of a demand that the nation be given collective political pre-eminence with a territorially delimited area: the nation-state. Therefore, nationalism seeks to establish a link between a named population and a given stretch of territory, which in turn indicates that named populations such as the Roma and Jews who in have historically lived in scattered, territorially dispersed communities, have often found themselves excluded or worse, from membership of putative national communities and nation-states.

We may identify proto-typical nation-states as having existed in Europe prior to the French Revolution (Hastings 1997) – England, the Netherlands and France itself are often given as examples (Tilly 1975). Such (potential) examples to one side; prior to the outbreak of the French Revolution in 1789, Europe was by and large a conglomeration of dynastic states and empires. It was only with the failure in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries of the pre-modern state system to meet the twin challenges of modernisation and nationalism that the political contours of the continent come to begin to resemble the Europe with which
we are familiar today. Nationalist ideology and the related demand for national self-determination, with its unique ability to cut across the burgeoning left/right dichotomy, provided a rallying call for increasing numbers of politically conscious individuals (Gellner 1994).

However, despite its seductive qualities and possibly glib prescriptions with regard to how emancipation may be achieved, nationalism creates as many paradoxes and problems as it purports to solve. In Eric Hobsbawm’s memorable phrase, apart from anything else, it demands the ‘invention of tradition’ (Hobsbawm & Ranger 1983): the re-interpretation of past events as ‘national’ history; the creation of a ‘national’ culture and language together with an attempt to define the ‘national’ territory (Smith 2004). However, for a variety of reasons, none of these endeavours is necessarily easily achieved. Regardless of whether the desired nation leans toward the civic or ethnic criteria, its building blocks, i.e. real people have to be moulded or socialised into the desired national character. This process may be as much voluntary as involuntary, yet the fact remains that it is a process, and that nations as we understand them to be today did not emerge fully formed from the primeval swamp, they are in a sense, constructed or ‘imagined’ communities (Anderson 1991). As such they are the product of ideologically inspired programmes for action, which involve competition for hearts and minds as well as territory.

With regards to the study of the topic, in the late 1940s, Hans Kohn argued that two distinct types of nation and by extension nation-state existed in Europe: the civic variety that could be found in Western Europe and the ethnic variant that was to be found throughout Eastern Europe, with Germany representing some kind of half-way house (Kohn 1944). With the benefit of hindsight it is easy to criticise Kohn’s characterisations as being both banal and stereotypical. Yet, before the arrival of Hans Kohn on the scene the study of nations and nationalism had essentially been the undertaken by historians whose strength lay in the presentation of empiric analysis of historical data as opposed to serious comparative study of superficially related phenomena. Whereas Kohn’s unpolished dichotomy may be precisely that, in providing us with this apparent contrast, he spawned greater interest among political scientists in the themes of nation and nationalism and set in train a whole series of studies and competing interpretations with regard their origins and characteristics. Whereas the authors of this collection do not seek to offer their own theoretical contributions any more than they attempt to laud any particular school of thought, through their endeavours they seek to add to our stock of knowledge with regard to the wider contemporary debate on the politics of nationalism in Europe with particular, but not exclusive reference to developments in post-communist Europe.
As stated, the large majority of the contributions to the volume deal with questions of nationalism in post-communist Europe. In a sense this emphasis reflects the interests of the majority of the contributors as it does the cultural milieu from which they stem. Yet, it also worth bearing in mind that historically this part of Europe was home to a veritable kaleidoscope of peoples. It is perhaps the case that the politics of nationalism became virulent and dominant in the states that emerged from the wreckage of the various empires that collapsed between 1917 and 1923, precisely because demographic realities contradicted the fantasies of nationalists. As a consequence of the violence engendered by rival nation-building projects and more importantly memories of such experiences, it is commonplace to assert that in post-communist Europe, questions surrounding the idea of nation and state and minority protection are more germane to everyday discourse than are similar questions in Western Europe. Yet, the veracity of such a statement is open to question given the large scale migration flows into Western European states and the re-emergence of sub state nationalism in the United Kingdom and Spain. Such trends indicate that the allegedly civic nation state, that Kohn characterised as being dominant in Western Europe, is under threat as a result of marked demographic changes. Just as post-communist states in their drive to ‘return to Europe’ had to abandon prior positions with regard to (indigenous) minorities and minority rights, so the politically engaged citizens of Western Europe and their political representatives are having to re-evaluate entrenched norms, practices and conceptions of nation and state. It serves no purpose for does either the researcher or the politically interested layman to assume that one part of Europe questions of ‘belonging’ have been solved, whilst in others they are central to the political process. In their different ways, all European states exhibit tensions concerning with regard to who is, or is not, considered to be a member of the national community.

If we return to the chapters themselves, we find that a thread common to them all whether they concern nation-building strategies, nationalism or the politics of minority accommodation is this: that the politics of nationalism in Europe is not dead. It may not be as virulent as it was in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, but it is still present. The question then becomes one of how to understand and accommodate tensions that may have arisen as a result of contested histories and warfare and its consequences, particularly with regard to the accommodation of minorities. This is a question that several of the contributors deal with in differing ways.

If we now turn directly to the contributions themselves, Cordell’s chapter seeks to explore the circumstances by which Poland and Germany, despite their painful history, have sought since the early 1970s and in particular the early 1990s
to foster a partnership that his free of the burden of history. In so doing, not only does he chart the path towards reconciliation, he also seeks to demonstrate that the categories ‘Pole’ and ‘German’ are not as mutually exclusive as some like to think. Cordell’s analysis German-Polish relations provides an entrée to Konrad Jajecznik’s assessment of nationalism and nationalist movements since the country’s return to liberal democracy in 1989 and points to how it has become embedded in everyday political discourse in that country. His contribution is all the more relevant given the success of Andrzej Duda of the Law and Justice Party (PiS), in the presidential election of 2015.

Moving on, we have a series of chapters that deal with different aspects of the politics of nationalism in Hungary and the various ways in which Hungarian minorities interact with both their kin and host states. Peter Smuk adds to our stock of knowledge with his assessment of how ‘Hate Speech’ in Hungary affects the conduct of politics there. This is an important topic not only because of the apparent rightward shift in Hungary as witnessed by the popularity of both the ruling national conservative party FIDESZ (Hungarian Civic Alliance) and the populist Jobbik (Movement for a Better Hungary), but also because the information presented allows us to assess the nature of current debates in Hungary concerning the nature of identity and the extent to which nationalist discourses are prevalent in the public sphere in Hungary.

The tone of domestic politics in Hungary and the position of ethnic Hungarians who live outside of Hungary’s state borders are topical issues that colour Hungary’s relations with its neighbours, as the next chapters demonstrate. For example, Gergely Egedy’s deals with Hungarian state policies towards kin-minorities, and Ágnes Vass elaborates on a broadly similar theme with regard to the Hungarian minority in Slovakia. Thus the volume provides the reader with a series of interlinked comparative studies on a topic of importance to a number of Central European states and their citizens.

Not only do these chapters offer a comprehensive overview of the current state of affairs with regard to nationalism in Hungary and the position of the large Hungarian minorities that reside in states bordering on Hungary, they also provide an excellent counterpoint for Justyna Polanowska’s analysis of the Swedish minority in Finland. What is striking about this contrasting example is not so much the politics of accommodation that is practised in Finland, but rather how Sweden has steadfastly refused to instrumentalise the Swedish minority in Finland in terms of domestic politics and its foreign policy.

If we return to post-communist Europe, we find that the politics of nationalism is not confined to Hungary, any more than it centres exclusively upon ethnic Hungarians and the states in which Hungarian minorities reside. As Jiří Čeněk
and Josef Smolík note, football hooligans in the Czech Republic provide us with an example of how ultra-nationalists utilise sports and sporting arenas as a means of articulating their atavistic message. Again, this case study informs the reader of the nature of contemporary nationalism in a given society and allows the interested reader to make comparative judgements.

The virulence of Czech football hooligans in the Czech Republic provides us with a useful counterpoint to Czech – Slovak relations which are the focus of Miroslav Mareš’s analysis. Taking a broad historical sweep he analyses the place of ethnic Slovaks in the former Czechoslovak state, assesses the role of Slovak nationalism in the eventual dissolution of Czechoslovakia and makes some observations on contemporary Czech – Slovak relationships. The overall point is that despite their differences, that in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet bloc, Czech and Slovak political elites managed to disengage from one another at state level without precipitating violence and, indeed, quite possibly against the wishes of a majority of the population.

The volume concludes with two chapters that deal with nationalism in the post-Soviet space. The first, by Andrzej Wierzbicki assesses the burgeoning strength of nationalism in Russia. He is concerned above all in identifying the nature of ‘new Russian nationalism’ and the tensions that exist within a movement that has to meet the demands of modernity whilst simultaneously promoting the value of traditional Russian civilizational standards. As with the Polish case, such analysis is prescient, probably even more so given the geopolitical importance of Russia and how the Putin administration sees itself as the guardian, of among other things, Russia’s national destiny. Finally, we have Katharina Buck’s contribution on contemporary Kazakhstan. Strictly speaking, Kazakhstan lies outside the European political space. However, the case is instructive for two reasons. First, it allows us to assess how nation and state-building has been pursued by the Kazakh political elite during the relatively short period it has been operating in a manner fully independent from Moscow. Secondly, Kazakhstan is host to a large Russian minority. In turn given that the current leadership in Moscow is by no means averse to propagating crude appeals to nationalism and indeed supporting sub-state nationalist movements that are in some way useful to its geostrategic ambitions, the case of the Russian minority in Moscow may have wider purchase with regard the future direction of the politics of nationalism in Europe.

In sum, we hope that this collection of essays will achieve a number of related objectives. The first is that it will stimulate interest in the subject and add to our overall stock of knowledge with regard to the ideology of nationalism and its operationalization in Europe. Secondly, we hope that the volume will contribute to the wider understanding of the nature of nationalism, particularly with regard
to post-communist Europe. Finally, we trust that in our own modest way, we have contributed to the ongoing global debate concerning nations and nationalism.

Karl Cordell

Bibliography

1. Introduction

In addition to debate concerning the nature of modern nations, there has long been dispute regarding their historical and cultural provenance. For some their historical longevity is self-evident and as such the question of the relationship between modern nations and their historical forebears is of no consequence. The supposed linear relationship between past and present is simply taken as an inconvertible fact (Özkirimli 2000). So, for example, to the adherents of perennialist or primordial perspectives on nationhood, questions with regard to the (ethno-national) lineage between the Polish subjects of the Piast (966–1385) and Jagiellonian kingdoms (1385–1572) and the citizens of the contemporary Third Republic simply does not arise, irrespective of territorial shifts, migration, intermarriage and the ethnically heterogeneous nature of prior dynastic states. For others, especially scholars of nationalism if not necessarily members of the general public, modern nations are fundamentally and symbiotically linked to processes of modernisation and industrialisation (Kedourie 1993). According to this line of thinking, dynastic states proved to be functionally incapable of meeting the challenges posed by the aforementioned phenomena and as such were vulnerable to the messages engendered by a whole host of novel political creeds. That included for example, socialism and liberalism, and importantly for our purposes included the doctrine of nationalism. For modernists, contemporary mass nations and nation states are the product of the Renaissance, Enlightenment and above all the industrial revolution (Gellner 1994). Other analysts take what may be regarded as a mid-way position. Ethnosymbolists argue evidence exists that renders problematic the reasoning of both the modernists and primordialists (Smith 2009). For primordialists, nations are seemingly fixed entities that exist independently of time and space and therefore it is (apparently) self-evident that, nationally conscious peoples (in Europe) have existed for well over a thousand years. For modernists, in great swathes of Europe, prior to the onset of modernisation and industrialisation, there is no empirically
verifiable evidence for the existence of populations sharing mass shared national consciousness. According to modernism terms individuals who dwelt in pre-modern societies lacked the means to envision as Benedict Anderson memorably put it, the ‘imagined community’ (Anderson 1991). Rather, pre-modern societies were rigidly stratified and demarcated in terms of social status and rank, the markers of which were of greater importance than any apparently shared cultural characteristics that purportedly cut across such distinctions. For their part, ethno-symbolists find the position of both the primordialists and the modernists problematic. The former school is criticised for its claim that nations are static, unchanging and unchanged. The latter school is criticised on the grounds that in parts of Western Europe there exists strong evidence to suggest that mercantile and scholarly elites together with their monarchical and aristocratic counterparts were instrumental in effecting the transition from dynastic to nation-state and as such engineered the development of modern national consciousness among the wider population that eventually came to transcend notions of loyalty to a particular estate (Smith 2008). Therefore, for ethno-symbolists, there is hard empirical evidence that allows us to observe from the Middle Ages, a process of modern nation building apparent in a variety of dynastic states: England constitutes the prime example, with Sweden, the Netherlands and perhaps France serving as further, possibly more controversial examples. Crucially, for ethno-symbolists the growth of modern nations and nation-states can and does precede the birth of nationalist ideology, which itself only became apparent and significant with the American and French revolutions of the late eighteenth century (Hobsbawm 1992).

If we accept this claim as being a useful starting point for our broader analysis, an intriguing puzzle becomes readily apparent: namely that in some parts of Europe, although nation-states as conventionally understood today had yet to appear, nations as we now understand and define them had come into existence in dynastic states that were slowly metamorphosing into nation-states. Yet, this phenomenon pre-dated the rise of what is allegedly the key ingredient of any national movement: namely the ideology of nationalism (Hroch 2007). Investigation of how this state of affairs came to pass is beyond the scope of this chapter, but we need to acknowledge that although the term nationalism was first employed by the German intellectual Johann Gottfried von Herder (1744–1803), it was not articulated in a recognizable form as both ideology and an action-based programme for change until the advent of the American Revolutionary War (1775–1783) the French Revolution (1789–1799) and the Kościuszko Uprising in Poland of 1794. It is only with these the occasion of these three critical junctures that the doctrines of nationalism and national self-determination began to achieve widespread resonance among the peoples of Europe. Further, once the chord had been struck, it did so with such
force that the idea of mass nations and nation-states became so deeply entrenched in the collective European psyche that by the early part of the twentieth century collective and individual acceptance of national self-identification was for the most part established as a common-sense notion. Partisans of alternative ideologies who argued against the national and nation-state as organisational principles and cultural fact, were either swept by the board or found themselves having to incorporate and adapt nationalist doctrine in order to sustain any intellectual and popular purchase among the wider population.

The success of this revolutionary impulse to create nations and nation states is as obvious as it is ubiquitous. If we cast our net a little wider in order to illuminate the opening sentence to this paragraph and start at the macro level, we find that the world today is dominated by entities that claim the title of ‘nation-state’. The assertion is made that any given state incorporates the titular nation and as such embodies the collective will and destiny of said population. Yet, throughout much of the world, we find plenty of examples of where both state elites and national movements have singularly failed either to engender state capacity or fire the popular imagination. The result is that such states are little more than hollow constructs whose citizens identify no more with the state than they do with the nation to which they have been assigned. Such a state of affairs might help explain why so many states are today classified as either fragile or failed (Rotberg 2004). The causes of state incapacity are many, varied and indeed disputed. With regard to failed nation-building strategies, explanations for their failure in part relate to the inability of the state either to act as a responsible political actor, but they also clearly relate to the dissemination of an idea, namely that the European nation-state is the universal and natural order of things, to societies that were and remain wholly un-European in terms of their understanding of notions of individual and collective self-identification.

If we return our focus to Europe, we find that in parts of Western Europe both nation-states and their attendant nations emerged as a result of a discernible domestic, usually state-led, impulse that came to be accepted and internalised by increasingly significant sections of the wider population. In other parts of Europe, although the initial enterprise was not initially state led, it was propagated by nationalist activists whose message was increasingly accepted by wider sections of the population buffeted as they were by the winds of industrialisation and modernisation (Gellner 1994). Multi-national empires and the dynasts who ruled them found themselves challenged by revolutionaries of all hues who demanded change and who acted either in the name of the putative nation or an emergent socio-economic class whose presumed members gradually and fitfully came to regard themselves as members of both a nation and a class. A wave of nationalism that is
conventionally dated as having come to the forefront in 1789, swept across the continent (Hobsbawm 1992). The years 1848, 1914, 1945 and then 1989 and 1990 all signalled that this wave has an innate strength that time has not yet moderated. Dynastic states and empires disappeared with nation-states arising in their stead. Further, some would argue, that on occasion the nations that became apparent during this turbulent epoch were no more historically rooted than the states that had come into existence.

As the Yugoslav Wars of Secession showed in the 1990s, this process of (imperial) collapse and concomitant nation and state building runs no more smoothly in Europe than it does elsewhere. State and nation building is rarely achieved without causing significant social dislocation. More often than not, the process involves both warfare and forced migration. In some instances it involves contestation on the part of nationalist movements for the hearts and minds of people whose national belonging is disputed by rival nationalists, just as the territory to which nationalist movements lay claim involves dispute between nationalists who claim that a stretch of territory is incontrovertibly theirs and belongs no other claimant. Such contestation is rarely, if ever solved through wholly pacific means.

2. State Construction, Interpretations and Consequences

If we now apply these observations to the micro level, unsurprisingly we find that Poland’s relationship with Germany illustrates these dilemmas in the sharpest possible relief. The foundation of Poland is conventionally given as being either 960 when Mieszko I first established his ascendancy over his rivals, or more usually as 966 when he accepted Christianity. From 1569 and the establishment of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the state that he and his various successors ruled came to be at times the most powerful in Europe. However, whatever the Piast and Jagiellonian kingdoms were, they were self-evidently no more nation states than was the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth as its name so clearly implies. The Commonwealth and its predecessors were dynastic/monarchical states, for whose rulers the national principle as understood today was irrelevant (Zamoyski 2009: 170 et seq.).

As for Germany, it did not actually exist as such until 1871 and when a state bearing the name of Germany emerged in 1871, it was proclaimed as an empire, which given the Kleindeutsch solution favoured by Bismarck, included several million nationally conscious Poles, but deliberately excluded several million ethnic Germans and the rival Austro-Hungarian Empire to which they were subject. Moreover, Germany came into existence at the territorial expense of its neighbours, specifically Denmark, France and most especially Poland in the wake
of the partitions of 1772, 1793 and 1795 when the Commonwealth had been forced to cede territory to the Russian and Habsburg Empires as well as Prussia, which itself later became not only the motor of enlightenment and modernisation, but the champion of German unification on terms dictated by its own monarchical elite (Barraclough 1947). Germany in fact presents us with a unique example of nation and state building. On the one hand an attempt was made selectively to consolidate Germans within a single state. On the other, the new state that came into existence not only claimed to be a German nation state, but simultaneously an empire. It was a peculiar state of affairs and one that directly impinged upon Germany’s relations with its own minority populations, including nationally conscious Poles.

The situation that existed from 1871 between Germany and the Polish national movement and later the Polish nation-state was distinctly novel. German (romantic) nationalism had begun as a reaction toward not nationalism per se, but against French imperialism and Napoleon’s empty slogans of national liberation, which had served as cover for the creation of German-speaking pro-French client states. Although Napoleon’s forces were finally defeated at Waterloo in 1815, the German Confederation that emerged was both inherently unstable and incapable of meeting the demands of the German national movement. The failed revolution of 1848 not only had the temporary effect of strengthening the hand of the Habsburgs, it also sounded the death knell of German liberal nationalism and enabled an increasingly conservative Prussian elite to present itself simultaneously as the harbinger of socio-economic and political modernisation. This project was eventually consummated in the Hall of Mirrors in the Palace of Versailles in January 1871. With the creation of an entity called Germany that was neither a nation-state nor an empire, we are presented with a unique example of state-led nation-building (Barraclough 1947).

As stated earlier, all nation-building projects involve a struggle for hearts and minds and the example of Poland and Germany gives us plenty of empirical evidence that confirms that assertion. Although no Polish state existed in the nineteenth century, a Polish national movement had been clearly discernible since the early 1790s as is most vividly exemplified by the exploits of Tadeusz Kościuszko and the abortive uprising of 1794. ‘For our freedom and yours’, is a slogan that perfectly sums up both the broader and narrower aspirations of nationalism per se. The fact that the uprising not only failed, but indirectly contributed to the partition of 1795 and Poland’s effective disappearance from the political map of Europe until November 1918, is in a sense irrelevant. What is important is that Kościuszko’s defeat was midwife to the Polish national movement (Pease 2009).

As that movement gathered strength in the nineteenth century the problems germane to all national movements arose: What is our territory? Who are we?
Who are our enemies? Who are our natural allies? And in the case of Poland how did a once mighty actor come to fall so low? Political activists, geographers, historians and embryonic social scientists set to work on defining Poland’s natural and historic borders (Bryczynski 2010: 645–650). Similarly, entire population groups were encouraged to become nationally conscious Poles. Competition between the Polish and German national movements was further sharpened by mutually incompatible appeals to groups of people, namely Kashubes, Mazurs and Silesians, who spoke a mixture of dialects that were to varying degrees infused with German. Thus the rival national movements attempted to convince the self-same people that they were in fact German. The Polish national movement sought explanations for Poland’s fall from grace that gave rise to the adoption of narratives that re-cast Germany and the Germans as possessing national interests that were inimical to those of Poland and the Poles. Similarly, Poles and Germans were characterised as being wholly alien to one another, despite the existence of clearly observable groups of people who possessed the cultural characteristics of both. Above all, the Polish nation was presented as having been in some ways a fixed entity that was now being subjected to unnatural pressures aimed at its dismemberment and assimilation into alien German and Russian cultures. There is a great deal of truth to these latter arguments, but in part they rest upon a traditional romantic (nineteenth) nationalist fallacy, namely that the nation is an entity whose characteristics are organic, and eternal, whereas ultimately nationalism remains a doctrine whose partisans selectively re-interprets the past in order to control the future.

Germans were no more of an exception to the rising tide of nationalism that engulfed Europe any more than were Poles. After the failed revolution of 1848, the dominant political authorities complemented the activities of German romantic nationalists in their effort to homogenise the population and popularise a standard version of German national history and culture. The work of the Brothers Grimm is particularly interesting within this context. Just as Polish nationalists posed the questions of ‘who is or could be a Pole and what is the Polish national territory?’ so their German counterparts posed the self-same question. As previously alluded to, the situation was particularly problematic precisely because Germany came to encompass historic Polish territories and hosted nationally conscious Poles alongside the aforementioned in between groups such as Silesians, who for the most part defied easy national categorisation and could have as easily been Polish as they could German (Kamusella & Kacir 2000: 92–122). The way the German authorities sought to engineer a solution that fulfilled their objectives contained a mix of policy instruments: they included giving German as opposed to Polish primacy in the public sphere both on the grounds of functionality and as a means of promoting a consciousness shift. Similarly, the Polish
national movement was subject to official harassment. Such measures were complemented by efforts to encourage ethnic Germans from the German heartlands to migrate eastward to former Polish state territory; attempts that met with little success. These moves were accompanied by the general processes of modernisation and industrialisation, coupled with the creation of an embryonic welfare state. In the absence of any kind of Polish state, bar the highly dubious example of the Kingdom of Poland (1815–1867), and given the greater functionality of German in the workplace and wider public spheres, endeavours to promote a consciousness shift, or indeed assimilation into the German national community, met with some success, both among ‘marginal’ groups such as the Mazurs, and also among nationally conscious Poles, as the intriguingly diverse examples of Rosa Luxemburg (Róża Luksemburg) and Angela Merkel’s grandfather Horst Kasner (Horst Kaźmierczak) both testify. Indeed, any perusal of contemporary Polish and more especially German surnames illustrates an important series of facts that some are reluctant to acknowledge: namely that for centuries there has been social intercourse between ‘German’ and ‘Pole’ as there have been waves of mass migration and indeed wholesale consciousness shifts between these two apparently wholly dissimilar nations (Kamusella & Kacir 2000: 92–122).

As a result of this mix of factors and despite continued migration and the existence of significant communities who defied easy national categorisation, as the nineteenth century wore on, Polish – German estrangement became ever more apparent. Had a variant of nationalist doctrine achieved ascendancy in either polity that espoused the creation of a civic community whose bonds (allegedly) rested upon adherence to a set of shared values as opposed to inherited cultural characteristics, then the tragedies of the twentieth century might have been avoided. In other words, had some variant of civic nationalism come to dominate in either country, perhaps the abyss could have been circumvented, but in both Germany and then in Poland with the state’s (re)establishment in November 1918, increasingly the state came to be defined as being exclusively the property of the titular nation (Brykczynski 2010: 649). This is not the place to recount the wider process of alienation to which the developments described in previous paragraphs were a contributory factor. In Poland, the increasing tendency to identify Poland as the state of ethnic (Roman Catholic) Poles, created problems for Poland’s myriad minority populations, many of whom had taken Polish citizenship after 1918 either because the prospect of the Soviet Union was no prospect at all, or because Germany had shifted westwards (Jasiewicz 2011: 735–740). In Germany, ethnically based romantic nationalism eventually gave way to something more sinister that may best be described as a form of political psychosis: namely National Socialism. The consequences of this lunacy are well known. As the Nazis consolidated their grip
on Germany from 1933, and hyper nationalism gained currency in Poland from 1935 so the position of those who didn’t fit became ever more precarious. In November 1918, Poland had been established as a nation state, partially at the territorial expense of Germany. Three uprisings followed in the disputed territory of Upper Silesia (1919, 1920 and 1921) followed by a plebiscite in 1921, following which the territory was divided in a manner that satisfied no-one. A further plebiscite in East Prussia that took place in July 1920, confirmed what figures such as Józef Piłsudski had long suspected: that the indigenous Mazurs had become German, even if many of them still spoke Polish. Correspondingly in 1918/19 Provinz Posen was wracked by the Wielkopolska Uprising of Polish nationalists and lastly in 1920, the historically Polish ruled, but overwhelmingly German populated city of Danzig was forced to assume the status of a Free City against the wishes of a clear majority of its inhabitants (Strobel 1997: 21–33).

This was more than an unpromising beginning for a new nation-state, accompanied as it was by a continental-wide dire economic situation that served the cause of extremism throughout Europe, of which the Nazi variant is both the most virulent and well-known example of the genre. In the wake of their ascent to power in January 1933, it became clear that (among other things) they sought the revision of Germany’s border with Poland by all means necessary. This was achieved temporarily through the invasion of 1 September 1939.

The consequences of this invasion for Poland’s wider population are well known. Inevitably as the Nazi occupation came to an end there was retaliation, mass flight and expulsion of ‘ethnic Germans’ a term which even under the Nazis had been defined in a remarkably broad manner (Urban 1994: 80–95). There is no need at this juncture to recount the consequences of war and occupation that were wrought upon Poles and Germans however, from the perspective of 2014 there is a need to assess the circumstances in which Germany’s contemporary largely pacific relationship with Poland came to be.

3. Year Zero and its Consequences

In 1945 and despite internal armed resistance that had all but ended by 1949, Poland had become a communist satellite of the Soviet Union. The Federal Republic’s relations with communist Poland which itself finally spluttered into nothingness in 1989 may be divided into two broad phases: the period 1945–1970 and the period 1970–1989. The first of these two phases was characterised by hostility, animosity, incomprehension and the utilisation of nationalism by the Polish United Workers’ Party (PZPR) in an attempt to mask their obvious lack of legitimacy among wider society. Given the lack of popular support for the alliance
with the Soviet Union and the concomitant societal revulsion towards Germany, the PZPR sought to convince the wider populace that alliance with the former was necessary in order to maintain independence from the latter (Cordell 2009: 3–5). Wartime occupation had seared Polish society and mutual alienation was compounded by a series of events and decisions in 1945 that were in broad terms as inevitable as they were tragic. Under the terms of the Potsdam Agreement of August 1945, Germany’s border with Poland had been pushed westwards to the Oder-Neisse line, with former German territories being placed under Polish administration pending the conclusion of a peace treaty. This decision acknowledged two basic facts: the first was that the Soviet Union, a few cosmetic changes to one side, was determined to keep former Polish territory that it had seized in September 1939 under the terms of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. The second was that Poland was to be compensated with former German territory, a move which in part satisfied prior Polish territorial ambitions, particularly with regard to Danzig (Gdańsk), East Prussia and Upper Silesia (Beer 2011: 20–30).

At one level, the creation of a border by politicians with the assistance of cartographers is a banal act. However, it is an act the consequences of which may well be anything other than commonplace. Nineteenth century Central Europe had been characterised by many things, including the absence of nation-states and the sheer diversity of its population, whose pattern of residence stubbornly refused to conform to nationalist aspirations. The ubiquity of nationalism, the creation of nation-states and lastly the rise of fascism certainly contributed to the region becoming more monochrome. Yet, the final act in the effort to render state and nation coterminous reached its apogee in the late 1940s. Led by the Four Powers, the states of Europe, in concert with the wider ‘international community’ sought to ‘solve’ this ‘problem’ by legitimising and sanctioning programmes of forced migration that affected above all ethnic Germans, and included others, principally Poles, Czechs, Hungarians, Lithuanians and Ukrainians (Ther & Siljak 2003). Such ‘transfers’, sanctified by the Potsdam Agreement and related treaties, in fact began even before world war two ended, and (especially after August 1945), were supposed to be carried out in an ‘orderly and humane’ manner. In reality, in a Europe that was all but destitute, few cared with regard to how these ‘transfers’ were achieved, particularly when it came to Germans and even those who did care lacked the means to alleviate to any meaningful degree the suffering caused by imprisonment and expulsion. Within this context and with regard to future relations between Poland and the Federal Republic, three issues were of crucial importance: the particularly brutal nature of the German wartime occupation of Poland; the German-Polish border, and the fate of up to nine million Germans who either fled or were expelled to Germany many of whom died in the process
of flight or expulsion or in some cases at the hands of those who sought justice/vengeance prior to some official signal having been given (Bender 1995: 29–55).

The large majority of these refugees landed up in the Western zones of Occupation from which the Federal Republic was carved in 1949. For their part, between 1949 and 1963, the governments of the Federal Republic, dominated as they were by the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) and Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, refused to accept either the finality of either the expulsions or the westward shift of Poland’s border. This refusal allowed the PZPR to present itself as the ultimate guarantor of Polish independence, albeit one that was conditional upon the humour of the Soviet leadership. They were facilitated in this aim by the memory of German occupation and popular ignorance and understanding of Adenauer’s position. Publicly the CDU/CSU aligned itself with the various Landsmannschaften and their umbrella organisation, the Federation of Expellees (BdV) (Cordell & Wolff 2005: 82 et seq.). Given the inability of these organisations to come to terms with (the causes of) their loss and the potential susceptibility of refugees and expellees to ultra nationalist propaganda, Adenauer had to act quickly. To this day, the rapid success of the Wirtschaftswunder is assiduously portrayed as having promoted the integration of the expellees and refugees into the fabric of the Federal Republic, although this claim is as much propaganda as it is fact. However, by providing a political home for this constituency, Adenauer did promote their gradual and halting integration into the post-war Federal Republic. Despite having privately acknowledged that the former Ostgebiete had been lost for ever, to have said so in public would have first caused the CDU/CSU to have alienated a significant chunk of its electorate and secondly destabilised the Federal Republic. Although such intransigence consolidated support for the CDU/CSU and helped to engender stability in a particularly fragile society, it had serious negative external consequences, one of which was to add grist to the PZPR’s mill and deepen the mutual alienation between Germans and Poles (Cordell & Wolff 2005: 75).

4. Towards a New Relationship

Paradoxically the stalemate only began to moderate with the erection of the Berlin Wall in August 1961, which had the side effect of facilitating the development of new thinking throughout sections of the political class in Europe, the Soviet Union and the United States that eventually crystallised in the détente strategies of the late 1960s through to the mid-1970s. In fact, is the year 1970 that provides us with our first breakthrough with regard to the impasse between the Federal Republic and Poland. In the Federal Republic, the Berlin Wall prompted a radical
re-think within the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), with regard to attitudes and policy towards the entire Soviet bloc. In the case of Poland, the SPD was less circumspect than were their Christian Democratic counterparts in their recognition that the Ostgebiete were gone and that moreover the Federal Republic lacked the moral authority to demand their return. When Willy Brandt became chancellor in 1969, he and a close circle of advisors embarked upon an innovative Ostpolitik that was predicated upon recognition of the territorial status quo in Europe. The Polish element of this strategy reached fruition in December 1970, with the signing of a bilateral treaty, in which the Federal Republic accorded recognition with Poland’s western border ‘in accordance with the norms of international law’ and even more importantly was symbolised by Brandt’s famous and spontaneous Kniefall of 7 December 1970 at the memorial to the Warsaw Jewish Ghetto Uprising (Bender 1995: 182).

It would be ridiculous to argue that as a result of these actions relations between the Federal Republic and Poland suddenly reached a state of unanticipated harmony. However, the subsequent establishment of diplomatic relations which stemmed from Brandt’s initiative made it slightly more difficult for the PZPR to portray the Federal Republic in a wholly negative light and similarly to use anti-German propaganda as a means of emphasising its patriotic credentials. The impact of these moves upon the wider population is more difficult to gauge. Invariably the large majority of the new population of western Poland were comprised of internally displaced persons from central Poland and of refugees and expellees from former eastern Poland. Unsettled by recent memories of German and Soviet occupation and being acutely aware of the fragility of their own existence, they were susceptible to anti-German propaganda, especially given the de facto absence of the Federal Republic from their daily lives in anything other than its portrayal as a centre for ‘revanchism’ (Lipski 1996: 229–245). However, it is not unreasonable to assume that the signing of the 1970 treaty lent some sense of security to the ‘new’ population of western Poland.

Brandt’s administration fell in 1974 at about the same time that the broader détente initiative began to peter out. The period between the mid-1970s through to the fall of the communist regimes in Europe in 1989/90 represents something of an interim period in terms of bilateral relations between the Federal Republic and Poland. Brandt’s successor, Helmut Schmidt, who with regard to eastern Europe prioritised stability and relations with the Soviet Union above all else, felt that the burgeoning Polish opposition movement endangered the wider European peace and in his early years at least, Helmut Kohl his CDU successor (from 1982), showed little interest in Poland. However, the slow collapse of the communist regime in the 1980s did afford a new opportunity for Poland’s relations
with the Federal Republic to enter into a qualitatively new phase (Hajnicz 1995: 28 et seq.). This is neither the time nor the place to recount the nature of the Four plus Two plus One talks that resulted in German unification. Neither is it appropriate at this juncture to examine the two treaties, The German-Polish Border Treaty of 1990 and the Treaty of Good Neighbourly and Friendly Co-operation of 1991, that form the bedrock upon which German-Polish relations now rest. What we do need to acknowledge is that Germany and Poland are now firmly allied to one another through their common membership of the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO): that Germany acted as a powerful advocate for Polish admission to these two organisations; that bilateral economic links between the two states are strong (Cordell 2013b: 90), and that in general Polish-German relations are not characterised by the frostiness that permeates Warsaw’s relations with Moscow. However, within the context of a broad assessment of bilateral relations at this stage it is important for us to do two things: highlight any remaining issues that exist between the two states and assess the extent to which nationalism is still an important factor in shaping perceptions of the other.

5. Matters Arising

If we first take the border issue, apart for a handful of antediluvians it has been solved. Not only do the aforementioned treaties of 1970 and 1990 provide a legal foundation for its resolution, but also joint membership of the EU has rendered the border more permeable. Similarly, there are no special restrictions placed upon Germans who wish to work or reside in Poland, any more than Poles seeking work in Germany face restrictions aimed specifically at them as Poles. In Poland itself, the German minority that is indigenous to Poland is recognised as such. Similarly, the German heritage that permeates western Poland in is increasingly acknowledged and contemporary relations are based neither on negative caricatures nor on memories of occupation between 1939 and 1945. In Germany perhaps the problem is not so much one of removing legal obstacles that hinder the full integration of Poles into wider German society as much of Germans being not particularly interested in Poland or indeed much engrossed in anything ‘East European’ unless it happens to refer to gas prices, have a sun-drenched beach or figures in a game of football. Why this is the case is in itself an interesting topic for analysis in its own right. A crude assessment of the situation might highlight the very success of Adenauer’s strategy of Westbindung (embedding the Federal Republic within NATO and the EEC), in concert with innate feelings of unease with regard to a part of Europe with which Germany has had such an ambivalent and sometimes tragic
relationship. Either way, although negative stereotypes of *polnische Wirtschaft* (backward, messy) are by no means absent, they are not as pervasive as they were even 10 years ago and the belief that Poles are in some way inferior to Germans has all but disappeared.

However, issues do remain and they revolve around three themes, none of which are of much importance to most Germans even if they are of some importance to varying degrees to a significant cross-section of Polish society. The first involves matters directly arising from the Second World War: including questions of compensation for expropriation, imprisonment and expulsion. The second relates to Poland's indigenous German minority and the third, which in turn is linked to the second, relates to Germany's Polish minority (Cordell 2013a: 114–119).

Questions concerning expropriation, imprisonment and expulsion do not form part of the staple diet of political discourse in either country, especially Germany. When they do feature, it is usually as a consequence of the words and actions of the BdV, which despite its increasing marginalisation in Germany still have a surprising capacity to raise hackles, particularly in Poland. As they have done since the late 1940s, the issues concern the level of compensation paid to Polish victims of the Nazi occupation and the fate of German civilians as the Red Army rolled westwards into the Reich from late 1944. It is this latter issue that in turn often provokes calls from Poles that the issue of compensation to Polish victims of the Nazis be re-opened. Over the years the BdV has refused to let the matter drop, as various of its initiatives ranging from the Prussian Trust to the Planned Centre Against Expulsions have shown (Kerski 2011: 240–260). Whereas there is a consensus between the two governments that the matter of compensation, expropriation and expulsion is closed and a (belated) admission from the Polish side that the tenets of the Potsdam Agreement were not adhered to, there is also enormous sensitivity in Poland towards investigations that focus upon the tragic detail of the expulsion process and point to both the sheer number of deaths and official Polish (as opposed to Soviet) culpability, in the overall incarceration and expulsion procedures. Why the current generation of Poles who had absolutely nothing to do with this process, show such hesitancy in discussing it, is in itself an interesting subject for debate. In part such a reaction may be the consequence of a failure on the part of both the Polish state and wider society to acknowledge less savoury aspects of its twentieth century past (Douglas 2012: 426–446). Having said that reaction of Poles to the human consequences of forced migration and the consequent realisation that forced migrations require human participation and direction, is by no means *sui generis*, as for example is evidenced, for example in modern-day Turkey.
The process of forced migration and flight did not as is sometimes assumed lead to the effective removal of all Germans from Poland by the end of 1949. The appearance of Poland’s previously invisible indigenous German minority in the late 1980s caused considerable debate for two reasons: first because its advent challenged the commonplace supposition that Poland was effectively a national monolith and secondly because of the fact that said individuals claimed a German identity. Today, the existence of a German minority and its political activities is much less of an issue (Cordell 2013a: 110), partly because the number of declared Germans has fallen markedly since the late 1980s and partly because for many the existence and toleration of such (small) minorities is taken as evidence of Polish ‘multiculturalism’. However, for the Polish right, as currently epitomised above all by Law and Justice (PiS), the very existence of such minorities, especially the German minority, is sometimes turned into an ‘issue’ which is instrumentalised in a way that allows the right to present itself as the guarantor of Polish national integrity in the face of a minority that, in this instance, looks to a kin state, Germany, that, according to one version of history has never been a friend to Poland. In turn, seemingly ignorant of the scope of the international obligations to which Poland is a signatory, members of PiS have threatened that a future PiS government would abolish all ‘privileges’ enjoyed by the German minority, unless similar rights are granted to the ‘Polish minority’ resident in Germany, which apparently labours under a discriminatory regime (The News Pl 2012).

The aforementioned Polish minority in Germany consists of two separate but by no means wholly discrete groups of people. First there are those of mixed German-Polish heritage, who (are the descendants of persons who) made a conscious decision to migrate to Germany on economic and/or political grounds. The extent to which this group and its descendants born in Germany sees itself as exclusively Polish, or indeed as wholly German, is open to question (Warchol-Schlottmann 2001). On the other hand, there are also millions of people of indubitably Polish descent living in Germany, some of whose ancestors migrated so long ago that their descendants barely regard themselves as being of Polish origin. Of course more recently-arrived migrants view themselves as being Polish, but as how their children and grand-children will come to view themselves is a wholly different question. In reality PiS and its supporters are faced by a process that they find difficult to comprehend: namely the steady integration of Poles into Germany society, as Germans of Polish descent. This is a phenomenon that first became apparent around 150 years ago when the mass migration of Poles into the German industrial centres first began (Kleßmann 1993: 303–310). In response, PiS invokes a singular version of history and misrepresents the nature of the European minority rights regime, which, rightly or wrongly caters explicitly for indigenous as opposed
to migrant minority communities in an effort to present itself as the guarantor of Polish national integrity. The reality of integration and consciousness shifts also, of course, goes against the grain of a belief that national identity is organic, immutable and innate.

Conclusion

What then of the role of nationalism both generally and specifically with regard to contemporary German-Polish relations? Nationalism is undoubtedly still a potent force in Europe, although its influence is unevenly spread throughout the continent. Germany, along with Sweden may be characterised as a state that to an extent is permeated by what may be termed by post-national ideals. However they are not fully accepted among the wider population and Germans still engage in debate concerning the extent to which membership of the German nation should be contingent upon ethnic or civic criteria. Within this context, the 2006 World Cup is of particular importance as it marked the first time since 1945 that Germans were able to celebrate the country’s achievements in a manner that could not be misconstrued as either nationalistic or chauvinistic. Today, if elements of Germany’s population exhibit a tendency toward collective and individual self-identification that privileges identity markers other than those we conventionally label as ‘national’, it as much as anything else down to Germany’s experience with hyper nationalism in the latter years of the nineteenth and early years of the twentieth centuries combined with its subsequent dalliance with National Socialism.

Poland’s experience is of course different, although it is sometimes difficult to disentangle the fate of the two neighbours and indeed their populations. Whereas Adam Mickiewicz’ portrayal of Poland as ‘The Christ of Nations’ no longer has either the resonance or relevance that it once had, his simile is still instructive: precisely because 100 years ago that was the dominant imagery for a large majority of Catholic Christian Poles. This was the case because of the violence of the creation and consolidation of the Polish nation-state between 1918 and 1921 and it was an image that was re-enforced by the destruction wrought upon Poland between 1939 and 1945. If that was not enough, for almost 45 years thereafter Poland laboured under authoritarian dysfunctional communist rule that in an increasingly hollow and half-hearted manner sought to present the PZPR as the sole guarantor of Polish national independence.

Today, both Poland and Germany are increasingly similar and less riven and driven by past anxieties. Although in Poland, as support for PiS and groups more clearly to their right shows, a significant element of Polish society has still to come to embrace the de facto EU norm of the nation being at least as much of a civic
as opposed to ethnically constructed community. Germans and Poles have learned to live alongside one another whilst acknowledging their differences alongside their similarities and their occasionally blurred as opposed to distinct heritages. The extent to which harmony may continue to be the norm is not dependent simply upon the conduct of elites toward one another any more than it is upon continued European integration. The secular ideologies that arose from the late eighteenth century and that provide frameworks for political programmes that re-shaped the European state system in an unparalleled and violent manner did so precisely because the prior and established belief patterns and systems of rule were incapable of meeting the challenge of scientific and technological change. If Germany and Poland are to survive and prosper in their currently recognisable form, then individuals and society as a collective unit will have to learn how to adapt to and therefore survive the unending process of change.

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The Nationalist Movement in Poland: the Third Evolution Phase of Polish Nationalism after 1989?

1. Introduction

1.1. The Nationalist Movement – Case Study and Comparative Perspective

In contemporary Poland, in contrast to the inter-war period when it was the most significant political camp, until fairly recently nationalist groups barely existed. After 1989, numerous parties representing this ideology, mutually conflicted and completely powerless, operated at the fringes of the political system. However, in the last five years, nationalism – or more precisely its newest variation, has aspired to become a permanent feature of the Polish political landscape. Since its inception, on Independence Day (11 November) 2010, the March of Independence (MI) has attracted mass attention and public interest. There was rioting during the rally, as the mainstream media, which is unfavourable of the entire far right, unintentionally provided valuable air-time to anti-government activists and their slogans (Rukat 2013: 283–284). This is how the nationalists, or more precisely this ‘new wave’ of its ideological adherents, returned to prominence in the public discourse. This situation is really significant for the condition of democracy in Poland because the essence of its liberal variant is plurality, meant as a multiplicity of contradictory opinions. The substance of liberal democracy is not a compromise, but a permanently unsolvable dispute. The existence of numerous pro-establishment parties that share fundamental liberal ideas does not in itself guarantee ideological pluralism. The participation of explicitly illiberal political actors within the political system is indispensable to the implementation of a modus vivendi-style liberalism (see: McCabe 2010; Krawczyk 2011: 110–113, 118–122). Paradoxically, anti-liberal orientated political groupings contribute to the consolidation of liberal democracy.

Mass attendance at this annual political rally slowly became the most identifiable part of Independence Day celebrations in Poland. As such, it requires a thorough examination of the origins, essence and the prospects for this phenomenon.
It is necessary to remember that MIs are only the most visible symptom of Polish nationalism’s profound transformation. In fact the MI constitutes a prelude to the formation of the Nationalist Movement (NM)\(^1\).

The following facts and indicators have to be considered when assessing whether the NM represents a ‘new wave’ of nationalism in Poland:

1. a forthcoming generational change – understood not simply as younger activists taking over from their older counterparts but as a crucial turning point in all aspects – from political thought through to organisational models and political strategy;
2. a challenge to other political leaders – two marginal youth associations organising the MI unexpectedly set the agenda for celebrating the main public holiday. This means they challenged both established nationalist activists as well as all the post-1989 parliamentary and ruling parties;
3. an open formula – young leaders making significant efforts to renew nationalism in the abovementioned aspects: a transition from ideological orthodoxy using modern social communications channels and revisiting the idea of a Central-European system (confederation) of nations-states.
4. a socio-political project – instead of small-scale authoritarian parties created by older activists in the last decade of the 20\(^{th}\) century, young nationalists sought to initiate a mass, multi-stream political movement.

There are two types of post-1989 nationalist concepts based on the three-stage evolution of this ideology. Analysis of this development will extract the key differences necessary when comparing adaptations of old-type nationalism of the 1990s with its moderate formula that came into existence in the second decade of the 21\(^{st}\) century.

Apart from internal factors – for example a leadership crisis, or doctrinal revision – it is also necessary to consider the formation process of the NM in a broader context. On the one hand, its role and position in the Polish political system, and on the other, the condition of similar, in the sense of illiberal and anti-establishment oriented, political groupings in some other European countries.

Throughout the 20\(^{th}\) century, Polish nationalism constituted a comprehensive antithesis of liberalism. In the 1990s, older activists struggled to convert doctrines formulated in the 1930s whilst preserving the authoritarian style of political

\(^1\) A literal translation of the original name of the Ruch Narodowy – which means the National Movement – is misleading, because it suggest nationwide status or nation-building character. In fact, this is a major political grouping only in the framework of the nationalist party subsystem, but in terms of the entire party spectrum it is a merely small proto-party at the fringe of the Polish political system. So it is a ‘nationalist’ grouping, and not a ‘national’ movement.
thinking. Moreover, adherents of this ideology did not take a part in the “Solidarność” opposition movement and in the ‘Round Table’ Agreements. Consequently, after 1989 they found themselves outside the political mainstream and they did not participate in the debate on the direction of the transition. Finally, in all crucial fields of domestic, foreign and economic policy nationalists present an alternative point of view to all parliamentary parties.

A complementary aspect of the Polish nationalism transformation is the current revival of an anti-establishment orientation throughout Europe. Despite such uncompromising opposition not being homogeneous, all parties belonging to this trend are oppose European integration. The growing importance of this issue is proven by the European Parliament (EP) elections held in May 2014, with gains for anti-immigrant parties demanding withdrawal from the European Union in France and UK (Results of European elections 2014). The sudden growth of highly diversified versions of Euroscepticism, both purely liberal (like the United Kingdom Independence Party or the New Right Congress party in Poland) or openly anti-liberal (such as the National Front in France), indicates in fact that we are witnessing is a noticeable legitimacy crisis among mainstream parties throughout the European Union (The Eurosceptic Union; European elections 2014). To illustrate the increasing relevance of nationalism in Central Europe, it is sufficient to draw attention to radical groupings from Hungary and Slovakia. Both combine populism with extreme right features: manifestly anti-governmental attitudes and the promotion of authoritarian traditions from before 1945, whilst appealing to anti-Roma sentiment (Kluknavská 2012: 7–8, 11–13, 20, 29; Varga 2014). Despite substantial similarities there are also significant differences between the cases. Regularly gaining several percent of votes (around from 900,000 to one million in total), the Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik) has become a permanent feature of the Hungarian political landscape (Hungary, National Election Office). By way of contrast the Peoples Party Our Slovakia (Ľudová strana Naše Slovensko, LsNS) is marginal, receiving only around 1 percent of votes at elections. It gained over 5 percent of votes in only three regions, coincidentally those with the most numerous Roma population (Kluknavská 2012: 19–21, 24–28).

These cases, despite their uniqueness, determined by the specific nature of the political systems, demonstrate a significant increase of the relevance of nationalist groupings as a part of a growing demand for an anti-establishment opposition. Considering that the NM seems to be part of this tendency and the earlier shock to mainstream public opinion by the sudden rise of the League of Polish

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Families (Liga Polskich Rodzin, LPR), a detailed analysis of its formation process is required. The main aspects of this phenomenon – (1) mass support, (2) a new formula and (3) a context of the revival of anti-establishment groupings in other states – define the three research fields covered by this chapter.

1.2. Research Questions

Firstly, the author intends to verify the thesis that the NM is not a continuation of mainstream post-1989 Polish nationalism but rather that it constitutes a new type of nationalism altogether. Since 2010, we have been able to observe efforts to initiate a modern political doctrine aimed at providing solutions to contemporary challenges and at bringing about a more effective formula of political activity.

Secondly, the NM is generally composed of two main organisations. An important question is to identify which of its political wings – moderate or radical – will emerge as dominant in the near future. Consequently, could the NM pose a threat to democracy or is it a mere protest party operating in the legal framework of the political system?

Thirdly, it is difficult accurately to assess the NM’s popularity and electoral potential. This is illustrated on the one hand by the immense success of the Independence March, and on the other by the low number of votes cast for the NM (less than 2 percent in total) in the elections of 2014 and 2015.

The final task is to diagnose whether the NM is a symptom of a legitimacy crisis of the political establishment in Poland. Taking this into account, the author intends to examine whether this grouping is able to call into question the political legitimacy of the parties that – during the last quarter of a century – determined the transition of the Polish political system.

For the above reasons, the most significant contribution of this chapter is analysis of factors that have brought about an increase in the social popularity of nationalism in Poland in the second decade of the 21st century. Diagnosis of the factors that determine the younger generation’s demand for nationalists ideas, political events, social networks and organisations is an interesting issue, especially in the context of elections, both held in 2014 (to the EP in May and to local government in November) and the presidential and parliamentary polls in 2015.

2. The Nationalist Movement as a New Type of Nationalism?

First, it is necessary to distinguish four aspects of the innovative character of the NM. A primary issue – but despite appearances not the easiest to define – is generational change. This is an important factor, because the young leaders
challenge both the establishment and the old-type nationalists by promoting alternative points of view in both the ideological and organisational fields. Furthermore, their vision of their contemporary role in the political system is significantly less opaque than in the 1990s, when nationalist parties fell into disarray unable to decide between choosing fundamentalist opposition and repeated efforts to enter into a coalition with some right-wing parliamentary parties (see: Maj & Maj 2007). The new generation of Polish nationalists aspires to gain an independent position within the party system and, what is more, to become the leaders of potential coalition of an anti-establishment right.

2.1. A New Image or New Forms of Political Activity?

To appreciate the innovative character of the NM it is necessary to consider the specific position of nationalism in the Polish political system. During the inter-war period, the very diverse political camp inspired by this ideology was the largest in terms of popular support. After the Second World War, the communist authorities did not allow its revival as a satellite movement, such as peasant party or social-democratic party. In the second half of the 20th century, overt nationalism barely existed in Poland. From the autumn of 1989, older activists – called ‘seniors’3 – tried to re-establish political parties referring to the pre-1945 tradition. As a consequence, in the 1990s a dozen small-scale, mutually conflicted and completely powerless nationalist parties existed at the fringe of the political system (see: Tomasiewicz 2003; Maj & Maj 2007). The generation gap caused by communist rule brought about a leadership crisis, a deficit of efficient organisations and funds, and out-dated political thought. Reference to the heritage of historical parties resulted in the adoption of archaic forms of political activity – authoritarian doctrines based on anti-Semitism and the imperative of unification within a single political party. As a result, in the first evolution phase of contemporary Polish nationalism the older politicians were not able to either create modern parties or political thought, and finally were unable to gain social acceptance.

The second formatory phase among the partisans of nationalism began in the first decade of the 21st century, when the relevance of its moderate wing increased significantly. The middle generation leaders4 substantially reformed their

3 The older activists (‘seniorzy’ – the ‘seniors’) began their involvement in the nationalist political camp before Second World War. After 1989, they were treated as the repositories of the ideological heritage and claimed the legitimate right to re-establish the historic Nationalist Party. In 1990s they shaped the belief systems middle generation of activists.

4 This group was led by Roman Giertych and Wojciech Wierzejski (see: Wierzejski 2008a: 8; Wierzejski 2008b: 147).
political strategy. Employing the imperative of solidarity – included in Catholic social teaching as well as being a constitutive ideological component of nationalism (Freeden 1998: 753) – they turned to populism. The League of Polish Families was established in 2001 taking advantage of a public demand for a Eurosceptic voice during the pre-EU accession referendum debate. The party combined a democratic type of nationalism with strong Catholic inspiration and right-wing populism. Despite the mainstream media and commentators – generally being ill disposed towards nationalists – the LPR surprisingly gained over a million votes and parliamentary seats in the national elections of 2001 and 2005 (Jajecznik 2006: 109, 121, 132). Firstly the LPR abandoned ideological orthodoxy for a populist strategy. Secondly it unified many small-scale political groupings rather than competing for exclusivity, and thirdly, it exploited the opportunity for the anti-EU opposition giving LPR temporary relevance. Roman Giertych served as the Minister of Education and deputy PM, which served as the high-water mark for medium generation leaders. The greatest weakness of the moderate wing of Polish nationalism at this time was lack of a modern doctrine – populist slogans and Euroscepticism were only a substitute.

It is now clear in retrospect that a crucial element of this phase of the evolution of Polish nationalism was the involvement of young activists as assistants to parliamentarians, MEPs and ministers (Jajecznik 2006: 113, 132). Substantive support by first-rank LPR politicians on the part of students or graduates was indispensable because of the post-Second World War generation gap. Young generation activists were mostly alumni and executive board members of the All-Polish Youth association (Młodzież Wszechpolska, MW). From observation of their leaders they evaluated the reasons for political success or failure. At the end of the day, this solution was a double-edged sword. In the short term, the young reinforcements

5 The LPR successfully took part in the local government elections of 2002. Two years later in the first EP elections in Poland, they gained ten seats. In 2005 they again received over 940,000 votes in the lower chamber of parliament election and, in 2006, entered into the government coalition with the Law & Justice (PiS) and populist the Self-defence party (Samoobrona RP) (see: Jajecznik 2006: 111, 133; Koziello 2014: 48–50).

6 The second government member from the LPR, as the Minister of Maritime Affairs, was a young lawyer – Rafał Wiechecki.

7 By adopting a law granting a child allowance regardless of parental income and the so-called “secondary school amnesty” allowing graduation without passing only one of exams, the Minister of Education convincingly proved the well-known populism of the LPR period in the government coalition.

8 The youngest activists were politically shaped by their experiences in the 1990s, not directly by the ‘senior’ activists but by the middle generation. They graduated from university and gained local government, government and parliamentary political experience – both national and European.
provided the existing leadership with expert knowledge, which was not at the disposal of the middle generation. However, eventually the MW’s members become aware of their own political potential and the differences between them and current mentors and leaders.

The transformation period occurred in the four years leading up to the early parliamentary elections in 2007, caused by the governing coalition's disintegration due to conflicts within and between the coalition parties. The election results, in which the LPR gained only 1.3 percent of the votes (Electoral Committee of the LPR 2007, Koziello 2014: 52–53), accelerated the generational leadership change. It was not only a disaster for the party, but first of all a defeat of the old-type nationalism and – what is important in the context of this analysis – also the end of the hegemony of middle and old generation politicians, who had no political and ideological offer acceptable to wider society.

The transformation process, apart from leading to the (electoral) marginalisation of the LPR, consisted of two complementary components. Firstly, Wojciech Wierzejski, one of the most recognizable LPR figures and most loyal partner of Maciej Giertych and his son Roman, returned from the political margins. In 2008, Wierzejski funded the journal Polityka Narodowa (PN, National Policy). Contrary to his intention of promoting the LPR's achievements in the field of legislation and public discourse, from the first issue it become a forum for debate on the condition of nationalism after 1989. The formation process of a new group of aspiring leaders began instantly. They pointed out the faults and persistent weaknesses their own political camp – faith in archaic points of views both in the field of ideology and political strategy. This attitude, understood as a continuous recalling of the heritage of the National Party (Stronnictwo Narodowe) from the first half of the 20th century, was considered proof of political infirmity. They refuted the ‘seniors’ and their direct successors, emphasizing the lack of real political achievement during almost twenty years and the party’s complete inability to reform organisational structures or offer an attractive political programme. The most die-hard critics

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9 The fall in the LPR’s popularity was the result of internal leadership conflicts between Giertych’s faction and regional party leaders, as well as the disintegration of the PiS–LPR–Samoobrona government coalition due to corruption scandal in the Ministry of Agriculture led by Andrzej Lepper, the undisputed leader of the Self-defence party (see: Koziello 2014: 51–53).

10 Giertych’s family has deep roots in the history of Polish nationalism in the 20th century. Jędrzej Giertych – Roman’s grandfather – was one of the most famous representatives of the radical doctrine created by the young nationalists in 1930s. As one of the few nationalists leaders who survived the Second World War, he and, his son Maciej, had a decisive influence on shaping the attitudes of generations of activists dominating during the 1990s.
were former MEP’s and parliamentarians Krzysztof Bosak and Daniel Pawłowiec elected respectively in 2004 and 2005 (see: Bosak 2008: 15–16; Pawłowiec 2010: 367). Krzysztof Bosak’s polemics with Wojciech Wierzejski amounted to a repudiation of allegiance to the mentors and recent political management of the moderate-wings of Polish nationalism, which in the 21st century consisted of the LPR and the MW.

At the same time, there was a parallel evolution of some radical groupings. Hitherto separate regional groups unified into one association under the historical name National Radical Camp (Obóz Narodowo-Radykalny, ONR). The adherents of the ONR maintained that organisational unification be supplemented by the adoption of traditional values borrowed from Catholicism and conservatism and abandoned a skinhead subculture (Witczak 2012: 330).

The gradual co-operation between groupings representing competitive wings of nationalism arose from contrasting internal transformations. The MW’s alumnus, after losing the status of a parliamentary party’s youth organisation, again became interested in radical types of nationalism. Meanwhile the ONR strove to moderate its own image.

The third phase of the evolution of Polish contemporary nationalism began in 2010 with the young leaders’ takeover of the editorial board of Polityka Narodowa and starting organisation of the MIs. Symptomatically, new political brands were employed in both cases. They built their image from the ground upwards to distance themselves from their predecessors’ inefficiency and associated negative stereotypes. However, in fact both these projects were guided by long-standing nationalist activists. Wierzejski appointed his deputy Konrad Bonisławski as acting editor-in-chief of the PN for the duration of the 2010 electoral campaign. In so doing Wierzejski paradoxically opened the door for the internal opposition. Soon young activists joined the editorial board, including four former chairmen of the MW (Jajecznik 2013a: 362). Thus the PN became not only a platform of an ideological debate, but also one of the major centres of an emerging political movement. Also, the nationalist demonstration held on Independence Day was nothing new – similar events had been held for many years in different cities and towns, separately by each of competing groupings. Meanwhile, the main organisers of the MIs refrained from emphasising the role of their groupings, because the MW and especially the ONR had been unable to attract backers. Therefore the MIs were held by an association established to be independent of existing groupings11, though its executive board consists of the former leaders of the MW and the ONR12.

11 The March of Independence Association was registered in 2011.
12 The chairman of the association is Witold Tumanowicz. One of the executive board members is Krzysztof Bosak.
This solution proved to be apposite. Employing a new political brand allowed the merging of nationalist groupings and unorganised nationalist circles (the first MIs were attended also by the Autonomous Nationalists) who had been in prior conflict with one another. Also, until then nationalists used different organisational models. In 1990s the old activists established small-scale parties, competing for exclusive legitimacy to represent the traditions of Polish nationalism. They were as numerous and as they were insignificant until united by the middle generation of Roman Giertych and Wierzejski in one umbrella party, the LPR\(^{13}\). Furthermore, the new image facilitated the attraction of right-wing anti-establishment opposition. Politicians from small right-wing groupings\(^{14}\), some famous columnists, researchers sympathising with Polish nationalism, the National Armed Forces Association members and veterans joined the Honorary Committee of the first MI. Backers of the *Gazeta Polska* and the *Solidarni 2010* association, both paradoxically closely connected with the establishment party, Law & Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, PiS), also attended the MIs in 2010 and 2011. The freshness of the initiative contributed to several thousand participants assembling at the MIs, which were in fact led by widely unknown leaders. Acting under their own political brands (of the MW and the ONR) the MIs organisers had been unable to gather mass social acceptance.

Criticising the command style of political leadership and deficit of programmatic and political strategy debates, the protesters restored the formula of a wide and informal socio-political movement applied by Polish nationalists one hundred years ago. Krzysztof Bosak, the leader of the moderate wing of the NM, maintains that

\[\text{\ldots} \text{a movement consisting of large and hierarchical organisations is much less effective, less stable, and in the end less useful than one consisting of a network of numerous and independent entities, grassroots initiatives and associations connected by ideological bonds (Bosak 2008: 16).}\]

In other words, they abandoned the ineffective and controversial attempts to create a single centralised party aiming for a monopoly in the field of the ideology, as sought after by the senior activists of the last decade of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century. The young

\(^{13}\) Officially the LPR was a uniform party, but in fact it was the product of an electoral alliance of right-wing populists, Eurosceptic, orthodox Catholics and nationalists. The PN editors estimate that only 10 percent of the party members held nationalistic beliefs (Pawłowiec 2010: 367).

\(^{14}\) Janusz Korwin-Mikke, was the leader of New Right Congress party (Kongres Nowej Prawicy). Professor Jacek Bartyzel formed the Conservative-Monarchist Club (Klub Zachowawczo-Monarchistyczny).
activists announced a model opposed in terms of a political strategy to that practiced by the ‘seniors’. The differences included:

1. post-2010 new-wave leaders preferred informal network structures based on common ideological beliefs and including political adversaries instead of exclusive parties;

2. existing structures for enforcing party discipline and subordination were replaced by a multi-stream structure associating political groupings that previously acted autonomously, or even in mutual competition, together with the incorporation of local grassroots initiatives;

3. rather than uniform party structures, the movement is composed of different types of units – associations, editorial boards of journals and newspapers, internet portals\textsuperscript{15} and sub-cultures\textsuperscript{16}.

Parallel to the political efforts, the annual political rallies and journals as programme creation centres, they endeavour to develop numerous and stable social bases for the movement. In contrast to their predecessors, who used traditional methods of communication and support networks\textsuperscript{17}, the new leaders opted for permanent contact with supporters as they could not rely on paid-up members. Aiming to create a social network, they used new channels of a social communication. It is no surprise that the youth movement, as opposed to other Polish political groupings, founded one of the most popular political web pages\textsuperscript{18}. To gain information independence from mainstream media – perceived by nationalists as sympathizing with the political establishment – they also launched the web portal (narodowcy.net) providing followers with daily news and ideologically committed publicity. Moreover, the use of pop culture (‘patriotic’ hip-hop or rock music, and comic books) to popularise the nationalist point of view (particularly modern political history) is also a novelty (Jajecznik 2013a: 363–365), especially given the very old-fashioned background of nationalists parties in the 1990s.

\textsuperscript{15} The newspaper \textit{Polska Niepodległa (Independent Poland)} – since 2013, the journals PN and the \textit{Mysł.pl} and narodowcy.net web portal.

\textsuperscript{16} Autonomous Nationalists, some football hooligan groups and ‘patriotic oriented’ music fans both rap and rock style.

\textsuperscript{17} The ‘seniors’ organised party meetings, and celebrations of national and religious holidays (see: Tomasiewicz 2003; Maj & Maj 2007).

\textsuperscript{18} The NM’s page is liked by 154,000 users, what is one the best result of a single political Facebook fan page. The New Right Congress party (216,000) has the greatest number of ‘likes’. J. Korwin-Mikke’s party, new grouping – the Korwin party – gained 154,000 of ‘likes’. By comparison, all parliamentary parties fan pages gained around 200,000 ‘likes’. It is necessary to remember that a large number of political fan page subscribers are not followers, but merely observers who receive newsletters and similar communications.
This organisational model has not been thoroughly implemented. Growing attendance at MIs might seem promising for fragmented right-wing non-parliamentary groupings, but despite initial declarations of uncompromising opposition, the MIs appearance of being a cross-party political rally has disappeared since 2012. The conversion of a socio-political movement project to a proto-party was caused equally by external and internal factors. In fact, the withdrawal of many well-known figures from the honorary committee – politicians, journalists, scholars sympathizing with right-wing or even celebrities – and declining support for the MI by representatives of various right-wing groupings (conservative liberals, monarchists and right-wing populists) derived from the new leadership’s faults (see: Szymanik 2012).

Above all, the inexperienced leadership aimed to take advantage of the MIs’ participatory success in order to gain political backers. Therefore, immediately after the MI in 2012, which was as usual addressed to a variety of right-wing anti-establishment circles, they organised another political rally, gathering mainly a young activists of the MW and the ONR, to officially announce the formation of the Nationalist Movement19 (Winnicki 2012). Winnicki and Bosak did not define whether it would be a kind of proto-party or remain a political movement, composed of various groupings and grassroots local groups. During the first NM congress, held in May 2013, several organisations20 signed the programme declaration. Repeated declaration that both initiatives – the MI and the NM – do not aspire for party status but rather represent a broad anti-establishment front (Bonisławski & Siemiątkowski 2014: 254), turned out to be false. Despite two electoral defeats in 2014 Winnicki announced the registration the NM as political party in November 2014 (Majewski 2014).

To recapitulate, as an organisation, the NM evolved in three phases. In 2010–2012 the new leaders declared the initiation of a socio-political movement project. In practice they sought to gain recognition and social acceptance for a new political brand by means of the MIs. Thereafter in 2013, they officially announced

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19 First signal of plans to establish the NM The initial signal to establish the NM were published in Gazeta Wyborcza, unfavourable towards nationalists, after the MI in 2011 (Szymanik 2011). Than leaders immediately denied (Winnicki & Holocher 2011).

20 Despite the reservations of the main players – the MW, the ONR and the MI Association – the declaration was accepted by: two journals (PN and Mysł.pl), ‘narodowcy.net’ web portal editors, two very small-scale parties: the Real Politics Union party (Unia Polityki Realnej) and The Freedom Movement party (Ruch Wolności), several local grassroots groups (for e.g. Koszalin Town’s Nationalists (Narodowy Koszalin), assorted other community activist groups and – paradoxically – some Catholic organisations (e.g. Civitas Christiana association, as well as the neo-paganist association “Niklot” (see: Bonisławski & Siemiątkowski 2014: 255–259; The NM 2nd congress 2014).
the creation of the NM without specifying its legal forms, thus converting the emerging political movement into a proto-party. They rebutted initial declarations that the movement would be composed of many separate groupings acting independently and connected only by ideological beliefs. The NM began turning into a single grouping. The third phase began in 2014 with participation in local government and EP elections. The registration of the party only confirms this tendency\(^{21}\). The frequent turning points are no surprise considering the newness of the political brands and the MI and NM were indispensable in order to attract thousands of followers. Essentially, both initiatives are not the beginning of a political movement but camouflage for the MW and the ONR coalition, because these associations would never have been able to attract even a fraction of this support acting under their proper names.

2.2. The Origins of the New Doctrine

The new generation leaders realise there will be no revival of nationalism without ideological modernisation. They openly criticise the ‘seniors’ as epigones who unsuccessfully attempted to adapt archaic ideas, which resulted in the use of inadequate and unpopular slogans. Therefore, the main challenge is to fill the “conceptual emptiness” inherited from their predecessors. In order to re-connect with their followers they call for a broad discussion about the basis of modern nationalist political thought. Thus the editorial boards of the PN and *Myśl.pl (Idea.pl)* are major components of the nascent socio-political movement. The journals’ editors strive to build an ideological platform uniting fragmented nationalist groupings (Jajecznik 2013a: 366, 372).

In Krzysztof Bosak’s opinion, comprehensive doctrines are obsolete. Today ordinary citizens demand single ideas that solve concrete problems. Thus he recommends giving up on reviving nationalistic solidarity and ideological rhetoric in favour of particular ideas. The ‘new wave’ of nationalists declare their strong ideological identity but are attracted to pragmatic and flexible solutions. Furthermore, an individual approach to selected contemporary challenges could strengthen their position in public discourse (Jajecznik 2013a: 367).

The editors of PN held to the belief that the long-term hegemony of liberal axioms to be nearing exhaustion. As a consequence, they believe that there will be a resultant rise in demand for alternative visions. From this point of view, civil unrest caused by a demographic crisis, the collapse of multiculturalism

\(^{21}\) On 11 February 2015 the NM entered into the political parties register (Małyszek 2015).
or a deepening of European integration fully express the nationalists’ position (Jajecznik 2013a: 367). The contestation of selected components of liberal belief provides them with keynotes for the draft of the new doctrine and allows them also to adapt some elements of the anti-liberal heritage of Polish nationalism. In fact, the editors of PN did not create their doctrine from scratch but attempted to connect old and new threads – in other words, the ideological identity is connected to responses to current challenges. Moreover, the contemporary polemic with liberalism is not a simple repetition of convictions from the inter-war period. The common threads of heritage and current nationalist thinking are connected in a polemic with liberal democracy and an anti-establishment orientation. Liberalism is continuously perceived as threat to national and religious identity.

They diagnose the sources of the demographic crisis – in Poland as well as throughout Europe – as individualism, consumerism and the permissive society. They attribute the collapse of the traditional model of life to – in simple terms: an expectation of comfort and prosperity instead of nuclear family duties – resulting in not only depopulation but also social disintegration. From this point of view, non-European migrant workers do not supplement the labour shortage but, above all, transform the cultural structure of society. The mass scale of the phenomenon is regarded as a reason for the crises of both national identity and European civilisation (see: Jajecznik 2013b: 446–447). In opposing multiculturalism and immigration, the contributors to The Handbook for Nationalists: The ABC of Contemporary Nationalism sought to promote the repatriation of Poles deported during the Second World War from post-Soviet states (Bonislawski & Siemiątkowski 2014: 179). This option would apparently compensate for the mass migration of (young) Poles to Western Europe and the fall in the birth rate and so protect the nation state’s composition.

The ‘new wave’ of Polish nationalists contests multiculturalism but does not yield to xenophobia. The old and middle generation nationalists were concerned primarily with domestic matters. The young leaders gave up national egotism as an integral component of old-type nationalism. A narrow-minded perspective was replaced by international co-operation. The implementation of this idea comes through the annual participation of foreign nationalist group representatives in the MIs. The NM’s activists exclude co-operation only with Lithuanian and German nationalists, accusing them of chauvinism (Bonislawski & Siemiątkowski 2014: 131–133). It is expressed by two separate factors – the search for inspiration with which to refresh the doctrine as well as observation of attempting to create an alliance of anti-establishment opposition in different countries. The contributors to The Handbook for Nationalists argue that a hypothetical nationalist government in one country will
be isolated, as evidenced by the international pressure of liberal states on Victor Orban’s government. So, in their draft of doctrine the contributors present themselves as moderate politicians. They emphasise the rejection of antithetical orientations such national egotism and chauvinism on the one hand, and imperialism on the other, which they attribute to universal ideologies of a liberal or socialist nature (Bonisławski & Siemiątkowski 2014: 131, 134–135).

Anti-imperialism was a traditional component of the ideology but in the last decade of the 20th century this idea not been pursued. The older and middle generation politicians mainly agitated fears of alleged German political and economic hegemony (see: Giertych 2009: 8–25). Promoting a strategic partnership with United States or Russia was equal to acceptance of Poland inside either sphere of influence (Jajecznik 2013b: 465–467, 475). Essentially, this point of view was supposed to counter anti-imperialism. Old-type nationalists confined themselves to stressing fears of deepening European integration as a threat to national sovereignty. ‘New wave’ leaders offer an alternative vision of Poland’s position in Europe, reviving the Central European confederation project22, taken from the middle 20th century and meant as an alliance of nation-oriented states (Brubaker 1998). Essentially it is return to the “Great Poland” concept – a vision of “cultural imperialism”. The idea of Polish leadership Central Europe was based on the assumption that a strong and vital identity – both national and Catholic – is an attractive alternative to liberal and unified West. Realising that single states are powerless against global challenges, they accept the necessity for permanent, voluntary economic and security co-operation between nation-states. The confederation project includes the following countries: Belarus, the Czech Republic, Hungary (if they respect a minority rights to avoid conflicts with neighbouring countries), Lithuania (only on the condition of autonomy for Poles in the Vilnius region), Slovakia and Ukraine (regardless of the unresolved issue of accountability for Second World War crimes in the Volhynia region) as confederation members. Strengthening co-operation on the north–south axis – with Nordic states for economic reasons was also considered. Similar plans were also touted with regard to the Baltic states (Estonia and Latvia) and with Romania due to its location and positive sentiment with regard to the inter-war alliance between Poland and Romania (Bonisławski & Siemiątkowski 2014: 97–104).

In summary, the draft of the Central European nation-states confederation project is an alternative to the EU, which is understood by nationalists to be

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22 The 11th number of the PN was devoted to reviving the concept of the CE confederation project, the original name of which is Międzymorze, which means Intermarum (isthmus) – an area between the Baltic, Adriatic and Black Seas.
an instrument of German hegemony in Europe. It is also a rejection of strategic partnership between Europe and the United States as in the LPR’s programme, or with Russia as advocated by some older activists (Bonisławski & SŁemiątkowski 2014: 89; see: Jajecznik 2013b: 470; Maj 2011). Paradoxically, they seek to legitimise the Polish imperial project as an anti-imperialist alliance of the nation-states of the region.

A novelty is also the distance of the ‘new wave’ nationalists to Catholic inspiration (Bonisławski 2011: 179–189; Pawłowiec 2010: 368). Recognising the fact that since the Second Vatican Council the Catholic Church generally refrains from directly supporting specific political parties, or movements, the new-wave nationalists do not expect direct backing from the church. They also are aware of the difference of opinion within the Polish church hierarchy on European integration and indicate some bishops’ involvement at the side of the political establishment in this case. However, the keynote of the contestation is the blurred boundary between Catholic values and liberal axioms – that is in other words an obligation to care for one’s own family or private sphere. They maintain that a “familial egoism” is not identical but tantamount to liberal individualism. However, Catholic social teaching is still respected as a source of inspiration but is not a guide for the drafting of the new doctrine (Bonisławski & SŁemiątkowski 2014: 227–228, 231, 234, 236).

The new-wave activists and are keenly interested in the condition of European national identities. They also monitor the actions of especially radical nationalists groupings in other countries in search of inspiration for an organisational model, a political strategy, social communication and programme components (Jajecznik 2013a: 351). The most dynamically developing cooperation is with Jobbik, the electoral successes of which demonstrate the potential for nationalism in Central Europe.

Finally, contemporary anti-liberalism is completely different to that presented by the older and middle generation politicians in the first and the second phases of evolution of the ideology after 1989. The older activists invoked an anti-Semitic interpretation of liberalism taken from the inter-war period. The ‘new wave’ nationalists do not employ anti-Semitic slogans, but identify liberalism as being at the heart of both the European and national identity crises. Moreover, an anti-liberal orientation is a platform to cooperation with nationalists from other countries, because liberalism is considered as a common threat to all nations. Paradoxically, anti-liberalism perceived as being a more inclusive perspective than narrow-minded old-type nationalism.
3. Against “the Roundtable Republic” – the Anti-Establishment Orientation of the NM

3.1. The National Movement Position in the Party System

The nationalist oppositional orientation results from its position in the political system. It did not partake in the “Roundtable Contract” that initiated the formation process of the political establishment in Poland. Taking this into account, the majority of the subsequent parliamentary party leaders deriving from participants of the “Roundtable negotiations” were as a result perceived by nationalists as part of the agreement of the division of political power between post-communists and liberals (The NM General Board statement 2014). Mainstream media, regarded as promoters of the left-wing and liberal parties were also considered part of the political establishment. Robert Winnicki, the frontman of the NM and the honorary chairman of the MW, considers Adam Michnik, the editor-in-chief of Gazeta Wyborcza, to be the main founder of the “Roundtable Republic” (Winnicki 2012).

After 1989, they continuously contested the political mainstream’s achievements on the grounds of the ideological contradictions within liberalism. This ideology, they argue, is not accepted by society and has been artificially imposed after 1989 by establishment politicians, which allegedly proves they represent foreign points of view contrary to national interest (Winnicki 2014). So first of all, nationalists question EU accession is the greatest success of the political establishment after 1989. In May 2006, the LPR entered into the government coalition with under the “Fourth Republic” slogan, which was tantamount to openly contesting the political landscape of the Third Republic (the constitutional name of Poland). Yet the nearest future proved this declaration was an illusion. Despite participation in the coalition with Law & Justice (PiS) until early parliamentary elections in September 2007 and further open support of former LPR leaders Maciej and Roman Giertych for the ruling party and the president, they in fact are now struggling to enter into the political mainstream (Giertych 2014). This turning point of political strategy is unsurprising taking into account the attempts of the Nationalist Party led by them (Stronnictwo Narodowe “senioralne”) to enter into a right-wing coalition in the 1990s.

The ‘new wave’ leaders returned to consistently uncompromising opposition though their status as an anti-establishment or an anti-system opposition is less clear. The “overthrowing of the Roundtable Republic”, the slogan employing by the NM leaders, is meant to deprive left-wing and liberal parties of

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23 The slogan was firstly used by Robert Winnicki after the MI in 2012, when he announced the creation of the NM (Winnicki 2012).
legitimacy and political power. The declaration of a socio-political movement also differs radically the NM from the professional parties gathering career politicians. The contributors to *The Handbook for Nationalists* undermined selected solutions to the constitutional order, which are, in their opinion, instruments of establishment parties’ hegemony. Public budget funding for parties that exceed 3 percent of the electoral threshold and formal/legal immunity explains the blockade on parliamentary status faced by the anti-establishment opposition. In this model, parties did not associate citizens, but are merely a party apparatus subordinate to party bosses, as they maintain. So there is a proposed 1 percent party financing income tax deduction, because this solution will put pressure on parties to create stable connections with their social base. Going forward along this course of reasoning, the handbook’s contributors demand the development of direct democracy, arguing the strengthening of citizens’ control over government (Bonislawski & Siemiątkowski 2014: 63, 66–71). To recapitulate, there is no doubt the NM position qualifies as an anti-establishment opposition in the political system. The co-authors of NM political thinking accept the democratic regime, proposing only the ruling system’s partial reforms.

The self-image of the NM leaders as an anti-systemic opposition is not a diagnosis, only a rhetorical habit. In practice, it is an attempt to authenticate themselves in the eyes of potential supporters as a real uncompromising opposition. They are aiming to be regarded as anti-systemic radicals. The NM’s slogan for the EP elections held in May 2014 was “a radical change” (see: narodowcy2014.pl), which intentionally but without being precise means change of ruling party, or the rules of the political system. However, after the announcement of a stricter of law on public assembly as a result of the riots during the MI in 2012, the organisers argued that civil liberties were being undermined by “the system”, meaning the establishment parties, and that nationalists were being victimised (Law of Assemblies reform project 2014).

Contrary to its claimed position, in practice the NM is not an anti-systemic political grouping, because it uses the multiple instruments of democracy such as freedom of speech (creating web portals and journals openly contesting the political establishment), freedom of assembly (annual MIs) or freedom of political activity (participation in EP elections). The NM is a radical opposition operating within the framework of the political system, because it does not contest the democratic regime even if it does undermine liberal values, but only the legitimacy of parliamentary parties that, in fact, originated in the “Roundtable Contract” and exchange roles of government and soft opposition. The NM’s activity – paradoxically – does not confirm the leaders’ declarations on that issue.
Due to the media coverage of riots taking place every year at the MIs, the organisers are regarded as political extremists. This issue is much more complex and the roles of different rally participant sides are ambiguous. At 2010, 2011 and 2013 MIs a part of the participants, supported by a football hooligans, clashed with a radical leftists (anarchists, so-called ‘anti-fascists’ groups and Antifa’s fighting squads\textsuperscript{24}) and objects or symbols non-tolerated by a nationalists were vandalised\textsuperscript{25}. Generally, the mainstream media, as repeated by the radical left-wing, called nationalists “fascists”, supported their opponents\textsuperscript{26} and approved of the activities of leftist fighting squads, who present themselves as “defenders of democracy” (Rukat 2013: 282). Hence, the first MI organisers did not feel responsible for the clashes taking place along the route of the march. These, the organisers claim every year, were caused by a “police provocateurs” or hooligans not participating in the rally and only taking advantage of the situation in order to have a fight with the police. This well-known opinion changed after the MI in 2014, but this time the clashes were clearly provoked by hooligans\textsuperscript{27}. Even media commentators acknowledged that the militants were not the MI’s participants (MI 2014). Finally, the current NM activity, including the MIs, does not legitimise calling it political extremism because it does not indulge in politically motivated violence.

\textsuperscript{24} In 2010 marginal radical left-wings groups (anarchists, ‘anti-fascists’, feminists) organised a counter-demonstration to block the march, but – after police intervention – the MI reached its destination. Gazeta Wyborcza also joined the call for blocking the MI.

\textsuperscript{25} At the beginning of the 2013 march, participants clashed with anarchist squatters. Just before the end of the march a guard booth in front of the Russian embassy was set on fire, and then also set on fire a rainbow art installation set up by the city authorities and located nearby the MI route. The rainbow is perceived by nationalists as a symbol of the Civic Platform’s (PO) support for gay rights (Kozubal, Majewski & Blikowska 2013; Majewski 2013).

\textsuperscript{26} For example, in 2011 the mainstream media promoted a counter demonstration, the Colourful Independent (Kolorowa Niepodległa), organised by a radical left-wing groups (Baranowska & Niewińska 2011).

\textsuperscript{27} Before the riots, hooligans attacked the March of Independence Guard (Straż Marszu Niepodległości) – a paramilitary formation created in 2013 to protect the MIs (MI 2014). The organisers legitimised its formation by arguing that in previous years riots were provoked by masked police officers.
3.2. The Marches of Independence as a Challenge to the Political Establishment

The MIs are not just a one-day annual political event. Media coverage provides relatively unknown young leaders with recognition and allows them to add ideologically motivated threats to public discourse, thus exerting pressure on mainstream parties, which have to reply to contradictory opinions. Secondly, the marches provide credibility to young activists aspiring to political leadership and strengthen connections between their followers. Furthermore, contributors to *The Handbook for Nationalists* question the use of selected political marketing tools (for e.g. billboards, TV spots) as instruments of the political establishment hegemony. Political communication based on expensive forms in practice excludes the opposition, because it is beyond the capabilities of non-parliamentary parties not reviewing budget subsidies. Moreover, as they maintain, the mainstream media are favourable to the mainstream parties. For this reason, new wave nationalists prefer direct contact between politicians and supporters such as political rallies, leaflets distribution and public meetings with voters. This approach is presented as much more democratic. Nationalists regard this strategy as the implementation of national sovereignty, but essentially they demand ordinary citizens’ permanent control of the political establishment (Bonislawski & Siemiątkowski 2014: 66–71).

Fourthly, the movement’s image, which as we know has not been implemented, is also a form of opposition against the parliamentary parties and career politicians, who prefer communication with citizens via the media. Taking this into account, contributors to *The Handbook for Nationalists* argue that mainstream media, regarded as unfavourable to the non-parliamentary opposition, belongs to one media-political establishment (Bonislawski & Siemiątkowski 2014: 7).

Parliamentary parties, paradoxically confirming the nationalist opinion, because they avoid forms of direct contact with voters beyond the time of pre-election campaigns. During last decade, the largest examples of this form of political mobilisation were the “Solidarity in Poland” march by the Law & Justice (PiS) and the “Blue March” by the Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska, PO) in response, both held in October 2006 (Kaczyński 2006; Tusk 2006). The increasing attendance at the MIs alarmed establishment politicians. In December 2011, right after the second MI, Law & Justice organised the march of “Independence and Sovereignty” (Wybranowski 2011a). Since 2012, the president of Poland has led the march “Together for Poland”. For nationalists, the participants are recruited from state officials and officers – in other words from groups whose professional position in fact depends on the ruling party political position. The sudden increase of major establishment parties and leaders interest in political rallies is the result of the yearly growth in attendance at the MIs.
Concluding, the MI organisers challenge the parliamentary parties and indeed the government. The presidential marches prove that the initiative to organise public holiday celebrations by relatively unknown activists is regarded as a threat to the establishment parties’ positions and legitimacy. This is no surprise because in the last five years two small-scale associations, until 2010 acting at the fringe of the political system, have turned the celebration of the Independence Day against the authorities to promote the belief that they do not secure the interests of ordinary citizens and nation-state sovereignty. Taking into account the disproportionate attendance between the indicated marches, it becomes clear that there is the ‘new wave’ of nationalists aiming to call into a question the political legitimation of parliamentary parties originating from the “Roundtable Contract” in 1989.

3.3. The Nationalist Movement’s Potential for Political Mobilisation

A precise, official and – above all – reliable number of public assembly participants is not available. Despite the data deficit, an attempt to estimate the level of social impact and support for the NM is necessary to analyse and predict its position in the political system in the nearest future. All the more so as differing political mobilisation potentials provide apparently contradictory tendencies. MI attendance is increasing annually and clearly exceeds the number of participants at rallies organised by a mainstream parties. At the same time, the NM suffered defeats both national elections in 2014 – to the EP in May and a local government in November. The disappearance is illusory indeed, because in both elections they gathered a comparable level of supporters/votes. Attracting numerous followers to an anti-establishment protest is no surprise in the case of a new political grouping. Nevertheless, its leaders are not perceived as responsible politicians offering “serious” and programmatic solutions.

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28 Around 8,000 persons took part in the “Solidarity in Poland” march and around 11,000 in the “Blue March” (Kaczyński 2006; Tusk 2006). In 2013, the second presidential march “Together for Poland” attracted over 10,000 participants (Kozubal, Majewski & Blikowska 2013).

29 The MI leaders’ claims are usually twice as high as that of the mainstream media. The organisers claimed that in the first there were around 10,000 participants, in the second twice that number; in the next 25,000 or more and in 2013 even almost 100,000. In the EP elections, the NM gained 98,500 votes, or about 1.4 percent of the overall vote (The NM’s EP election results 2014). In the local government elections held in November of that year, it received 188,000 votes, or around 1.57 percent (Local election results 2014a; Local election results 2014b). Marian Kowalski, the NM’s candidate in the presidential elections held in May 2015, gained only 77,600 votes (Presidential elections results 2015).
Over the last five years, between the first March of Independence and the elections of 2014, the new-wave nationalists' political mobilisation potential reached, but not exceeded 100,000 people. Despite the fact that this constituted a multiple increase in comparison to the previous membership of the NM founding organisations (the MW and the ONR), and notwithstanding the fact that such growth was rapid and significant, the NM’s electoral potential remains very limited. This is illustrated by consideration of the 2011 parliamentary election results (see: Parliamentary elections results 2011). In practice a party, or an electoral committee, had to gain more than 750,000 votes in total in order to reach the 5 percent electoral threshold. In its three electoral tests in 2014 and 2015 the NM gained only slightly more than 10 percent of this effective threshold.

In sum, the NM electoral potential is lower than the LPR’s almost ten years ago. Employing the same criteria, the NM’s relevance is severely limited, meaning it is a powerless opposition. Any attempt to provide public discourse with new topics and ideologically motivated opinions has only marginal influence on the government. In fact it is only an ideological, and not a political opposition. This is more than the marginal position of the nationalist parties in the 1990s, but there are no indications that predict an increase to a level allowing veto power over a selected reforms implemented by ruling parties. It is too early to evaluate the extent and stability of the social base, not only because of the very limited electoral experience, but above all due to the lengthy process of ideological connection formation between young politicians aspiring to become leaders and their supporters. The NM organisational efficiency, including organised political rallies – not only the MIs – and created local structures and electoral campaigns, contribute to a further growth in a social acceptance. That scenario is possible only under two conditions – first, if a generational change, seen in terms of the entire party system, takes place, and second, if a moderate-wing will come to dominate the NM structures. Taking into account the very stable social support for the mainstream parties since the beginning of the 21st century, is clear that no political radicalism is acceptable in Poland.

Electoral potential has the following components: 1) level and stability of electoral support; 2) a five-degree relevance scale (marginal, limited influence, effective blocking, one of policymakers, domination); 3) an area of influence (governmental, parliamentary, public opinion); 4) organisational effectiveness (capacity for immediate reaction) and 5) independent initiator of public debates (Jajczynski 2006: 122).

For example, the MI’s leaders support the annual “Anti-Communist March”.

The undisputed leader of the moderate-wing is Krzysztof Bosak. This group also includes the PN editors. The majority of the leadership belongs to the radical-wing.
Conclusion

Any conclusions are preliminary given that the NM is an unfinished political project that still has not gained a definitive form. Its formation process provides arguments in favour of the thesis that during the last quarter of a century the evolution of Polish nationalism has been composed of three successive stages corresponding to generational changes of leadership. During the adaptation period of the 1990s, the old activists (‘seniors’) created numerous small-scale, mutually conflicted and completely powerless authoritarian parties and proclaimed archaic and unpopular political thought inspired by doctrines taken from the inter-war period. The second stage, defined the LPR’s relevance in 2001–2007, was a period of the middle generation politicians’ hegemony. The direct disciples of the old activists not only established the LPR, an umbrella party for the numerous small-scale organisations, but also combined nationalism with populism. As it clear in retrospect, this alliance of highly diversified anti-establishment circles turned out to be a one-project party. The third phase began in 2010, but essentially the arrival of the MI and was only the most visible symptom of a generational change, which was originated in 2005 (see: Jajecznik 2006: 110). The leadership change took place twenty years after the beginning the transition, when activists born after 1989 who had benefitted from higher education, which allowed them to rethinking a socio-political processes in Europe and on that basis initiate the ‘new wave’ of nationalism (Bonisławski & Siemiątkowski 2014: 253; Jajecznik 2013a: 375).

Turning to the first research question posed in the introduction, in essence, the profound transformation of nationalism in Poland is not a generational change, meant as not only a withdrawal of the youngest activists’ allegiance to previous mentors and leaders, but first of all a mental breakthrough. The distinguishing features of the new type of nationalism are firstly, the draft of a doctrine in response to current challenges and demands and secondly, the declaration of socio-political movement’s formation replacing a one ‘hegemony’ political party model. The registration the NM as a political party in February 2015 called into question the leaders’ recent commitments that the MIs would not be affiliated to any political party (see: Bonisławski & Siemiątkowski 2014: 96, 254; Jajecznik 2013a: 377). In fact

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33 The author’s prediction that the LPR would be a permanent feature on the Polish political landscape has proved to be incorrect (see Jajecznik 2006: 120, 129–130).

34 Instead of the adaptation of archaic points of view as in the first phase, or abandonment of ideology in favour of populism as happened in the second phase.

35 In the first phase – numerous and conflicted, or in the second phase – through the creation of an umbrella party, which is in fact an alliance, hiding its member organisations rivalry from external observers.
this solution negates the model of a broad socio-political movement consisting of many independently acting groupings, connecting only by ideological beliefs and an anti-establishment orientation. Employing “movement” as part of the party name – even if, journals’ editorial boards and other associations cooperate with the party meant as a main centre – is indeed misleading. The new leaders, more precisely the fraction led by Robert Winnicki, have returned to the old political strategy of hegemony within the nationalist party sub-system. Withdrawal from the socio-political movement creation project undermines the thesis of the third evolutionary phase of Polish nationalism.

Despite its self-identity, the NM is not an anti-system grouping but, in essence, an uncompromising anti-establishment opposition. Its participation in the national elections held in 2014 and in the presidential election in May 2015 proves that the NM is not an anti-systemic grouping. In practice, despite its leaders’ declarations, it respects the rules of the democratic regime and benefits from constitutionally guaranteed political freedoms. In light of the above and of course of the MI in 2014, when for the first time hooligans clashed with police and were clearly separate from the rally participants (MI 2014), at present there no facts or reasons to qualify the NM as an extremist grouping or a threat to democracy. The NM image is intentionally ambiguous because radical rhetoric attracts young followers disillusioned by the powerlessness of other nationalist groupings, and paradoxically moderate-wing leaders promote it as a serious alternative to mainstream parties, which is indispensable during pre-electoral campaigns. Finally, is necessary to note that this diagnosis may become out-dated if the radical wing become dominant.

When combining the third and fourth research question responses, we notice that the social support for the NM reaching up to 100,000 supporters or voters. It is a level nine to ten times lower than the electoral results of the LPR from ten years ago or to Jobbik electoral results of the last five years. The social acceptance of the NM is similar to that of the LsNS. The NM leaders did not impugn the political legitimisation of the mainstream parties because of their inability to increase social support but because they cannot undermine the consensus concerning the success of political transition after 1989. The present immaturity of the NM’s political doctrine is the source of this. In order to solve modern problems such as the challenges posed by mass migration, it is necessary to disseminate modern ideas. The scale of the NM’s powerlessness is illustrated by anti-establishment yearnings, upon which they cannot capitalise, as was demonstrated by the support for Paweł Kukiz in presidential election of May 2015, who received more than 20 percent of the vote (Presidential elections results 2015). The second of major factor that determines the groupings current position is its abandonment of a long-term strategy aimed at creating a broad socio-political movement, composed
of many independent organisations, in favour of the rapid establishment a single political party. In turn, this state of affairs is the result of the dominance of the radical fraction in the NM’s leadership.

It is not clear how the NM will evolve. The radical rhetoric symbolised by the slogan of overthrowing the “Roundtable Republic” is in contrast the attempt to incorporate the party within the political system, coupled with the unambiguous dissociation from the violence that occurred during the MI in 2014. The path taken by the moderate leadership does not preclude the NM from becoming will be a permanent feature of the Polish political landscape. On the contrary, evolution towards radicalism prevents any return to the fringe of the political system.

Bibliography


Peter Smuk

Combating Nationalist Hate Speech by Legal Means  
– European Standards and Selected Case Studies from Hungary

Nationalist movements often appear in public discourse and their extremist representatives' speeches are regularly labelled as “hate speech”. In this chapter, I give an overview on the legal means of restricting hate speech, introducing several cases from Hungary, where in recent years several legal and political documents have been adopted to enhance combating hatred and hate speech. The following are the most important European legal sources for domestic legislation:

- EU – Council Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA on combating certain forms and expressions of racism and xenophobia;
- Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers – Recommendation No. R (97) 20 on “hate speech”. It should be noted that the case law of European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) is based on the Article 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights, which guarantees freedom of expression; so the ECtHR has to balance between these principles.

Responding to international demands, the constitutional and legal regulation pertaining to freedom of expression has been changed in the legal systems of several European states. My chapter gives an overview focusing on Hungarian achievements, analysing them according to the concept of the freedom of expression and to the importance of protecting of the dignity of communities.

1. What is Hate Speech?

Hate speech is not as easy to define in legal terms, as we prima facie might think; no universally accepted definition exists, despite its frequent usage (Volkova, 2003). This research was supported by the European Union and the State of Hungary, co-financed by the European Social Fund in the framework of TÁMOP 4.2.4. A/2-11-1-2012-0001 (‘National Excellence Program’).
By studying public discourses, in terms of linguistics, sociology or political science, we can point towards those speeches that are generally regarded as hate speeches. Yet if we want to act against them by legal means, strict definitions are needed – otherwise legal means may be directed against the wrong persons, or may rendered ineffective or dysfunctional.

Basically, we define “hate speech” as speech that is directed to emotions and not to rational thinking. It aims at creating emotional outbursts, incites hatred against certain persons or – in our case, rather – social groups. By analysing public discourses, sociologically speaking, hate speech can be identified in terms of the actors (orators), the contents, targets (victims) and social dangers posed by such speech.

Orators are invariably extremist political actors (politicians, journalists, etc.), as hatred is generally absent from the discourse of centrist and governing parties. This does not mean that certain instances do not produce emotional outbursts from moderate politicians, or from persons who are not politicians or public actors. Regarding its content, hate speech involves hate, discrimination, incitement, dangerous propaganda, and incitement towards ethnic conflict. It is important to note that extremists exist not only among nationalists: logically others can also incite hatred, but my current focus lies with nationalist speeches. Within the European context we can identify certain groups that are more often than not on the receiving end of hate speech: Jews, Roma, LGBT, national and indigenous ethnic minorities, foreigners (migrants, refugees). Often western-type values such as democracy, liberalism or respect for the dignity of others are infringed. On other occasions even majority communities (Catholics or the majority nation) may be targeted. This shows at least the fluidity of the definition of hate speech, because we might think that minority groups are to be protected. As a social phenomenon, hate speech endangers personal rights, the values of equal treatment, the peaceful co-existence of social groups and nations and the public peace. These are values of democracy, equality and freedom, so there is no doubt that democratic political forces and the democratic political system (institutions) must act against attacks on these values.

Based on the clear social symptoms of hate speech, European legal documents definitions with regard to hate speech encompass the following points and

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2 According to the Hungarian Criminal Code, the offence of incitement to hatred can also be committed against the Hungarian nation. For example, on Christmas Eve 2003, a speaker on the Tilos radio station broadcast said that “he would kill all the Christians”. This provoked a protest-demonstration against the radio station, where the speaker’s opponents also voiced incendiary comments and burned the flag of Israel (see: Boromisz-Habashi 2013: 36–39).
principles. The Council of Europe (CoE) provides the following formula:

For the purposes of the application of these principles, the term “hate speech” shall be understood as covering all forms of expression which spread, incite, promote or justify racial hatred, xenophobia, antisemitism or other forms of hatred based on intolerance, including: intolerance expressed by aggressive nationalism and ethnocentrism, discrimination and hostility against minorities, migrants and people of immigrant origin.

The aforementioned EU Framework Decision calls upon member states to include several offences into their criminal law, but these offences reflect upon the phenomenon of hate speech only in an indirect way (see below, point 3). According to Anne Weber (Weber 2006: 98),

This term is also found in European case-law although the court [ECtHR] has never given it a precise definition. The court simply refers in some of its judgments to «all forms of expression which spread, incite, promote or justify hatred based on intolerance (including religious intolerance)». It is important to note that this is an «autonomous» concept, as the court does not consider itself bound by the domestic courts' classification of the remark under examination.

I find these legal definitions rather vague and cautious, and they show results of the political compromise between the member states – but they may produce problems during their application.

2. Actions Combating Hate Speech

We can specify the actions against hate speech by assessing the actors who apply these actions. In my chapter I focus on the state, as it has a variety of tools at its disposal. At the national level, the state can act both by legislation (adopting regulations, implementing and executing them) and through education. Further at the international level, there are several achievements and efforts in the framework of the United Nations, Council of Europe and the European Union (EU).
The issue of responsibility in this sphere on the part of political actors’ (parties, politicians, media) has recently been debated in Hungary. In the pre-election campaigns of 2014, the participation of the right-wing radical Jobbik (The Movement for a Better Hungary) party in campaign programmes and party-debates were controversial: there was discussion about whether or not mainstream parties should enter into debate with the extremists, or whether should the Jobbik face exclusion? In my view, exclusion affects the whole democratic political discourse (see below).

Although the effectiveness of different strategies could be discussed, legal instruments raise the most interesting questions as they have a huge impact on the value of the freedom of expression. With regards to legal actions against hate speech, it is important to note that different branches of a country’s legal system offer various sanctions or means to act. Having now established the broad parameters of the debate I shall now turn to an examination of the Hungarian legal system.

The Hungarian anti-discrimination Act CXXV of 2003 can be regarded as a comprehensive piece of legislation that mentions different forms of discrimination and which also established the Equal Treatment Authority as a body with real competences (for example, it can order that its final decision declaring the infringement be made public and can impose fine from 50,000 HUF to six million HUF). As we will see, criminal law actions only react to hate speech and deter perpetrators from repeating a previous message. In the long run the ‘educational’ function of the legal system seems to be more effective. Members of society should thereby come to know and respect the value of equal treatment. If this thinking becomes a social habit – the Equal Treatment Authority has such a function – hate speeches become less effective.

Civil law offers legal remedy in cases where personal rights have been violated. The violation of personal rights includes the violation of human dignity, libel, defamation and also discrimination on grounds of nationality, race, religion, etc. According to Hungarian civil law, before the new Civil Code (Act V of 2013) only individuals had personal rights, so hate speech against social groups was beyond the scope of the civil law, but the situation changed in 2013, as I will demonstrate below.

It is commonplace to argue that the main platforms of public discourse: media, including the internet, need careful regulation. Central issues surrounding media law include content regulation, the competences of the media authorities and the problems of jurisdiction regarding trans-border operation of broadcasting and service providers. All these issues have been the subject of rigorous debate recently in Hungary. Regarding the regulation of the media law, we can
draw the attention to Article 17 of Act CIV of 2010 on the Freedom of the Press and the Fundamental Rules of Media Content, which provide a basis for decisions of the media authorities including the printed press. The provision reads as follows:

Article 17 (1) The media content may not incite hatred against any nation, community, national, ethnic, linguistic or other minority or any majority as well as any church or religious group. (2) The media content may not exclude any nation, community, national, ethnic, linguistic and other minority or any majority as well as any church or religious group.

This provision harmonizes with Article 6 of the Audio-visual Media Services Directive (AVMSD) of the EU. Since 2011 the Hungarian media authority has posited that the media law’s term “incitement to hatred” shall be equal to the similar Criminal Code’s term. Despite this, media and criminal law have different rules with regard to accountability. So we can find cases where the authority sanctioned a newspaper based on this rule, but there has been no criminal procedure or sanction against the journalist who wrote the offending piece. State authorities are also entitled to carry out further legal actions against hatred, in special and sensitive cases of sporting events (against for ex. hooligans), unlawful associations and violent assemblies.

If we return to Jobbik, we find that it obtained 47 seats in parliament in 2010, and although several xenophobic speeches of its representatives were generally condemned by public opinion and other parties, parliamentary discipline proved to be an ineffective means of curbing the public utterances of Jobbik politicians. Referring to the dignity of parliament and also the democratic public discourse, the new disciplinary regulation (Act XXXVI of 2012, Art. 48) provides an effective means of sanctioning speeches and conduct that violate the dignity of persons, groups, and of parliament itself, although it could be argued that such restrictions


6 See: Decision 802 of 2013. A journalist wrote that criminal gypsies are unable to peacefully socially co-exist with their non-gypsy neighbours, so the state must act immediately for to achieve a ‘final solution’ to this state of affairs. For further analyses and case law see Koltay (2013b: 85–86; English summary: Koltay 2013c).

7 See Act II of 2012 on offences; Act CLXXV of 2011 on the freedom of association; Act III of 1989 on the freedom of assembly.
contradict the doctrine of parliamentary immunity and the right of MPs to freely express themselves.8

Finally, the criminal law provides for the most severe legal sanctions and as such is considered to be the ultima ratio of the legal system. Criminal offences spectacularly challenge the highly respected constitutional value of freedom of expression and determine the framework of political discourse – so I find the means of criminal law worthy of investigation in detail, in conjunction with introducing the reader to the expectations of the EU on this field.

3. The Council Framework Decision on Combating Certain Forms and Expressions of Racism and Xenophobia by Means of Criminal Law

It was a great achievement for the European Union to adopt the Council Framework Decision on racist hate speech (hereinafter: FD)9, following a seven-years-long procedure. Regarding the problems of terminology, I note that the text of the FD does not mention the term “hate speech”. It uses the legally more accurate terms “certain forms and expressions of racism and xenophobia”. According to the Lisbon Treaty of 2007 the legal nature of framework decisions will change: following a five years transitional period, the commission will have the competence to launch infringement proceedings even in the case of framework decisions adopted prior to the entering into force of the Lisbon Treaty. In January 2014 the commission published its report on the status of the implementation of the FD in the member states10. Reading the commission’s report, we can observe the initial and fundamental point of the issue. Although the representatives of the member-states accepted the common values of the initiative (combating hate speech), harmonisation of the various legal systems seems to have been only partially achieved and mainly at a superficial level. Judicial case law (of constitutional courts) may contradict legislation, causing obstacles for the implementation of the FD. Ironically, a solution to this problem may be found in the text of the FD, which states:

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8 Any MP who violates the dignity of others, may be excluded from the rest of the session day, and his/her honorarium may be reduced. See for further details Smuk (2013a: 109–112).


it shall not have the effect of requiring Member States to take measures in contradiction to fundamental principles relating to freedom of association and freedom of expression as they result from constitutional traditions (Art. 7).

This may offer a rationale for exculpation, if the commission finds that a member state’s legislation has not implemented the FD.

The FD expects member-states to include certain offences into their criminal codes\(^\text{11}\). According to the Article 1 of the FD these offences shall exist when directed against a group of persons (or a member of such a group) defined by reference to race, colour, religion, descent or national or ethnic origin. They include the following intentional actions:

- publicly inciting to violence or hatred, including via the public dissemination or distribution of tracts, pictures or other material;
- publicly condoning, denying or grossly trivialising crimes (genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, etc.) defined in certain international agreements (London Agreement of 8 August 1945, the Statute of the International Criminal Court).

Regarding differences between legal systems, the FD (Art. 1 para. 2) gives some room for member states to choose whether they punish only the conduct which is either carried out in a manner likely to disturb public order or which is threatening, abusive or insulting. States are also obliged to provide with “effective, proportionate and dissuasive” criminal penalties; racist motivation shall be taken into account as an aggravating circumstance or a factor of determining penalties by courts; and also legal persons may be liable in relation to such conduct (Art. 3–5).

As the EU Commission only drew-up its report in January 2014, member-states still have a lot of work to do. I note here that the report is based on the data provided by the states for the period of 2010–2012. As a result there is no assessment of recent changes to Hungarian law. Below are some examples drawn from the Hungarian legal system regarding the legal means of combating hate speech.

4. Case Studies from Hungary

From the Hungarian perspective, FD references to constitutional traditions are of great importance. It is called often the “hate speech saga” (Belavusau 2014: 42) in Hungary, because of the almost twenty years long controversy between

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the parliament and the constitutional court (CC). In its decision, the CC (Decision 30/1992) found a rather liberal, so-called “American-style”, standpoint in the conflict of freedom of expression and combating hate speech. Subsequent case law of the CC drew a strict area for criminalising hate speech expression. Only the presence of a clear and present danger to the public peace or direct danger of violating fundamental rights can justify the punishment of excitement to hatred (Art. 269 in the former, Art. 332 in the new Criminal Code)\(^\text{12}\). Other conduct that is not directed towards a certain person, or only indirectly endangers the public peace remains under the protection of the freedom of expression (Art. 61 in the former Constitution, Art. IX in the new Fundamental Law). The Hungarian Parliament has repeatedly tried to find another way to criminalise conduct that violates the dignity of certain group of persons, but the CC has repeatedly annulled its efforts\(^\text{13}\).

It is worth mentioning at this juncture that there are other offences in the Criminal Code that can be used as means against certain contents of hate speech – such as the denial or trivialization of crimes carried out by totalitarian regimes (Art. 333); the use of symbols of totalitarian regimes (Art. 335), and the violation of national symbols (Art. 334). These can be found among the “crimes against public peace”. As such they protect the public peace and not the dignity or fundamental rights of individuals. Offences relating to the “use of symbols of totalitarian regimes”, an example of which was the ban placed upon wearing the red star was challenged in the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in 2008. In the Case of Vajnai v Hungary (8 July 2008, Application no. 33629/06), the ECtHR found that wearing such symbols may have several meanings, so cannot always be equated with dangerous propaganda. The court argued that decades have passed since the collapse of the communist regime in Hungary and elsewhere in Europe, so there is no real risk of restitution thereof, and the victims’ “emotions cannot be regarded as rational fears”. Regarding the limitations on freedom of expression, it is worth citing the court’s argument at this point:

\(^\text{12}\) The text of Article 332 of the new Criminal Code is the following:
A person who incites to hatred before the general public against:
  a) the Hungarian nation,
  b) any national, ethnic, racial group, or
  c) certain groups of the population — with special regard to disability, sexual identity, or sexual orientation —
shall be liable to punishment for a felony offence with imprisonment up to three years.

In the Court’s view, a legal system which applies restrictions on human rights in order to satisfy the dictates of public feeling – real or imaginary – cannot be regarded as meeting the pressing social needs recognised in a democratic society, since that society must remain reasonable in its judgement. To hold otherwise would mean that freedom of speech and opinion is subjected to the heckler’s veto\textsuperscript{14}.

Following the judgement of the Hungarian Constitutional Court (Dec. no. 4/2013, that followed the reasoning of the ECtHR) the Hungarian Parliament adopted an amendment to the Criminal Code (in 2013), according to which the use of symbols of totalitarian regimes can only be liable to legal sanction only in cases where such display and related conduct disturbs the public peace, or harms the victim’s personal rights. Although this case dealt with the red star and not Nazi symbols, the argumentation can be equally applied to racist hate speech. Similar cases have occurred have in other post-communist countries, including Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Lithuania and Moldova\textsuperscript{15}. In the next section I summarize two issues that can be highlighted in the past one year or so and in so doing show the future perspectives of the combating of hate speech in Hungary, and maybe also in other European legal systems. These examples demonstrate that strategies aimed at effectively combating hate speech probably need a new approach in Hungary; and that the paradigm that was used by the CC in the “hate speech saga” over the last twenty years will have to be changed.

4.1. Dignity of Communities – Means of Civil Law

As a part of the thoroughgoing post-communist transformation of the Hungarian legal system, parliament adopted the new Civil Code in 2013\textsuperscript{16}. The Civil Code provides the authorities with new means to act against orators of hate speech, namely against expressions which violate the dignity of a community and as a consequence, violate also the personal rights of the individual persons who belong to the community that is being attacked. The novelty of this regulation is the right to bring the action to the court without having been mentioned personally.

\textsuperscript{14} Case of Vajnai v Hungary (2008), par. 57.
in the hate speech. The law therefore establishes that the dignity of the community and the personal rights of individuals as members of communities are connected.

It is interesting to note that parliament had already tried to adopt this regulation, but the CC annulled it in its Decision no. 96 in 2008. The court found that several elements of the draft text were unconstitutional. On the one hand, the CC admitted that it is possible to protect communities by means of civil law. On the other hand, the regulation in question was found to be unconstitutional, because it sought to limit freedom of expression in a disproportionate way and because it included vague terms that were contradictory to the rule of law.

Parliament adopted two regulations almost parallel in 2013 – the new Civil Code and the 4th amendment to the Fundamental Law. The latter amended Article IX, “protecting” the regulation of the Civil Code and stopped the constitutional court from employing preceding case law (i.e. the Decision no. 96/2008). So the new constitutional text overrides the position of the court. The relevant text of Art. IX, following the 4th amendment in 2013, reads as follows:

The right to freedom of speech may not be exercised with the aim of violating the human dignity of others, or with the aim of violating the dignity of the Hungarian nation or of any national, ethnic, racial or religious community. Members of such communities shall be entitled to enforce their claims in court against the expression of an opinion which violates the community, invoking the violation of their human dignity, as provided for by an Act.

The Act mentioned here is the new Civil Code, in which Article 2:54 allows members of the aforementioned groups to sue, and in cases of public interest the prosecutor has also the power to bring action, even without the consent of any of the members of the allegedly injured community. In contradiction to the CC Dec. no 96/2008, anyone can sue, because everybody can declare him/herself to be the member of the impugned community. Yet, the criteria by which belonging to a social community cannot be fully defined in legal terms, because ultimately it is a matter of individual choice. According to Act III of the 1952 Law on Civil Procedure (Articles 347–348/B) any person who wants to bring the action to the court, shall only declare him- or herself as member of the community. The court can unify the lawsuits and proceedings, and can award damages for the violation of personal rights. Although this finding is controversial, several NGOs welcomed this regulation17. The new Civil Code entered into force

17 See the opinion of the Venice Commission on the 4th amendment (CDL-REF(2013)014, p. 20–21).
in March 2014, and as of the time of writing (August 2015) we are awaiting the first decisions based on this “innovative” regulation.

4.2. The Case of the Magyar Gárda

The most important and infamous case of hate speech and extreme nationalist movements in Hungary’s recent history is that of the Magyar Gárda (Hungarian Guard, hereinafter: Guard) case. In briefly summarizing its story, I will mention only the basic contours of and the dissolution of the Guard. Since 2007, Jobbik and in parallel the Guard (as an organisation connected closely to Jobbik) proclaimed that Hungary was the victim of a rural crime-wave and that the (vast) majority of criminals are gypsies. The movement called for effective measures against those criminals, and used the term “gypsy criminality” when speaking about the situation. As they found the action of the authorities to be improper and ineffective, they started to organise threatening marches around gypsy/Roma communities. They were threatening in appearance as well, because the participants wore uniforms and armbands, as well as carried flags that were very similar to those of Hungarian Nazi organisations (for example the Arrow Cross Party) and other such organisations active during World War Two. Surprisingly, the Hungarian court dissolved the organisation and the movement in 2009. Parliament subsequently adopted a criminal regulation against the Guard, including provision for punishment for wearing its uniform.

The leaders of Jobbik brought the case to the ECHR, stating that the Hungarian authorities had interfered with their right to freedom of association and assembly. The ECHR in the Case of Vona v Hungary (9 July 2013, Application no. 35943/10) found that the Hungarian authorities had not violated the plaintiff’s fundamental rights guaranteed by the ECHR. The court found that intimidating marches could be viewed as having constituted the first steps in the realization of a certain vision of “law and order” which is racist in essence. Large-scale, co-ordinated intimidation – related to the advocacy of racially motivated policies which are incompatible with the fundamental values of democracy – may justify state interference with freedom of association.

The expression “gypsy crimes” precipitated wider debate among the Hungarian public. Some argued that if there are criminals who are Roma/gypsies, what is the problem with using this term? The separate opinion of Judge Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque, attached to the judgement of ECHR, answers to this question by the following argument:
The use of the expression “Gypsy crime”, which suggests that there is a link between crime and a certain ethnicity, constitutes a racist form of speech intended to fuel feelings of hatred against the targeted ethnic group. This expression reflects a clearly divided view of society into “them”, the Roma, perpetrators of crimes, and “us”, the “ethnic” Hungarians, the victims of their crimes. Such sweeping generalisations attributing negative behaviour and characteristics are made solely on the basis of the target group’s origin and ethnicity. Intolerance and prejudice towards Roma are objectively fanned by statements of this nature. The same can be said for the anti-Semitic utterances made in the parades18.

The dissolution basically ended the story of the Guard, but Jobbik gained social support from this movement. Although the party partly erased references to “gypsy criminality” from its programme, they remain at the extreme radical right-wing of the political system, gaining over 20 percent of votes in parliamentary elections in 2014, and are fighting for second place among the Hungarian parties19. The question arose in the public debates of best to prevent this party from becoming stronger.

Conclusion: How to Deal with Extremists?

The institutional structure of democratic political discourse – an environment and framework for public debates – offers fora and possibilities to discuss issues of public concern. Different opinions compete in the “marketplace of ideas” and as a consequence, the public power (government) gains on the basis of the informed decisions of citizens and as such enhanced legitimacy. Democratic discourses should include all relevant opinions represented in society, but there is the troublesome issue of anti-democratic opinions. This classic question (Fennema & Maussen 2000) has been raised in Hungary recently regarding the discussion with Jobbik represented as it is in parliament.

Two concepts of democracy collide in this debate. If we decide to ban extremist parties and we exclude them from public debates (“We do not talk to Nazis”), it may affect not only a certain campaign period, but the whole political arena as well. By limiting freedom of expression, the accessibility of democratic discourses will be limited. Although this freedom is a basic fundament and precondition

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18 Vona v Hungary (2013), Concurring opinion of Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque.
of democracy, we have to defend democracy, “democracy shall be able to defend itself”\textsuperscript{20}. This is the popular concept of “militant democracy”\textsuperscript{21}. Such arguments posit that involving extremists in debate may legitimise them as equal partners, and also may help them to disseminate their rotten ideas. What is more, their presence in discourse may have a “silencing effect” for those who are the targets of hate speech (Koltay 2013b: 22). We cannot deny that history also teaches us for the dangerous consequences of tolerance for authoritarian arguments and propaganda.

In opposing these arguments, deliberative democracy articulates the intellectual/moral supremacy of democratic arguments and debates (“We are able to defeat hatred by words!”). This standpoint confirms freedom of expression, and posits that public opinion has a self-cleaning function in the ‘marketplace of ideas’\textsuperscript{22}. Democrats reply by articulating arguments against hatred. If every democratic political force explicitly condemns extremist, racist, etc. hate speech, hate orators and extremists become marginalized. A democratic state governed by the rule of law must combat anti-democrats in a democratic manner and respecting rule of law.

The Hungarian Constitutional Court articulated this second standpoint in its decision no. 30/1992. Many scholars in Hungary say that the views of the CC were very naive and twenty years later we do not see any results in terms of the scope of the public debate in Hungary. Extremists are not marginalized but rather they are becoming more powerful (Kilényi 2000: 16; Koltay 2013a: 125–126, 132–135). So they argue that the Hungarian CC should turn away from “American-style” protection of freedom of expression, and should protect human dignity in the “German way”\textsuperscript{23}.

The most pressing issue in this regard in today’s Hungary revolves around conflict between the protection of the dignity of minority communities and the fundamental right of freedom of expression. I think parliament aimed to change the standpoint of the Constitutional Court, and involved a constitutionally questionable regulation into the constitution. The change in case law by the CC can be supported by reference to some of the ECtHR’s argumentation. These changes

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{20} The concept occurred in the SRP-Verbot case in Germany, see BVerfGE 2, 1 (1952).
\item \textsuperscript{21} The term was introduced by Karl Loewenstein, see more at Capoccia (2013).
\item \textsuperscript{22} See Oliver Wendell Holmes’ dissent in Abrams vs U.S.: “the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas… the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market”. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919).
\item \textsuperscript{23} For interpreting the difference, see Nieuwenhuis (2000).
\end{itemize}
try to institutionalize the German practice of prioritising human dignity over hate speech, but the constitutional risks of these provisions are higher than the (possible) positive outcomes. Although the new regulations in the Fundamental Law, Civil Code and new justifications in (international) judicial case law can serve as a basis for this turn, I suggest we have to be careful in limiting fundamental rights by overriding the established CC case law. I argue this is not only because of a belief in the sacrosanct nature of democratic debates, but also being aware of previously mentioned concerns regarding the exact and trustworthy legal terms that may restrict political discourse. If legislation incorporates new legal institutions, uncertain and nugatory terms into the legal system, unanticipated outcomes may hinder the achieving of favourable goals.

**Bibliography**


1. Introduction

What kind of approach should be adopted to the Hungarian minorities of the neighbouring countries? This was one of the crucial questions facing the new democratic Hungarian state after the fall of the communist regime in 1989–1990. In the communist era the idea of the nation not only lost its earlier significance, but it was also declared to be a dangerous „bourgeois remnant”, incompatible with the teachings of Marxism and Leninism. Consequently, the regime was not concerned with the lot of Hungarian minorities in Czechoslovakia, Romania, the Soviet Union (Ukraine) and Yugoslavia. The present study makes an attempt to outline the strategy of re-emergent Hungarian conservatism in respect of the nation and its attitude toward kin-minorities. The following analysis thus concentrates on the role of Hungarian kin-minorities within the context of conservative attempts at nation-building within Hungary, which are also designed to strengthen cohesion among the Hungarian communities in the Carpathian Basin. But first some words about the defining features of Hungarian conservatism. The author is convinced that the approach of a political party or a government to the idea of the nation is closely related to how the core values are defined by its chosen ideology.

The study starts from the assumption that since the regime-change in the late 1980s two versions of political conservatism have crystallized in Hungary: the so-called patrician and the mobilizing–plebeian versions (Egedy 2009). The former, which is often called „elitist” conservatism, is very sceptical with regards to mass democracy, because it perceives the masses to be a direct threat to civilization. This variant trusts only the rule of law. By contrast the latter trend is convinced that the stability and discipline of society are threatened not by the masses but by liberal elites; it assumes that the masses can be trusted more than the established elites (Aughey, Jones & Riches 1992: 44–53). It is my conviction that the new Hungarian conservatism emerging after 1989 first became a variant of the patrician type. However, it suffered a crushing political defeat in 1994 and in the second half
of the 1990s the Hungarian right gradually broke with the patrician legacy and worked out a special variant of populist conservatism that I label “mobilizing-plebeian” conservatism. The issue of attitudes toward the nation had special importance for both variants – but their attitudes differed. They agreed that the concept of the nation must be defined on the assumption that all individuals speaking Hungarian and identifying with Hungarian culture are to be regarded as Hungarians. The two variants also shared the conviction that the kin-minorities should not be relocated to Hungary; rather they should preserve their culture in their homelands. In some crucial respects, however, their approaches and priorities sharply differed. The following study makes an attempt to compare these two distinct types of political conservatism in respect of their attitude to the nation, especially with regard to kin-minorities.

2. The Patrician Concept of the Nation

After the demise of the communist regime all major new political actors endeavoured to formulate their own conceptions of the nation; this issue became a crucial component of their self-definition. It is worth noting that the Hungarian constitution, which had been completely amended in 1989, did not use the word “nation”. It did not define the Hungarian state as a “nation-state” (as the constitutions of most of the neighbouring countries did), but it did contain the so-called “clause of responsibility”, i.e. the vaguely formulated obligation of the Hungarian state “to feel responsibility for the fate of the Hungarian minorities abroad”. The position of patrician conservatism, represented by the Hungarian Democratic Forum (Magyar Demokrata Fórum, MDF), led by József Antall, the first prime minister of democratic Hungary, can be described briefly by the following features. First of all, it is to be stressed that in the view of patrician conservatism the two defining political cleavages in the transition period were the communist – anti-communist cleavage and the cleavage between the conservative policy of the governing Democratic Forum and the radical liberalism advocated by the Alliance of Free Democrats (Szabad Demokraták Szövetsége, SZDSZ). In Antall’s eyes the issue of nationhood was somewhat subordinated to the predominance of these two cleavages. It would certainly be a mistake to conclude from this that the nation did not play an important role in the strategy of patrician conservatism. This conservatism held the loyalty to the nation in high esteem but it was also committed to the doctrine of the rule of law and espoused the legal-civic concept of the nation, in keeping with the old constitutional traditions of Hungary. The underlying assumption was that the identity of the members of the nation must be based primarily on the relationship between the state and the individual. We can infer that the patrician
approach was inclusive; it considered the nation to be historically embedded, but it rejected the view that membership in a nation is based solely on ethnic and cultural factors (Egedy 2011).

There can be no doubt that patrician conservatism was committed to preserving national traditions and to reviving a national consciousness that had been damaged to a significant degree during the decades of Soviet occupation and Marxist indoctrination. Antall stressed:

We are convinced that the idea of the nation has not lost its relevance by the end of the twentieth century [ , adding that] (...) this has nothing to do with any kind of nationalism (Antall 1994a: 9).

At the same time he insisted that the promotion of national identity must be reconciled with an unconditional commitment to democracy. As early as March 1989 he declared that:

We are of the view that the idea of the nation and the democratic rights of liberty, the human rights and the wish for social renewal must be represented simultaneously, in equilibrium, without giving priority to any of them (Antall 1994a: 9–10).

He also expressly emphasized that the approach of his government to the nation did not seek to exclude anyone who sought membership of the Hungarian national community. The patrician attitude was also reflected in the 1993 law on national minorities within Hungary. It laid down the principle that though their cultural traditions were different, they were “state-constituting actors” (Föglein 2000). There can be no doubt that Cordell is right in calling attention to the fact that by providing such opportunities the conservative government wished also to offer an appropriate model for Romania, Slovakia, Ukraine and Yugoslavia (Cordell 2000: 46–47).

How then can we characterize the position of this type of conservatism towards the Hungarian minorities in the neighbouring countries?

The patrician attitude can be characterized by two features. First of all it should be emphasized that it represented a radical break with the “internationalist” policy of the communist regime, which ignored completely the existence of the three million Hungarians living in neighbouring countries (Bárdi 2004: 90–100). Antall stressed that future Hungarian governments must bear responsibility for their fate, and that they have to meet their obligation deriving from the above-mentioned “clause of responsibility” in the constitution. Yet patrician conservatism made it also clear that it did not want to follow an “irredentist” policy because it had
no territorial claims against its neighbours. Antall declared that Christian democracy, a defining component in the ideology of the Democratic Forum, acted as a balancing force against the rise of excessive nationalist claims (Antall 1994b: 119). He emphasized therefore in his speeches that he expected European integration to be able to solve the problems of the incongruence of national and political borders. Thus the Hungarian nation could be reunited by eliminating internal boundaries within the European Union (EU). The guiding assumption of this strategy was that the aspirations of the nation would be best served if Hungary and her neighbours alike join the EU in which state boundaries will fade away (the dominant discourse in this respect used the expression: “virtualizing” the borders).

I am convinced that the dominance of the legal-civic approach in trying to solve this classic “Gellnerian” dilemma cannot be called into question by referring to Antall’s famous declaration of 2 June 1990. On this occasion he expressed his wish to in the future act as the prime minister of 15 million Hungarians “in spirit and sentiment”. It cannot be denied that this gesture represented a step towards the cultural idea of the nation, but Antall pointed out unequivocally that he had meant it in a purely symbolic way; the addition of the phrase “in spirit and sentiment” is therefore crucial. It demonstrated emphatically the new concern of Budapest with Hungarian minorities but it was certainly not the irredentist stance that Antall’s political opponents accused him of taking (Erdődy 2011: 192–193). The patrician respect for law and prudence was not compatible with a radical nationalist course.

3. State-Building and Nation-Building

Juan J. Linz was right in calling attention to the fact that the processes of state- and nation-building are not the same. It is worth quoting an important statement from his study *State Building and Nation Building*:

> It can be said that state building and nation building are two overlapping but conceptually different processes. To the extent that they are overlapping they are largely inseparable but if the overlap is not total (as we well know it is not) they are also different processes (Linz 1993: 355).

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1 Antall stated:

In a legal sense, in accordance with the constitution, I want to act as the head of the government of all the citizens of this 10 million-strong country, but in spirit and sentiment I wish to act as the prime minister of 15 million Hungarians.
Both are historical processes: the former focuses on the institutional dimension, the latter on strengthening emotional solidarity within a political community. Although state-building came to be closely connected with nation-building, in historical perspective state-building preceded nation-building. To accentuate the difference Linz referred to some well-known historical examples. Thus he reminds us that historians of Italian unification disagree over the extent to which it was a process of state-building under the leadership of Cavour or nation-building under the direction of Mazzini and Garibaldi. He also cites the case of Germany, supposing that although there was a strong nationalist movement behind the process of unification, “the German Reich was more the product of the state building by Bismarck than by the nationalists” (Linz 1993: 356–357).

In turn, my argument is based on the assumption that though the Hungarian state could not be qualified as a “new state” in the strict sense of the word in the period of the systemic changes in 1989–1990, the unprecedented scale of the transformation involved a dual challenge to the Hungarian political community, i.e. both state-building and nation-building. By this I mean that a new democratic state had to be built on the ruins of the demolished communist state and if democracy was to work, the people of János Kádár had to be transformed into a nation of self-conscious citizens. This study assumes that the first democratically elected government, representing the values of patrician conservatism gave priority – in keeping with the character of the patrician view of the state – to state-building. Though from a purely theoretical point of view one could not say that this choice was unavoidable, in practice there were cogent reasons for choosing this option. The decision to give priority to state-building was motivated primarily by two factors. One of them was the historical experience according to which it may easily lead to instability in new states if nation-building is preferred to state-building. The second factor can be identified as the patrician attempt to create a state that can demand as much obedience and loyalty as a nation. The patrician attitude to kin-minorities outlined above is to be understood in light of the preference to state-building.

4. Mobilizing-Plebeian Conservatism and the Nation

By the first decade of the new century a new variant of political conservatism crystallized in Hungary – and with it a new approach to the nation. The heavy political defeat of patrician conservatism, signalled by the electoral failure of the governing Hungarian Democratic Forum in 1994, resulted in the appearance of a vacuum in the Hungarian right and the Alliance of Young Democrats, FIDESZ (Fiatal Demokraták Szövetsége), originally a liberal youth party, had turned to the right
in order to occupy the centre-right position. Under the leadership of Viktor Orbán it made a successful attempt at uniting the mainstream groups of the political right. FIDESZ gradually became the most powerful party on the right side of the political spectrum (Fowler 2004a; Oltay 2012). However, its leaders broke with the legacy of patrician conservatism, assuming that its ideas were not effective enough in the fight against the entrenched socio-economic and cultural positions of the post-communist socialists. In 1998 FIDESZ succeeded in winning the election, but it was only its electoral defeat in 2002 that led to the full crystallization of the Hungarian variant of populist conservatism, termed by the present author “mobilizing-plebeian conservatism”.

In Hungary practically all sociological surveys have demonstrated that the left–right divide based on economic issues, i.e. on the attitude to the role of the state has not become as important for the electorate as issues relating to culture and identity (Körösényi, Tóth & Török 2009: 170–174). This situation differs significantly from Western Europe where the priorities of the voters reflect the opposite of this pattern. Mobilizing-plebeian conservatism became aware of the crucial importance of national identity and realized that by successfully utilizing the political cleavage based on this divide it could effectively shape the political discourse. In other words nationality was turned into the dominant mobilisational tool. The issue of loyalty to the nation came to be considered by FIDESZ as its own exclusive terrain, and the party managed to convince the majority of voters of the virtues of its own approach. What then are the characteristic features of this reinterpretation of the nation?

To begin with, it aimed at integrating the political community on the basis of national identity. Mobilizing-plebeian conservatism adopted the so-called cultural account of the nation, which differed markedly from the patrician approach. It gave priority to culture which the noted English conservative philosopher, Roger Scruton held to be the “pre-political” foundation of the nation (Scruton 2003: 60–68) (It is worth adding that mobilizing-plebeian conservatism is prone to look upon national culture in a rather essentialist way, trying to preserve it in its original form, resisting significant adaptations). In other words this approach came to determine membership in the Hungarian nation on the basis of culture. As a consequence, the identity-politics of mobilizing conservatism has diminished the importance of the relationship between the state and the individual: belonging to the nation and having citizenship has become two separate spheres.

In light of these developments we can state that mobilizing-plebeian conservatism has committed itself to give priority to nation-building instead

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2 For a general overview of the factors leading to the rise of ethnicity and nationality in Europe see Cordell (1999: 3–10).
of state-building. Implicit in this assumption is that it discarded the nation-model adopted by patrician conservatism. Nation-building in this context refers to the process of consciously constructing a national identity. In so doing it started from the assumption that the nation had a weak position within the state whereas, in its view, the nation should have predominance over the state. This strategy is based on the conviction that the objective of achieving national goals can be realized only if the nation has a firm grip on the state. As indicated above, patrician conservatism saw the crucial cleavage in Hungarian politics in the left – right divide. By contrast, for mobilizing-plebeian conservatism it was attitudes toward the nation that formed the central issue in Hungarian politics. Orbán deliberately wished to move the issue of the nation into the very centre of Hungarian politics, often stressing in his speeches that the old distinction between left and right had already lost its meaningful content. This conservatism strove to use all potential means of symbolic politics to make national identity the most important form of all identities (Orbán 2006a: 256–257).

In connection with these efforts FIDESZ began to consider itself as the repository of national values and interests. (It is worth adding that this strategy was aided to a significant degree by the inability of the political left to work out an authentic interpretation of the nation.) Orbán’s oft-cited words uttered after the electoral defeat in 2002 that the “nation cannot be in opposition” implied the conviction that the party representing the nation simply cannot be pushed into opposition (Orbán 2006b: 308). This interpretation of political legitimacy was deeply alien to patrician conservatism. The approach of mobilizing-plebeian conservatism reflects a monist conception of the political community, presuming the existence of a homogeneous nation.

5. The Trans-Sovereign Strategy of the Kin-State

The Hungarian communities of Romania, Slovakia, Ukraine and Serbia had a very important role in the nation-building strategy of mobilizing conservatism (Bárdi, Fedinec & Szarka 2011). The chosen method of their inclusion into the nation reflected a significantly different approach compared to that of patrician

3 Characterizing the pragmatic and populist foundations of the strategy of FIDESZ Korkut writes of „a unique reconceptualization of politics“ (Korkut 2012: 162).
4 The millennium celebrations in 2000 (commemorating the thousandth anniversary of the foundation of the Hungarian state) offered a unique chance for FIDESZ to highlight national traditions and enhance national pride.
5 As a result of the peace-treaty of Trianon (1920) more than three million co-nationals found themselves outside Hungary’s new borders. In more details see: Romsics 2002.
conservatism. The latter also acknowledged the cultural unity of the nation but in this respect mobilizing-plebeian conservatism went further. At the rhetorical level it defined its aim as “the spiritual reintegration of Hungarians over the borders”, but in fact it aimed at more than mere spiritual reintegration. On the one hand, it endeavoured to create institutional forms to enable the cultural reproduction of the Hungarian minorities in their national homelands. On the other, it tried to link these minorities to the kin-state by institutionalizing the relations with them. Two experts, Zsuzsa Csergő and James Goldgeier, distinguished four types of potential nationalist strategies with regard to European integration (Csergő & Goldgeier 2004: 273 et seq.).

1. Traditional nationalism. This is the “classic” strategy of attempting to ensure the congruence of the political and cultural boundaries. One can call this approach “traditional”, because this was the dominant strategy of nationalism and of state development in the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries. There are a number of variations within this model, depending on the choices made by the elites but, in the words of Csergő and Goldgeier, “what binds these cases together is that the countries [choosing this strategy] all continue to pursue political-cultural congruence within the nation-state model” (Csergő & Goldgeier 2004: 278). The elites opting for this strategy tend to view the EU as an organisation of state governments, in which each state is interested in emphasising and strengthening its sovereignty.

2. Sub-state nationalism. This is the strategy that characterizes the activity of those groups which view themselves as rightful owners of a homeland but have no state of their own. Sub-state actors expect the EU to weaken the authority of the central state government and hope to receive help from Brussels in their struggle for nationalist agendas.

3. Trans-sovereign nationalism. This type of nationalism aims at creating institutions to link the nation across state boundaries; “it applies to nations that reach beyond current state boundaries but forgo the idea of border changes because it is too costly to pursue border changes in contemporary Europe” (Csergő & Goldgeier 2004: 281). Examples of trans-sovereign nationalism include Austria and South Tyrol in Northern Italy, Russian policies toward the Baltic states, where a significant number of ethnic Russians live and also Romania’s policies toward the ethnic Romanians of Moldova. As we shall see, Hungary is a particularly good example.

4. Protectionist nationalism. This might be the position of those – typically Western – states that have attracted large numbers of immigrants; in this case “the fundamental goal is to preserve an established national culture in the face of immigration and rapid social change” (Csergő & Goldgeier 2004: 283).
Hungarian mobilizing-plebeian conservatism has opted for the trans-sovereign strategy and has tried to harmonize nation-building with European integration. As mentioned above, this strategy requires the rejection of the demand — espoused by certain circles of the radical right — to insist on border changes. Trans-sovereign nationalism holds that the political community should be based on national identity — without creating a nation-state. In this framework the Hungarian kin-state establishes institutions to maintain and reproduce the nation by co-operating with the kin-minorities living beyond its borders. As Csergő and Goldgeier point out, to a certain extent this type of national project is related to sub-state nationalism, nevertheless it derives from a different source: “it is coordinated by a national centre which is at the same time the political centre of a state” (Csergő & Goldgeier 2004: 284).

Gábor Kardos points out that a kin-state can take four types of action in favour of its kin-minorities. It may take actions by applying to international bodies and mechanisms. It may take actions in cooperation with the home states; it may also take actions vis-à-vis other states, or it may initiate domestic legislation in respect of its kin-minorities (Kardos 2006: 130). Mobilizing-plebeian conservatism chose the fourth option to implement its trans-sovereign national project. To this end FIDESZ not only supported the idea of gradually “virtualizing” the state borders within the EU, but took steps to complement the cultural cohesion of the nation with a legal-political dimension – an important departure from the policy chosen by patrician conservatism. In this spirit the first government formed by FIDESZ (1998–2002) organised in 1999 the Permanent Hungarian Conference to create a forum for regular consultation with the leaders of the Hungarian minority organisations of the Carpathian Basin.

6. The Status Law

In 2001 parliament passed the so-called Status Law providing benefits to ethnic Hungarians living in neighbouring countries. The benefits were to be provided primarily on the territory of Hungary in the fields of education, transportation,
employment, and health care, but the law also stipulated the provision of some benefits in the home countries of the minorities, for example regular payments for every child from among the diaspora sent to a Hungarian school. From a legal point of view the Status Law can be described as a transnational minority law offering benefits not for the citizens of the state implementing the law but for citizens of other states. It provided a so-called Hungarian Identity Card which – in Küpper’s words – was “far from awarding a minor form of Hungarian citizenship” (Küpper 2006: 180). Foreign Minister János Martonyi declared unequivocally that the law was not about status but about benefits. The law created a special type of relationship which differed from the usual legal relationships between states and individuals.

The idea of the Status Law rested exclusively on the cultural account of the nation. Orbán himself pointed out in the debate preceding the vote on the law:

The Hungarian Status Law is based on cultural identity. Thus anybody can decide if she or he accepts the cultural identity with the Hungarian nation (Orbán 2006c: 251).

His words referred to the fact that the law itself did not provide any criteria regarding what constituted Hungarian nationality. The law used the notion of national identity, but did not specify its meaning. It demanded only that the applicant should be of “Hungarian national identity”. The determination of identity thus depended on whether an individual declared herself or himself to be Hungarian. In a speech dedicating a new Hungarian university in Transylvania, Orbán expressed his deep-felt conviction that the Hungarian community could survive in the Carpathian Basin only by relying on its culture. In the view of the present writer the Status Law laid the ground for the “trans-sovereign” interpretation of the nation.

As Brigid Fowler points out, these moves ran up against “modern” norms of statehood, against the principle that states can legitimately have a relationship only with their citizens or with people resident on their territories (Fowler 2004b: 197). In connection with the law Fowler even speaks of a conflict between “modern” and “post-modern” norms of statehood. Stephen Deets went even further, expressing his view that the strategy of FIDESZ questioned the Westphalian system and invoked a neo-medievalist world in which there are competing legitimate organising principles for the international arena and in which individuals are legal members.

Legal provisions for supporting kin-minorities are not solely confined to Hungary (Halász 2006: 255–279).
of a transnational community while also being under the control of the territory on which they reside (Deets 2006: 17).

He referred to the fact that while the European Union, in its present form, is still tied to the principle of the territorial state, and horizontal violations of state sovereignty are not permitted, the strategy of mobilizing-plebeian conservatism exceeded, in some respects even precluded the principle of territoriality.

The Status Law was considered by FIDESZ to be only the first step towards establishing a legal bond between the kin-state and the kin-minorities. However, it provoked a debate all over Europe on the optimal relationship between states and nations9. Since this study focuses its attention on the nation-building strategy of Hungarian conservatism, it does not cover in details the heated international debate sparked by the Status Law. It is enough to remark that in 2003 the socialist-liberal government – in response to sharp European criticism of the law – significantly changed its provisions and removed “almost everything that implied a trans-sovereign nation” (Deets 2006: 32). However, FIDESZ did not want to accept this modification of the law. Mobilizing conservatism aimed at much more than merely cultural cooperation with the kin-minorities.

This was the background to the launching of a new initiative in nation-building. The World Federation of Hungarians began to organise a referendum in 2003 on the introduction of dual citizenship and FIDESZ, at that time in opposition, supported it, even if it did not agree with the timing of the proposal. The reasoning behind this step was that the re-establishment of Hungarian citizenship for Hungarian minorities would redress at least some of the perceived injustices of the Treaty of 1920, which assigned areas heavily populated by ethnic Hungarians to its contemporary neighbours. It was emphasized that the ancestors of ethnic Hungarians in the Carpathian Basin had been Hungarian citizens until the end of the First World War. FIDESZ emphatically argued that to vote “Yes” was a moral obligation. Some experts warned that dual citizenship was not an adequate means of minority protection, but one can safely assume that the aims of mobilizing conservatism were not confined to this limited goal (Halász 2004). On the other hand, the then socialist Prime Minister, Ferenc Gyurcsány, campaigning for the “No” option, succeeded in utilizing “welfare chauvinism”, i.e. in raising fears that by acquiring citizenship rights, the kin-minorities would threaten the standard of living in Hungary. The referendum failed in December 2004, having been ruled invalid

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9 The European reaction cannot be understood without taking into consideration the fact that international law prefers to cast minority rights in terms of individual rights. The Venice Commission of the European Council stated in its report in October 2001 that differential treatment of citizens of other states can be justified only in matters of culture.
due to the low voter turnout (Bakk 2004). The result demonstrated that the strategy of mobilizing conservatism was opposed heavily by a significant part of Hungarian society: the chosen way of nation-building involved vitriolic debates and conflict within the Hungarian electorate. It clearly proved that nation-building can turn out to be divisive not only between nations but also within a nation.

7. The Adoption of Dual Citizenship

After the failure of the referendum, mobilizing-plebeian conservatism for some time avoided the issue of dual citizenship in public discourse. However, it did not give up its eventual intention to return to its creation. Accordingly, the second FIDESZ administration, formed in May 2010, again took up this question and passed the dual citizenship law in a hurry, practically as its first major act. The law, another crucial step in the process of implementing trans-sovereign strategy, provided citizenship on demand for those co-nationals who do not live in the kin-state. In explaining this decision FIDESZ argued that the Hungarians of the neighbouring countries were in a disadvantageous position: whereas in 1990 citizenship was restored (upon request) to those Hungarians who fled from communism to the West, this option was not available to the former group. This was considered to be a form of discrimination that had to be abolished. Some authors speak of a paradigm shift in this respect, because while the Status Law was designed primarily to serve the aim of supporting the minorities in their homelands, dual citizenship tends to give incentives to co-nationals to set up residence and work in Hungary. However, I am convinced – without calling into question the differences in the potential effects of the two approaches – that the nation-building strategy of plebeian conservatism has displayed a relatively high degree of coherence. Apart from the psychological wish to remedy the humiliating failure of the referendum of December 2004, the fundamental motivation has been from the beginning to reassert the cohesion and unitary character of the Hungarian nation – a basic aim of this conservatism. The guiding concept of the law is that Hungarian citizenship would be granted as an extra citizenship, i.e. not affecting the original citizenship of the applicants. Granting citizenship to non-resident ethnic kin is a crucial element in trans-sovereign nation-building. It has redefined the concept of nationhood, and, as a corollary, the idea of national interest has been transformed to include not only the interests of the Hungarian citizens but also those of the Hungarian minorities.

The implementation of trans-sovereign strategy did not stop with passing the law on dual citizenship in 2010. This act did not provide voting rights for the holders of dual citizenship living in the neighbouring states. In fact, the issue
of voting rights was consciously avoided by the new Orbán-government for fear of arousing heated debates about the expediency of the extension of dual citizenship with the right to vote in Hungarian parliamentary elections. However, a year later leading representatives of FIDESZ took up this question as if trying to familiarize the Hungarian electorate with the idea of granting voting rights to kin-minorities. Speaker of the National Assembly, László Kövér, a key figure in FIDESZ, argued that there can be only one type of (Hungarian) voter. Similarly, the Under Secretary of State, Bence Rétvári, declared that “the right to vote forms an integral part of citizenship” (Rétvári 2013). As for potential worries concerning the international reaction, FIDESZ adopted the viewpoint that the provision of voting rights to co-nationals falls within the competence of national governments. In 2011 a law was passed to entitle the holders of dual citizenship to vote for party lists in Hungarian parliamentary elections (only for party lists; the precondition of voting is preliminary registration with the relevant authorities). This controversial act, which was heavily criticized by the opposition, also served domestic purposes since it is a well-known fact that the Hungarians of the neighbouring countries tend to support FIDESZ.

Conclusion

The noted researcher of nationalism, Rogers Brubaker described in *Nationalism Reframed* a “triadic nexus” between national minorities, nationalizing states and external national homelands (Brubaker 1996: 4). Brubaker’s model offers a useful framework for analysing the relationship between the home state, in which the minority lives, and which may easily become a “nationalizing” state, the kin-state (labelled by him as external national homeland) which may also behave as a nationalizing state, and the minority itself. This study has attempted to demonstrate that mobilizing-plebeian conservatism – by opting for a political course that aimed at centring the political organisation on nation-building – devised a number of non-territorial policy innovations and thereby brought new elements into this complicated triangular relationship. Thus it has undoubtedly brought new challenges to the traditional conception of state sovereignty. Highlighting the contradiction between the roles of the home state and of the kin-state it clearly reflects the shortcomings of the traditional hierarchical Weberian state to effectively deal with identity communities.

By adopting the Status Law and, later, the law on dual citizenship, mobilizing-plebeian conservatism wanted to include the kin-minorities in the nation-building process of the kin-state. Patrician conservatism was reluctant to give priority to nation-building and to subordinate other major objectives to this aim, because
it did not wish to jeopardize the success of state-building. It was also aware of the fact that focusing on nation-building would have increased the role of the masses in politics. Plebeian conservatism has no such fears. While patrician conservatism based its doctrine of legitimacy on the rule of law, it has held that state power can be legitimized only by the will of the nation. In this vein it expressly declared that the legitimacy based on the nation is superior to that based on parliamentary politics. This strategy of nation-building which has considered the active involvement of the kin-minorities absolutely indispensable is much more ambitious than the patrician variant, but it creates as many dilemmas as it can solve.

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1. Introduction

The introduction of preferential naturalisation for ethnic Hungarians living abroad in 2010 was a controversial decision made as there was no consensus on the matter in Hungary. The question became politicized and highly contested but most of these contributors tend to draw mainly on theoretical narratives and are predominantly normative in character. Less is known about how preferential naturalisation influences the relationship between Hungary and ethnic Hungarian communities living around Hungary, however, citizenship offered by the kin-state affects both directly and indirectly the relations of ethnic minority communities towards their “homeland” as well as their “kin-state”.

In the case of ethnic Hungarians living in Slovakia this question became more complicated, because Slovakia was the only country that responded to the Hungarian citizenship law amendment by legal means. According to the Slovak Citizenship Act\(^1\) passed in response, those Slovak citizens, who voluntarily acquire another nationality, automatically lose their Slovak citizenship. The then ruling Slovak government expressed openly\(^2\) that the main reason of the amendment of the citizenship act was to avoid dual nationality of those Slovak citizens who belong to the Hungarian minority in Slovakia. According to the official Slovak statistics, more than four years after the amendment of the law, nearly 700 people lost their Slovak citizenship\(^3\). Most of them were persons who acquired Czech citizenship and only

\(^1\) Act No. 250/2010 Coll. on Nationality of the Slovak Republic as amended and modified Act No. 40/1993 Coll.

\(^2\) At a press conference on 13\(^{th}\) of May 2010 Fico said: “Because of this citizenship law Slovakia is in security risk now. (...) What would be our answer, if the President of Hungary wishes to visit their Hungarian citizens living on the territory of Slovakia? This is a really dangerous security risk for us in the future” (resource: Martina Kováčová, (TASR): Fica maďarské občianstvo desí, available online at: www.sme.sk/c/5373194/ficmaďarske-obcianstvo-desi.html).

\(^3\) According to the Ministry of Interior of the Slovak Republic.
about 40 people have lost their Slovak citizenship upon acquisition of the Hungarian citizenship. One might think that the reason for the lack of interest of ethnic Hungarians living in Slovakia in acquiring Hungarian citizenship is the amendment of the Slovak citizenship law but the answer is not so simple.

The aim of this chapter is to analyse from a qualitative perspective how different citizenship constructions are integrated (or not) into the identity of the minority groups, more specifically the Hungarians living in Slovakia and how the new citizenship policies influence their attachments and relations towards Slovakia, as state of residence; towards Hungary, as their kin-state; and towards their own minority community.

2. The Development of the Relationship between Hungary and Hungarian Minorities Living in Neighbouring Countries

After 1989, Hungarian relations towards kin-minorities living in neighbouring countries around Hungary were reconceptualised. This issue was important not only from foreign policy perspectives of Hungary but also played an important role in the creation of main political identities in the domestic political space. The first democratically elected post-communist prime minister, József Antall, considered himself as the prime minister of fifteen million Hungarians and both the governmental and opposition parties agreed that Hungary should actively support trans-border Hungarian communities in neighbouring countries. During the MDF (Magyar Demokrata Fórum, Hungarian Democratic Forum) period of rule the protection of kin-minorities became a fundamental principle of the foreign policy of Hungary (Tóth 2000). Relations and policy towards kin-minorities was based on three main principles:

1. the Hungarian government would protect Hungarian minorities living in neighbouring countries with tools of diplomacy and in the framework of international human rights development;
2. no decision in Budapest could be made about kin abroad without consulting them – in those issues which concern Hungarians living abroad, Hungarian government was bound to consider the kin-minorities’ elite’s opinion;
3. to create a model of minority protection that would be an example for neighbouring countries’ governments about the possible forms of handling minority issues; the result of this conception was the minority law which created a special system of self-governance of minority communities living in Hungary (Bárdi 2013).
For the leftist Horn government (1994–1998), the most important ambition was to prepare and then successfully complete the Euro-Atlantic integration of the country in the near future. The development of Hungarian – Hungarian relations was also subordinate to this main aim (Mák 2000). As a result, the Horn government changed its rhetoric concerning kin-minorities in neighbouring countries. Instead of national and historic responsibility, the policy was based on constitutional elements and determined by the realistic argument that the “Hungarian issue” cannot be allowed to destabilise the region and must not hinder or slow down the Euro-Atlantic integration of the country. The signing of basic treaties with neighbouring countries was aimed at buttressing the government’s strategy (Győri-Szabó 2000; Sidó, Fiala, Vincze & Jarábik 2003).

By the end of 1990, it seemed that Hungary would join to the EU sooner than its neighbours, especially Romania. Subsequent acceptance of the Schengen requirements meant that borders of Hungary became in part the Eastern external borders of the EU and the new, more restrictive borders could separate co-ethnics living in Ukraine, Croatia, Serbia and Romania from the kin-state (Bárdi 2004). In order to find an adequate solution to this question the Hungarian government made some changes that changed the whole character of the Hungarian kin-state policy. The Orbán government established the Hungarian Standing Conference (MÁÉRT) which was a consultative organisation between Hungary’s political forces and those minority organisations that had parliamentary or regional representation in neighbouring countries. In establishing this kind of consultative forum, the FIDESZ (Alliance of Young Democrats) government sought to give greater pre-eminence for ethnic Hungarian political elites with regard to the decision making process of the Hungarian government on kin-minorities living abroad. The most important decision of this period was the acceptance of the Status Law. The law offered Hungarian residency for Hungarians living in neighbouring countries and introduced different types of financial allowances for them. It is of little surprise that it became a controversial issue in the relations with Slovakia and Romania4.

The acceptance of the Status Law also determined the directions of the subsequent left-wing government’s foreign policy. One year after the Hungarian Socialist Party came into power in 2002, they began negotiations with neighbouring governments about the law. In 2003 the government accepted amendments of the law to ensure compliance with international legal norms and it also rolled back some of its more controversial provisions. They modified the preamble by taking out the reference to the ‘united Hungarian nation’ and mentioned only the cultural

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4 Act No. LXII. About Hungarians living in neighbouring countries.
connections existing between Hungary and its kin-minorities. The new version of the law was pushed through parliament without the provisions about special health and insurance benefits and work permits for trans-border Hungarians.

At the beginning of 2000s it became clear that the question about the legal status of ethnic Hungarians and the so-called Schengen dilemma had not answered by the Status Law and Hungarian governmental policy towards ethnic kin was unable to find adequate solutions to ease tensions within the Hungarian–Hungarian relations (Kántor, Majtényi, Ieda, Vizi & Halász 2004). Hungary’s upcoming European integration lent special urgency to this issue. According to the World Federation of Hungarians by granting non-resident citizenship to ethnic Hungarians living abroad, Hungary was promoting the integration within the European Union (EU) of kin-minorities whose host state was not in fact joining the EU, for example Ukraine. Eventually, the World Federation began to collect signatures for a referendum in Hungary about dual citizenship. One year later – and six months after Hungary joined the EU – Hungarian citizens were asked in a plebiscite to decide whether ethnic Hungarians living outside of Hungary should receive non-resident Hungarian citizenship or not.

One of the main paradoxes of the situation was that the initiative for the referendum and non-resident dual citizenship did not come from the Hungarian domestic political arena, but from an organisation abroad, which was not well integrated into the Hungarian political sphere. Another paradox is that moderate political leaders of ethnic minorities abroad clearly expressed their scepticism in connection with the referendum (Bitskey 2010). In spite of the fact that the right-wing parties were relatively passive at the beginning, later they declared their support for it while leftist parties were clearly against. During the campaign it became clear that the whole issue was not about ethnic Hungarians living in neighbouring countries but mainly about the balance of forces in the bipolar political environment – mainly between FIDESZ and the MSZP (Magyar Szocialista Párt, Hungarian Socialist Party). For the MSZP leadership the whole campaign was about re-enforcing its power both within the party and the wider Hungarian political sphere in order to demonstrate to the electorate that Viktor Orbán and his nationalist rhetoric could be defeated. Despite most of the voters voting in favour of non-resident citizenship the low turnout invalidated the results. The referendum and the initiative to give Hungarian citizenship to ethnic Hungarians living abroad

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5 On one hand, it became clear that those autonomy conceptions represented by the Hungarian political elites in the neighbouring countries were unsuccessful. On the other hand, the legal status of trans-border Hungarians in Hungary was not properly defined which complicated relations between the Hungarian government and political representatives of minority communities in neighbouring countries.
failed. However, the question remained on the Hungarian political agenda (Bárdi 2005; Kovács 2005).

The aftermath of the referendum was that relations with the Hungarian political elites abroad cooled, not just because the MSZP did not support non-resident citizenship, but mainly because of their negative campaign in which they highlighted mainly the adverse social and economic effects of giving Hungarian citizenship to ethnic Hungarians living abroad. As a kind of compensation, the second left-wing government (2004–2009) established the Programme of National Responsibility and the ‘Homeland’ Programme, nevertheless without a coherent concept lying behind them. The policy towards ethnic Hungarians living in neighbouring countries became a second order issue for the government – the abolition of the Government Office of Hungarian Minorities Abroad (HTMH) and the Teleki Foundation⁶ are symbols of this (Bárdi 2006; Kántor 2006).

In 2010, FIDESZ gained control of the government by winning two-thirds of the parliamentary mandates. After this convincing victory, policy towards ethnic Hungarian communities living in neighbouring countries was shaped mainly by two political motivations. First, FIDESZ wanted to demonstrate that the party’s policy towards ethnic Hungarians living abroad had legitimacy in the Hungarian domestic political arena. Second, FIDESZ understood that the party has to handle somehow the strengthening of Jobbik (The Movement for a Better Hungary) – a radical right-wing party. Jobbik’s position has strengthened in recent years, it having become the third strongest party in the country and its voters are sensitive to these questions. FIDESZ needed to offer alternatives in order to head-off support for Jobbik. So, from this perspective it is easier to understand why the newly established government’s first decision was to introduce preferential naturalisation for ethnic Hungarians and sustain this kind of national policy (Waterbury 2010). From 2010 the policy towards ethnic Hungarians living in neighbouring countries has developed in a new direction. This policy is full of symbols that have meaning derived mainly from domestic political perspectives. The introduction of exchange programmes for high school students in Hungary is one such example. The basic idea of this programme is that at least once during their studies, students from high schools in Hungary should visit those territories in neighbouring countries where Hungarian minority communities are resident. Another symbolic act was that the government made 4 June, the Day of National Togetherness, to commemorate

⁶ The Secretariat for Hungarian Minority Affairs was established and later replaced by the Government Office of Hungarian Minorities Abroad (Határon Túli Magyarak Hiatala – HTMH). The aim of the publicly founded Teleki László Foundation was to conduct different academic research focusing on the social, political and legal development of ethnic Hungarian communities in neighbouring countries.
the anniversary of signing the Treaty of Trianon in 1920. The opening of the ‘House of the Hungarian nation’ in one of the most representative building in the Buda Castle with the aim to represent the culture of minority communities has meaning mainly for Hungarians living in Hungary. In comparing the national policy of the first and the second Orbán governments, we can see a fine distinction. Whereas in the first period the main aim was the national integration of kin-minorities and giving them special status within the structure of the kin-state, from 2010 the aim has been the national incorporation of Hungarians living in neighbouring countries and making them equal members – both in political and legal means (Bárdi 2000). Simply put, Orbán’s government started a trans-border nation-building process and preferential naturalisation together with voting rights and created the political and legal tools necessary to achieve this aim.

3. Citizenship and Its Different Meanings

We can argue that especially in Central and Eastern European countries (national) self-determination is based on ethnic, cultural and linguistic aspects and this also determines the citizenship policies and practices of these states. As Irina Culic argues citizenship policies in this region are determined mainly by state-building processes and are “shaped by elite and popular visions of the state (…) as well as by perceived threats to its integrity and welfare” (Culic 2009: 9). Countries in this region are multi-ethnic and as Kymlicka argues members of different ethnic minority communities are not identified with the state by their citizenship (Kymlicka 1994). This could be the reason why they feel themselves as outsiders in society – they bear the citizenship of the state but they have a nationality other than the majority of that country. This feeling of alienation is stronger in those countries where these minority communities face assimilation, discrimination or limitation of their minority rights. In these cases the citizenship of the state in which they are living has a totally different meaning for them than the citizenship offered by their kin-state.

In Slovakia, national self-identification is very important in everyday practices (Burzová 2012) and – as scholars argue – national identity is constructed mainly discursively, especially through the media, education and legislation (Chudzíková 2011). This discursive identity construction implies definitions of ‘us’ versus ‘them,’ categories often created with references to intergroup threats and conflict between majority and minority, but mainly against the Hungarian community living here. These tendencies can be found in all aspects of state policy as is manifested in the laws about the language usage (Act on the State Language, Act on the Minority Language Usage), the Patriotism Act, and also the Act on Citizenship.
Notwithstanding Europeanization, states enjoy absolute and unrestricted discretion to decide whether they prohibit or recognise the practice of dual citizenship or not. When the Hungarian government accepted the amendment of the citizenship law offering extra territorial citizenship for Hungarian kin-minorities living in neighbouring countries without residence requirements in Hungary, Slovakia was the only country that responded to this decision by legal means. On the day of the Hungarian decision, the Slovak government accepted an amendment to Slovak citizenship law that outlaws dual citizenship. According to the amendment, application for a citizenship of another country means the automatic loss of Slovak citizenship and individuals are obliged to notify the state authorities on his/her second citizenship.

Political elites did not deny that the reason of this stark amendment was fear that due to Hungarian preferential naturalisation, ethnic Hungarians living in Slovakia will become Hungarian citizens on the territory of Slovakia. This is not only a matter of potential disloyalty to the state, but it is also a real territorial and security danger for the Slovak state itself. Albeit, Slovakia tolerated the practice of dual nationality and until 2005 also offered citizenship for ethnic Slovaks who were permanently resident abroad\(^7\), Hungarian preferential naturalisation was unacceptable for the Slovak government which was opposed to the principle of dual citizenship. The methods by which Hungary amended of citizenship law and the fact that the requirement of permanent residence in Hungary was waived with the result that ethnic Hungarians can become citizens of Hungary on the territory of Slovakia were the main reasons for Slovakia abandoning former citizenship practice (Kusá 2009). To understand the complexity of this question, we will now focus on different interpretations of dual or multiple citizenship.

4. Conceptual Framework of Multiple Nationality

Until the end of the twentieth century, plural citizenship was foreign to international legal practice and disfavoured by states. However, the results of globalization, the development of human rights, reduction of conflicts between states and increasing migration flows have changed the common understandings of plural citizenship. What is more, globalization makes it possible simultaneously to exercise both the principle of *ius sanguinis* and *ius soli* (Spiro 2010). Due to this changed state of affairs, dual nationality has become widely accepted and in some

\(^7\) In 1997, the Slovak Republic passed Act No. 70/1997 on Expatriates Slovaks. It was the first country in the region which offered extraterritorial citizenship for Slovak expatriates. After 2005 preferential naturalisation of Slovak expatriates is possible only after having lived at least three years permanently on the territory of the country.
cases it is used as a tool of integration of migrants into host societies. According to Bloemraad, dual citizenship is both the reason and the cause of transnationalism, and is reinforcing transnational identity structures (Bloemraad 2004).

Nowadays citizenship is interpreted mainly as membership which can be chosen or renounced individually (Brubaker 1990). However, citizenship cannot be interpreted only as a membership in a political community (state) but as a membership in a cultural community – the nation. In this manner citizenship is a bond symbolising the individual’s belonging and it also means, that this bond is a generational link, ensuring historical transcendence and continuity in the future of the nation (Szabó 2013). Individuals can own more than one membership at the same time and can use these memberships in different contexts (Bosniak 2002). Analysing debates about the changes of Swedish citizenship policy, Gustafson draws the attention to the fact that allowing dual citizenship is changing the homogenizing nature of “traditional” citizenship concepts. However, dual citizenship policies assume a kind of individualization since the new citizenship (the second) is obtainable on an individual basis only. Due to this citizenships can be ranked in a hierarchical order and their owners may distinguish them as primary and secondary citizenships (Gustafson 2005). As Spiro has written: “plural citizenship will almost always involve one citizenship that is dearer than the other” (Spiro 2010: 22). Dual citizenship can include at least two different ties, which have different meanings for their owners. Which one is dearer and why – is decided individually and mainly contextually (Bloemraad, Korteweg & Yurdakul 2008).

Rainer Bauböck determines three types of cross-border citizenships. Trans-border citizens are those who are recognized by two or more states. Denizenship is a kind of citizenship when the individual is living in another country for a longer time (long-term residents, or resident non-citizens) but he/she did not have acquire the citizenship of the state where he/she lives. For its part, 'ethnizenship' is citizenship offered by the kin-state for co-ethnics residing abroad (Bauböck 2007). From the perspective of our research is important to briefly elaborate the term of ethnizenship. According to Bauböck, it is an “external quasi citizenship” offered by the kin-state for those ethnic kin who live in the neighbouring countries. On the one hand, it can be interpreted, as a form of symbolic membership. On the other, as a type of minority protection (Bauböck 2007). As he has highlighted, ethnizenship, especially when it is combined with external voting rights, can change the character of relations between ethnic kin-minorities and the kin-state. Through this kind of citizenship policy, the kin-state becomes the only (or the main) representative of the kin-minorities, while the members of these communities become equal with those citizens who migrated from the country. This means that this citizenship policy gives equal status to the members of kin-minority
communities with immigrants who left the country on their own will. The kin-
minority communities can lose their special “status” and become a community of citizens living abroad. What is more, voting rights granted alongside extra-
territorial citizenship can also reinforce the political orientation of kin-minority communities towards their kin-state, but on the other hand their political integra-
tion and representation in their state of residence can at the same time weaken. Accepting ethnizenship and actively using voting rights given by the kin-state can deepen pre-existing cleavages and ruin relations within and between the minority and majority communities in the state of residence (Papp & Vass 2014). Levente Salat has also taken up this communitarian perspective when he argues that recent Hungarian national policy towards ethnic Hungarians living in immediate neigh-
bouring countries is changing: with the institutionalization of dual citizenship. Hungary as a kin-state is not supporting the ambitions of these minority com-
munities to develop their own political communities and build parallel Hungarian minority societies but instead aims to create diaspora communities out of them (Salat 2013).

The aim of our qualitative research is to analyse how Hungarians living in Slo-
vakia think about these issues. We are trying to answer these questions:

• How do citizenship policies and practices (both the Hungarian and Slo-
vak) influence the identity constructions of Hungarians living in Slova-
kia? How do they accept non-resident citizenship offered by the Hungarian government and the decision of the Slovak National Council?
• What does citizenship/the “new” Hungarian/the “old” Slovak citizenship mean for them and how do they integrate (or not) these citizenships into their everyday practice – are they important for them, as the members of minority community or not?
• How are their attachments and relations towards Slovakia (as their home country), Hungary (as their kin-state) and their own minority community changing and influenced by these citizenship practices?

5. Methodology

We conducted focus group discussions among members of Hungarian commu-
nity living in Slovakia. The aim of this pilot qualitative research was to investigate participants’ individual attitudes towards their homeland and nation and also ex-
perience how they reconceptualise their national identity. Our aim was to analyse their identity constructions and examine how the citizenship(s) (both the “old” and the “new”) influences these constructions. We assessed only those attitudes which could be determined in our discussions. As a result, these findings are not
representative and it was not our aim to make them so. However, this method seemed well-suited to gain an insight how people conceptualize the above-mentioned questions and how they discuss them together with each other.

We conducted four focus group discussions in Slovakia and one in Budapest with young people have long been resident in Hungary but were born in Slovakia. The number of participants of each group was ten to twelve and the age-distribution of the groups was heterogeneous. The discussions involved a mix of Hungarian passport holders and those who do not hold Hungarian citizenship. The moderator of the focus groups followed the same set of questions but all of the groups had their own dynamic, different shifts of emphasis occurred in each group. The discussions were anonymous.

6. Types and Elements of the Identity Structures

In our interpretation, minority identity or ethnic identity is a construct which is not given but it is manifested in concrete situations and it is also a tool of self-representation. Focus group discussions enabled us to follow and examine different social praxis, which are important in connection with the above mentioned topics. To analyse the structure of minority identities our point of departure was Brubaker’s triadic model – we assume that ethnic Hungarians living in neighbouring countries around Hungary have different attitudes towards the state in which they live, towards Hungary as their kin-state and towards their own minority communities. These multiple attachments and the fact that they are members of a minority community create a special, multi-layered identity structures.

In our region we are often mixing Slovak with Hungarian. (…) In Gömör\(^8\) we have our own small world and we are closely connected to the Slovaks living here. It often happens that we start the sentence in Hungarian and end in Slovak language… and we also borrow some expressions from the Romani language… (3\(^{rd}\) interview, Slovakia).

It was interesting to see different understandings and identification of this multi-layered identity construction. For participants who were living in Hungary for longer time this multiple identity was described as a positive attitude:

We are living in a border of two cultures, the Slavic cultures and Hungarian culture. We have bonds with both of them and it is positive (5\(^{th}\) interview, Budapest).

\(^8\) Gömör is a historical region in Central and Eastern part of Slovakia.
Participants who had spent most of their lives in their minority community conceptualised this heterogeneous identity construction as an attitude based on exclusion:

Because here we are just – I’m sorry but – ‘stupid Hungarians’ for Slovaks. But for Hungarians in Hungary we are just ‘stupid Slovaks’. Because of this I am not able to identify myself with any of them. (…) But basically I think I am Hungarian (1st interview, Slovakia).

Other examples for this inside heterogeneity are the answers given to the question about the community affiliation of participants. In every focus group we asked our interviewees how they define themselves and the community to which they belong. From their answers it is clear that their personal self-definition is also based mainly on national identification which is glued to the geographical region where they are living. In the focus group conducted in Southern Slovakia emotional debates developed around the question how they call themselves, which of these expressions are correct and why: “Hungarian from Slovakia” or “Hungarian from Upperland”.

I prefer to use the expression “Hungarian in Slovakia”, but on the other hand I am just simply Hungarian… To be honest I really do not like to use the expression “Hungarian from Upperland”. I think this is just a new trend. Upperland existed only between 1938 – ‘45 and before… I think to use this expression is embarrassing. I think here is no Upperland today. (…) Here is Slovakia now and I am Hungarian from Slovakia, but simply Hungarian and only Hungarian, apart from the fact that not from Upperland (1st interview, Slovakia).

I always said as a history teacher that there is only one Hungarian nation, firstly. It is not important if someone is living in America or in other part of the world, there is only one Hungarian nation. And “Hungarian from Upperland” is also a member of this community – there is nothing wrong with this expression, anyway. (…) This kind of distinction is – on one hand – originated from geographical circumstances, on the other hand is the aftermath of Trianon… that some political forces want to deny that there is only one Hungarian nation (1st interview, Slovakia).

Nowadays in political discourses in Hungary the historical appellation of today territory of Slovakia “Upperland” is often used when they are talking about Hungarians living in Slovakia. It means that in some discourses the ethnic Hungarian community in Slovakia is called “Hungarians from Upperland”, which is unacceptable to Slovak political elites. This question is not important only from historical perspectives but today (as we can see from the answers) it has a political and identification meaning as well.
It is indisputable that minority identity is bounded by territory. It originates from the fact that borders of the homeland (the motherland) and the borders of the state in which they live are not the same as for Hungarians living in Hungary. Elements of their identity structures are closely connected with the feeling of insecurity – these communities are involuntary communities that came into being as a result of a political decision, the Trianon treaty (Bárdi 2013). Our aim with the questions concerning their homeland was to conceptualise their bonds to the region where they live and also understand their relationship towards the kin-state and the state of residence. For the majority of the participants homeland was defined regionally – it is the region where they are living their everyday life or they were born. Participants did not name neither Slovakia nor Hungary as their homeland. For the minority of the participants, homeland was a spiritual concept connected to the Carpathian basin or to the Hungarian nation itself. It is also important that the feeling “homelessness” was mentioned in all of the focus groups.

I think, we do not know where we belong. (…) Well, I do not feel I am totally Hungarian… I am Hungarian but I do not feel myself just as Hungarian, but I am not Slovak neither. That’s why I said, if I leave Slovakia, I will never come back because I do not feel I belong here (4th interview, Slovakia).

I think there are only a few people from our generation who identify themselves as Hungarians and Slovakia as their homeland. Hungary did not support us on 5th of December, so … we are living here… we are here… we are taxpayers here, but we do not have our homeland (2nd interview, Slovakia).

During the focus group discussions we asked participants what they think about Hungarians living in Hungary. Our aim here was to ascertain about the existence of the assumed ethnocentrism that distinguishes culturally and mentally the Hungarians living in Hungary from Hungarians living outside the borders of Hungary. This question is important, because if we assume that acceptance of Hungarian citizenship is based mainly on national and cultural solidarity, this solidarity must also be expressed between the members of the nation. Yet after analysing the answers given to this question it seems for us that the systemic preconceptions about the “majority Hungarians” are still real. There were some positive opinions about Hungarians living in Hungary; however, negative prejudices were dominant. We can say that the most important differences become permanent, the cultural production of borders is continuous and is more intensive when we are talking about the links towards the Hungarian nation and meaning
of national symbols. There is a deep structural division, an invisible barrier: belonging to the Hungarian nation that is natural for those who live in Hungary, but for Hungarians living in neighbouring countries it is an emotionally, culturally determined question which influences their everyday existence.

XY, he just kissed his Hungarian card… He was so happy… He was a Hungarian citizen in '12, when he was born, and for him spiritually… He showed all of his honours from the Second World War when he got the card and he was crying. So, you will not understand this symbol there in Budapest, here we better appreciate it… (2nd interview, Slovakia).

The distinctions developed between the Hungarians in Hungary and minority Hungarians in the neighbouring countries are very important from the perspective of Hungarian citizenship. It is sensitive for ethnic Hungarians when Hungarian citizens identify themselves as the members of “majority” towards ethnic Hungarians. It was also a common experience for the participants to realise that Hungarian citizens have a lack of knowledge about them, about their conditions and it was manifested in questions like: “Where did you learn Hungarian so well?” We also have to add that Hungarians from neighbouring countries are often labelled as immigrants in Hungary or just called Slovaks, Serbs, Ukrainians and Romanians after their country of residence. These invisible borders are reproduced and in the future will also mentally detach these communities from one another. We can also say that Hungarian citizenship is not enough to change these stereotypes.

For me the fact that I am Hungarian does not mean that I am ‘Hungarian Hungarian’ – it is important for me to identify myself as ‘Hungarian from Slovakia.’ I do not feel myself as a member of a minority community, but… Because it is totally different to be a Hungarian from Slovakia and that’s why we have to say from which country we are coming from (5th interview, Budapest).

These answers show that national affiliation, regional attachment, heterogeneous linkage to the kin-state and mental barriers are all involved in the self-identification structures of our respondents. Let us now turn to how citizenship(s) and citizenship policies influence these constructions.

7. Citizenship Constructions of Hungarians Living in Slovakia

As we mentioned in the first part of the chapter, citizenship can be interpreted as a flexible bond between the state and the individual and in the case of dual
nationality the values of different citizenships are not equal for their owners (Soysal 1994; Ong 1999; Spiro 2010b). In our research we also analysed different aspects of the “old” Slovak and the “new” Hungarian citizenship and their “values” for the participants.

For participants, citizenship by the state of residence is interpreted mainly as a legal bond, a group of rights and obligations. Almost everyone described Slovak citizenship as an empty link with the state. The reason of this is – as they explained – that they, as people who have other than Slovak nationality, feel themselves as outsiders whose community is not involved into the state building process.

Those participants who had acquired Hungarian citizenship described this relationship as an emotional connection to the nation and not to the country itself. As they explained during the ceremony of citizenship oath they “ceased to exist” as individuals and became spiritually a part of the Hungarian nation.

For me, for example, it was really important that the Hungarian government accepted the amendment… finally. It was like… finally, here is the compensation for 5th of December 2004. There is a historical continuity created within the people. I was smiling a lot when this came into my mind that finally we have this opportunity. (…) Finally there is a call from the kin-state towards the Hungarians living around Hungary (5th interview, Budapest).

This is not only just an official relation with a country. (…) For the acquisition of the Hungarian citizenship is needed to find the linkage between your ancestry and the Hungarian nation, a document proving that e.g. your grandma’ was Hungarian. And when you find handwritten diary or school report of your great-grandmother… well this is pounding everyone’s heart (5th interview, Budapest).

This classical example of kin-state protection and the emotional reasons are not the only motivation, of course. Participants also mentioned some other, more practical reasons, e.g. to take up a job in Hungary. Here we have to add that Hungary’s role as kin-state was also discussed in all focus groups. In the focus group discussions conducted in Southern Slovakia the interpretation of kin-state’s role became an emotionally charged issue connected with the question of voting rights offered by Hungary. Those interviewees, who supported the idea of preferential naturalisation, argued that Hungary is playing and must play an important role in the future of Hungarian community living in Slovakia. These participants also highlighted that for minority communities is really important which party is governing in Budapest and with this argumentation they also expressed their support towards the voting right given together with the citizenship. The majority
of the participants in these focus groups, however, did not really accept this argumentation. According to them, the Hungarian community in Slovakia must find its place in Slovak society and strengthen the community and the Hungarian identity of ethnic Hungarian living in Slovakia without the political support of Hungary.

I think, it is just an illusion to think, Hungarian citizenship will ensure the future of Hungarians in Slovakia and help them to remain Hungarian and do not change their identity. It’s a really wrong conception. And this a really big problem that a lot of people think like this (2nd interview, Slovakia).

In connection with voting rights the cleavages between participations are also visible. Emotionally based commitment, special ethnocentrism and territorial interpretations are confronting with each other:

A: From my point of view Hungarian dual citizenship is just a political trick. It is good, but why? It has no meaning for me (…).

B: I do not really agree. Citizenship is based on two things. It is a legal relation and an emotional relation. (…) And from the perspective of Hungarians living here is important what is happening in Hungary.

A: It is all one to me.

B: That is you, I am sorry for you. The future of Hungary matters and this is the reason why it also matters are we voting or not. It is important here for us who will have the power in Hungary and what Hungarian government will do for kin-community living here. We can see now, what this government is doing for us, but we also have a counterexamples from the past.

A: (…) The question who could gain control of the government in Hungary must be decided by those, who are living there, who are paying taxis there. (…) For me it is a moral question. I do not want to interfere in other country’s affairs…

B: But for Hungarians living in other parts of the world always was important who gain control of the government in Hungary.

A: But we, as outsiders living here, cannot talk about Hungary as our country.

B: Then about organic Hungarian nation…
A: Yes, we can talk about the Hungarian nation, but not about the country.

B: But we have a kin-state. And to decide who can govern in that kin-state…

A: …must be decided only by those, who are living there. I am living in the territory of this country and I want to decide who can get the power here! (1st interview, Slovakia).

In the focus group conducted in Eastern Slovakia participants expressed other opinions about kin-state. These participants, who are living mainly in ethnically mixed municipalities, argued that Hungary must support Hungarian community in Slovakia but only through the channel of diplomacy and good neighbouring relations. For them, Hungarian support is important but not by offering citizenship – these participants honestly expressed their disappointment about the timing of the whole citizenship question. Accordingly, it was a mistake and Hungary as a kin-state cannot allow such kind of mistakes.

We also should mention those opinions that did not support the idea of obtaining Hungarian citizenship through the process of preferential naturalization. In Slovakia these opinions were in majority. One can assume that this negative approach toward Hungarian citizenship is because of the Slovak citizenship law, which does not tolerate the practice of dual citizenship. Surprisingly, the effects of the Slovak citizenship law were not really discussed in these focus groups.

The main argument of the participants was that Hungarian citizenship has meaning only when someone is planning to move to Hungary. For them it was irrational to acquire a citizenship of a state in which they do not live. Without “real” relationship with Hungary it was unimaginable for them to acquire Hungarian citizenship. The majority of the participants in Slovakia did not accept “emotions” as reason for acquiring – they connect citizenship with the territory of the state in which they live and they did not step outside this framework. It is also interesting, that the majority of the participants assumed that the aim of offering citizenship by the kin-state would be to reinforce and support their Hungarian self-identification. However, they argued that Hungarian citizenship cannot strengthen the Hungarian identity of ethnic Hungarians living in Slovakia; it cannot guarantee that ethnic Hungarians remain Hungarian.

We can bring up the next generation here. We have our rights, or schools here. I do not feel I would have some benefits from Hungarian citizenship. I feel myself Hungarian without any Hungarian citizenship (4th interview, Slovakia).
But why is it important? The previous question was about who is Hungarian and no one answered that I am Hungarian because I have Hungarian citizenship (1st interview, Slovakia).

I think Hungarian citizenship is important only if I move to Hungary. Because after moving there I will not be called Slovak, like now, because now I’m Slovak there (2nd interview, Slovakia).

As we can see, the unequal valuation and differentiation of citizenship is also true in the case of participants of our research. For those, who support preferential naturalisation, Hungarian citizenship is closely connected with their national self-identification. These participants connect Hungarian citizenship to the feeling that they belong to the Hungarian nation and they have a real, “paper based” connection with the kin-state. For them, Hungarian citizenship is something that reinforces them “to be Hungarian” and step out from minority circumstances which are connected with the feeling of insecurity (Papp 2014). What is more, due to the fact that Hungarian citizenship is not given “naturally” as Slovak citizenship is, they can also enjoy the freedom of choice and decide individually to become Hungarian citizens – something that also gives a special meaning to it. However, the majority of participants did not ascribe such a meaning to Hungarian citizenship. They conceptualised the meaning of Hungarian citizenship mainly from their minority perspective. First, Hungarian citizenship itself does not solve the main problems of their own minority community such as assimilation, migration, and high levels of unemployment. Secondly, citizenship is not able to strengthen their national self-identification, because these are separated from each other. Thirdly, both countries are members of the EU and Hungarian citizenship does not offer special benefits for them – from this point of view Hungarian citizenship is “just another piece of paper”. Last, but not least, acquiring Hungarian citizenship supports neither directly nor indirectly their aims in Slovakia, for instance to build a parallel society structure for their own minority community.
Conclusion

In this chapter we examined how different citizenship policies determine a person's relation towards his/her kin-state, state of residence and minority community. Our point of departure was that the “new” Hungarian citizenship creates new elements of identity construction that is changing the aforementioned approaches of persons living in the Hungarian minority community in Slovakia. Hungarian citizenship can reinforce the linkage with the kin-state and the identities connected to the nation and, from this point of view, we can ask what is happening with the ties towards the local minority communities and with the attitudes towards the state in which they are residents.

In the first part of the chapter we briefly summarised the development of policy towards Hungarians living in neighbouring countries to better understand those processes which drove to the acceptance of preferential naturalisation. In the second part of the chapter, we analysed the results of focus group discussions conducted in Slovakia. The aim with these focus group discussions was to analyse these questions at the micro level and from an “every day perspective”. We asked questions such as: what are the effects of the Hungarian government’s and also the Slovak government’s policy towards Hungarians living in Slovakia? Does citizenship matter in the European Union today?

According to the answers analysed above, some theoretical statements mentioned in the first part of the chapter have been reinforced while some of them did not receive confirmation. In the case of ethnic Hungarians living in Slovakia citizenship is conceptualised from a territorial perspective and is based mainly on facts, on the feeling of national belonging. As respondents expressed clearly, for the majority of participants, citizenship is a connection with the state and
not with the nation. Slovak citizenship is integrated into their national self-identification but mainly just because they are living in the territory of that country. One of the results of Slovak minority policy and the Slovak radical-populist attacks against this minority community is that they do not feel they are equal members of Slovak society. For some of the participants this kind of lack of identification could be compensated for by Hungarian citizenship (we belong to the Hungarian nation and to Hungary as our kin-state), but for the majority Hungarian citizenship is not enough to bridge those distances that developed between Hungarians living in Hungary and those living in Slovakia. Such distances are mainly based on cultural and habitual differences – due to these mental barriers minority Hungarians are often labelled as ‘Slovaks’ in Hungary, or someone who is an outsider from the Hungarian society. But the reverse is also true: ‘majority Hungarians’ are also still ‘the others’ for Hungarians in Slovakia. Citizenship offered by the kin-state for ethnic Hungarians is not creating a community of equal Hungarian citizens.

Discussions also showed that there is a strong need among members of the minority community to build their own ethnic Hungarian society which is developing within the Slovak society as a parallel society.

Hungarian citizenship may have an effect on their national self-identification but this effect is not so strong. Due to the above discussed mental borders (the feeling of “otherness” and prejudices) and the possible negative effects of Hungarian cross-border political activity (participants expressed concerns that Hungarian citizenship could be also a good tool for the Hungarian political parties to broaden their political activities within the members of Hungarian minority in Slovakia which has really negative effects, participants critically evaluated the changes of Hungarian citizenship practice and emphasised the importance of their own community building process. Citizenship can be a part of their national self-identification but it cannot be the reason to identify themselves as Hungarians.

Some scholars argue that the results of Hungary’s citizenship policy could be the transformation of minority communities to diaspora communities (Bauböck 2007; Salat 2013). Hungary is going to make Hungarian citizens from the members of these communities alongside those Hungarians who are living in Western countries as diaspora communities. They also argue that with this step, Hungary can easily ruin or change their minority societies and become the legal representatives of those Hungarians who are living in the territory of other countries. It means that these communities can lose status in their states of residence.

In the case of ethnic Hungarians living in Slovakia these fears are at present groundless. The hierarchy of citizenship is realistic in their case and based on community interest. According to Slovak law, they lose their Slovak citizenship by acquiring Hungarian nationality. In spite of the fact that obtaining Hungarian
citizenship is interpreted as a symbol of national unity and through which they can feel they belong somewhere, for them their Slovak citizenship is more important. The explanation is that by losing their Slovak citizenship they also lose their voting rights in Slovakia. However, ethnic Hungarians living in Slovakia can have a say mainly through their votes. They vote for Hungarian politicians and parties who are representing the interest of Hungarian community in Slovakia. In spite of the fact that Slovak citizenship is an emotionally empty link with the country and is not connected with their national-identification, Slovak citizenship and voting right are higher in the hierarchy of their identification structures than Hungarian citizenship. Through the voting rights given by the state of residence's citizenship, ethnic Hungarians living in Slovakia can represent their own interests, build and integrate their own parallel minority structures more effectively than by acquiring Hungarian citizenship and “interfere in” who can gain control of the government in Budapest.

Our results, as we mentioned at the beginning, are not representative. However, these discussions are useful when analysing the effects of citizenship policies on the everyday life of ethnic Hungarians living in Slovakia. At the micro-level, Hungarian citizenship can be a part of national self-identification of Hungarians in Slovakia and can be integrated into their life structures. However, it is not harmonised with their interests and aims. Slovak citizenship is still an empty relationship with the state, without feelings – it is a legal bond with the country in which they live. The amendment of the Slovak citizenship law reinforced the feeling of “outsiders”, yet the newly offered Hungarian citizenship is not able to bridge the mental distances between those Hungarians who live in Hungary and those living in Slovakia. From the arguments given by the participants of focus group interviews we can say, that today these citizenship policies mainly reinforce regional self-identification and the ties with their immediate community. Our respondents feel as Hungarians living in Slovakia, trying to find their own well-functioning strategy to help them remain Hungarians in Slovakia.

Bibliography


Ágnes Vass


The Swedish-Speaking Minority in Finland: Identity, Ethnolinguistic Vitality and Upcoming Challenges in the Preservation of Official Language Status

1. Introduction

The Swedish-speaking minority in Finland, in comparison with other linguistic minorities around the world, seems to be one of the most privileged. Swedish-speaking Finns comprise 5.4 percent of the total Finnish population and their right to use their own language before courts of law and other public authorities has been guaranteed by the Constitution of Finland from 1919 and since 1922 by the Finnish Language Act. Both documents define Finnish and Swedish as the national languages of Finland, which means that the languages have equal status and the cultural and social needs of both language groups should be respected on an equal basis. The status of Finnish and Swedish as national languages has noticeable social significance and makes each of them an important component of the speakers’ cultural and national identity.

However, it is impossible to speak about one, homogenous Finnish-Swedish identity. The identity, or rather – identities of Swedish-speaking Finns have become within the last few decades more hybrid and fluent, especially in the areas where the local community is dominated by Finnish speakers, as for example in the capital region of Helsinki. Noticeable numbers of Swedo-Finns, depending on the region in which they live, declare themselves as bilingual which finds expression in their language patterns, media consumption, as well as their cultural activities. The media, especially the internet, have become an important means of preserving and maintaining the Swedish-speakers’ ethnolinguistic identity and vitality, but the media also serves as an arena for discussion concerning the Swedish language's status in Finland.

Finnish bilingualism faces challenges which do not allow it to be fully implemented. The Swedish-speaking minority usually functions within relatively small and close-knit communities and networks, which take responsibility for different areas such as education, media and culture. Due to several different factors in recent years, the Swedish-speaking minority has become less visible in Finnish
society. First of all, Swedish-speaking or bilingual Finns much more often than before choose to pursue their careers in Finnish. Secondly, the significant growth of immigration and greater language plurality in Finland has dimmed the Swedish-Finns’ visibility as a cultural and linguistic minority (Saukkonen 2011: 10).

2. Historical Background

The coexistence of Finnish and Swedish speakers in Finland dates from the twelfth century when Finland became an integral part of Sweden. On the Åland Islands – which nowadays are an autonomous, monolingual Swedish-speaking region of Finland – Swedish may have been spoken as far back as the sixth century (Lönqvist 1981: 40). In the Middle Ages, Swedish settlement spread to the uninhabited or sparsely inhabited coastal areas then under Swedish. Swedish settlement, however, remained scattered and sparse, mainly due to the presence of the Finnish population which had lived in the regions of Varsinais-Suomi and Pohjanmaa river valley for more than one thousand years. Swedish was the dominant language in this area for almost seven centuries. Russia’s continuing hostilities with Sweden led to the Finnish War which in 1809 resulted in the Grand Duchy of Finland being subordinated directly to the Czar. Finnish representatives persuaded Alexander I to convene a representative Diet of Finland organised according to the previous Swedish model of four estates (McRae 1997: 27). The legislative system and laws of the Grand Duchy of Finland were delineated in Swedish which was also the language of the officials and the educated classes. The Royal Academy of Turku (in Swedish: Kungliga Akademin i Åbo) functioned in Swedish, but the Protestant church used both Swedish and Finnish in communication with the congregations (Tandefelt & Finnäs 2011: 39). The Czarist policy, whose aim was to wean Finland away from Swedish influences, allowed the patriotic Finnish Fennoman movement to flourish. The Fennoman movement was striving to raise the Finnish language and Finnic peasant culture to a national position. After 1809, Swedish remained the only official language until 1863 when the Czar issued a language manifesto granting to the Finnish language equal administrative status with Swedish.

Both language groups coexisted harmoniously until the 1870s when the Swedish nationalist movement started to arise. The Svecoman movement was a strong reaction to the demands of the Fennomans for replacing Swedish with Finnish in public administration, courts and schools. One of the main aims of the Svekomans was to integrate the scattered Swedish-speaking population around the Swedish language and to draw within its ranks the educated finnicized Swedish speakers who insisted on using Finnish in formal and informal
communication. The Svecoman movement was the origin of many Swedish-language organisations such as Svenska folkskolans vänner (The Organisation of Swedish Public Schools) (1882), Svenska litteratursällskapet i Finland (1885) (The Society of Swedish Literature in Finland), Arbetets Vänner (The Organisation of Workers) (1897), or Svenska kulturfonden (The Swedish Cultural Foundation in Finland) (1908). In 1906 the Swedish Party was founded but in the wake of subsequent reforms of the Finnish Parliament – Eduskunta – many smaller unions and societies started to separate from large Swedish-language organisations. In the wake of the Russian Revolution, on 6 December 1917 the Diet of Finland declared the country's independence. In independent Finland pressing political problems emerged, including Sweden's claims to the Åland Islands and demands for a definitive settlement of the long-standing linguistic conflict. In 1919 the Finnish government declared Swedish to be a second national language. The law was confirmed and elaborated in the Language Act adopted three years later (Heikkilä 2010: 14).

In independent Finland disputes and controversies over language law continued. Heated debates concerning both languages concentrated mainly around the single Finnish university, previously the Imperial Academy of Turku which was moved after the Great Fire of 1827 to Helsinki. The university's language was exclusively Swedish until 1864, but in the twentieth century the number of Finnish-speaking students grew continuously, although the professors were mainly Swedish-speaking. In 1922 Finnish-speaking academics and students founded the Academic Karelia Society at the University of Finland in Helsinki, an elitist and nationalist Finnish organisation which became one of the most visible debate platforms. One of the major goals of this activist organisation was to make Finnish the main language of instruction at the university. After years of struggles, debates and even riots, the society's goal was eventually achieved. In the spring of 1937 a new university law was promulgated and Finnish became the language of instruction, although Swedish continued to be used and certain professors and faculties received permission to continue teaching in this language (Klinge 1990; Heikkilä 2011: 14–15). During Second World War some language issues emerged, but the conflict never returned to the same level of intensity as in the 1920s and 1930s. The threat of an external enemy made national unity a core value and internal conflicts vanished immediately (McRae 1997: 73). Yet arguments, conflicts and discussions concerning the two official languages in Finland continued almost throughout the whole of the 20th century. According to Kjell Herberts' research, discussions concerning the language situation in Finland in the 1980s and 1990s resembled very much those of the 1930s (Heikkilä 2011: 15).
3. Sociolinguistic and Demographic Situation of Swedish-Finns

Swedish-speaking Finns are an example of an ethnic and language minority which is characterised by solidarity and – at the same time – noticeable internal division, not only because of scattered settlements, but also due to differences in language and social and economic status. According to official statistics, in 1880 Swedish-speaking Finns comprised 14.3 percent of the total Finnish population; in 1940 – 9.6 percent, and in 2014 – only 5.3 percent. The major reasons of this decline include, among others, a diminishing birth-rate, migration and the growing number of mixed marriages (Finnäs 2010: 7, 35–37). The socio-economic status of Swedish-speaking Finns is comparable on average to that of the Finnish-speaking majority. The Swedish-speaking Finns’ socio-economic situation seems to be better in the regions of Helsinki and Uusimaa, whereas in Pohjanmaa their status is slightly lower. Many Swedish-speaking Finns live in coastal areas in western and southern Finland and in the region of Åland. Nearly half of them (134,000) live in Uusimaa. On the coast of Pohjanmaa live 97,000, in Varsinais-Suomi 27,000 and on Åland 25,000.

In Finland the municipalities and local authorities play an important role in the decision-making process and choice of the dominant language. Municipalities can be unilingual or bilingual with either language predominating. In 2009 there were 19 Swedish-language municipalities, sixteen of them located in the Åland region, and 31 bilingual municipalities. In 2004 the new Language Act came into force with the aim of protecting the Swedish language and the culture of Swedish-speaking Finns. In March 2011 an action-working program on the vitality of Finland’s two languages was published. The important institutions for Swedish-speaking Finns are the Educational Board of Swedish language (ruotsinkielinen koululaitos), independent universities and guaranteed places for Swedish-speaking students in law and medicine faculties at the universities. In addition to Swedish-language newspapers; theatres, literature and central organisations are considered to be vital and important for protecting and sustaining the vitality of Swedish in Finland.

The Swedish language in Finland did not become the subject of linguistic studies until the end of the nineteenth century. Separation from Sweden allowed the language to evolve and develop its own modes of expression. Finnish-Swedish dialects, archaisms, borrowings from Finnish and Russian awoke the interest of scholars and became a starting point to further research. These studies also served important purposes in language politics, especially when Finno-nationalistic – and at the same time anti-Swedish – movements arose. For scholars it was necessary to show and prove how deep are the historical roots of Swedish-speakers
in Finland (Tandefelt & Finnäs: 40; Hämäläinen 1968). In the opinion of some scholars, the separate evolution of Finland-Swedish was inconsistent with the language-political interests of the Swedish-speaking population. The process of language planning in Swedish was to a certain extent the result of an analogical process in the development of standard Finnish. Both language groups demonstrated a tendency towards linguistic purism, manifested in replacing foreign borrowings from the language. Swedish, thanks to its status of a national language, is an all-purpose language in Finland, used by public authorities, in legislation, churches and education institutions on all levels. Swedish is also a language widely used in Swedish-Finns' cultural activity, journalism, entertainment and services (shops, banks, insurance companies).

4. Stereotypes, Group Images and Main Components of the Swedish-Finnish Identity

The Swedish-speaking minority, as the second major language group in Finland, has often been confronted with negative attitudes and stereotypes that have found expression in Finnish public and social life. Over the last few decades a number of academic and scientific studies, research projects and surveys have been carried out to examine the perception of and attitudes towards language and ethnic minorities in Finland, among them Swedish-speaking Finns. According to most, Swedish-Finns are usually perceived as “better”, which means wealthier and belonging to the upper social strata. Kenneth McRae in his in-depth study of language landscape in Finland refers to several surveys and researches examining the collective images of the Swedish-speaking minority in Finland. One noteworthy study explores the images of Swedish-speaking Finns presented in Finnish-language school textbooks of the 1960s. In schoolbooks Swedish was usually recognised as the language of Sweden or Åland, but not necessarily as the language used in mainland coastal areas. Swedo-Finns and Swedish-speaking families were usually presented as belonging to upper social classes which harmonizes with a common stereotype of Swedo-Finn as belonging to the “bättre folk” (better nation) (McRae 1997: 152).

In the 1960s Kalevi Kivistö and Klaus Mäkelä asked students of the Finnish-language Faculty of Education at Jyväskylä to identify occupations from a given list which in their opinion seemed to be the most relevant for either Finnish or Swedish speakers. About 50 percent of the respondents identified Swedish-Finns as economists, engineers, seamen, large farmers, factory owners, wholesalers and professors, while the Finnish-speaking Finns were recognized mainly as agronomists, elementary and secondary school teachers, forestry workers, clergymen,
small farmers, unskilled workers and retail merchants (Kivistö & Mäkelä 1967). The study also showed that Finnish-speaking students are more likely to see the national and personal characteristics of Swedish-speaking Finns as markedly similar to those of Swedes in Sweden than to those of the Finnish-speaking majority (Mäkelä 1966).

More recent studies, examining positive and negative feelings and attitudes towards certain language and ethnic groups, give many interesting results. In a study measuring positive feelings towards different ethnolinguistic minorities, both Finnish and Swedish-speaking Finns ranked their own language group highest. It is of significance that while Swedish speakers ranked Finnish speakers very high, Finnish speakers ranked Swedo-Finns as tenth on the positive feelings scale. The survey shows clearly how noticeably the level of positive identification differs in both language groups. Closer analysis shows that negative attitudes are more likely to appear among men of under 25 years old, mainly blue-collar workers. This particular group of respondents was also more likely to consider official bilingualism and knowledge of Swedish unimportant. Researches prove that Swedish speakers are perceived by the Finnish-speaking majority as a relatively unified and homogenous group, but features identified as typical for Swedo-Finns are very often contradictory, i.e. identified as positive and negative at the same time (McRae 1997: 157).

Research examining the identity and self-image of Swedish-speaking Finns shows how considerably they differ from stereotypes and group images which have been present among the Finnish-speaking majority for many decades. Most of the surveys carried out among Swedish speakers identified the language as the main component and basis of their identity. A different tendency can be observed in urban areas (e.g. in the city of Vaasa or Helsinki) where bilingualism and a double, bilingual identity are commonly declared. The dominant Finnish-language surrounding is in this particular case of no consequence. In a Suomen Gallup survey conducted in Vaasa, language ties seemed to be less important than regional affinity. Identification with Swedes in Sweden was relatively weak, despite the fact that 90 percent of respondents had family members and relatives in Sweden, or have themselves, at one point or another, lived in Sweden (McRae 1997: 159). The linguistic identity of Swedish speakers is for many reasons difficult to measure. Studies and researches show that in many cases language boundaries have become fluid, especially in the southern coastal areas. Many respondents identify themselves as bilingual or belonging to both groups (in most studies this ranges between 17 and 55 percent, depending on the province and survey method chosen). Bilingualism among Swedish-Finns in practice exists usually within the highly educated, urban population even if individuals declare themselves
bilingual in official surveys; declared bilingualism or double, bilingual identity is not synonymous with language proficiency and should not be confused with language competence (Saarela & Finnäs 2004).

According to Erik Allardt’s and Karl Johan Miemois’s research, as much as thirty years ago, the Swedish-speaking minority consisted of very different social groups. The considerable division between centre and periphery is visible in the social structure as well as in geographical division. Contrary to stereotypes and group images among Finnish speakers, all kinds of occupations (agronomists, fishermen, blue-collar workers, but also clergymen, civil servants, professors) can be found within the Swedish-speaking minority (Allardt & Miemois 1979). Another significant study conducted in Helsinki showed interesting differences in identification patterns among adolescent Swedish speakers and their parents. Research proved that adult Swedish speakers felt more secure with their language identity than their adolescent children who, at the same time, declared a weaker identification with the Finnish-speaking majority (McRae 1997: 163).

Areas where Swedish-speakers live are in many senses divided. This division is reflected for example in a variety of dialects, the practical usage of Swedish, access to and use of services and media in Swedish. Media consumption can serve as a relevant indicator of practical language usage and the media's role in preserving and maintaining minority identity is also significant. In 1992 a survey was carried out measuring media usage among pupils in 37 Swedish-language schools in the Helsinki region. More than 60 percent of respondents identified themselves as bilingual, while monolingual, Swedish-speaking identity was declared by only 31 percent of the pupils. Their families subscribed to the large metropolitan daily newspapers – the Swedish-language Hufvudstadsbladet and Finnish-language Helsingin Sanomat – in almost equal numbers. The pupils’ weekly reading level of both newspapers was 44 and 42 percent for each of them. For other printed material, books and magazines, Swedish ones were read noticeably more often in comparison to Finnish-language publications. What is interesting, the tendency was the reverse when it came to electronic media. Television and radio channels in Finnish were viewed and listened to much more often than their Swedish counterparts (McRae 1997: 162).

5. Swedish-Language Media Landscape in Finland

The role of minority media in the development and preservation of the Swedish language, which is a central attribute of the identity of Swedish-speaking Finns, is significant and in many cases even crucial. For Swedish-speaking Finns the access to Swedish-language media in Finland is exceptionally wide.
A relatively small population has access to nine daily newspapers, two radio stations, Swedish-language television and a wide choice of transnational media available directly from the neighbouring region – Sweden. There is an extensive literature and studies that explores the media’s impact on minority populations’ ethno-linguistic vitality and their participation in social and cultural life. A number of them have addressed the representation patterns of ethnic and language minorities in majority media, and their possible negative influences on small ethnic communities. Much research has focused on mapping the misrepresentation of ethnic minorities in dominant mass media, entertainment, literature and cinema. The ownership and control of media is a crucial element for maintaining the capacity for self-representation and participation in the sphere of public media. In the context of Finland, resistance to hegemonic majority media and extensive Swedish-language media supply allows Swedo-Finns to proudly assert their identity. The interactions between media use and media impact on minority identities, which have become noticeably more hybrid and fluid within the last few decades, should be analysed cautiously. According to these researches, the selective use of minority and/or majority language media does not necessarily correlate with language proficiency or loss in language commitment (Moring & Husband 2011: 78–79).

Tendencies such as the adoption of new technologies and the increasing fragmentation of the media landscape in Finland lead to increased media consumption across traditional cultural and linguistic boundaries, especially among the young. A good example of this phenomenon is Radio X3M established in 1997, a Swedish-language radio aimed mainly at a younger audience. From the very beginning this radio station promoted traditional “Swedishness” and started offering programs which were a specific patchwork of elements belonging to Swedish, English and Finnish cultures (Moring & Husband 2011: 79).

A minority’s ethnolinguistic vitality can be measured only if we take into account its three core dimensions: demography, institutional support and status. The Swedish-speaking Finns, as mentioned before, are not separated from the majority population by territorial borders. The exception is the unilingual Swedish territory of Åland Islands, whose autonomous status is guaranteed by an Autonomy Act confirmed by the League of Nations (1921). Proficiency in Finnish within the Åland society is considerably low and more than 90 percent of the population live in unilingually Swedish households. As a consequence, media use in Åland is predominately Swedish. Two local daily newspapers, Ålandstidningen and Nya Åland, are regularly read by the majority of population, 73 and 63 percent respectively. It is important to mention that the penetration of newspapers from Sweden is marginal, equally low as the reach of Finnish-language newspapers. Local radio
stations – Ålandsradion and Radio Väst – gain considerably bigger audiences than radio stations broadcasting directly from Sweden. The tendencies according to television consumption are quite the opposite, mainly due to the lack of a local Swedish-language television channel. As we can see, the robust ethnolinguistic vitality of the population of Åland results in a high consumption of Swedish-language media (Moring & Husband 2011: 89–90).

In the unilingual households of the Ostrobothnia region, consumption of Swedish-language media is considerably bigger than the penetration of media available in Finnish. Vasabladet – the biggest regional newspaper – is read by almost 90 percent of Swedo-Finns in this region; the smaller – Syd-Österbotten – by nearly 35 percent, while the national Huvfudstadsbladet reaches less than 20 percent of the unilingual Swedish households. The share of listening time of Finnish-language radio stations remains very low, while the reach of Swedish and Swedish-language radio stations in unilingual Swedish families is about 85 percent, compared to 50 percent in bilingual households. Television programs viewed by Swedish-Finns in Ostrobothnia are broadcast mainly from Sweden, whereas in households where both national languages are used consumption of exclusively Swedish television falls dramatically and Swedish-language television is viewed less often than the dominant Finnish-language television (Moring & Husband 2011: 90–92).

In the capital region of Helsinki, Swedo-Finnish identity seems to be more dispersed and the number of bilingual households and families, in comparison to the regions mentioned above, is significant. The influence of Finnish media and media usage patterns in unilingual Swedish households are similar to those typical for bilingual families in Ostrobothnia. The reach of Swedish media in bilingual families is visibly lower, and to some extent even marginalised. In the capital region two daily newspapers gained a dominant position – the Swedish Huvfudstadsbladet and Finnish Helsingin Sanomat. In radio listening, unilingual Swedish families usually choose Swedish stations (Radio Vega, Radio X3M), whereas patterns in bilingual households are reversed and two-thirds of daily radio listening at such homes is in Finnish. Television viewing habits remain similar. The population of the capital region, in comparison to Swedish speakers in Åland or in Ostrobothnia, shows considerably weakened ethnolinguistic vitality. All these examples prove clearly that bilingualism in households – together with diffused demography and the language composition of a particular community – has a great impact on media usage and, in consequence, on the ability of maintaining language proficiency and vitality (Moring & Husband 2011: 92–93).
6. Media Discussion Concerning the Status of the Swedish Language

In 2004 heated debates over the status of the Swedish language appeared in traditional media, but what was new is that they also flared up on the internet which became an important arena of discussion. In 2004 the new Language Act came into force, whose aim was to protect and strengthen the linguistic rights guaranteed by the Constitution of Finland. The new Language Act, with few exceptions, was identical to the first language law from 1922. The new legislation reinforced the right to legal proceedings and public services in one's own language, which should be guaranteed on equal basis for both Swedish and Finnish speakers. The new Language Act redefined the system of unilingual and bilingual municipalities. Its coming into force provoked heated debates and allowed the public opinion to express its critical attitude towards Finnish bilingualism and the Swedish-speaking minority. For example in 2007 the organisation Vapaa kielivalinta ry (Free language choice) was founded and its aim was to introduce the possibility of choosing a different foreign language at school instead of the obligatory Swedish.

The internet gave more opportunities to express one's opinion on blogs and more anonymously on internet forums. In 2005 the website pakkoruotsi.net (obligatory swedish.net) appeared and quickly became a significant opinion channel. Its main aim was “to give more objective information concerning the meaning and importance of two national languages in Finland and allow open discussion to flourish”. The New Language Act reinforced the Swedish-speakers’ linguistic rights. The main change was that the authorities became fully responsible for the realisation of the linguistic rights of the citizen, who now longer needs to apply individually for their revision. In reality the situation of Swedish-speakers worsened noticeably, mainly due to demographic changes. Another event which stirred up the controversy was the government’s 2004 decision of making the Swedish language an optional part of the matriculation exam. The idea of making Swedish an optional subject was strongly supported by many students, teachers and headmasters, but also by many deputies in the Finnish Parliament – Eduskunta. In march 2004 approximately 40,000 students took part in a demonstration organised by Suomen Lukioalaisten Liitto (The Union of Finnish high-school students). Participants in demonstrations in Helsinki, Oulu and Isalmi demanded making Swedish optional on the matriculation exam throughout Finland. Swedish People’s Party (SFP) opposed this decision decidedly, but in 2005 Finland’s second official language became an optional subject on the matriculation exam (Väistö 2012: 58).

The political and media debate, which flared up in the spring of 2004, can be divided into several different modes of argumentation. The principle of the freedom of choice was evoked in opposition to that of obligation justified by the need
for an all-round education. In media discussions the notion of “language battles” – associated with 19th century language politics which stimulated Finnish nationalism and political awareness – was often brought up. But the most influential arguments were the practical ones, such as good results of the experiment of making Swedish optional in certain schools: approximately 90 percent of students chose Swedish voluntarily in their matriculation exams.

The point of the debate was not to eliminate obligatory Swedish from the educational system, but only to make it optional on matriculation exams. The supporters of optional Swedish pointed to the importance of individual choices and argued that obligation should not be part of modern high school education. Supporters of obligatory Swedish stressed that it was important to protect the system of all-round education, a crucial part of which was the knowledge of Swedish and of its historical roots (Väistö 2012: 56–57). The freedom of the students’ individual choices lies at the basis of Finnish high-school education whose aim is to prepare students for taking responsibility for their further university education. According to many opinions which appeared in the media at the time, obligatory Swedish was not in line with this principle. One of the arguments of the supporters of obligatory Swedish was that optionality might make students lazy and decrease their motivation to learn Swedish at schools. The supporters of the freedom of choice emphasised that responsibility for choosing one’s educational path lies with the individual and does not concern society as a whole.

Opponents of making Finland’s second official language optional tended to use the argument of the principle of all-round education. Magnus Buchert, for example, wrote in the columns of *Helsingin Sanomat*:

> It appears to me that in today’s political debate we have completely forgotten about the fact which is more important than the whole language problem – there is no obligation to take any second language on the matriculation exam because the matriculation exam as such is optional, just like the whole of secondary education (*Helsingin Sanomat*, 13 April 2004).

Supporters of optional language choice argued that the knowledge of Swedish should not be perceived as an integral part of all-round education and that it is no more important than the knowledge of any other foreign language. On the other hand, it was often argued that the knowledge of Swedish is necessary for a deeper understanding of Finnish culture and history (Väistö 2012: 64).

During the debate in the spring of 2004 there was a visible disproportion in the number of articles concerning obligatory Swedish in Finnish-language and Swedish-language newspapers. In Swedish-language media and newspapers
the problem of obligatory Swedish was discussed much more often than in Finnish-language media. The subject was commented on in columns, interviews and other critical articles. At the time, especially on the internet which became an important medium of exchanging opinions, a strong nationalist tendency emerged. A lot of hostile and aggressive opinions appeared, as well as demands for making Finland monolingual and abolishing the “exorbitant” privileges of Swedish-speaking Finns. On the other hand, nationalist argumentation in Swedish-language media and among Swedish People's Party members and supporters also became apparent and resulted for example in calling on all Swedish-Finns to take part in “the last battle” for the Swedish language. Opponents of obligatory Swedish often stated that it should be the Finns’ own business which language they choose to learn, and that the number of Swedish speakers is really small, while globalisation and multiculturalism require the knowledge of other foreign languages. There were also many opinions according to which Swedish in Finland is not endangered in any way and making it optional can paradoxically improve and reinforce its status. On the internet forum Suomi24 many discussions took place in which the Swedish People's Party's political activity in supporting obligatory Swedish in schools was perceived as social, cultural and even criminal oppression of Finnish-speakers (Väistö 2012: 66).

In many debates the very concept of Finnish-Swedishness as a separate and autonomous identity was put into question. The debate concentrated also on finding other than exclusively linguistic differences between Finnish-speaking and Swedish-speaking Finns. Possible racial differences were taken into account, for example someone on the Suomi24 forum, writing under the pseudonym E. Kakko, wrote:

In Finland some Swedish-speaking and -thinking extremists try to make use of 18th and 19th century racial researches. In their opinion Swedish-speakers should maintain the leading position in society, because they belong to the Germanic race of «the founders of culture», unlike Finns, whom they associate with Mongolic races (http://keskustelu.suomi24.fi).

There were also many comments concerning the Swedish-speaking Finns’ allegedly larger influence and power in politics and economy, but the majority of them did not maintain the view that there are any genetic or racial differences between Swedish-speaking and Finnish-speaking Finns.

Another noteworthy argument concerned the small number of Swedish-speakers and the fact that many of them speak Finnish fluently. The participants of the internet discussions often expressed astonishment that the government was
not making any decisions concerning abolishing obligatory Swedish in a situation when most citizens favoured such a move. In the debate both sides of the discussion used many practical arguments. First of all there was a visible objection to the prolonged experiment as a result of which high-school students were being treated unequally. Secondly, making Swedish optional was supported by the good results of the experiment in which more than 90 percent of students chose to write Swedish voluntarily. Supporters of obligatory Swedish argued that the trend in which boys chose Swedish in their matriculation exams more rarely than girls could also lead towards inequality. The opponents of obligatory Swedish pointed out that making Swedish voluntary could actually increase the students’ motivation to learn this language.

Supporters of obligatory Swedish were also worried that making Swedish optional could start a chain reaction, leading to the decrease of regard for Swedish and, in the worst scenario, to a complete elimination of Swedish from schools as a result of which Finland might soon become a monolingual country. Concerns of the supporters of obligatory Swedish also included the possible limitation of Swedish-language public services, but on the other hand it was often emphasised that the new Language Act was a solid guarantee for bilingual services in Finland. Another argument which appeared in the debate was that Swedish was necessary for pursuing professional careers in Scandinavian countries, as well as being an important element of integration within the whole of Scandinavia. Scandinavian countries are perceived to be Finland’s important political partners and supporters within the European Union and the globalised world. Removing obligatory Swedish from the matriculation exam could deprive young Finns of many professional opportunities within Scandinavia.

After the decision of introducing the new form of the matriculation exam to all schools around Finland the media debate concerning the status of the Swedish language in schools continued. The discussion was provoked mainly by the demand of replacing Swedish by Russian, but also by the upcoming parliamentary elections of 2007, as well as the activity of many voluntary organisations and a vast number of articles and columns published in newspapers at the time. In 2007 the municipalities of Tohmajärvi gave permission to pursue an educational experiment in which Russian would be taught as the second obligatory language in schools. The decision was justified by the larger usefulness of Russian in the eastern regions of Finland. The experiment received financial support from the province of Northern Karelia, entrepreneurs and neighbouring provinces. As a consequence of this experiment, the Ministry of Education rejected the proposal of teaching Russian instead of Swedish in selected regions and justified its decision by emphasising that the knowledge of Swedish is equally important in all regions of Finland.
The Finland – Russia society rejected the ministry’s argumentation, saying that knowledge of Russian is much more important in eastern Finland than Swedish which is used rarely and whose economic importance is noticeably lower (Väistö 2012: 82).

In 2008 Suomalaisuuden Liitto (The Association of Finnish Culture and Identity) published a new program in which they presented a plan for making Swedish an optional school subject on all educational levels. The new demand in language policy was in practice tantamount to officially making Finland a monolingual country. The Association justified its stand with an argument that nowadays the labour market’s demands have become more varied and the knowledge of other languages has gained in importance. As a result concerns about the status and future of the Swedish language in Finland were often voiced in the second half of 2000 and many studies exploring the current situation of Swedish-speakers were published at this time, for example Suomalaisuuden Liitto’s survey conducted in 2007 in which 63 percent of Finland’s population declared a negative attitude towards mandatory instruction of Swedish in schools. In a survey carried out in 2008 by the Magma Think Tank only 25 percent of Finns agreed or partly agreed that Swedish should remain a mandatory school subject (Väistö 2012: 87). A good example is provided by the numerous critical writings published by Finnish-speaking activists like Marja-Leena Lempinen or Jari Helispuro. These critical publications mainly focused on internet discussions concerning mandatory Swedish, but most of the standpoints presented by the authors were critical of political arrangements in Finland and, to some extent, of Swedish-speakers and their “exaggerated claims” (Saukkonen 2011: 24–36).

In analysing internet discussions several difficulties present themselves, among others the inability of establishing the exact number of participants, mainly because of the fact that some users write under different nicknames. Many studies of the internet discussions prove that in the last few years the whole debate has become visibly more aggressive and demands for making Finland monolingual have become much more radical than ever before. In the summer of 2010 the discussion moved from the internet to traditional mainstream media like television, radio and newspapers. What triggered the new debate in the media was the party meeting of Kansallinen Kokoomus (National Coalition Party) in June 2010. During the meeting the members accepted the initiative of the Party’s Riihimäki youth organisation for removing obligatory Swedish from schools altogether. At the same meeting the members voted over another one of the party’s youth organisation’s (Kokoomus Nuorten Liitto) initiative for changing the constitutional status of Swedish, but it did not find approval. Reactions to this event immediately appeared in the Swedish-language newspaper Hufvudstadsbladet and on internet forums.
In the summer of 2010 *Helsingin Sanomat* published a series of articles in which the status and history of the Swedish language in Finland was examined. These articles also provoked intense discussions on internet forums. The amount of columns and articles concerning the Swedish language grew noticeably also in other Finnish newspapers. At the end of November 2010, TV2 organised a debate as part of the feature program *Ajankohtainen kakkonen* to which many politicians, journalists and other important participants of the debate concerning the status of Swedish were invited. During the discussion, which took several hours, arguments presented on the internet were also quoted. After the television debate several articles about it appeared in *Hufudstadsbladet*.

Two weeks before parliamentary elections the supporters and opponents of obligatory Swedish in schools clashed during a demonstration in front of Eduskuntatalo (Parliament House in Helsinki). On one side was a group of about 800 members and supporters of Vapaa kielivalinta ry and Suomalaisisuuden Liitto (Association of Finnish Culture and Identity), and on the other – a visibly smaller group of the Swedish People’s Party’s supporters. After the elections, many posts and opinions concerning obligatory Swedish and its possible future appeared on the website Suomi24. Many of them expressed the opinion that the success of the Party of True Finns might lead to a complete abolition of obligatory Swedish (Väistö 2012: 90–92).

7. Swedish People’s Party of Finland and the Finns’ Party – Two Main Political Opponents

Finland has for a long time been perceived as an exceptional country, lacking nationalist movements and extreme right-wing parties. However, nationalist tendencies visible in many European countries have recently started to appear in Finland too. The most evident example of a political shift towards nationalism and right-wing populism is the electoral success of the Finns’ Party (Perussuomalaiset, previously the True Finns’ Party) in parliamentary elections in 2011, when the party won 19.1 percent of votes. Timo Soini, the leader of the Finns’ Party since 1997, represents conservative social values, socio-cultural authoritarianism, nationalism expressed by ethnocentric and racist attitudes. The party’s increasing popularity has been fuelled by growing economic insecurity and fear of immigrants, crime and abuses within the public sector. The True Finns’ election program (2011: 10) gives various propositions for preserving “the national cultural heritage”, mainly by strengthening the Finnish national identity (Mars 2011).

In the program we find a strong emphasis on national values and culture, which – it is claimed – is endangered by multiculturalism. Negative and xenophobic
attitudes towards different ethnic minorities, mainly immigrants, openly expressed in the Finns’ Party’s electoral program, have also had a significant impact on the Swedish-speaking minority and its official status and preservation of linguistic rights. To give one example, during his speech in Parliament, Timo Soini said that “The majority of the Finnish nation thinks that instruction of Swedish in schools should be voluntary” (VP PTK 2263/2004 Edustaja Soini). On the party’s official website we can find statements declaring the intention of making Swedish an optional subject in schools:

Mandatory Swedish is not immemorial. It was introduced in 1968 as a result of the reform of elementary schools which made Swedish mandatory in addition to the instruction of a second foreign language. The abolishment of obligatory Swedish is not unconstitutional. What is unconstitutional is the fact that deputies of the governing party are forced by party discipline to support mandatory Swedish, contrary to their own convictions. (…) The next government will be able to change things, if the Swedish People’s Party is detached from the government and becomes part of opposition. When the Swedish People’s Party is no longer part of the government, language freedom of the Finns will proceed. Better knowledge of other foreign languages is important to our competitiveness (https://uutiset.perrussuomalaiset.fi).

On the other side of the political debate on the status of Swedish is the Swedish People’s Party of Finland. The Swedish People’s Party (SFP) is the only unilingual Swedish party in Finland. Founded in 1906, SFP was first a parliamentary elite party and part of the Svecoman movement. Nowadays its main purpose is to protect and strengthen the position of the Swedish language in Finland. SFP has a strong support from Swedish voluntary organisations which help Swedish-speaking Finns to maintain their cultural autonomy. SFP is one of the most eclectic parties in the Finnish parliament and its members and supporters tend to represent various professions, as well as different economic and social groups (Kreander & Sundberg 2011: 58).

The role of the Swedish People’s Party of Finland in the language debate is difficult to measure. For the members of SFP, obligatory instruction of the second national language is understood not only as language equality, but is seen as a crucial part of their ideology which should be protected at all cost. In many opinions concerning the language debate, the role of the SFP in the whole discussion was questioned. Many critical writers wondered how the SFP can demand from the whole nation to pursue their language policy. For example Mikko Elo from SDP stated in parliament:
maybe the SFP should consider if the reason for their decreasing popularity is not perhaps its presumption to teach us, Finnish-speakers, what is good for us (VP PTK 2274/2004 Edustaja Elo).

In many Swedish-language newspapers the opinions concerning the SFP’s actions were also quite critical. It was even suggested that the party is responsible for the weakened status of Swedish in Finland (Väistö 2012: 89).

In the parliamentary elections of 2007 the Finns Party clearly opposed obligatory Swedish in schools and the demand that it should be made optional was an important part of the party’s program. Conversely, the SFP affirmed their goal of retaining the equal status of Swedish and Finnish. In 2011 the speaker of SFP, Stefan Wallin, warned in the *Huvfudstadsbladet* that upcoming parliamentary elections can turn into a battle for Finland’s bilinguality. When interviewing party leaders, Wallin demanded that they publicly declare their intention to protect the status of the Swedish language in Finland. What is interesting, among SFP’s members there is no unanimity. The vice-chairman of SFP, Nils Torvalds, in his column in *Huvfudstadsbladet* came out with a surprising declaration. He said that the party would agree to abolish obligatory Swedish from primary schools, if the Swedish-speaking minority’s rights to public services in their own language were guaranteed. The next day the previous speaker of the SFP, Pär Stenbäck, agreed that Swedish speakers should be prepare for the possibility that obligatory Swedish will one day disappear from schools and that neither he nor anyone else can promise that the current status of Swedish will last forever (Väistö 2012: 92).

**Conclusion**

The Swedish-speaking minority in Finland, although it gained the reputation of the most pampered and privileged thanks to their linguistic rights, has in the last decades faced serious challenges of a demographic and political nature. The number of Swedish speakers decreases constantly due to several different factors, including diminishing birth rate, migration and linguistically-mixed marriages. The considerable population decline and increasing support for the populist and nationalist agenda of the True Finns Party among Finnish speakers exacerbates and polarises discussion on limiting linguistic rights of the Swedish-speaking minority and abolishing Swedish as a mandatory school subject for Finnish-speaking pupils. Swedish-Finns, perceived as “better”, wealthier and belonging to upper social strata are constantly facing negative attitudes and stereotypes fuelled by growing nationalist tendencies among the Finnish-speaking majority, as well as in Finnish political life.
However, the identity of Swedish speakers has nothing to do with common group images and stereotypes; its main components are changeable and difficult to grasp. Finland-Swedish identity has become more hybrid and fluid than ever before and increasing number of Swedo-Finns identify themselves as bilingual. The media’s role in maintaining and preserving the Swedish-speakers’ identity and ethnolinguistic vitality is of great significance. Wide access to Swedish-language newspapers, radio stations and television allows Swedish speakers to enjoy their linguistic rights in practice and express their concerns over their linguistic status in Finland. In the last few years, heated debates over the status of Swedish appeared in traditional media, but they also flared up on the internet which became an important arena of discussion. This phenomenon became the subject of many studies, as for example Pasi Saukkonen’s book *Mikä suomenruotsalaisissa ärsyttää? (What is irritating about Swedo-Finns?)* and numerous other critical studies. The modes of argumentation differed noticeably depending on linguistic, political and socio-economic affiliation, but what is surprising is that many arguments have remained the same since the 19th century.

The visible shift towards nationalism and right-wing populism in Finland is of great consequence for the possible future of the Swedish-speaking minority in Finland. Upcoming parliamentary elections in 2015 will show us if the political landscape in Finland will change; if nationalist tendencies will remain or even increase among the Finnish-speaking majority. Should the political declarations of the Finns Party find their expression in political decisions, Finnish bilingualism might face severe difficulties and lose its unique position among other European countries.

**Bibliography**


Parliamentary speeches:


Nationalism and Its Manifestations in Sport:  
the Case of Football Hooliganism in the Czech Republic

1. Introduction

Contemporary sport has historical links with the phenomenon of nationalism. This paper is focused on the present-day relationship between sport and the manifestations of patriotism, and considers various displays of what has been termed ‘national chauvinism’ in sport. A belief in the superiority or supremacy of one’s own nation is typical of national chauvinism. Such chauvinism does not consider nations as equal in terms of their right to self-determination, as some nations are alleged to have qualities and traits that justify their primacy over others. National chauvinism is fed by feelings of intense, even hysterical fanaticism, because it is based on a clear division between “us” (the insiders) and “them” (the outsiders). Most typically, it is displayed during great football tournaments (the World Cup, the European Championship). Indeed, major championships, perceived by fans as events of national importance, provide suitable opportunities for surges of national chauvinism with displays that include the burning of national flags and attacks on opponents from the ranks of fans of other national teams. These attacks might be verbal (derisive chants), graphic (insulting banners), or physical. Chauvinism becomes especially manifest in situations where nationalist moods permeate society. Such was the case during the disintegration of the states of the former Soviet bloc. During the break-up of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and even of the Soviet Union, displays of national chauvinism were apparent in many forms (cf. Smolík: 2001, 2008). Accordingly, this chapter documents these displays in reference to examples of football hooliganism in Czech Republic we also describe individual nationalist (or even racist) displays that take place during football matches, vulgar nationalist chants, and manifestations of ethnic intolerance. The main focus of our analysis lies with the Czech situation since the 1990s.
2. Sport and Nationalism

Since antiquity, sport has been an activity aimed at comparing the performance of various nations and cultures. By virtue of the principle of competition, sport as a phenomenon creates a group distinction between “them” and “us”. “Us” is the group to which we feel we belong and which we understand. For sports fans, a prime example of such a group is one’s national team. Allport’s (2004: 63) definition of the ‘us’ group states that “all members of one’s own group use the word us in the same basic sense”. In social sciences the difference between “us” and “them” is sometimes understood as a difference between the in-group and the out-group. Thus, when understanding “us” in terms of the self, “they” plays an important role as a threatening element, one that we do not understand, and indeed do not wish to understand; however, it is one that prompts us to defend “our world” or “our order” more vigorously. The consciousness of group belonging, the feeling of “us”, is complementary to feelings or awareness of group difference, the automatic process of identifying the members of other social groups, creates an awareness of “them” (Heřmanová & Patočka 2007: 85).

Sport, therefore, can influence group creation, and more specifically, the emergence of nationally defined social groups, i.e. nations. This was particularly noticeable in the nineteenth century, the century of the rise of nation-states (see Heywood 1994). One of the possible ways of expressing “national consciousness” or “national belonging” was an establishment of various sports federations with a national character. Apart from sport organisations, also cultural organisations (literature, theatre, and art) were flourishing in the 19th century. These organisations were focused on formation of depiction of Czech nation (as can be seen in works of Alois Jirásek, Karel Havlíček Borovský, Karel Hynek Mácha, Božena Němcová, among others).

In the Czech lands, sport was perceived through the prism of nation, state or ethnicity, as testified by the foundation of various Czech sports federations, unions and associations in the late nineteenth century. Historically, the oldest organisation Czech Sokol (Falcon) Community (ČOS), a representative of a mass sport organisation with rich traditions (founded in 1862), which overlapped with the social, cultural and political life of the Czech society. It formed a pattern upon which organisations such as: the Workers Sports Union (DTJ, founded in 1897), the Catholic Orel (Eagle, founded in 1909) and the Federation of Workers’ Sports Unions (FDTJ, founded in 1921) were established. The most important events held were the “slety” (literally, the flocking of falcons) and gatherings of Sokol (falcon) societies which brought together spectacular mass performances and competitive championships (see Holzer & Smolík 2010: 478). Also worthy of mention are
the Czech Sculling Circle (CSC, founded in 1893), the Czech Amateur Athletic Union (CAAU, founded in 1897), and the Czech Football Union (CSF, founded in 1901). After the foundation of the Czechoslovak Republic in 1918, further organisations appeared, such as, in 1922, the Czech-Moravian Football Association (ČSAF), which unified the Czechoslovak Football Union (CSF), the German Football Federation (DFV), and the Polish Football Union (PFS) (Vaněk et al. 1984: 68; cf. Duke 1990: 147). Most importantly, institutionalisation occurred in a nationalist environment, in which sport was understood to have important social and political consequences.

Football appeared in Bohemia in the 1890s, but like other branches of sport (rowing, cycling, and later skating, fencing, shooting, and athletics), which spread primarily from the United Kingdom, it faced conservative opposition from the Sokol management, which refused to recognise it as a sport movement and insisted on its own conception of physical training activities. According to Sokol managers, sport was an activity that was supposed to contribute to the creation of national consciousness, and particular elements of Sokol were to be mobilised in an eventual “call to arms” in order to emancipate the Czech nation from Austro-Hungarian monarchy.

Football was cultivated in Bohemia primarily by Germans, and the most powerful team was Regatta Prag, which ranked among the best in the Czech lands from 1885–1895. Czech athletes became intensively engaged in football by the second half of the 1880s, but they played it for the most part to as a means of diversifying their rowing and cycling regimes (Smolík 2006: 1).

In accordance with contemporary Central European trends and standards, and also – if not above all – in keeping with the then-dominant logic of political interpretation proceeding from the Czech nation’s subjugation within the Austrian-Hungarian monarchy, Czech elites and an important segment of Czech society understood sport as a vital instrument in the construction of national, even quasi-state, structures. It was a natural tool of the national emancipatory project, which competed with the ambitions of the German national element. During the First Czechoslovak Republic, sport became a truly nationwide phenomenon, influencing national identity, but not its systemic outputs. In addition to periodic festivals such as the Sokol “slety”, occasional events were also staged, such as celebrating the Czechoslovak team’s winning the silver medal in the 1934 World Cup in Italy (cf. Holzer & Smolík 2010).

After the communist takeover in 1948, sport became instrumental in reinforcing not only communist ideology, but in many cases also feelings of nationhood and Czechoslovak unity. After 1993, the Czech and Slovak teams once again served as building blocks for newly established states, and the newly conceived
nations. Mutual rivalry between Czechs and Slovaks manifested itself first and foremost in collective sports such as football (e.g. FIFA World Cup qualifications in 2010) and ice hockey (World Championship in 2007, 2008, 2011; Olympic Games in 1994). On the other hand, in other sports, such as handball, joint leagues existed even after the break-up of Czechoslovakia. Representatives of political elites frequently commented mutual matches.

3. Football and National Chauvinism

Football is considered a traditional game, in which manifestations of heightened nationalism (national chauvinism) have been recorded on a large scale. National level football is an interesting social phenomenon, one that often has a fundamental impact on other aspects of society. From a recreational activity, football has developed into an important indicator of influences in other spheres of social life: including politics, the economy, interpersonal and family relationships. It even has consequences for the provision of security. Assisted by development of the media, the popularity of football is extraordinary; it is, without doubt, the most important mass spectated sport worldwide. Television, the internet and a radio allow millions, even billions of fans throughout the world to participate vicariously in football matches (cf. Smolík 2008).

On the basis of previous research, visitors to football matches can be categorized into three basic groups. These are spectators, fans, and hooligans (cf. Smolík 2008). Football spectators can be characterized as passive observers of the game, who are not affected by the rivalry of the two teams, and watch the game with an entirely neutral attitude. Most attend not only football matches, but other sporting events as well (and events in other areas such as culture). The spectator is interested in the course of the game and the final score. He is neither connected to any club (does not wear its symbols), nor does he identify with the club. Unlike fans or hooligans he is not biased, which improves his discerning judgment about the quality of play and the individual efforts of the players. The football spectator is not always present at the football stadium, but often follows the game “passively”, or through various media (internet, television, radio, press, mobile telephone, etc.). Because the football spectator does not usually attend all of the matches, he does not know the exact rituals (choruses, chants\(^1\), etc.) usual for football fans, or hooligans. For regular spectators, football is at the same level as

\(^1\) Balcar (2000) divided the shouts made during football matches into six groups: cries made to encourage one’s own club or individual players, shouts against visiting clubs or players, shouts made against referees, against other persons or clubs, shouts made in favor of other clubs, and extremist shouts.
a theatrical performance, because after watching a game (ideally) the spectator leaves satisfied with the enjoyment of the performance (Mareš, Smolík & Suchánek 2004).

The football fan is tied to football through a favourite team or particular favourite player. He has certain expectations of the game (he demands “his” club to win) and because he is identified with the team, he has strong feelings about that club’s wins and losses. Fans, for example, have much stronger reaction to an uncalled foul on their “own” player, and react with greater outrage (Slepička 1990). The football fan’s favourite, beloved sport is football. This category of football fans display their fan identification through club apparel (jerseys, scarves, t-shirts, banners, badges, etc.). The very principle of fandom is that during the match a certain kind of rivalry appears in which the fans of one team become a group with its own identity that defends itself against those who are opposing it; that is, the fans of the other team. Characteristic of the football fan is the division between “us” and “them” (fans of the other clubs) (Slepička 1990; Tilly 2006).

Hooligan groups, unlike regular fans, often do not even identify with a football club (or national team), but only with their group. The self-identification of hooligan groups leads to feelings of exclusivity (Mareš, Smolík & Suchánek 2004). In some cases, a kind of “superstructure” of football hooliganism is an involvement with organised crime (after all, many hooligans are active in the underworld via individual criminal activity unrelated to the football environment). Typical expressions of hooligan identity are symbols of particular hooligan gangs. These ubiquitous symbols (presented on banners, scarves, and clothing) reinforce feelings of identification and cohesion among hooligan group members. The symbols allow clear and swift differentiation among groups. Individual groups of football hooligans meet all the criteria for a small social group. These criteria may include stability, structure, integrity, cohesion, attractiveness, stability, exclusivity, interactivity among individuals, intimacy, homogeneity, specific value system, control of the value system, group goals, the satisfaction of individual members, etc. Over the course of time individuals in the group gain common experience, relationships between individual members deepen the motives for the group’s behaviour and the behaviour itself change, etc. Certain group tendencies can be observed in shared values and goals (aversion to police, trust in the hooligan group, striving to be the best hooligan group). Each group has its own unique norms and limits for interpersonal relations and behaviour: e.g. support/lack of support for the team, political stance, etc. (Smolík 2008).

In recent decades, football hooliganism and other negative phenomena connected with football, including national chauvinism, has become the subject
of intense media, political, and academic scrutiny. Nationalism is particularly manifest at international football matches, where national teams represent specific nations or home countries.

Probably the best example of the impact of national chauvinism on political development of a country (on European continent) is the violent collapse of former Yugoslavia. The disintegration of the Yugoslav federation was preceded by several years of violent skirmishes between various nationalist groups of hooligans, which peaked during 1989 in clashes between Serbian, Macedonian and Croatian rowdies, although ordinary fans supporting football clubs such as Red Star Belgrade, Hajduk Split, Dinamo Zagreb and Partizan Belgrade also became involved (cf. Mareš, Smolík & Suchánek 2004). When rival groups of supporters of Dinamo Zagreb and Red Star Belgrade clubs clashed on 13 May 1990 at Maksimir Stadium in Zagreb, leaving more than 60 injured, the melee provided a glimpse of the horror that would soon mark the forthcoming wars of Yugoslav succession.

The clashes between the “Bad Blue Boys of Zagreb” and the “Heroes of Belgrade”, broadcast live on national television, introduced the public to large-scale violence, but also provided an insight into how these groups were organised and used for purposes that had little if anything to do with the game football. These two largest organised groups of football fans in former Yugoslavia established a model of internal organisation and dynamics that is now the standard for all major groups of football club supporters. The model includes a mixture of strong ethnically and religiously-based identity politics, links to organised crime, informal ties to politicians, and a love of the game of football (Azinovič, Bassuener & Weber 2011: 147–148; cf. Mareš, Smolík & Suchánek 2004: 105–106).

After months of political tensions and nationalistic warmongering over the future of Yugoslavia, anger and frustration boiled over, culminating in street fights and later in major riots at the stadium between supporters of the two clubs, which to this day embody Croat and Serb national identities. Many commentators later observed that this confrontation had opened the “gates of hell” – soon afterward, the whole country would implode in chaos and bloodshed (Azinovič, Bassuener & Weber 2011: 147).

It is generally known that at the beginning of civil war in Yugoslavia, Željko Raznatović, later known as Arkan, assembled a Serbian combat unit the “Tigers” from among the hard core of the fans of Red Star Belgrade. This unit was later

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2 In the Czech language, the word for motherland (vlast) in itself gives rise to the impression of an emotional relationship to space and other people, which, in a way, we have adopted as our own (vlastní). Indeed, in one of its original meanings, vlast is connected with vlastní and it is this relationship that distinguishes vlast from all other countries (Holý 2010: 71).
implicated in war crimes against Croats and Bosniaks and became notorious for its acts of cruelty (cf. Mareš, Smolík & Suchánek 2004).

Courtney Angela Brkicová (2006) has argued that a match between Dinamo Zagreb and Red Star Belgrade marked the beginning of Croatia’s war of independence. At the beginning of the match, fans from both camps brawlled on the stadium’s terraces and on the field. The police, controlled by the Serbs, beat the Croatian fans, while allowing the Serbians fans to commit violence. A growing discontent within Yugoslavia then surfaced. The fact that national chauvinism is still present in the area can be manifested by following incident: in Autumn 2006, when about 150 fans of Serbian team Rad were arrested after shouting slogans “Serbia for the Serbs” and “Muslims out”. Apart from such tragic consequences of national chauvinism in football stadia, there are, as we shall see, also examples of more amusing examples of it.

During the Falklands War (1982), the World Cup was held in Spain, and English fans displayed a banner reading “Soccer’s Task Force” in support of the military measures taken by their government. During the same championship, Scottish fans put up a banner of their own with the slogan “Alcoholism vs. Communism” during a match against the Soviet Union. Although Williams (2001) notes the rise of nationalist themes among the radical Scottish fans, this particular banner can be considered more likely a joke and an expression of ironic nature of Scottish supporters, who are famous for their liking of alcohol.

In recent years in Central Europe, national chauvinism appeared during matches between the Slovak and Hungarian national teams, among others. This claim can be evidenced by referral to several cases, for instance, the game between Slovakia and Hungary on 31 March 1999 in Bratislava, which UEFA categorised as a high-risk match. During the game, fans of the home team unfurled a banner saying “Hungary – No, thanks!”, which was removed in the 41st minute of the game with the assistance of the Slovak police. The whole match, broadcast on a public television station STV, was drowned out by shouts and chants “Long live Slota!”, a reference to the then leader of the (chauvinist) Slovak National Party.

The most important incident took place on 1 November 2008 during a Slovak Premier League match between DAC Dunajská Streda and Slovan Bratislava. Following this high-risk game (the high level of risk is consequent upon the historic malice between Slovaks and Hungarians, and upon the frequent clashes between the fans of both national teams), a discussion developed concerning not only football hooliganism, but also political extremism and ethnic intolerance in Slovakia. Among the security measures taken, 31 people were arrested (16 from Hungary, 15 from the Slovak Republic). During the match, paramedics provided aid to approximately 50 people, and around a thousand policemen were involved
in the operation. Spurred by police action against the fans of DAC Dunajská Streda, a rally was organised in front of the Slovak Embassy in Budapest, in which several hundred protesters participated. Supporters of the Hungarian Guard and Jobbik (The Movement for a Better Hungary) were also involved in the provocations. The incident became politicised, and the following figures made pronouncements about the football match: Hungary’s consul – Géza Farkas, Slovak deputy prime minister – Dušan Čaplovič, Party of the Hungarian Coalition (SMK) deputy chairman – József Berényi, SMK chairman – Pál Csáky, the Slovak Minister of the Interior – Robert Kaliňák, as did the prime ministers of the two countries, who met a few days later in the Slovak town of Komárno. In response to the match, incidents occurred in the Slovak border regions: Slovak signs were painted over in certain municipalities, the Hungarian Guard appeared in the uniforms of the National Guard (Nemzeti Őrsereg), and border crossings were blocked, etc. (for more details see: Kupka, Laryš & Smolík 2009: 63).

Shifting our focus, we find that in addition to being a reaction to internal or regional political developments, national chauvinism can also be considered a response of part of the sport fans to the processes of globalisation and trans-nationalisation. The greatest sport victories of small countries furnish us with graphic examples of how sport provides a setting in which national identity is created and expressed. Sport has become a noticeable symbol, indicating national, ethnic and civic affiliation, which is made visible via symbols of social communication, such as badges, logos, flags, t-shirts, chants, replicas of national team jerseys and anthems (Smolík 2001; Sekot 2006).

Charles Tilly cites Marovits and Hellerman, who argued the following:

If anything, nationalism plays an even greater role in team sports than it does in individual sports. Whereas it could be argued in the case of the former that the contestant represents him or herself as much – if not more – than their countries, in the case of the team’s collective entity and very being, the collective in the form of the country, city, or region most definitely supersedes any identification with the individual. Indeed, any placement of individual loyalties and achievements over those of the collective are seen as selfish, wrong, detrimental to the collective good – and often unpatriotic (Tilly 2003: 81).

Analogies between the national team and the nation, in which the former represents the latter in the minds of the fans, contributed to surges of national chauvinism during the great sport events, highlighting historical and political reminiscences in matches such as Germany vs. Poland, Serbia vs. Croatia, Turkey vs. Greece, and Argentina vs. England.
4. Football and Football Hooliganism: Manifestations of Czech National Chauvinism

Violent and anti-social behaviour amongst football fans is referred to as “football hooliganism”, or sometimes as the “British disease” or “English disease”. These populist terms have been used by media and by politicians to label deviant behaviours, which have become associated with (particularly) English football from the late 1960s onwards. These labels are based on three popular fallacies: that the violence is something relatively new; that it is found only at football matches; and that it is an English phenomenon. None of these statements stand up to scrutiny (Frosdick & Marsh 2005: 3).

Football hooliganism is a concept used to describe asocial and anti-social activities by fans of individual football clubs. The term hooligan itself appeared in 19th century in London after the arrival of a particularly large and rowdy Irish immigrant family called Hooligan or Houlihan (cf. Marsh, Rosser & Harré 1978: 335–336; Mareš, Smolík & Suchánek 2004: 30; Wann et al. 2001). The term was later used as a general description for any criminal or disorderly conduct. Football and hooliganism have been linked since the late 1960s. Modern football hooliganism was formed and influenced by some sub-cultures of this period like Mods, Bootboys, Skinheads etc. (cf. Mareš, Smolík & Suchánek 2004; Frosdick & Marsh 2005).

In other European countries, the phenomenon started to attract scholarly attention approximately ten years later. The main research and theoretical starting point for football hooliganism appeared at the end of the sixties thanks to sociological, psychological and anthropological research conducted by the English academics: John Harrington, Ian Taylor, John Clark, Stuart Hall, Rom Harré, Norbert Elias, John Williams and others (Frosdick & Marsh 2005). Currently, the issue of football hooliganism has received attention not just from the aforementioned, but also from social scientists such as: Giovanni Carnibella, Anne Fox, Kate Fox, Joe McCann, James Marsh, Peter Marsh, Anthony King, Eric Dunning, Steve Redhead, Richard Giulianotti, Gary Armstrong, Patrick Murphy and others (cf. Frosdick & Marsh 2005).

There is no dispute about the fact that the peak of football hooliganism was in the 1980s, which was characterised by an escalation of violence, aggression and disturbances at football matches, both before and after the match. Hooliganism had become an increasingly greater problem far from football stadiums during the 1980s and 1990s (cf. Smolík 2008). As King (1997) asserts, already by the end of the 1970s in England, it was increasingly difficult to provoke clashes between individual groups of hooligans directly in the stadium due to frequent intervention.
by the police, which led hooligans to opt for a new strategy. They began to wear informal clothing that was not connected to the club, thus enabling them to avoid police supervision and to carry individual clashes to the streets. Marked manifestations of football hooliganism include incursions onto the pitch, throwing objects onto the playing surface and at players, disturbances, vandalism, verbal as well as violent conflicts leading to aggression between hooligans and referees, hooligans and players, hooligan groups against one another (cf. Frosdick & Marsh 2005; Smolík 2008; Sekot & Smolík 2008).

Displays of national chauvinism had already been recorded in Czechoslovak football during the 1930s. For example, the newspaper *Nedělní list* (*Sunday Gazette*) reported in a series of articles about the “foreign legion” within the domestic competition. The newspaper demanded that our sport be only managed patriotically, that is solely by Czechs, and that it be represented – on the fields, racing circuits, tennis courts and everywhere it takes place – only by citizens with Czech ethnicity. They argued that history had already convinced us that the foreign elements are unreliable. In effect the slogan was: “Czech sport for Czech people!” (*Nedělní list* 1938: 15).

The issue of the Czech and German national chauvinism in sports came into the focus of Adolf Hitler, who, with regard to the national symbols of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, said that it would be intolerable for the Czech national anthem to be played and the Czech flag displayed if the team of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia were to achieve a sports victory abroad (Kokoška 2006).

According to Hitler, the German anthem should be played and the German flag displayed (Kokoška 2006). Czech Germans, who for the most part supported occupation, represented according to Nazi ideology a privileged social class (*Oberschicht*), while Czechs were considered to be second-rate citizens (*Unterschicht*) (cf. Brandes 1999).

Czech (and Czechoslovak) football has no history of widespread or serious violence, although there have been some reports of incidents during the 1980s and early 1990s, mainly involving Sparta Prague fans. Several incidents occurred at stadiums and involved attacks on opposing players, although Sparta supporters also caused damage to trains *en route* to away matches and were involved in street fighting after derby matches. The national sports authorities became so concerned about the behaviour they commissioned a quasi-documentary film on Sparta fans entitled “Proč?” (Why?). Officials admitted that this initiative was counter-productive, resulting in a widespread boycott of the film. Following a train-wrecking
incident in 1985, 30 fans were arrested, and warnings were issued that the authorities would not tolerate “the manners of English fans” in Czech football. Top flight clubs became obliged to provide separate section for away fans, and given the right to search spectators at entrances to the grounds. In 1986, extensive street fighting occurred after a Sparta – Bohemians derby match. Further measures included banning of club flags and scarves, and serving a weaker variety of beer at football grounds (Frosdic & Marsh 2005; cf. Smolík 2008; Duke 1990).

Throughout the existence of Czechoslovakia, displays of national chauvinism have often appeared on the terraces of the stadia. Houška and Zemánek (1996) described how, during a match between Sparta Prague and Slovan Bratislava in 1980, fans chanted chauvinist slogans such as “Hit the Hungarian on the head” and “Shit, shit Hungary!”. At a particularly tense moment, a bottle flew down from the terraces. The disciplinary commission not only issued Sparta with a fine, but even closed down its stadium at Letná in Prague.

Since the dissolution of the Czechoslovak federation at the end of 1992, several clashes have been recorded that seem to have been incited by the disintegration of the common state and associated heightened nationalist moods (see Bazal 1993). Some older fans, who had established contacts with fans of other clubs, condemned these actions (examples of Czecho-Slovak fan networks included Ostrava [Czech] – Trnava [Slovak], and Sparta [Czech] – Košice [Slovak]). Despite these activities, it is evident that the majority of Czech hooligan gangs identifies with the ideal of national chauvinism. Apart from physical violence between rival gangs, national chauvinism is commonly displayed also by nationalist chants.

Nationalist verbal abuse has often been heard in football stadia, such as the chant “Hit and hit and hit the Slovak on the head”, to which Slovak fans replied with cries such as “Czechs back to Prague!” and “Hit the Praguer on the head”. Another typical chant at Slovak football stadia during the period of the common state with the Czechs was: “Who’ll drop out of the league? Hungarians and Jews”. Hungarians and Jews are negatively perceived especially by Slovak radicals. Chants about Jews are in Czech football associated to Slavia Prague, which was historically connected with Prague’s former Jewish community.

Another variant of national chauvinism in football or ice hockey stadia is a reaction to turbulence in international politics (e.g. international matches between the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia within 1968–1989). In recent years nationalist passions also appeared in Czech stadia during matches in spring 1999, for instance, chanting could be heard in support of Slobodan Milošević and against NATO intervention in Serbia, the most common chant was “Fuck the USA”.

Displays of national chauvinism have also been observable on banners and flags unfurled at matches. A typical example was a banner shown by Czech
hooligans “No to Austrian football, yes to Temelín” at a match between Austria and the Czech Republic on 11 October 2003. Temelín in South Bohemia is a location of nuclear power plant, its construction began in 1987, and it was completed in 2000, despite Austria’s protests. The UEFA disciplinary commission dealt with this incident and fined the Bohemian-Moravian Football Association.

In the Czech Republic, there are currently active around 30 gangs, each consisting of maximum few dozen individuals (see Mareš, Smolík & Suchánek 2004: 135–137). The most active groups support a wide number of clubs: Sparta Prague, Slavia Prague Baník Ostrava, Zbrojovka Brno, Sigma Olomouc, and Bohemians Prague 1905. As in other countries, in the Czech Republic a hooligan subculture has developed. It is homogeneous and characterised by the observance of substantially distinctive social norms, which produce stable, structured, integrated and closed groups with specific value systems, focuses and aims (see Smolík 2008: 134).

The views of Czech sociologists and social psychologists on the phenomenon of football hooliganism and fandom can be found in several monographs and research studies (Slepička 1990; Slepička et al. 2010; Mareš, Smolík & Suchánek 2004; Smolík 2008). For example the research by Beyer and Smolík (2007), with respondents from the Czech fan scene, tried to map out the people present at the so-called “kettle” at football stadiums. The typical respondent in the research sample was male aged between 20 to 29 years old. In terms of education, the large number of secondary school graduates was somewhat surprising; in socioeconomic terms there were very low numbers of unemployed. One interesting target of the study was the socio-economic activity of respondents, which showed that an important part of the scene consisted of students and economically active respondents (tables 1, 2, 3).

The study sought to categorize fans more or less into: sports spectators (mainly watching the game), fans (actively rooting), the ultras (who plan the choreography, use of pyrotechnics, banners, etc.), and hooligans (who take advantage of the football match to “cut loose”, get into fights with rival fans, etc.) (see table 4).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age category</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10–19</td>
<td>35,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20–29</td>
<td>51,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30–39</td>
<td>11,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 and over</td>
<td>1,3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Beyer & Smolík 2007: 76.
Table 2. Respondents by education

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of education</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basic</td>
<td>23,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary without graduation</td>
<td>32,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary with graduation</td>
<td>42,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>1,9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 3. Respondents by socioeconomic activity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Socio-economic status</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Employee</td>
<td>39,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student</td>
<td>42,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed</td>
<td>10,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>7,3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 4. Identification of football spectators by category

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category of football spectators</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ultra</td>
<td>38,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fan</td>
<td>25,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hooligan</td>
<td>19,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No category</td>
<td>11,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spectator</td>
<td>5,2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In some countries, such as Germany, we find groups of ultras who present themselves as football fans. In other countries, for example Italy, they rather present themselves as radicals or openly as football hooligans. The ultras mainly work to affect the atmosphere inside the football stadium (Smolík 2008). Slepička (et al. 2010: 152) points out, however, that ultras and hooligans are mixed, and it is very difficult to draw a clear line between them two. Some ultras are capable from time to time of taking part in organised fights, while some hooligans take part in the mass fandom and sometimes even help to prepare the choreography. Most of the respondents to the survey confirmed a link between football hooliganism and the existence of a distinct subculture, i.e. the subculture of football hooligans.
Agreement was expressed by 56.8 percent of fans, 21 percent gave neutral answers or had no awareness of the subject (see Sekot & Smolík 2009).

The football hooligan subculture in Czech Republic shows a number of un-written rules or behavioural norms. These include: avoiding violent clashes outside the hooligan subculture (non-use of physical aggression against “normal fans”), never reporting an incident to police (even when injuries occur during violent clashes), refusing any cooperation with the media, and non-use of weapons during clashes. The theft of personal belongings during individual fight is also frowned upon, but this rule does not apply to football banners and other insignia (Smolík 2012).

In the past, Czech hooligan groups have not acted peacefully among themselves when present at international matches; this has often led to an increase in random incidents among the various groups. Despite this, matches between national football teams have manifestly not been the primary focus of rowdies in the past. In many countries hooligan groups join against hooligan groups of other countries (e.g. Polish vs. Russian groups at EURO 2012).

Over the last decade, hooligan groups in the Czech Republic have not adhered to the “National team peace”; a previous agreement to not fight each other at international fixtures. This has led to an increase in random incidents among various hooligan groups. Despite this, matches between national football teams manifestly have not been the prime focus of rowdies in the past. This is one of the reasons why displays of national chauvinism have appeared principally at matches involving individual football clubs competing with teams from abroad. Although such incidents are comparatively rare, they have occurred at multiple levels. They have involved, for instance, the following: (1) displays of banners expressing hatred of the members of the opposing nation (for example, hatred towards fans, players, and others); (2) shouts insulting the opposing nation (or its historical figures and politics, with the USA, Israel and, in the past, the Soviet Union being the typical targets); and (3) attacks on the fans of the opposing team, which are most often rooted in historical enmities.

Perhaps the most typical insult hurled at Czech football stadia is the description of the rival fans as “Jews”: examples include the shouts “Polish Jews”, and the chant “You’re the scum of the Czech league; you’re the Polish Jews”. We can assume that elements of these radical fans are racially or religiously prejudiced against Jews or that they consider Jews to be an alien element in Czech environment, but in many cases these chants are perceived as simple hyperbole or ‘humour’. However, in many cases it is very difficult to distinguish aggressive national chauvinism from pranks, hyperbole and allegedly amusing comments. Thus, although displays of nationalist chauvinism, by players, coaches, functionaries,
and others, have manifested in Czech sport, it can be stated that today these are isolated excesses, typical for football hooligans or ultras.

The extreme attitudes (racism, xenophobia, anti-Semitism) found in some football hooligans may be considered as displays of anti-social behaviour. Xenophobia at football matches is concentrated on “different” groups of hooligans (also from abroad). This involves a stereotype on the basis of which groups are judged already according to nationality, religion, political attitude, ethnicity, football club or region. Racial intolerance is increased primarily by anthropological deviations from the social average, such as differences in skin colour, facial appearance, hairstyle, etc.

In the Czech Republic, as in other countries where football is popular, racism is manifested primarily by vulgarity, vituperation, and heckling towards black players (cf. Smolík 2004). In the Czech Republic, racist shouts and chants first appeared in the 1990s, which is when non-white players first joined Czech (or Czechoslavak) football clubs. From the 1990s to the present, instances of racism in Czech stadia have been garnering significant media attention, chiefly because of the financial sanctions imposed on the Czech football representatives in the Champions League and the UEFA Cup (today the Europa League). Despite this, racism continues to present itself within Czech championships. An example of a racist attitude from the Czech football league is a banner hung by some of the radical fans and hooligans of Sigma Olomouc during a match with FC Slovácko in autumn 2006, which contained motto “We are racists, more than fans”.

Conclusion

This chapter has focused on some aspects of the interface between sport and nationalism. Nationalism in its various forms is likely to remain a permanent feature, uniting the worlds of sport and politics. For this reason, we have focused our discussion on the issue of national chauvinism in sport, and in the final section of the chapter, we have also mentioned racist expressions.

Manifestations of national chauvinism at football matches have been described, and it can be stated that its presence can lead to serious conflicts with possible political and social consequences. In other cases, manifestations of national chauvinism are only excesses of individuals or small radical groups of hooligans. The sociological characteristics of Czech football hooligans based on previously conducted empirical research have also been presented. Approximately 20 percent of football matches attendees in Czech Republic consider themselves to be football hooligans, while more than 55 percent of attendees are aware of the football hooligan subculture.
In the future, it is anticipated that the negative phenomena described in this chapter, which can be characterised as national chauvinism, will continue to occur at football matches. In our opinion there are two ways to reduce football hooliganism in the Czech Republic. The first of them is repressive and is consequent upon legal actions, for example banning convicted hooligans from attending matches. The second method is preventive: improvements between and among communication among fans, state institutions and sport associations; social work with football fans and football hooligans. The preventative route will be longer and more demanding, but it could produce better results in terms of reduction of violence and the displays of national chauvinism.

Bibliography

The dissolution of Czechoslovakia and the creation of two new states – the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic – at midnight between 31 December 1992 and 1 January 1993 – is considered as an example of the “best practice” of the peaceful division of a multinational country (Bayenet, Capron, Liégeois 2007: 15). In fact, the Czechoslovak case was an exception to the situation in Eastern and Central Europe, where an escalation of bloody conflicts could be observed in the post-Yugoslav and post-Soviet spaces (Šmíd, Vaďura 2007: 5–6). On the other hand, some dangerous tendencies of Slovak nationalism and separatism as well as some intolerant Czech approaches towards Slovaks can be identified at the time of the dissolution. Therefore, the goal of this chapter is to analyse the pathways of risk radicalisation during and after the process of the dissolution of Czechoslovakia and to explain how the successful elimination of these tendencies occurred.

2. Concepts of Separatism and Radicalisation

In a broader sense separatism is connected with various aspects of territorial and/or ethnic demands. In modern history, it can be observed in many forms. There are various conceptualizations of separatism and of interconnected terms, such as secessionism and irredentism, sometimes also autonomism etc. Possible basic definitions of these terms are included in the following table (table 1). However, it is important to mention that various authors use these terms in different ways and contexts (Cabestan, Pavkovic 2013; Šmíd, Vaďura 2007).

Slovak separatism connected former autonomist and federalist demands with the struggle for confederal statehood and full separation (the Czech-Slovak federation was established in 1969, see below). The Slovak struggle for independence was carried out within the context of the right to self-determination and it can be labelled as a legitimate political activity. However, several risky tendencies
and activities signalized the dangerous radicalisation of a part of the Slovak political spectrum.

According to the European Study of Youth Mobilisation Report radicalisation in contemporary Europe is defined as follows: “Radicalisation can be seen as the acceptance of the use of violent or undemocratic means to reach specific goal” (British Council and St. Andrews University 2011). According to the same source: “Radicalisation seems best understood not as the collection of particular positions or opinions on matters, but rather as a social process, dependent on individuals and the specific background situations of all involved” (British Council and St. Andrews University 2011).

However, in the context of the post-communist development, violence may be seen as a singular element of separatist radicalisation. The glorification of the legacy of former non-democratic regimes and movements on the claimed territories (in the tradition of the Slovak clerical-fascist state of 1939–1945) as well as tendencies towards the embracing of modern forms of non-democratic government and intolerance towards other nations and ethnic minorities are also important “warning signals” of incipient radicalisation in Central and Eastern Europe (Averre, Cottey 2002: 17).

Table 1. The conceptualization of separatism and interconnected terms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Separatism (in a broader sense)</th>
<th>Separatism in a strict sense</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Secessionism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Split of one territory and/or a racial, national, ethnic or religion community from another (others) and creating a new state</td>
<td>Split of two or more territories and/or a racial, ethnic or religion community/ies from the existing states and creating one new state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autonomism (federalism)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demands for autonomy and/or federal unit(s) for a race, nation, ethnic or religious community within the existing state (by secessionist or separatist intra-state way)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


3. Historical Legacies

On the one hand, the historical legacy of the Czech-Slovak relationship is characterized by friendly co-existence and a common struggle against external enemies (fascism, Soviet aggression, etc.), and by some incidents and tensions on the other. The foundation of Czechoslovakia in 1918 and its recognizing in the Treaty of Versailles was the result of difficult negotiations of the Czech and Slovak delegations
with the victorious powers of the First World War. The existence of the united Czechoslovak nation was propagated to justify the existence of the state where a quarter of the population was of German origin, with there also being large Hungarian, Polish, Ruthene and Jewish minorities (Wallace 1996: 49–50).

Post-1918 Slovak demands for autonomy were not appreciated in Prague and this led to the radicalisation of the Slovak autonomist movement, which for its part, was inspired by Italian fascism. In the 1920s the paramilitary organisation Rodobrana (“Defence of the tribe”) was created, later it was banned by Czechoslovak authorities due to its anti-governmental activities (Čaplovič 2001: 28–29). In the autumn of 1938, when German pressure led to the Munich Treaty and the loss of border territories, Prague finally accorded autonomy to Slovakia. However, leading political forces in Slovakia were influenced by fascist and chauvinistic nationalist ideas. In 1938, the paramilitary Hlinka Guard (Hlinkova Garda, HG) named after Andrej Hlinka the leading figure in the Slovak autonomist movement was established (Sokolovič 2009: 37–39). In 1938–1939 Slovak nationalists supported a small irredentist movement in the so-called Moravian Slovakia (Mezihorák 1997: 49–75). The quasi-independent Slovak Republic was declared on 14 March 1939. In fact this clerical-fascist regime may be best viewed as having been a “puppet state” of the Third Reich (Kopeček 2006: 91).

The first years of wartime Slovak Republic’s existence were characterized by an emphasis upon social welfare and by satisfaction with such an approach on the part of a large segment of the population. However, later the situation became more complicate, (a worsening of economic situation as a result of war) and anti-regime resistance strengthened. Under the leadership of the Catholic priest Josef Tiso, the Slovak Republic became actively engaged in anti-Jewish measures. When the Slovak national uprising of 29 August 1944 started, the goal of its main leaders was to re-establish Czechoslovakia. The Slovak government defamed this uprising as a “Czech–Jewish–Bolshevist coup” (Rychlík 2012: 216). Crimes against its own population were carried out by the HG and the German army (Halaj, Mičev, Stanislav, Rodák 1990). Yet with the defeat of Germany in May 1945, Czechoslovakia started a new era of its existence, with stronger Slovak autonomy.

The elections in 1946 were won by the Communist party of Czechoslovakia (Komunistická strana Československa, KSČ) in the Czech Lands and by the Democratic Party (Demokratická strana, DS) in Slovakia. After the communist coup d'état in 1948 the pressure against Slovak Catholicism and against Slovak “bourgeois nationalism” became very strong. During the totalitarian period of the 1950s the national question was frozen. However, during the process of political reforms of the 1960s, which peaked in 1968 during the so-called Prague spring, Slovak national demands became more prominent. In the eyes of the wider Slovak
public, such demands were viewed as being wholly legitimate (Fowes 1994: 136). As a result of this development and in the wake of the Soviet-led invasion of 1968, the Czech-Slovak federation was established in 1969.

The 1970s and 1980s were again typical of the elimination of public manifestation of nationalist ideas. The anti-communist opposition in the Czech lands was formed mostly by liberal humanists centred upon Václav Havel and former reform communists. In Slovakia these two streams were marginal. The stronger role was played by the Catholic opposition. In addition, representatives of the wartime Slovak state continued to be active during the whole post-war era and continued to argue for Slovak independence (Rychlík 2012: 557–558).

4. The Fall of Communism, National Question and Collapse of State

The fall of communism in Czechoslovakia was characterized in both parts of the federation by rise of strong democratic movements. However, from the point of view of later developments it is important to mention that the “main revolutionary movements” chose different names in each part of the federation. In the Czech Republic it was the Občanské forum (Civic Forum, OF), in Slovakia – Public Against Violence (Verejnost proti násiliu, VPN). These two movements won the first free elections in 1990 in their respective parts of the federation (Sígl 2010: 430).

In 1990 the controversial so-called “hyphen-war” began. It was so-called after disputes between Czech and Slovak politicians relating to the new name of the common state. Since 1960 the official name of the state had been the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. After the fall of communism common agreement to remove the word “socialist” from the name led to discussions about the new name for the state. Representatives from the Czech Republic recommended a return to the former name Czechoslovak Republic. Their Slovak counterparts demanded that the name be hyphenated (Czech-Slovak Republic) or other variants in order better to reflect strengthening Slovak identity within the state. The result of the debate that the state was re-named as the “Czech and Slovak Federal Republic” (Kopeček 2010: 58).

This “hyphen-war” was an initial warning signal of highly difficult negotiations on the future structure of the federal state or indeed confederal state. The OF and the VPN were eventually dissolved due to internal disputes. The main successor party in Slovakia – the Movement for Democratic Slovakia (Hnutie za demokratické Slovensko, HZDS), under the leadership of the charismatic Vladimír Mečiar, demanded more and more powers for each of the national republics. Whereas their Czech counterparts led by Czech Prime Minister
Petr Pithart from the Civic Movement (Občanské hnutí, OH) formulated somewhat vague counter-statements. Negotiations in the years 1990–1992 led to the paralysis of political life at the national level. Neither side was able to accept the argument of the other. The Slovak side sought to weaken federal structures, whereas the Czechs were reluctant to accept the existence of a distinct Slovak identity. Misunderstandings led to a worsening of bilateral. In this environment the risk of radicalisation grew and the risk elements were understood very ardently in both parts of Czechoslovakia.

5. Glorification of the Wartime Slovak State

The legacy of the Slovak state from the wartime period was propagated in Slovakia after the fall of communism. It is important to note that according to the (official) theory of legal continuity of Czechoslovakia between 1938–1945, the Slovak state in 1939–1945 was seen as illegitimate in Czechoslovak law. In the emergent Slovak post-communist state, wartime crimes against Jews and political opponents were denied or even celebrated. The post-war court proceedings against President Josef Tiso and his execution in 1947 were considered by small circles of Slovak radicals as a Czech-ed anti-Slovak outrage. They were supported in this assessment by some exiled Slovak post-war politicians (Mareš 2008: 244–245). Their activity influenced strongly the image of Slovak separatism within Czech public opinion.

Several political parties and movements with clear separatist demands and a positive view of the wartime Slovak state were founded after the fall of communism. The most important was the Slovak National Party (Slovenská národná strana, SNS). It won parliamentary representation in 1990. However, this party can be considered as moderate within the overall nationalist spectrum. Various splinter groups and new parties and movements were also established, such as Slovak National Unity (Slovenská národná jednota, SNJ), the Movement for the Liberation of Slovakia (Hnutie za oslobodenie Slovenska, HoS) or the Slovak People’s Party (Slovenská ľudová strana, SLS). These groupings provoked a strong anti-Czechoslovak and revisionist rhetoric, in the sense of “re-writing” the history of Slovakia during the years 1939–1945 (Rychlík 2002: 136–137).

Militant youth subcultures also grew in Slovakia, mostly the racist skinhead subculture. The group Krátky proces (Short Proces) played in modern rock-style an anti-Semitic song of the Hlinka Guard from the war period (“Rež a rúbaj” – “Cut and thrash”). This subcultural milieu used separatist rhetoric, whilst cooperating, with similar streams on the Czech side (Mareš 2012: 570).

The Radicalisation of Slovak Separatism…
6. Violent Incidents and Threats

Violent small scale incidents were committed mostly by freelancers, not aligned with specific organisations. However, these incidents were understood very emotionally in both parts of the federation. The incident from March 1990 in the Slovak town Svit u Popradu won media attention. Several high school students and teachers from Prague were attacked and beaten there during a school trip, allegedly due to their Czech origin (Pacner 2001: 230).

One year later a more serious case hit the Czech – Slovak relations. President Václav Havel tried to visit a rally of separatists on 14 March 1991, organised to commemorate 52nd anniversary of the proclamation of the Slovak clerical-fascist state. Havel, his colleagues and bodyguards were attacked by a mob. Moderate Slovak political parties condemned the attack. On the other hand, a representative of the Slovak National Party, Jozef Prokeš, described Havel’s attempt to visit such a kind of demonstration as a provocation (Rychlík 2002: 172).

In the early months of 1992 the creation of the underground Slovak Liberation Army (Slovenská oslobodenecká armada, SOA) was announced. This “army” declared itself to be the “armed forces of the Slovak nation”. It sought the creation of an independent Slovakia and demanded the transfer of all Slovak soldiers to Slovak territory. It claimed that if separation were not achieved by 31 December 1992, the SOA would commence “battle operations”. Czech soldiers in Slovakia would be considered as prisoners of war according to the Geneva conventions. In turn the antics of the SOA were discussed in the Federal Assembly and it was investigated by the security forces. However, the SOA mounted no real actions of any description, although they did create a lot of media attraction (Mareš 2005: 210–211).

A failed bomb attack in the Czech town Kolín on 29 February 1992 represents a specific case of Slovak militancy. A phone call announced that a bomb had been placed in a bookstore, where a meeting with Jiří Rajlich and Jiří Sehnal, the authors of the book Slovak Airmen 1939–1945, was taking place (Rajlich, Sehnal 1992). The bomb was found but did not explode. The declared reason for the attack was the fact that the book included details about Slovak military collaboration with Nazi Germany, including a photograph of President Tiso, who personally decorated German soldiers after the Slovak National Uprising of 1944 was suppressed. Police investigation suspected that among others, the culprits were Slovak soldiers from the Kolin barracks (and that there might have been possible link to the SOA). However, the perpetrators were never identified (Mareš 2005: 212). This incident was characteristic of the mood of growing radicalisation – and a re-evaluation of the legacy of the Slovak wartime state and violence.
It is important to mention that these violent incidents were rejected by a large part of the Slovak political spectrum, including parties supporting full sovereignty for the Slovak Republic. The security forces at the federal level as well as in national republics were active in the investigation of such cases. However, these incidents signalized a significant worsening of the security situation.

7. Czech Anti-Separatist Militancy, “Reactive” Separatism, and the Moravian Question

Growing Slovak separatism led to reactions on the Czech side. On the one hand the struggle for the “status quo” led to the unequivocal rejection of each new Slovak demands. On the other hand Czech counter-separatism was stimulated. This latter approach was expressed in the popular motto “Let them go, if they want”.

Indeed, in a contemporary one speech, the Czech Christian Democratic politician Václav Benda speculated on the possible “use of tanks” in Slovakia. Unsurprisingly, this statement led to intensive media attention and protests (Mareš 2005: 230). Czechoslovak ideas were defended very strongly by the right-wing extremist Assembly for the Republic – Republican Party of Czechoslovakia (Sdružení pro republiku – Republikánská strana Československa, SPR–RSČ). This party even declared irredentist territorial claims on Carpathian Ukraine (it had belonged to Czechoslovakia in the inter-war period). Indeed, this party also had a small Slovak branch (Eibl 2008).

From the Czech perspective, Slovak separatism was perceived very sensitively also due to the so-called “Moravian question”. In the eastern part of the Czech Republic there are two historical areas with their own regional history and identity – Moravia and Silesia (the territory of historical Silesia was at that time – 1990–1992 – divided into Czechoslovak and Polish parts). In Moravia the regionalist Movement for Self-Government Democracy – Society for Moravia and Silesia (Hnutí za samosprávnou demokracii – Společnost pro Moravu a Slezsko, HSD–SMS) was very successful in the elections in 1990. It won 10 percent of votes in the Czech Republic it was over 20 percent and on the territory of Moravia and Silesia polled over 20 percent. In the autumn of 1990 the more radical Moravian National Party, which articulated a Moravian ethno-nationalist programme (Moravská národní strana, MNS) was established (Pernes 1996: 239).

In the census in 1991 more than million people declared that they possessed Moravian nationality, but this phenomenon cannot be understood as support for Moravian full state sovereignty, but rather as an expression of Moravian identity within Czechoslovakia. The Moravian movement demanded either autonomy within the Czech Republic or the creation of a federation consisting of Bohemia,
8. The Elections of 1992

After the so-called Velvet revolution of 1989 it was decided that a general election would be held in 1990. From our perspective, the subsequent parliamentary election of 1992 is more important. After these elections the regular four-year long electoral cycle should have commenced. This decision was adopted as in light of the experience with the fall of non-democratic regimes and transition in other regions (Southern Europe and Latin America after the fall of right-wing authoritarian regimes). The development of the party system in this transformation era is usually very “tempestuous” (Bureš, Charvát, Just, Štefek 2012: 76). From a contemporary point of view we can see this decision as having been farsighted, because it helped create and consolidate a clearly discernible party system in both republics in the wake of the dissolution of the OF and the VPN.

In the elections of June 1992 the Civic Democratic Party (Občanská demokratická strana, ODS), with chairman Václav Klaus, won in the Czech Republic. It received 30 percent of the votes (together with a small coalition partner – Christian Democratic Party – Křesťansko-demokratická strana, KDS). The ODS was inspired by “Thatcherism” and it supported privatisation and the creation of a capitalist economy. The ODS supported the existence of the Czechoslovak federation in its party manifesto its candidates stood (without success) throughout the country. However, the ODS stated that any future federation must be functional (Pšeja 2005: 63).

The winner in Slovakia, the HZDS with its charismatic leader Vladimír Mečiar, with 37 percent of the votes was more focused on social issues. It rejected mass privatisation and supported strengthening the Slovak position within the federation (Agnew 2004: 304). The Slovak National Party which argued for full independence
won 8 percent of the votes, which was less than it had expected. The real power
of the party lay in its informal support for the HZDS in negotiations with the ODS
(Kopeček 2007: 421).

The result of the parliamentary elections of 1992 highlighted significant dif-
ferences between the political landscape and political preferences in both parts
of the federation. On the other hand, it is important to mention that the so-
called “silent majority” favoured the continued existence of Czechoslovakia,
even in Slovakia (where the model of confederation was very popular). The atti-
tudes of the public towards various forms of development of the state are included
in the following table.

Table 2. Attitudes of citizens towards the future form of the state
(before elections 1992)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Form of state</th>
<th>Czech Republic (in percent)</th>
<th>Slovak Republic (in percent)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Two independent states</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federation</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unitarian state</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State of self-government regions</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confederation</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Srb, Veselý 2004: 89.

9. Peaceful Dissolution

The initial negotiation between Václav Klaus and Vladimír Mečiar highlighted
the gap between both the views on powers of the republics and the government
in Prague. In this problematic situation the proposal to dissolve the republic was
a logical step. However the defenders of Czechoslovakia rejected such a solution
due to their strong emotional ties to the common state. On the other hand, radical
separatists strengthened their campaign to split the federation. On 17 July 1992
the Slovak National Council adopted the so-called Declaration of Sovereignty

In this situation it was very difficult to use a referendum as an instrument
for solving the political situation, because in both parts of the federation terms
such as federation, confederation, sovereignty, etc. were employed in a variety
of ways. Despite the strong opposition towards dissolution, the constitutional Act
no. 542/1992 on the dissolution of the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic was

In October 1992 the federal government had adopted a plan of measures for securing a peaceful dissolution. However, it was not necessary to use it (Srb, Veselý 2004: 94). The final months of the existence of Czechoslovakia were free of violent incidents, with the exception of an unsolved attack on a new Slovak customs house during the night of 31 December (Mareš 2011: 249).

Václav Klaus was criticized within the putative Czech Republic because of his role during the negotiations with Mečiar, but this debate had no significant impact on Slovak nationalism. President Václav Havel, a supporter of the federation, was simultaneously the last Czechoslovak and the first Czech president. He resigned on 20 July 1992 (Srb, Veselý 2004: 100–101).

10. “Meciarism” and Czech – Slovak Relations

The birth of two new states on 1 January 1993 was understood as a much more important step in Slovakia than in the Czech Republic. Moreover, after dissolution the Slovak political scene was characterized by strong nationalist and populist elements. The middle of the 1990s is referred to as the period of “Meciarism”, in which Prime Minister Vladimír Mečiar played a decisive and dominant role. Within this regime some important political freedoms were threatened and violated (freedom of speech, right to privacy, minority rights), on the other hand, it was not so autocratic as Milosevic’s regime in Serbia or Lukashenko’s regime in Belarus at that time (Kopeček 2006: 190–197).

Relations between the two new states were complicated because of several unsettled issues (among others why the Czech Republic continued to use the former federal flag). The most tension was caused by several border disputes. The delimitation of the border between two villages – Sidonia and U Sabotů – led to long term negotiations. The situation was solved by treaty in 1997. In the meantime several local small clashes and neighbourhood hassles were reported in these villages, however, serious violent incidents did not occur (Mareš 2005: 212–213).

During the final phase of “Meciarism”, the activities of the Slovak Information Service (Slovenská informačná služba, SIS), the intelligence service, became increasingly problematic. The Slovak regime was isolated due to allegations from the Western European politicians that it harboured non-democratic tendencies. In contrast to the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary, Slovakia was not invited to the first wave of NATO enlargement and negotiation with the European Union were stalled. The SIS started two operations against the Czech Republic. The first was called “Neutron” and aimed to supporting anti-NATO attitudes
within the Czech public. The second was called “Dežo” (it is a typical Gypsy name) designed to bolster racist groupings and attitudes in the Czech Republic, with the goal of discrediting the Czech Republic in the eyes of Western states as a “racist state”. Both operations were stopped after the fall of Meciar’s regime following the elections 1998 (Williams, Deletant 1991: 146).

Meciar governed in coalition with the SNS. This former separatist party occupied the extreme right part of the political spectrum in the new party system. In addition there existed some small neo-fascist groupings (Milza 2004: 424–425). The glorification of Slovak war president Tiso was tolerated by Meciar’s regime. On the other hand, Slovak democratic political traditions were respected in the education system. Also in the Czech Republic the right-wing extremist SPR–RSČ was represented in parliament in the years 1992–1998, although it remained permanently excluded from power (Mazel 1998: 247–255).

Militant right-wing extremists from the Czech Republic and Slovakia for the most part enjoyed friendly relations. In 1992 the National Socialist Movement of Europe (Národnosocialistické hnutie Európy, NSHE) was founded in the Slovak town of Kosice. In 1993, it also established a small branch in the Czech Republic in 1993 (Mareš 2003: 468). The exception from these friendly relations is the concert of the Slovak white power music band Memorandum in the town Senica in May 1994. The band changed the lyrics of one of its songs: the traditional version of the lyrics included a part where Gypsies, Jews and Hungarians were “transported to the gas chambers”; in the new version of the lyrics the Czech were added. Unsurprisingly a mass fight broke out between Czech and Slovak Nazi-skinheads (Mazel 1998: 252–253).

11. Coexistence in NATO and the EU

Since 1998 official relations between both the Czech Republic and Slovakia can be characterized as being close and friendly. Both countries are members of NATO and the European Union and they also co-operate within the framework of the regional Visegrad Group. Their mutual support was demonstrated among others during the “gas crisis” of 2009 (after the disputes between Russia and Ukraine) (Tůma, Janošec, Procházka 2009: 110).

Slovak nationalism was not focused against the Czechs, despite negative evaluations of several aspects of their common history. Co-operation between right-wing extremists from both countries developed, among others during anti-Roma riots in 2008–2009. In 2014 the organisation Moravian Recruits (Moravští branči, MB) was established in Brno as a branch of the Slovak paramilitary group Slovak recruits (Slovenský branči, SB) (Mareš 2014).
In 2007 an incident complicated relations between the Czech National Party (Národní strana, NS) and the youth wing of the Slovak National Party. Representatives of the NS met with representatives of Hungarian Jobbik party in the Slovak capital Bratislava. It was understood as a provocation from the point of view of Slovak nationalists, because Hungarian nationalists propagated irredentist demands on Slovak territory (Smolík 2013: 192–193). The Slovak right-wing extremist organisation Slovakian National Unity (Slovenská národná jednota, SNJ) tried to establish its own branch among the Slovak minority in the Czech Republic, however, without long-term success (Mareš 2008: 248).

Slovak organised crime networks became active in Prague during the first decade of the 21st century. Their membership included some persons who had been at the interface between organised crime and politics from the era of “Meciarism” (Murín 1997). However, this issue such criminals were interested in money as opposed to politics. In 2009 a Slovak citizen Jozef Bódi, was sentenced in the Czech Republic for possession of explosives and the case led to speculation about a possible “secret service” background, but such suspicions were never confirmed (Městský soud v Brně 2009: 19).

In the second decade of the 21st century a process began which can be characterized as the “Slovakization” of Czech politics. Politicians of Slovak nationality occupied important positions in the Czech governmental sphere. The Slovak citizen Gustáv Slamečka became Minister of Transport in 2009. A Slovak multimillionaire with Czech citizenship Andrej Babiš founded the political movement ANO 2011 and this movement was placed second in the parliamentary elections 2013. Andrej Babiš was appointed minister of finance in 2014. The leader of the ANO in Prague municipal elections in 2014 was Adriana Krnáčová, former director of the Czech section of Transparency International. She is also of Slovak nationality and she received Czech citizenship only several months before these elections. Despite this she won the elections in the capital of the Czech Republic (Kyselová 2014).

In contrast to the tensions of the 1990s we can mention a fact which seems to be marginal, however, maybe it can represents a new trend. In autumn 2014 a group named the Czechoslovak federal committee (Československý federální výbor, ČFV) was established and its members marched in former Czechoslovak military uniforms in Brno. They spread leaflets with demands to reunify Czechoslovakia (Československý federální výbor 2014). They have members in the Czech Republic and in Slovakia. However, their call met with little public response in either state.
Conclusion

The radicalisation of Slovak politics after the fall of communism had deep historical roots. Nationalist ideas had been frozen during the communist era (with the exception of the second half of the 1960s), when proletarian internationalism was propagated. Czech national feelings were interconnected with Czechoslovak identity, but Slovak national identity was autonomous. This Czecho-Slovakism on the one hand and Slovak national identity on the other caused Czech – Slovak tensions. The historical legacy of the Slovak state of 1939–1945 was used in order to delegitimise many non-problematic Slovak demands.

The clerical-fascist legacy of Tiso’s regime was propagated by some Slovak exile groups and after 1989 it was represented by several groupings in Slovakia. Many of them were marginal organisations. However, the SNS incorporated some very radical elements within its ambit, which in turn brought about very negative reactions on the Czech side.

Some small scale violent incidents harmed Czech – Slovak relations in 1990–1992. It is important to mention that in contrast to the horrible events in former Yugoslavia, Transnistria or Caucasus at that time, the Czecho-Slovak conflict was non-violent. However, tendencies to more serious violence were visible. In this context the dissolution of Czechoslovakia can be understood also as a preventive de-radicalisation measure at the macro-level of politics.

It was a difficult responsibility of politicians on both sides to divide a state where the majority of population supported its future existence. The resistance of pro-federal forces was non-violent and this fact supported the peaceful dissolution. As the development in the first years after the dissolution shows, the existence of the common state with “Meciarism” in Slovakia and the relatively strong position of the extreme right in both republics seems to have been dangerous from the point of view of possible radicalisation. There is some speculation that after several years Czech – Slovak relations within the common state could have been “normalized”, but the risk of violence and other problems makes such speculation unlikely.

Contemporary relations between the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic are very friendly and both states co-operate in many ways. The success of Slovak politicians in the Czech Republic shows that there are no prejudices against former federal partners. The radicalisation of Slovak politics at the beginning of the 1990s had no long term impact. The counter-trend – to reunify Czecho-slovakia – is demanded by a marginal part of the political spectrum, but it seems to be unrealistic.
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Andrzej Wierzbicki

The ‘New Russian Nationalism’
as a Challenge to Modernization in Russia

1. Introduction

Modernisation is usually understood as a process leading to the creation of a modern state, society and economy. For the admirers of modernization, this process is appreciated as a preferred value while for opponents the preference is for the maintenance of tradition. In the process of state or nation-building, modernization is understood as the creation of a political community based on citizenship and common values.

One of the key components of Russian modernization and consolidation is the idea of the Russian political nation (rossiiskii narod) connected with the belief in the unique nature of Russian civilization (rossiiskost). The core of Russian civilization is the Russian (Russkie) ethnic nation (Putin 2012). This idea of the Russian ethno-nationalism is presented as an alternative to the political nation that paradoxically does not need to be a barrier to modernization. The political platforms of various organisations, which we can call ‘new Russian nationalism’, are internally contradictory but have strong modernizing potential. The ‘New Russian nationalists’ try to reconcile traditional Russian values with the organisation of a modern state and economy. On the one hand, they want to build the Russian nation as an ethno-cultural rather than a political community. Therefore, both concepts of nation are based on common culture. However, for ethno-nationalists it signifies cultural assimilation more than political socialization. On the other hand, the ‘new Russian nationalists’ propose the transformation of Russia into a strong, modern state with a competitive economy and a civil society.

The terms of ‘new Russian nationalism’, which concern some political organisations, differ from those employed by traditional Russian nationalists. It is ‘new nationalism’ because unlike the ‘old’, it is not, first of all, strongly anti-Western and,

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1 “Self-determination of Russian peoples as a multi-ethnic civilization with a Russian cultural core” (Putin 2012).
secondly, it is not strongly anti-democratic. The ‘new nationalists’ do not agree with the political system in Putin’s Russia but – in comparison with the ‘old’ nationalism – they are more democratically oriented. Their recipe for building a more Russian state in the ethno-cultural sense is to promote democracy and civil society. The ‘new Russian nationalism’ supported the Ukrainian “Maidan” movement as an idea and a means of overthrowing an authoritarian and “anti-national” power. Within the ethno-nationalist movement there are various sub-divisions apparent: (1) adherents of a “pure ethnic state” model, who agree with the separation of ethnically non-Russian territories from the Russian Federation even at the price of isolation; (2) “separatists”, who wish to establish the Russian people as the titular nation of Russia with the Russian republic as a new subject of the Russian Federation and; (3) adherents of the “status quo”, who are in the majority and who wish to preserve the present territory of Russia, under the assumption that non-Russians remain effectively subordinate to the Russian state. Partisans of this option also demand pre-eminence of the Russian language and Orthodox Church, and liquidation of the federal structure.

Support for “Maidan” does not exclude acceptance of present Russian policy towards Ukraine. The borders of a ‘new Russian national state’ are unknown but undoubtedly the ‘new Russian nationalists’ support the idea of unifying the Russian people not by migration of Russians from abroad but by expanding the borders of the Russian state. In order to elaborate my argument, I shall examine the programme of the Ethnopolitical Union “Russkie”, because in my judgment the programme of this movement is the most complete and representative for the ‘new Russian nationalism’.

2. The Russian Nationalism at the Beginning of the 21st Century

Russia has long been the home of many nations and its ruling elite has largely been multi-ethnic. The conditions of nation-state building in Russia influenced the perception of the nation as an ethno-cultural community, a belief that was reinforced by Soviet science and political practice. Nowadays, ethnicity remains one of the most important social categories in Russia, where – according to the 2002 census – there are 193 nations, and where Slavs (mainly Russians) and Christians (mainly Orthodox) dominate.

Nationalism has dominated political processes in contemporary Russia. Its different orientations can be divided into four categories creating “concentric circles”, as proposed by Marlene Laruelle (Laruelle 2008b). The first is that of the power elite: the president of the Russian Federation, his advisers, administration and the United Russia Party. The second comprises parliamentary parties
that play the “nationalist card”, such as the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, the Liberal-Democratic Party and the historical alliance “Rodina”. The third circle is constituted by non-parliamentary organisations (Russkoe Natsional'noe Edinstvo), and the fourth is made up of various informal radical movements (skinheads, Nazis, etc.). We can add to these circles a fifth composed of intellectuals, researchers, politicians and the Russian Orthodox Church. The third and fourth groups are the focus of our Before we analyse these two rings of the ‘new Russian nationalism’, we must first define the Russian nationalism in broad terms.

The ethnic identity of contemporary Russians is defined by the term russkost, understood as a feeling of belonging to the Russian nation and civilization, adherence to specific cultural standards and self-identification as Russkie. In other words, russkost is based on the Orthodox confession, the memory of the Russia's greatness, Russian language and culture, love of the Russian motherland and the bond between Russians in the area of the “Russian world”, including not only citizens of the Russian Federation, but also Russians in the “near abroad”.

At the beginning of the 21st century, the spontaneous ethnicization process of the russkost (etnizatsia russkosti) began, which happened to coincide with Vladimir Putin's presidency. The mobilization of ethnic Russian identity, as a reaction to Russia's loss of status, compensated for the weakness of the state. However, this process is not the cause of the ethnicization of the state, which may be understood to be imperative in order to secure the hegemony of the ethnic Russian majority. On the contrary, the radicalization of the ideology and programmes of Russian nationalist organisations has reflected this development. All the so-called traditional nationalist organisations have common features irrespective of specific differences between them, of which the primary one is the prioritisation of ethnic Russians as the state-creating nation of Russia and the core of the Russian state.

However, this feature is independent of the division of the Russian nationalism into discrete imperial state orientation, and a broad ethno-nationalistic cultural orientation. This division is the main problem of the Russian ethnic nation. The first orientation is that of the “Empire Savers”, and the second is of the “Nation Builders”, or “All-Russians”. The identification of the modern state with the empire is understandable as Russia has only been a nation-state since 1991. The Russian Empire was precisely what its name suggests, based upon the dominance of the Russian ethnicity and its key features – language, culture and the Orthodox Church.

The second feature of Russian nationalism is acceptance of non-democratic political regimes with authoritarian, monarchic, or aristocratic-oligarchic characteristics concealed beneath a superficially democratic regime. According
to the nationalist thesis the nation is “organic” and “indivisible”. From the nationalist point of view, internal national divisions are unnatural and undesirable. Therefore, liberal-democratic values and political pluralism are to have a specifically Russian character, which means they must be subordinated to the interests of the whole nation.

The third feature is a critique of federalism as a territorial-political system in Russia. It is argued that federalism undermines the status of the Russian people and the territorial integrity of the Russian state. For Andrei Savel’ev from Velikaia Rossia (Great Russia), ethnic federalism is based on an historical misunderstanding originating from Lenin (Savel’ev 2007). In Savel’ev’s view federalism is an alien doctrine undermining the existence of the state.

The fourth feature is the intellectual and psycho-emotional relationship with the West. At the heart of this relation is the opposition between the core the ideology of russkost’ and Western values. From this point of view, traditional Russian nationalism has always been Western-centric and the West was a starting point for analysing Russian values. However, anti-Western orientations have a long tradition in Russia. While at present the West is considered: (1) a carrier of definite values, institutions and cultural norms; (2) a reference point in respect of living conditions; (3) a technological leader; (4) an ally and partner that is alternately both trustworthy or fallible; (5) an adversary and source of danger; and (6) a centre of cultural expansion (Malinova 2008), the dominant nationalist orientation maintains that the West is alien, hostile and threatening to Russian identity.

The fifth feature of Russian nationalism is its attitude towards religion. For nationalist organisations, the basis of Russian national identity is the Russian Orthodox Church. For Eurasianists, both the Orthodox Church and Islam participated in the process of Russian state-building. However, not all Russian nationalists accept the dominance of the Orthodox Church in the Russian national tradition. They argue that Christianity has a universal, and not an ethnic character, and that it is not a “Russian” religion emanating from Byzantium. Secondly, historic and teleological connections with Judaism are not acceptable to some groups of anti-Semitic nationalists. Some nationalistic movements refer back to pre-Christian Slavic religions as a cultural marker (Laruelle 2008a), and many are oriented towards syncretic pagan belief systems.

Russian nationalism has had a clear influence on the Russian power elite. The President of the Russian Federation, his administration, government and party have adopted elements of the nationalistic agenda and in so doing their aim has been to marginalize and exclude particular nationalist groups from the political process.
3. Russian Political Nationalism

According to liberal-democratic approaches, a political nation grounded in the common unified culture helps not only to preserve, but even to develop, ethnic identities. In short, fully functional liberal democracies seek to facilitate preservation of minority cultures. The opposite point of view, represented by nationalist organisations, regards civic national ideals as a threat to ethnic identity. With regard to Russia and its multi-ethnic population, as far as Russian nationalists are concerned, Russian civilization should form the national base and become the main reference for all its citizens irrespective of their ethnic identities (rossiiskii narod). This community therefore becomes the basis of the Russian nation-state (rossijskovo naroda) and all citizens are to become Russian in the political sense.

The realization of these objectives in turn demands the transformation of the idea of the nation in Russia. Contemporary Russian understandings of nation result from past Soviet experience. In the USSR, the nation was a synonym of ethnos (Stalin 1949). The scholar Valerij Tishkov, head of the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology of the Russian Academy of Sciences, and main adherent of Russian political nation idea (rossiskaia natsia) insists that the nation ought to be understood as a civic community (Tishkov 2013). In his opinion the multi-ethnic Russian nation has been already formed though not all recognise this fact:

There is a real unity despite the ethno-cultural differences among the Russian people (Rossiian), however there is no imagination of one nation, its national interests and culture (Tishkov 2013).

Rossiiskost’ as an identity and rossiiskii narod-natsia are not the result of an internal unification but of a clash between ethno-culturally different population groups. Nevertheless, rossiiskii narod is the fact (Wierzbicki 2011: 35).²

For Tishkov, civic nationalism is made up of values, laws, and political and cultural symbols formed by an imagined community that develops a collective vision of its national state and the wider population as a nation (Tishkov 2013: 308).

² Two terms are used in the Russian language – narod (people) and natsia (nation). They are used as synonyms in many cases but there are differences between them. Narod means the population of the country and in the constitutional sense of having supreme national sovereignty. Sometimes narod is used as a synonym of ethnos. Natsia is more connected with the state organisations of national community understood as a state and territorial community. In the Russian tradition, natsia is also understood as an ethnic community and means both ethnic communities (ethnic nations) and state communities based on citizenship (Wierzbicki 2011: 35).
Tishkov’s approach can be called liberal-democratic, because it depends on the civic consciousness, and individual political and civil rights. He emphasises that this concept can be realised not only in liberal-democratic countries but even in “sovereign democracies” such as Russia, or indeed in other systems\(^3\).

The formation and consolidation of the *rossiskii narod* as a civic community is the most important aim of ethnopolitical activists in contemporary Russia. They seek the consolidation of a multi-ethnic population within a federal state that in turn consists of national entities. In Russian conditions, ethnopolitics is thereby connected with geopolitics. *Rossiiskii narod* or *rossiskaia natsia* are terms often used by Russian politicians, especially by President Vladimir Putin:

> We are a multi-ethnic society, but we are one nation. It is necessary for our strategy of ethnopolitics to be based on civic patriotism. No man living in our country should forget his faith and ethnicity, but above all he should be a citizen of Russia and be proud of it. Nobody has the right to place ethnic or religious interests above the state law. Equally the law should take into consideration national and religious differences (Putin 2012).

In December 2012, he said to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation: “For the whole world (…) we have always been and remain one nation” (Putin 2012)\(^4\).

In case of the *rossiskaia natsia*, one of the most important problems of the nation-building process is the status of the Russian nation (*russkaia natsia*). It is beyond doubt that only the Russian people, Russian culture and language should be the core of the *rossiskaia natsia*. The ethnic Russian core of the Russian political community is increasingly popular in the speeches of President Putin and in official documents such as the state Ethnopolitical *Strategy of the state nationalities policy of Russian Federation until 2025*.

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\(^3\) Valerij Tishkov writes: “In modern Turkey or China there is no more freedom than in Russia but existence of the Turkish or Chinese political nation it is not undermined. We have spoken about these nations with reference to the time when Turkey was the Ottoman Empire and China an empire and a colonial estate at the same time” (Tishkov 2013: 105). The opinion of Liah Greenfield is helpful for justifying the concept of *rossiskii narod*. She writes that during reign of Peter I, there emerged in the Russian population a feeling of responsibility for the motherland and the national pride, though it was not citizenship in the modern sense (Greenfield 2008: 190, 217).

\(^4\) The official document of the ethnopolitics in Russia is the Strategy of state national policy of the Russian Federation up to 2025.
4. 'New Russian Nationalism'

'New Russian nationalism' is a part of nationalist project of modernization. The key problem of all Russian nationalist movements is the understanding of the Russian nation (*Russkie*). Russian nationalists understand the Russian nation in two ways. The first is the civilizational approach, where the Russian nation is defined “according to the principle that all people for whom Russian traditions values are important”. The Russian nation is seen as the base of Russian civilization. For instance, we read in the programme of the nationalist Great Russia Party: “Russian people transformed their *russkost* into something more than only *russkost*. It is not possible to be born a Russian” (Kobiiakov, Aver’ianov 2008: 40–41).

The second meaning of the term “Russian nation” among Russian nationalists is primordial, even biological. From a methodological point view, we have to differentiate between ethnic and cultural nationalism, although in principle ethnicity is identified with the culture. Common origin and kinship, which are very important for ethno-nationalists, are understood now as a traditional-cultural kinship. Their basis is a cultural, and not a biological bond. In this way there are two meanings of ethno-nationalism: ‘narrow’ and ‘broad’. Some nationalists regard alleged origins from a common ancestor (ancestors) as the basis of nation, from which its members create “wider groups of kinship with ‘blood bonds’”. Such a national community is exclusive and ‘entry’ is possible almost only by birth (excluding mixed couples). This is in fact a racial approach. The Russian social researcher and nationalist activist Alexander Sevastânov and nationalist publicist Vladimir Avdeev define ethnos as a “biological community connected by common origin and biogenetics, and interdependent with race as a species (...)” (Heywood 2008: 177–178).

As Russian historian Valerij Solovej states, “there should be so much Russian blood in a man that the whole of society treats him as a Russian (*Russkie*)” (Avdeev, Sevast’ianov 2008: 119). Such an understanding of the nation excludes assimilation and integration. It has a primordial, exclusive character and promotes ethnopolitical radicalization and confrontation instead of the creation of a national community, and it has a discriminatory and anti-democratic character. It is neither socially progressive, nor modernizing, and it would have negative consequences for the Russian state and nation. It is characteristic for ethno-nationalists to root in Russia a spirit of multi-nationality that paradoxically threatens all real achievements of Russian nation in the history of humanity. Great Russian culture was created in multinational Russia by representatives of all nations. Russian culture is alloy of interaction all cultures our multinational country (Tsipko 2012).
To oppose Russian and non-Russians is incorrect, because in fact there are no typical Russians [Russkie]. They exist only in the old meaning typical to the period before the October Revolution that underlines the community of Great Russians [Velikorusov], Ukrainians [Malorusov], and Belorussians (Tsipko 2012).

Understanding the nation as an ethno-cultural, even biological, category is typical for the ‘new Russian nationalism’. The ‘new nationalism’ movement is not a monolith but its various parts have common ideas. We have to define it as a national democratic movement. Its political platform is characterized by dualism. The ‘new nationalistic’ organisations try to combine a radical concept of the nation with liberal-democratic values.

On the one hand, they accept the biogenetic (radical primordial) concept of nation as a community based on blood relations, so in the programme of the Russian Social Movement, the nation is defined as a socio-biological community “created as a result of cohabitation and reproduction” (Politcheskaia Platforma Russkogo Obshchestvennogo Dvizheniia 2013). Language, culture and traditions have, according to the authors of the programme, a secondary character as result of common activity. However, a more ‘biological’ nation is defined in the programme of the Ethnopolitical Union “Russkie”:

Russians are a nation with genetically inherited psycho-physiological characteristics, national identity and unique culture. Russians represent the pheno- and genotype of the White Race. Russian culture is a part of Indo-European culture. (…) A person who has at least one ethnic Russian parent can be a Russian (Russkaia Rossiia 2013).

Children born into marriages between Russians with representatives of non-European nations could be identified as Russians in special cases on the strength of a special commission’s report (Russkaia Rossiia 2013)\(^5\).

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\(^5\) The leader of the Ethnopolitical Union “Russkie” explained that Russian nationalists do not support the slogan “Russia for the Russians”, because it has to be qualified in so many ways that it is useless as a mobilizing tool and dangerous if is applied in a narrow sense. “From the point of view of Russian nationalists (…) this slogan is incorrect because even for us there are an enormous number of qualifications. We begin with the fact that even the Russian nation includes Russians, Ukrainians and Belorussians”. Moreover, Russians nationalists have “always spoken out on behalf of and reflected the interests of the indigenous peoples of Russia who have taken part in the construction, defence and strengthening of Russia and who do not have their own national formations beyond its borders. These are the Mordvins, Komis, Tatars and the like” (Window on Eurasia 2013).
On the other hand, the ‘new Russian nationalists’ accept the concept of a democratic nation-state as in European countries.

We want to build a classical, democratic European state because almost all national states sooner or later choose a democratic form of government and all forms of non-democratic government are dangerous (…) (Politcheskaia Platforma Russkogo Obschestvennogo Dvizheniia 2013).

In their opinion, Russians (Russkie) are discriminated against while the government protects other nations, so the ‘new’ state should be a Russian (Russkoe) national-state. According to the Party of National Majority “New Power”, “Russia should be a republic with a presidential system, bicameral parliament, with elected organs of regional power” (Programma Novaya Sila 2013).

5. Ethnopolitical Union “Russkie” – Prospects for Modernization

5.1. The Russian Nation

According to this organisation’s platform, Russians, defined as a genetic community and an ethnic majority, should be acknowledged as a state-building titular nation within a mono-national (mono-ethnic) state of the Russian nation (russkovo naroda). In such a scenario their rights and interests will be on a par with other ethnic groups even though until today Russian people have, in their opinion, been discriminated against. They argue that even in the Russian Empire before the October Revolution, Russians did not have equal status. In their opinion, the Bolshevik (Communist) party pursued an anti-Russian Ethnopolitical strategy. Indeed, the programme of the Ethnopolitical Union “Russkie” is radically anti-Soviet and rooted in the Tsarist epoch. For them, the new Russia created after hundreds of years of struggle by the Russian people for emancipation should be a unitary state rooted in Kiev Rus.

For partisans of this stance, political and socio-economic changes in Russia are impossible without an ‘ending’ of Soviet times, which have continued up to now. As the entry condition for reforms, “Russkie” wants to settle with communism and demands that the Soviet political organisms (USSR, RFSSR) and the Russian Federation to be acknowledged as anti-national (Russkaia Rossiia 2013).

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6 The Ethnopolitical Union “Russkie” maintains that in the Soviet Union a genocide of the Russian people was realized with a continuation as ethnocide in the Russian Federation.
5.2. State and Power

The Ethnopolitical Union “Russkie” would like to build a strong, modern state based on democratic values with a national specification. The Russian people, as a dominant ethnic majority would express their will through elections and referenda, in which other ethnic groups would participate. Non-Russian peoples of indigenous origin⁷ would be proportionally represented at all levels of power. This would seem to be yet another contradiction in their programme but that is not the case. If Russia is defined as an ethnocratic national-state, it does not mean that non-Russians are automatically barred from participation in power structures. If we take into consideration the ethnic structure of the population⁸, non-Russians could take more than 20 percent of seats in parliament, government and central and local administration. The state’s Russian character would be guaranteed by the head of state – a “Supreme Ruler” belonging to the Russian nation and elected by all citizens. One of the main roles of the “Supreme Ruler” would be the protection of the rights and interests of the Russian people.

Although the Ethnopolitical Union is radically anti-Soviet in orientation, the vision of the construction of its power structure is quite similar to the Soviet system of councils. As in the Soviet Union up until 1936, parliament was elected indirectly by the representative organs of regional entities and by deputies of local government institutions.

The programme of the Union is focused on fighting corruption and the reduction of bureaucracy. Russian ethno-nationalists want not only to fight the existing problem but also look for ways of preventing it from re-occurring. These include law-enforcement and state budget transparency. State officials and their family members would be prohibited from involvement in business activity.

5.3. Civil Society

The constitution of the state should guarantee civil rights and free participation in politics. These rights include freedom of information, freedom of assembly and association, the right to take part in government and equal access to state administration and universal suffrage etc. One of the most important rights from the point of view democratic principles and civil society is electoral transparency. The current Russian authorities are accused of organising non-transparent elections.

⁷ Indigenous people – non-Russian peoples and traditionally living in Russia over a long period of time (not immigrants).
⁸ According to the last census, in 2010, 77.7 percent of the population declared Russian ethnicity (Russian Census Population 2010).
The local administration supports the ruling party *Edinaya Rossiia* candidates while discriminating against all others, including nationalist organisations.

Social control and self-government are crucial elements making up the democratization process in Russia. The “Russkie” Union focuses on forms of direct democracy such as referenda in territorial communities or on other forms of direct democracy rooted in the Russian tradition (plebiscites, mass meetings and *shod*). Before the October Revolution, the *shod* was a form of self-government in Russian rural communities, or *obshchiny*. Thus traditional Russian political practice did not exclude all forms of democracy. In today’s Russia, re-introduction of the *shod* would supposedly confirm the Russian character of the state and the specifics of democracy⁹.

According to the “Russkie” Union, local referenda as a real tool of people’s sovereignty could be organised for solving vital problems at the local level. Additionally, the community should be able to veto local government decisions. Territorial communities should have the right to remove local government deputies and court judges and issue a vote of no confidence on executive chairmen. Organs of state power would organise meetings with structures of civil society and social organisations on the strength of legislation as a consultation form for political decisions while handling projects of law concerning of socio-political and socio-economic problems.

Voluntary assemblies of indigenous peoples would be organised to take into consideration a needs. of the multinational population. These assemblies would work as a consultation office in parliament in conjunction with the appropriate parliamentary committee.

### 5.4. Economic Modernization

Interestingly enough, the economic programme of the Ethnopolitical Union “Russkie” is not different from the official programme of the Russian government as far as its opposition to Western economic sanctions against the Russian Federation caused by the Ukrainian crisis is concerned.

One of the most important problems for all Russian nationalistic organisations is the privatization process in the 1990s. Union “Russkie” wants to change the results of this privatization whatever the actual assessment of this process.

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⁹ The *shod* was a meeting of adult men representing farms – members of the community (*obshchiny*), which decided about their important problems. The *shod* were organised almost every Sunday or holiday when village people did not work. In extreme situations they could be organised in week days. If it there were no adult males, the family was represented by a woman.
may be, which is a typical approach for almost all Russian nationalist organisations, both ‘traditional’ and ‘new’.

The “new economic model” of the Union “Russkie” is a part of the security strategy of the movement. I think it could be divided into the following sections. The most important aims of economic policy should be the fight against unemployment, social aid for deprived groups, reducing inflation, the development of small business, especially among indigenous Russians, and the limitation of foreign competition. Secondly, it advocates protectionism and import substitution by national production above all, in the fields of agricultural technology and production. The programme of the Union “Russkie” published a few years ago points out that the scale of Russian dependency on the import of these products has been very high. The proposal of the union has emerged as far-sighted and has taken into account the need for an enforced modernization of the Russian economy. Unlike the current authorities, the union accepts the transition from resource to product export is a necessity though it does accept a state monopoly of resource export. In their opinion, this transition will create jobs and budget revenue.

6. The ‘New Russian Nationalism’ and Internal Colonialism

The problem from a political and research point of view is how to find a role for the ‘new nationalism’ in the modernization of Russia because its various platforms include inconsistent ideas. Above all, all modernization projects must confront the heritage of internal colonialism. The key problem of Russian modernization from the Ethnopolitical point of view is the confrontation between Russian nationalism and that of other nations in Russia. The argument that centre develops at the expense of the periphery is baseless. The slogan “enough to feed Caucasus” is more and more popular among Russian nationalists (Wierzbicki 2013: 79). National republics in the Northern Caucasus (Ingushetia, Chechnya, Dagestan, Kabardo-Balkaria, Karachayo-Cherkiesia, Northern Ossetia and Adygeya) are in fact financed by the federal budget. Federal budget grants account for at least more than half of these republics’ budgets (Wierzbicki 2011: 218–219; Słowikowski 2012: 245–249).

In the context of modernization, the mutual perception of Russians and the peoples of the Caucasus, mutually negative stereotyping is at the basis of their dislike and even hostility towards one another. As such it is a very important

10 “It is necessary to build a technological bond, to be ready for possible transition into economic self-sufficiency in case of aggressive action of other countries against our state” (Russkaia Rossiiia 2013).
problem. Russians and the inhabitants of Northern Caucasus perceive each other as “peoples of lower category”, which in turn disrupts the process of national and social integration and transformation of all Russian citizens into a consolidated political and cultural community. Russians call people from the Caucasus “persons of Caucasus origin”. Meanwhile, it is worth considering the perception of Russians in the eyes of the people of the Caucasus.

From the point of view of the inhabitants of the Caucasus, Russians do not belong to the system of tribe-clans relations and are treated as people of lower category with Russia as an area of criminal activity free from traditional norms and limits in force in the national republics (Osobennosti kavkaskogo mentaliteta i “novaia Rossia” 2011). This means that relations with these “strange” people can be unregulated and they may be killed, enslaved, robbed and cheated if this is required by tribe-clan interest. Skilful usages of high-level corruption by the Russian police and courts by immigrants from the Caucasus and other regions of the Russian Federation compete with one another for attention in Russian society. This situation undermines the prestige of the Russian police and judiciary and confirms the opinion about the connection of corrupt power elites with organised crime in the Caucasus.

With regard to relations with the (peoples of the) Northern Caucasus as mentioned above, Union “Russkie” proposes the transformation of territories inhabited by Russians into either national districts or their isolation from national republics by transforming them into Krasnodarskii or Stavropolskii Krai – administrative, non-national entities of the Russian Federation. The Ethnopolitical Union “Russkie” has an anti-immigrant orientation. A significant part of internal migration in Russia originates from the Northern Caucasus. Russian antagonism towards the Northern-Caucasians is a consequence of the war in Chechnya, terrorist attacks in the cities of central Russia, especially Moscow, and behaviour of people

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11 A German writer, who observed immigrants from the Caucasus wrote: „The fear of Russian people towards immigrants from Caucasus has real roots. During perestroika, many criminal groups from the Caucasus terrorized Russia and its citizens, behaving as if they were at home far from their motherland. Even on the street or in the queues they used fists and treated their victims very brutally. Many Russians personally experienced their rudeness and aggression. Consequently, they oriented their hatred against all inhabitants of the Caucasus“ (Reitschuster 2005: 66–74, 75).

12 This concerns above all the Dubrovka Theater and attacks on the Moscow underground.
from the Caucasus in general. Taking into consideration the ethno-cultural specifics of the region and the deepening civilization distance from the rest of Russia, the Northern Caucasus has been termed as “internal foreign countries”. This, as suggests Michał Słowikowski, reveals the real socio-cultural distancing of the region from Russia (Słowikowski 2012: 234).

The Caucasian policy proposed by the Ethnopolitical Union “Russkie” differs from the official position. Keeping the Northern Caucasus in the Russian Federation is a main aim of official Russian ethnopolitics. This is not based on a need to internally integrate society and create the Russian political nation (rossiskaia natsia). The priority of Russian policy is geopolitics even if it means high budget expenses. President Putin said:

When they begin to shout “enough to feed Caucasus” – wait, tomorrow they will shout “enough to feed Siberia, the Far East, the Urals, Povolzhe Region or Podmoskovie Region”… These are the conditions that caused the fall of the Soviet Union (Putin 2012).

“The economic pull” of the regional elites should ensure their loyalty to federal power. However, the effectiveness of this policy is now in doubt.

The approach of the Ethnopolitical Union “Russkie” to the Northern Caucasus can be defined as ‘non-imperial’ and in opposition to the official approach to the most challenging Ethnopolitical problem in contemporary Russia. The best option, from the point of view Union “Russkie”, would be a referendum on the status of the Northern Caucasus. The citizens of Russia should decide if they want the Northern Caucasian national republics to remain inside the Russian

13 Immigrants from the Northern Caucasus are internal migrants. On the one hand, they have Russian citizenship and a justified right to feel at home in central Russia. The problem is that they bring with them habits and traditions that are alien to central Russia. On the other hand, they refuse to integrate with ethnic Russians and other nations. An example of this problem is an incident from September 2012 in Moscow. Participants of a wedding cortege coming from Dagestan used fired guns in central Moscow in celebration. The chairman of the Russian Congress of Caucasus Nations, Aslambek Paskachev, condemned the incident: “I find it not as a demonstration of national customs and tradition but as a demonstration of lack of culture, a sign of ignorance and neglect for the surrounding environment” (Guliati tak guliati: svadebnyi saliut iz travmatiki v centre Moskvy 2012). Moscow inhabitants and the other Russian people were concerned that such practices would spread throughout Russia.

14 The financial aid from the federal budget for regional socio-economic development is usually syphoned off by the republican elites. Consequently, little money reaches the local level and instead creates the local population’s aversion to the corrupt local authorities loyal to federal centre and promotes nationalistic and separatist tendencies.
Federation. This, they believe, is the best way forward for the federation because it defines what the Russian government should do. If the Russians vote for the *status quo* (the Northern Caucasus inside the Russian Federation), then the government could take action according to the decision. The first stage could be modification of the criminal law and temporary exit visa denial for sentenced persons and family members of terrorists from Chechnya, Ingushetia and Dagestan. The next stage should be a state of emergency or direct presidential government in regions posing a terrorist threat or those where illegal armed organisations operate and the enforcement of internal visas for the inhabitants of the Caucasian republics. In the economic sphere, the Union “Russkie” proposes tighter budget expense verification and fiscal policy towards the Caucasian republics, especially with regard to illegal Caucasian “business”.

### 7. The ‘New Russian Nationalism’ and the Ukrainian Crisis

Some of the ‘new Russian nationalists’ currently support the policies of the Putin regime, which they previously considered “anti-Russian”, while others find themselves siding with the liberal opposition with which they otherwise share little in common. There is emerging concern about the promotion of civil values and democracy, but the ‘new nationalism’ cannot break away from its imperial foundations, and after the annexation of the Crimea all its civil qualities disappeared from view.

Ukraine state is defined by the Union “Russkie” as a “territory named Ukraine for the last 23 years”. This is a typical approach for many Russian nationalists to “Russian national territory” including not only the central region of contemporary Russia (*Velikorossiia*) but also Ukraine and Belarus. It is a result of the above-mentioned definition of the Russian people (Russian nation). The Union “Russkie” support the idea and policy of the “gathering of the Russian people and territory” as a beginning of the creation of the Russian political nation. One of Moscow leaders of the “Russkie”, underlined that such an approach is not support for Putin’s policy but results from Russian national interests (*Russkie natsionalisty za vossoedinenie russkovo naroda* 2014).

### Conclusion

We are not able to predict with any great accuracy the future of the ethnopolitical process in Russia. Prediction is the most challenging task in social science, especially in political science. Recently, we have observed the radicalization the ethnopolitical process in Russia under the influence of external (flow of immigrants and
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geopolitical challenges, for example the Ukrainian crisis, etc.) and internal (migration from the Northern Caucasus, the politicization of ethnicity and religion, separatist tendencies, etc.) factors in nature. We are not able to predict to what extent the programme of the Ethnopolitical Union “Russkie” would be realized after it potentially gains power and if this is at all possible. However, we can affirm that under pressure by the other projects, Russian power will be bound to take a modernization programme into account both in the political and socio-economic spheres. One of the possible ways is the adoption of nationalistic platforms.

The British historian, Geoffrey Hosking, proposed five different scenarios for the development process of state and nation creation in 21st century Russia. The first and least probable is adherence to the Russian imperial tradition. According to that scenario, Russia would reclaim and enforce a multinational empire in northern part of Eurasia, with the borders similar those of the Soviet Union. The second scenario reveals the future Russia as the state of Eastern Slavs – a tight alliance of Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine. The third scenario, which is also not probable, suggests that Russia will be a country with a Russian-speaking population, irrespective of its ethnicity or citizenship. With the Russian population scattered over the whole territory of the former USSR, the possibility for creation of a uniform citizenship not connected with the place of residence could emerge. This scenario would foster the strengthening Russian influence in the countries of the former USSR through the possibility of intervention in defence of Russian citizens. According to the fourth scenario, Russia would exist as the Russian Federation, where rossiiskii narod would be formed on the foundation of citizenship, irrespectively of the ethnicity. In the fifth scenario, Russia will remain a federal state, but with certain privileges for ethnic Russians (Hosking 2003: 408). The last scenario may become the most attractive for Russians themselves. The eventual choice of state-creation process model will depend on many of factors. Theoretically, the creation of civil commonwealth (rossiiskii narod) – may be possible if political processes and economic-social development lead in the direction of the modernization of political and economic structures and the creation of a middle class. However, if the current elites enforce facade and command democracy, and the economic processes follow an undesirable course deepening social and economic differences, conditions will favour increasing ethnicization of Russian identity, with all the resulting consequences. Vladimir Putin’s presidency has shown that the majority of Russian citizens accept the analogy of the Soviet and contemporary Russian power. In reality, we can see the middle solution – somewhere in between the domination of ethnic Russians and attempts to create a political nation. Furthermore, it will increase the political influence of the ‘new Russian nationalism’ representing ethnically mobilized groups of Russian peoples.
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Limitations to the Nationalising State: the Case of Kazakhstan

1. Introduction

The case of Kazakhstan has attracted and perplexed scholars of nationalism since the country's independence from the Soviet Union in 1991 (Buck 2013: 1–2, 7–8). Although a series of studies in the 1990s (Buck 2013: 3) suggested that Kazakhstan would have major problems creating a coherent citizenry from its multi-ethnic population and thus establishing state legitimacy, the country has not fallen apart, and is even often seen as a relative success story in the post-Soviet space.

With a territory five times the size of France, Kazakhstan was the second largest independent polity to emerge from the disintegration of the Soviet Union and remains the world's ninth largest country in terms of area. It extends from western Siberia in the North to the Central Asian Silk Road in the South. It borders China in the East and the Caspian Sea in the West, and a small portion of its land west of the Ural River is situated in eastern-most Europe.

Kazakhstan's vast expanses are inhabited by a population of around only 17 million people who make up an ethnic potpourri of more than one hundred stable ethnic identity categories. These categories are a legacy of Soviet ideology and administrative practice that defined and institutionalised diverse ethnonationalities. Moreover the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic (Kazakh SSR, KSSR) was the only Soviet Republic where the ‘titular’ population was not an ethnic majority. According to the last Soviet census of 1989, less than 40 percent of the Kazakh Republic’s population were ‘titulars’, meaning ethnic Kazakhs. The non-Kazakh Russophone segment, in turn, made up about 50 percent. Ethnic Russians, Ukrainians and Byelorussians together constituted 44 percent. When added to the Kazakh SSR’s ethnic Germans and Poles, the Russophones represented an absolute majority in the Republic and 80 percent in its North and East (Khazanov 1995: 246; Peyrouse 2008: 107).

To clarify the terminology, the term Russophone describes a demographic segment that is not necessarily ethnically Russian, but maintains a lifestyle in which
the Russian language and traits of everyday culture associated with being Russian are dominant. The largest proportion of Kazakhstan’s Russophones is ethnically Russian, followed by ‘Russified’ ethnic Ukrainians, Tatars and Germans; some Kazakhs also fall within this category.

Since independence, many of Kazakhstan’s Russophones have chosen the exit option. Especially during the first decade of Kazakhstani sovereignty, they emigrated from Kazakhstan to what are commonly referred to as their ‘historical homelands’; the majority of them to Russia or Germany. Between 1993 and 1994 alone, when net emigration peaked, Kazakhstan saw a mass exodus of more than half a million of its non-titular citizens. Although emigration has slowed down since, a total of 3.5 million people left the country between 1991 and 2009, causing an officially acknowledged brain drain (Nazarbayev 2008: 12–13; Nyussupova & Rodionova 2011: 81). In spite of this chiefly non-Kazakh mass emigration the non-Kazakh segment still makes up around 37 percent of the total population of Kazakhstan today.

An even higher percentage of Kazakhstan’s population remains linguistically Russified to varying degrees. In the latest Kazakhstani census of 2009 (STAT 2010), 85 percent of all Kazakhstaniis claim proficiency in Russian, and 95 percent say they understand the language. Only 62 percent, mostly ethnic Kazakhs, declare that they are proficient in Kazakh, which has been the official state language since 1989. About 26 percent confess to not knowing any Kazakh at all. Importantly, questions enquiring about preferred language use are avoided in Kazakhstani censuses. In addition, the figure for Kazakh language proficiency is likely to have been inflated due to another crucial Soviet legacy, namely the common understanding among Kazakhstani that one particular language forms the indispensable core of any ethno-nation, and that this language is also almost automatically each ethno-national individual’s ‘mother tongue’. This reality has lately been more carefully examined by Kazakhstani scholars who now “admit that (…) answers about the question of mother tongue [in research interviews or surveys] cannot give the real picture of language knowledge” and instead tell us more about “the level of self-consciousness of the ethnic group” (Bokayev, Zharkynbekova, Nurseitova et al. 2012: 338). To clarify the terminology employed by me throughout this chapter, in accordance with public discourse in Kazakhstan I use the term ‘Kazakhstani’ to refer to the citizenry and institutions of the state of Kazakhstan. ‘Kazakh’, in contrast, signifies ethnic affiliation.

Throughout the 1990s the dominant discourse about Kazakhstan focused on latent ethnic instability, or, as Ingvar Svanberg put it, “the development of hate group behaviour” (1994: 113) within the newly-independent polity. Against the backdrop of the success of Samuel P. Huntington’s 1993 *Clash of Civilizations*?
the country’s two main demographic segments were often seen as representing two immutable ethno-cultural entities, rendering Kazakhstan a candidate for breakup. The Kazakhstani scholar Rustem Kadyrshanow described these two “civilisations” as comprising an ethnic Kazakh-dominated Turkic-Muslim bloc on the one hand, and an ethnic Russian-dominated Slavic-Christian bloc on the other (1996: 14). Differentiated not only by their ‘mother tongues’ (Kazakh versus Russian) and religions (Sunni Islam versus Orthodox Christianity), but also by geography (Kazakhs in the South versus Slavs in the North and East), economic inequalities (rural Kazakhs versus urban Slavs), and by a painful history of Russian ‘colonisation’ of Kazakhs, the two blocks were seen as irreconcilable and Huntington’s criteria seemed over-fulfilled.

Yet despite these expectations, Kazakhstan has become a comparatively stable polity in the post-Soviet space that remains characterised by its multi-ethnic population. This populace has neither turned its homeland into the next “Yugoslavia”, as Western analysts such as Zbigniew Brzezinski (1997: 125) and Eugene Rostow (1993: 16) suggested. Nor has Kazakhstan deteriorated into something “far worse than Yugoslavia”, as the country’s own and still incumbent political elite warned (Olcott 1995: 298; *The Economist* 1992: 79). Although regarded as an unlikely candidate for successful state-building and the preservation of interethnic harmony, Kazakhstan has developed viable political institutions and has not seen any large-scale interethnic clashes in its now nearly twenty-five years of independence.

Stability and successful state-building do not imply, however, that the country has also succeeded in the related challenge of ‘nation-building’ in the sense of instilling a state-framed national identity and a feeling of common destiny based on civic loyalty to the territorial homeland and its institutions, and some
reconciliation or subordination of ethnic affiliations (Brown 1999: 283). In short, the absence of overt ethnic conflict, Walker Connor suggests, does not necessarily entail the existence “of a single national consciousness that is shared by all segments of the population” (1972: 348). The creation of precisely this kind of consciousness, however, has featured prominently on the agenda of Kazakhstan’s authorities who have argued that both the development of a state-framed, overarching feeling of national unity and the effective prevention of interethnic discord associated with this development are prerequisites for state security and, in fact, survival (Strategy 2030 1997: 6).

In the year 2000, on the occasion of the country’s early decennial independence celebrations, Kazakhstan’s President Nursultan Nazarbaev\(^1\) invoked Massimo d’Azeglio’s *bon mot*\(^2\) declaring: “We created Kazakhstan, now the task is to create Kazakhstansis” (Seisenova 2005: 6). In 2002, in an attempt to move on from the oft-deplored post-Soviet ideological vacuum, the Kazakhstani ‘Supreme Scientific-Technological Commission’ defined as one of its key research priorities the “theory and practice of a nationwide idea as the foundation for the stable development of contemporary Kazakhstan” (Chebotarev 2008). In 2008, President Nazarbaev embarked on the last major civic identity project to date when commissioning select academics and the council of his consultative body, the Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan, to draft a ‘doctrine’ of civic national unity. These repeated attempts at giving meaning to ‘Kazakhstani-ness’ reflect the reality that there is still not one clear, officially sanctioned and popularly accepted understanding of what Kazakhstani-ness should be.

The apparent absence of the two key features which I have discussed, overt ethnic conflict and an established understanding of an overarching ‘Kazakhstani’ national identity, is a puzzling observation that forms the starting point of my contribution to this volume (cf. also Buck 2013). Crucially, with these dual absences, the case of Kazakhstan seems to contradict not only the Kazakhstani government, but also the Western literature that considered it important for the newly-fledged state to create one state-framed civic national identity in order to bridge ethnic divisions, stabilise and consolidate the polity, support state-building and prevent disintegration (Holm-Hansen 1999: 156; Kaplan & Herb 1999: 3; Kolstø 1998: 52; Olcott 2002: 51; Svanberg 1994: 122).

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\(^1\) The President’s surname is also transliterated as ‘Nazarbayev’ and ‘Nasarbajew’ in the secondary sources.

\(^2\) “L’Italia è fatta. Restano da fare gli italiani” often colloquially translated as “We have made Italy. Now we must make Italians” is a famous quote from Massimo d’Azeglio’s memoirs, published in 1866. D’Azeglio was an Italian statesman and Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Sardinia from 1849 to 1852.
As the Kazakhstani case challenges the twofold expectations as to why this country should have fallen apart, my contribution examines what has actually happened. It therefore analyses the state’s endeavour to ‘create Kazakhstanis’. This means that I ask what Kazakhstani nation-making has looked like, what it has sought to achieve and where it has failed. This chapter thus has two main foci. First, it examines the politics and policies of official nation-making in Kazakhstan. This focus implies a concentration on elite political actors, in particular government, which is an appropriate choice here as this contribution deals with a highly centralised political system, which is characterised by its president dominating over a power vertical. Second, this chapter pays attention to the limitations of the official programmes of nationalism. Looking for and at these limitations should not mislead us into thinking that Kazakhstan is a cauldron of ethnic conflict. Rather, my focus on Kazakhstani deviations from ideal-type ‘nation-building’ as described by David Brown (1999) and Connor (1972) serves to explore how, regardless of the officially stated desire to make a state-nation, this project is unfinished.

Moreover I suggest that the official programme of nation-making is imperfect and indeed riddled with inconsistencies and contradictions. In particular, I focus on the paradox of a dominant, ethnic-based Kazakh nationalism that wants to erase difference and a more multicultural, civic-based Kazakhstani nationalism that seeks to accommodate difference, but on its own terms, often by co-opting minority elites. Thus, the analysis of the Kazakhstani case is important, because it highlights the constraints and paradoxes of nation-making and demonstrates that states can sometimes be ‘nationalising’ in contradictory ways and seemingly indecisive or undecided. My analysis therefore also suggests that the scholarship on nationalism might have assigned not only too much power to states, but also too much decisiveness and, indeed, decidedness, over what the state hopes to ultimately achieve.

2. Dialectical Nationalising Now and Then

In order to understand this seeming indecision over what kind of nation Kazakhstani authorities hope to build, it is vital to first acknowledge that official national identity-making in Kazakhstan has in many ways remained, as Sally N. Cummings puts it, a Soviet-tinged “dual-track process” (2003: 144). Independent Kazakhstan has for example retained Soviet practices of institutionalising ethno-‘nationalities’ and continues to ascribe both a citizenship and a ‘nationality’ or ‘ethnos’, meaning a definite ethnic affiliation, to each of its citizens. In practice, this means that Kazakhstani censuses count both citizens and their ethno-‘national’ affiliations, and passports state both citizenship and nationality. Despite the fact that there
are legal ways to avoid including this categorisation on a passport, most Kazakh-
stanis continue to display their nationality in this manner. This tradition is rooted
in practices pertaining to Soviet ‘internationalism’.

The Soviet Union succeeded an empire which, according to Lenin, the first
political leader of the USSR, had been characterised by the suppression of non-
-Russian peoples (1939: 124). Having inherited and indeed recaptured these peo-
ple, Lenin sought to change the previous approach to the ‘nationalities question’
and replace the practices of imperialism by ‘internationalism’, which implied
the development of close ties among ‘freed’ peoples. Lenin claimed to thus sat-
isfy the national aspirations of the suppressed. In theory, therefore, the USSR was
founded as a voluntary association of nations, represented in member republics.
Hence, the Soviet Union was the first ever federal state to base the boundaries
of almost all of its political units on ethno-linguistic divisions, later defined as
ethno-national, and thus on what were considered largely pristine, “anthropoge-
ographic” criteria (Farrant 2006: 61).

The process of transforming the former governorates and protectorates
of the Russian Empire into nationally defined Union Republics was labelled
‘national-territorial delimitation’ in Soviet historiography. Starting in 1924, this
‘national delimitation’ reorganised the political boundaries introducing a principle
of social and political identity which was radically new for the majority of Kazakhs.
The new structures drew on the exploratory work of tsarist ethnographers as well as
on Soviet ethnography and ethnology.

The majority of Soviet scholars favoured primordial approaches to the analy-
sis of ethnic identity and ‘ethnogenesis’ and stressed material factors over psycho-
logical ones. The existence of ethnus was, for these scholars, an objective reality,
and both conscious and unconscious forms of ethnic attachment were regarded as
possible and to display high levels of stability. Political borders drawn along ethnic
lines were therefore regarded as particularly durable. While ethnic self-ascription
was recognised as a factor in the formation of ethnic identity, it was largely treated
as a feature in which several ‘objective’ properties of an ethnus were expressed.
Historical changes were acknowledged but, as in classical Marxism, understood
to be evolutionary in nature rather than a response to changing socio-political
conditions.

According to Soviet ideology, nationalities (natsional’nosti), nations (natsii)
and peoples (narody) were distinct subtypes of the ethnus. Their formation was
not inevitable but depended on the development of the given ethnus. In line with
the stages of linear human progress proposed by Marxist-Leninist scholarship, na-
tionalities had to be studied over time. They were, in Marlène Laruelle’s words, un-
derstood as “participants in a process governed by rules and spanning a trajectory
that was common to all and was divided into stages” (2008: 173). Accordingly, the allocation of a ‘national’ Soviet Socialist Republic territory and the ensuing “affirmative action” (Martin 2001) in the form of a state-sponsored national evolution signified that the ethnos in question was officially endorsed. It is precisely this Soviet-approved high socio-political value that has rendered ethno-national identities so durable.

In strictly dialectical terms, the majority of Soviet ethnographers and ethnologists believed that the ethno-cultural ‘flourishing [rassvet]’ of nationality characteristics would go hand in hand with their ‘drawing together [sblizhenie]’, leading eventually to the complete withering away of nationalities after the imposition of Russian language and Soviet culture and the ‘merger [sliyanie]’ of a ‘Soviet people’. This merger would imply a leap forward on the evolutionary timeline towards socialism. However, by the 1930s, the system of ethnic ascription, including the indication of ethnic affiliation on passports since 1932, had become so entrenched that any dissolution of ethno-nationality and the reaching of a next, ‘advanced’ stage was unthinkable (Miller 2008: 61). The timetable for merger was pushed into an indefinite future.

This dialectic or dualism in the understanding of ‘national development’ and the resulting collision of ethnic and civic or statist imperatives still resonates in Kazakhstan today. Kazakh political and educational stakeholders as well as ordinary people frequently argue that they are currently willingly part of a ‘narod Kazakhstana’, a ‘people of Kazakhstan’. But they do not want to consider themselves part of a ‘nation of Kazakhstan’. The creation, or re-creation, of such a state-framed (‘merged’) ‘Kazakhstani nation’, according to them, should only be attempted once the ‘Kazakh nation’ has fully developed (‘flourished’). However, there is usually no clear perspective as to when this development will be completed. Hence, I suggest that key aspects in the apparent contradictions and vagueness inherent in today’s officially-sanctioned narratives of nationalism are undigested leftovers from the Soviet period, leading the incumbent political elite to dualist rhetoric and actions, many of which have been identified in the literature.

As Rogers Brubaker accurately observes, Kazakhstani political leaders

have self-consciously used the language of civic nationhood to present their [state] to domestic and especially international audiences as [a paragon] of civic inclusiveness and tolerance, as [a state] of and for all [its] citizens, rather than as [a state] of and for a single ethnocultural group (2004: 134).

However, this civic project has not been the only national project and ‘narrative’ in independent Kazakhstan. Indeed, “the ideal of a supra-ethnic Kazakhstani
identity”, as Jørn Holm-Hansen puts it, has co-existed “with an idea that all inhabitants should find their ethnic roots and live according to them” (1997: 20). This means that the existence of ethnic distinctions amongst Kazakhstan’s populace has been constantly re-emphasised and effectively re-constructed by the country’s political elites; a process Pål Kolstø describes as a “multiple re-ethnification” (2004: 176) of society.

Kazakhstani nation-building has been characterised by these two seemingly antagonistic projects that both have their roots in the ideology and practices of the Soviet period: a conspicuous celebration of ‘inter-national’, that is interethnic, diversity and, importantly, harmony – and a discourse and legislation that seek to turn all citizens of the country into proud representatives of one people of Kazakhstan. Whether this people is, should or will be a ‘nation’ of Kazakhstan, and whether it does, should or will consist of ‘Kazakhstani’ or ‘Kazakhs’, and what exactly these terminologies entail, is highly controversial. The regime’s vague and under-defined idea has been to craft an officially multi-ethnic, that is multi-ethno-cultural and/or multi-ethno-lingual, Kazakhstani people who acquire a public culture based on a Kazakh ‘core’.

Dualism, controversy and also vagueness are reflected in Kazakhstan’s constitution. It avoids mention of the ‘nation’ altogether and instead resorts to the concept of the ‘people of Kazakhstan [narod Kazakhstana]’. Bhavna Davé and Peter Sinnott perceptively remark that the term is reminiscent of its ideological precursor, the “Soviet people” (2002: 7). Kazakhstan’s constitution thus lays the foundations for a substantial continuation of Soviet conceptualisations and practices and for the adherence to a frame which Edward Schatz calls “internationalism with an ethnic face” (2000: 73). This signifies interethnic ‘friendship’ between distinct nationalities that (will) become the one people of Kazakhstan by assembling and uniting around the Kazakh core. According to the constitution’s preamble, this people of Kazakhstan is:

united by a common historical fate, creating a state on the indigenous Kazakh land, considering [themselves] a peace-loving and civil society, dedicated to the ideals of freedom, equality and concord (Constitution 2007).

In plain terms, this preamble declares that the Kazakhstanis are a civic community who live on lands that belong to the ethnic Kazaks. This implies that the question of whether Kazakhstan is now, once and for all, the country of the ethnic Kazaks, or whether it could have a future as the country of all civic Kazakhstanis, irrespective of ethnicity, is not settled.
A key problem is that along with the ethnic and linguistic makeup outlined above, the Soviet Union bequeathed to independent Kazakhstan a titular-dominat-ed state apparatus and political elite and the popular belief amongst many titulars that of Kazakhstan’s resident nationalities, only the Kazakhs ‘owned’ the Soviet republic-turned-state, in spite of constitutional provisions guaranteeing equality. A common practice of referring to any non-Kazakh ethnic minority as a ‘diaspora’ reflects this ideological heritage. The diaspora tag is applied irrespective of the ‘nationality’s’ relations to any theoretical or actual ‘homeland’ outside Kazakhstan. It connotes a less legitimate claim to a territorial base in Kazakhstan than the label ‘minority’. I argue that this rhetoric symbolically relegates the successfully re-ethnicised non-titulars from the ranks of the ‘core’ and ‘state-forming’ Kazakhs to a subordinate category of Kazakhstani citizens.

Taken together, these conditions have not been expected to contribute to a nation-building process that results in the creation of a ‘civic’ national framework. Scholars have argued that Brubaker’s concept of the “nationalizing state” provides an apt theoretical tool for the analysis of a kind of nation-building and politics of nationalism within which the dominant elites imagine their respective polities as ethnically-defined “nation-states, as the states of and for particular nations” (1996b: 411). The nationalising state implements an elite-led, top-down form of compensatory political action that addresses the allegedly incomplete, imperfect nationhood of the ethnically-defined titulars within their own polity (Brubaker 1996b: 411; Davé 2007: 140 et seq.; Holm-Hansen 1997: 22–23; Kolstø 1996: 129–130).

Davé identifies two distinct forms of ethnic nationalism in contemporary Kazakhstan that are both promoted by the ethno-nationalising ideology and practices as identified by Brubaker (Davé 2007: 168). First, there is an instrumental nationalism that benefits the old-established Kazakh nomenklatura and upwardly mobile ‘New Kazakhs’. Ethno-nationalist mythology justifies a practice that Nozar Alaolmolki calls the “ethnocratization” (2001: 61) of power in the political and administrative apparatuses. Since independence, Soviet-inherited elites have taken care to favour disproportionately, but not exclusively, ethnic Kazakhs in nomination and election processes. These practices do not correspond to official policies, but are no secret either. The Kazakhstani scholar Zharmukhamed Zardykhan describes them as:

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3 Article 14, Paragraph 2 rules out “any discrimination for reasons of origin, social [sic], property status, occupation, sex, race, nationality, language, attitude towards religion” (Constitution 2007).
[favouring] socially, politically and economically the long-suppressed ethnic Kazaks. The measures include promoting the revival and development of the Kazakh language and Kazakh traditional values, encouraging the immigration of ethnic Kazaks from abroad, giving tacit support, at least unofficially, to the emigration of non-Kazakhs, and building a state institutional structure consisting mostly of Kazaks (Zardykhah 2004: 72).

As Kolstø perceptively put it early after independence; “the political clout of the Kazakhs is clearly running ahead of their demographic weight” (1998: 61). While the over-representation of Kazakhs in the political and administrative apparatuses has its roots in Soviet times and the Soviet policies of ‘indigenisation [korenizatsiya]’, it has gathered momentum since President Nazarbaev’s accession to power (Kadyrshanow 1996: 17; Oka 2009: 14; Peyrouse 2007: 485). This ‘Kazakhisation’ of structures means that the face of Kazakhstan’s executive branch of government and legislative bodies is now Kazakh.

Second and more generally, the term ‘Kazakhisation’ also encompasses similar tendencies in the cultural, educational, historiographic and economic spheres and the health sector, where since independence Kazakhs have continued to improve their relative standing in comparison with non-Kazakhs. These developments inspire and fuel the second distinct form of nationalism which Davé identifies. She describes this as a day-to-day ‘assertion of Kazakhness’ (Davé 2007: 169), an expression of ethnic Kazakh entitlement and anti-Russian or anti-minority rhetoric in a range of social settings. It is important to note that both these processes and expressions of Kazakh nationalism as identified by Davé thus focus on nationalising the “territory” instead of the “people” (Brubaker 1996a: 88), meaning that they seek to change personnel rather than to culturally assimilate Kazakhs and non-Kazakhs, which has upset for example the ‘national-patriots’; a small but vociferous, rather loosely organised collective of intellectuals and political activists, most of them not immediate members of President Nazarbaev’s ruling circle, who advocate a stronger role in the country for what they see as ‘Kazakh’ ethno-culture, most importantly the Kazakh language4.

4 An indication of the numeric strength of publicly recognised national-patriots was given in October 2007, when 73 representatives of the Kazakh-speaking intelligentsia signed an open letter to the president, asserting that Kazakhstan’s national identity should be ethno-culturally Kazakh. They wrote again in November 2009, this time involving 124 signatories. Rendered politically ineffectual from the mid-1990s to the early 2000s, the national-patriots have still come to be popularly regarded as the guardians of Kazakh ethno-culture. Moreover they have become more vociferous and influential from the middle of the first decade of the 2000s onwards.
Similar to the literature reviewed above, my own observations also suggest that Kazakhstan is indeed to some extent ‘nationalising’. It is true that, for example, the state-sponsored and more generally state-supported historiography of contemporary Kazakhstan attempts to institutionalise and thus consolidate a nation with a first and foremost Kazakh face. Aided by the centralising, unifying state power of independent Kazakhstan, the country’s dominant historiography, its Andersonian “museum” (1991), reifies a Kazakh ethno-nation as ‘the’ nation of Kazakhstan and argues that the Kazakhstanis are building a state on the basis of a centuries-long tradition of Kazakh statehood, beginning with the Kazakh Khanate in the fifteenth century.

However, I argue that Kazakhstan is not ‘nationalising’ as consistently in other spheres. The country’s official programmes of nationalism are more manifold than that, and more contradictory. A clue for this analysis is in Brubaker’s remark at the end of his chapter on the “nationalizing” new states in Europe and the post-Soviet space, that the question is not “whether the new states will be nationalizing, but how they will be nationalizing – and how nationalizing they will be” (1996a: 106). As I have highlighted, I suggest that Kazakhstan is ‘nationalising’ in at least a dual manner, and less consistently, decisively and indeed decidedly than the literature seems to assume. In what follows, I therefore discuss a prime instrument for ‘making’ a somewhat alternative nation of Kazakhstan, or, to use Benedict Anderson’s (1991) terminology, for taking an alternative Kazakhstani national “census”, thus also shedding light on the centrality of performance in this context.

3. ‘Assembling’ All Kazakhstanis?

A key instrument and mechanism for taking a non-exclusively ethnic Kazakh, alternative Andersonian ‘census’ of Kazakhstan has been identified in the aforementioned Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan and its organisational substructure. Established by presidential decree in 1995, this assembly forms a consultative body to the president, usually understood to be based on a ‘traditional’ form of ‘council of elders’ and modelled on a Kyrgyzstani equivalent which it has long outshone in terms of size, manifestations of institutional identity and public presence.

The assembly now comprises around four hundred Kazakhstani delegates. Its annual full plenary meeting includes the about fifty numerically strongest Kazakhstani ethnies, and all but the Kazakh and especially the Russian ones are significantly overrepresented. Delegates are appointed by the president from a pool of activists and ‘cultural workers’ in Kazakhstan’s manifold ‘national cultural centres’ and ‘ethno-cultural associations’. These various centres and associations
co-operate with the assembly, and thus also with the presidential administration via the assembly’s organisational structure and substructure of regional bureaus and centres. While the ‘diaspora’ organisations do not operate according to a principle of representativeness, it is worth pointing out that many of the centres and associations that are now part of the assembly structure existed before 1995 and were indeed founded during the last days of the USSR, which again reveals how Kazakhstan’s elites have adopted, adapted and continued Soviet ‘internationalist’ practices.

Known until 2007 as the ‘Assembly of the [many] Peoples of Kazakhstan’, the change of name reflects President Nazarbaev’s reinvigorated efforts to consolidate the polity by means of a narrative of harmonious unity in interethnic diversity. This, however, is not the only narrative of nation-making spun in the context of the assembly’s activities. Analysis of the role of the assembly is an excellent way to identify further central, yet often inconsistent, lines in official nation-making. While the official function of the assembly is to promote interethnic harmony in Kazakhstan, my analysis identifies two further, non-official key functions. I argue that the assembly functions in order to divide Kazakhstan’s Russophone population into more manageable, smaller ethnicities, and that it co-opts ‘diaspora’ elites into the Nazarbaev circle, thus indirectly supporting the president’s claim to leadership.

Like Kazakhstan, many other newly-independent states engaged in projects of nation-building initiate highly visible ceremonies that are hoped to contribute to the creation or strengthening of imagined communities that include all or part of their respective citizenries. The idea seems to be Durkheimian, in that a skillful combination of ceremonial elements will attract, or at least somehow lead to, the mass participation of assembled groups, which in turn will install in the members of these groups a feeling of commonality and cohesion (Elgenius 2011: 396). In Kazakhstan, ceremonial and thus performative aspects are central to official projects of nationalism.

Kazakhstan celebrates its multi-ethnicity on a number of public holidays, but one of the most important days of the year in this respect is May Day. The holiday was re-dedicated by presidential decree in 1995 as the ‘Day of the Unity of the People of Kazakhstan’ and, according to officials, it will eventually become one of the most important public holidays for ‘the people’ of the country. I suggest, however, that the public celebrations of this day have so far honoured the many peoples’ rather than the ‘people’ of Kazakhstan, exhibiting these peoples’ allegedly distinct, ‘revived’ ethno-cultures, furthermore suggesting that multiple different identificatory options are offered by the Kazakhstani government to its citizens, with not all of them being compatible or available to every Kazakhstani.
In 2010, for example, May Day festivities in Astana involved representatives of the Armenian, Chechen and Moldovan ethno-cultural centres, who were “dancing and singing the [ancient – KB] history of their peoples” to honour the “unity, peace and harmony of the peoples of Kazakhstan”, according to the public announcements by the organisers on the day. Similarly, official celebrations of Kazakhstan’s main secular public holidays such as ‘Constitution Day’ and Independence Day usually feature performances of interethnic harmony in the form of colourful parades involving members of non-titular ethno-cultural centres sporting their ‘traditional’ national costumes alongside the obligatory dancers and *batyrs* (‘warriors’) in ‘traditional’ Kazakh attire. Closely involved in the organisation of these parades and performances of interethnic harmony and indeed instructed, mandated and monitored by the presidential administration are the ethno-cultural centres as elements of the assembly and its organisational substructure.

Their activities constantly re-affirm the relevance of ethnic distinctions and ensure that Kazakhstanis do not perceive of themselves as a culturally amorphous or uniform mass, but as members of distinct ethno-cultural categories that are relevant in their everyday lives. The mechanism was explained to me by the head of office and chief secretary of an *oblast* branch of the assembly. At the time of our interview, they were preparing the public celebrations of the oblast’s ‘Day of the Ethnos’, and according to the secretary, a Kazakh, on this holiday:

> each ethnos exhibits their culture. The Slavs want to go together, the Germans (they are a big group), they have their creative collectives. You can sit there and watch them sing and dance and listen to them for days. There are more Germans than Romanians, and yes, also Koreans; they are very active.

And do Kazakhs participate on that day, too, I asked?

> Our assembly, although we [also] work with Kazakhs, works [foremost] with the ethnies who reside with us. It is our task to assemble all other peoples, ethnoses, around the state-forming nation, the Kazakhs.

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5 A Kazakhstani *oblast* (Russian *oblast*, Kazakh *oblysy*) is the administrative division below state level and similar to a province or region. The next subdivision is a *rayon* (Russian *raion*, Kazakh *audan*).

6 Author’s interview as part of ethnographic fieldwork in Astana in February 2010.

7 *Ibid* [“Nasha Assambleya, khotya my i s kazakhami rabotaem, rabotaet s etnosami, kotorye u nas prozhivayut. Eto nasha zadacha, vokrug gosudarstvoobrazuyushchey natsii, kazakhov, sobrat’ vse drugie narody, etnosy”].
These statements illustrate a common understanding concerning the official role of ‘the Kazakhs’ in relation to the assembled non-titulars and include the notion that Kazakhs are the ‘state-forming nation’. While non-Kazakhs are also constructed as communities and ‘groups’ in this ‘assembly discourse’, they are ‘only’ ‘ethnoses’ or ‘peoples’ in accordance with the Soviet terminology for stages of national development which I have outlined above. Celebrating multi-ethnicity hence means that these ‘ethnoses’ and ‘peoples’ symbolically assemble around a Kazakh national core.

Hence the Russophone demographic is divided, and the resulting, more manageable non-Kazakh ‘ethnoses’ rallied around a re-constructed Kazakh core. Importantly, this Kazakh core is not congruent with the Kazakh-speaking segment of the population. Instead, the fragmentation and re-assemblage of the Russophone ‘bloc’ also serve to construct and consolidate an overarching ethnic Kazakh core that consists of both Kazakh-speaking and Russophone Kazakhs. The fragmentation is both symbolical and ‘tangible’, and the key instrument by means of which both the fragmentation and re-assemblage of the Russophone ‘bloc’ have been carried out has been the assembly with its organisational substructure. In addition to a mainly symbolical fragmentation of the Russophone segment for the purpose of parades on national holidays, there is also a more ‘tangible’ fragmentation that is effected by equally palpable incentives which the assembly disposes of. Most importantly, the assembly used to set quotas for nationalities at certain Kazakhstani universities. There is thus a direct material benefit in identifying with one’s ‘ethnos’ and ethno-cultural association – and in some cases even in identifying with an altogether different one than previously – and to some extent ignoring a potential identification with a Russophone ‘bloc’.

Many non-titular, and especially non-Russian, elites have exploited the opportunities the assembly system offers. As Holm-Hansen argues, a majority of the projects of post-Soviet nation-building have not generally focused on creating loyalties above ethnic divisions, but have instead sought to establish fidelity by means of ethnicity (1997: 7). I suggest that this precise mechanism can be observed when studying Kazakhstan’s assembly structure which has created, to use Holm-Hansen’s terminology, positions of “ethno-cultural middlemen” that are attractive for both social and economic reasons.

Non-titular elites demonstrate support for the incumbent regime and president – and, ideally, bring in money and contacts from their respective ‘historical homelands’. In turn they enjoy a friendly political climate towards their corresponding ‘diaspora’ or at least ‘its’ organisation. A typical event at which non-titular support for the Nazarbaev regime was performed was the festive reopening of the ‘House of Friendship’ of the (regional) Assembly of Almaty in March 2011.
The ceremony took place days before the presidential elections and was attended by the president. Well-known Almaty 'diaspora' figures canvassed for Nazarbaev by praising his fostering of interethnic peace and accord, thus demonstrating their acceptance of their predominantly 'functional belonging' to Kazakhstan.

Ghassan Hage's concept of “governmental belonging” (1996: 468) helps explain the acceptance of a hierarchy of belonging as displayed by these diaspora elites. For Hage, a full, 'governmental belonging' of an individual to a state starts with a feeling of being legitimately entitled to a governmental or managerial 'concern' for this state. This means feeling entitled to make ‘governmental-type statements’: to have a view about the state's policies and political future and to legitimately express this view. As I have argued, in Kazakhstan, the 'museums' predominantly suggest that it is primarily the titulars, who 'naturally' possess full 'national capital' and thus this 'governmental belonging'. However, via the assembly structure, I propose, non-titulars can 'accumulate' officially-acknowledged forms of 'national capital'. Because they have to actively accumulate this capital, their belonging depends on acceptance by the titulars.

Political opportunity structure approaches such as the one developed by Ruud Koopmans (2004) help shed further light on this phenomenon. According to Koopmans, national integration regimes, here defined by state authorities, can be seen as political opportunity structures that encourage, restrict and channel degrees and types of non-titular political involvement. This means that political environments make opportunities available as well as they set constraints. Authorities can offer some discursive legitimacy to pre-defined forms of claims-making, while creating negative stimuli for others (Koopmans 2004: 451). The more claims-making is encouraged and the less it is restrained, the fuller non-titulars can participate in public debates and exercise full rights in the country.

The example of Almaty 'diaspora' figures canvassing for Nazarbaev by praising his fostering of interethnic peace highlights that they have internalised the government's rhetoric on Nazarbaev's 'protection' of minorities and accept their principally ceremonial political role in visibly performing interethnic harmony, instead of, for example, criticising discrimination, in exchange for certain benefits of co-optation. Almaty's diaspora elites, I suggest, demonstrated that they accept the fact that they gain much of the legitimacy of their belonging to Kazakhstan and its elite structures by being useful to the functioning of the state as a whole. They showed, I argue, using Hage's criteria, that they have “integrated into their self-definition the dominants’ mode of classification” (1996: 470), in that they depend on the national core's predilection for a markedly multi-ethnic harmony.

Taken together, my observations allow me to draw the following conclusions about this second type of official nation-making via an Andersonian multi-ethnic,
colourful and pictorial census-taking in Kazakhstan. I suggest that the rather under-defined idea of civic harmonisation via celebrations of multi-ethnicity in and through the assembly structure can indeed foster interethnic exchange and friendship, starting at a personal level. The assembly’s “new public holidays, ceremonies, heroes [and] symbols”, which Eric Hobsbawm (1983: 263) argues are necessary for a successful re-construction of existing social identities, seem to resonate meaningfully with quite a few, especially young, members of the assembly. Limitations to this ‘accomplishment’, however, are important to note. There is, for example, a minimal spill-over effect as so far few of the unifying myths that are created among some of those participating in the assembly structure have reached, attracted and meaningfully involved Kazakhstanis, especially the large Kazakh majority, in ways that look sustainable. Outside the immediate assembly context the celebrations and performances of interethnic accord seem to bring about neither a deconstruction nor a subordination of the concept of ethno-nationality to a state-framed identity.

My findings suggest that although only little is known in the general public about the actual work and purpose of the assembly, the highly visible assembly-related public celebrations act to continuously reemphasise the existence and significance of ethnic distinctions and to thus gradually re-ethnicise the population as a whole. While a majority of my Kazakh and Kazakhstani interlocutors cared little about the manifold ethno-cultural ‘revivals’ which the assembly structure and ethno-cultural centres are officially designed to foster, the impact of the ‘assembly discourse’ on these people generally seemed to be a perception that primordial ethnic categories actively exist, and that the state needs to work with them and channel the impact which the nature of ethnicity can have on stability. One of the key reasons for this perception is that the highly visible assembly ceremonies do not only advance unifying myths of a common homeland, but they continuously re-create boundaries, difference and hierarchies within the Kazakhstani populace: While ‘real’ politics is for an overwhelmingly Kazakh elite, and for those non-Kazakhs who accept the rules and restrictions to their degree of involvement set by this elite, ceremonial singing and dancing as a performance of unity in diversity is for non-Kazakh ‘diaspora’ members of the assembly. The understanding of many of my interlocutors outside elite circles also seemed to be that there are many different and ‘given’ ethno-nationalities living on Kazakh soil and in an essentially Kazakh state, a perception which reflects the different ‘censuses’ described.

The Soviet-inherited and now officially reproduced myths and narratives of ‘inter-national’ friendship, celebrated in the assembly and at the events of its affiliated bureaus and centres, have portrayed Kazakhstan’s ‘nationalities’ as harmoniously sharing territory and certain public memories. The regime has thus to some extent successfully constituted harmonious social practices by means
of discursively downplaying potential ‘chosen traumata’ and hostilities and by drawing extensively on the Soviet-inherited imagery of multi-ethnic harmony. Highly visible celebrations, and thus performances, of interethnic harmony have characterised this approach.

However, these tactics have also reproduced ethno-national distinctions and boundaries in many aspects of social life and, more importantly, affirmed the role of the Kazakhs as ‘hosts’ in the territory. Probably the most significant ramification of these tactics has been a frequently observed understanding that the Kazakhstani people, although constitutionally enjoying equal rights, have different degrees of ‘national capital’ and depend on the hospitality of a Kazakh core that in turn forms an ‘original’ or ‘first’ nation of Kazakhstan. While for Kazakhs the identification with Kazakhstan is dominantly constructed as being ‘given’ and ‘natural’, for non-Kazakhs the identification with Kazakhstan is primarily with the rules of the state and their ‘functions’ within these. By shaping the discursive and institutional framework in which claims can be made, the state is co-opting some willing minority elites but on its own terms, thus undermining civic equality and therefore ultimately hindering a ‘national’ consolidation of equals.

Conclusion: ‘Making Kazakhstani’ – Mechanisms, Successes, Limitations

The brief overview of Kazakhstani nation-making provided in this chapter of the volume suggests that the dominant nation-making project in Kazakhstan that is funded by the state makes ample reference to dominant ethnic Kazakh, and not ‘Kazakhstani’, myths and symbols. These ‘Kazakh’ myths and symbols were readily available at independence thanks to Soviet policies and practices. The historiography and Andersonian ‘museums’ of Kazakhstan, in sum, are therefore dominated by an ethnic-based Kazakh nationalism that wants to erase difference and make Kazakhstan nationally Kazakh.

At the same time, however, the analysis also brought to light the deep-rooted ‘internationalist’ orientation of many important stakeholders, reflected in the performances of interethnic harmony in the context of the assembly structure, which convey a ‘Kazakhstani’, multi-ethnic image of a potential state-nation. ‘Assembly nationalism’ is thus a more multi-cultural, civic-based type of Kazakhstani nationalism that seeks to accommodate difference. It seeks, however, to accommodate difference on its own terms. Minority elites have been co-opted through the material incentives which participation in assembly activities offers them. In turn, they accept a limitation to their degree of ‘belonging’ to the state. The state of Kazakhstan has thus been found to shape the institutional and discursive frameworks in which claims can be made, limiting and precluding ‘Kazakhstani-making’.
In sum, Kazakhstan has not been found to fully confirm with the Brubakerian model of a nationalising state described above. While it can indeed be argued, as Annette Rohr does, that a Soviet-inherited belief system has fostered the view that the “titular nation” is “the natural patrimony” of Kazakhstan (Smith, Law, Wilson et al. 1998: 139), and that this view has manifested in local historiography, the access (if limited) for non-Kazakhs to the echelons of power and more generally their ‘functional’ belonging to the state means that the nationalising paradigm fails to grasp the full picture of nation- and nations-making in Kazakhstan. In contrast to the claims of Yilmaz Bingol, it is not the case that nationalism in Kazakhstan is only “ethnic, genealogical and exclusive” (2004: 55). While Kazakhs have been favoured in a number of official and unofficial programmes and processes, the signs of a Kazakh ethno-national programme are not unambiguous.

Crucially, ‘Kazakhisation’ in the form of an ethnic-based Kazakh nationalism that wants to erase difference is not the only official nationalising programme. Although it is the strongest project, I have also identified a more multi-cultural, civic-based Kazakhstani nationalism that seeks to accommodate difference. Although the ‘Kazakh’ programme is the more dominant of the two, it is not yet clear how the regime intends to ultimately bring these programmes together. This suggests, first, that nation-making in Kazakhstan is unfinished, riddled with inconsistencies, and, second, that it is not clear what the state hopes and can realistically achieve in terms of creating Kazakhstanis.

Bibliography


Notes on contributors

**Katharina Buck**, PhD is based at the Research Centre for East European Studies (Forschungsstelle Osteuropa, FSO) at the University of Bremen, Germany, where she conducts research in the realm of Comparative Politics, focusing on post-colonial and post-Communist regimes and the role of different types of parliaments therein, particularly with regard to questions of legitimacy, stability, nationalism, and ethnic conflict. From 2012 to 2015, she worked for the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) in Central Asia, taught and carried out research projects at several universities in and affiliated with the region. In 2013, she was awarded her PhD by the School of Sociology, Politics and International Studies (SPAIS) of the University of Bristol, UK, for her thesis on national identity in Kazakhstan.

**Jiří Čeněk**, Mgr. Ing. is employed as a teaching and research assistant in the Faculty of Regional Development and International Studies, Mendel University, Brno, Czech Republic. He is currently completing a doctoral programme in social psychology. His research interests include the process of adaptation to foreign cultures and individual and cross-cultural differences in perception and cognition.

**Karl Cordell** is Professor of Politics at Plymouth University in the UK. His areas of research include nationalism, especially in post-communist Europe: minority rights in post-communist Europe; German-Polish relations and Germany’s role as kin-state. He has authored and edited numerous books and academic papers and co-edits the academic journals *Civil Wars* and *Ethnopolitics*, both published by Taylor & Francis in the UK.
Gergely Egedy is historian and political scientist, university professor. He teaches at the National University of Public Service in Budapest. He specializes in the history of conservative political thought, and in modern conservative politics. His research interest includes the attitude of conservatism to nationalism and multiculturalism. His major works include *Conservatism at the Turn of the Millennium* [*Konzervativizmus az ezredfordulón*], *British Conservative Thought and Politics* [*Brit konzervatív gondolkodás és politika*], *Conservative Thought and Politics in the United States* [*Konzervatív gondolkodás és politika az Egyesült Államokban*]. He has published a number of articles on contemporary Hungarian conservatism as well.

Konrad Jajecznik, PhD is political scientist, graduate of the University of Warsaw. His research fields include Polish political thought and nationalism (topic of his PhD in 2015), ethnopoltics in Central Europe and political extremism. In 2010–2013 he partake in research project on Polish nationalist political press [*Prasa Narodowej Demorkacji*] led by University of Maria Skłodowska Curie (UMCS) in Lublin. He has authored of 30 academic papers or book chapters.

Miroslav Mareš is Professor at the Department of Political Science, Masaryk University, Brno, Czech Republic. The focus of his research lies with the study of political violence and extremism, primarily in the Central European context. He is a member of the European Expert Network on Terrorism Issues (EENeT) and he participates in activities of the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) of the EU. He is a co-author (with Astrid Bötticher) of the book *Extremism – theories, concepts, forms* (in German) and author or co-author more than numerous articles, chapters and books.

Justyna Polanowska graduated from the University of Warsaw with an MA in Hungarian Studies. Her main fields of research interest include Finno-Ugric linguistic minorities and Finnish literature. She is currently researching aspects of modern Finnish literature for her PhD at the University of Warsaw. She has also studied at the University of Tampere and the University of Turku in Finland, where she was awarded a scholarship by the Finnish Ministry of Education and Culture.

Josef Smolík, PhD, teaches at the Faculty of Regional Development and International Studies, Mendel University, Brno, Czech Republic and at the Security and Strategic Studies section of the Department of Political Sciences
Peter Smuk, PhD is associate professor and Head of the Department of Constitutional Law and Political Sciences at the Széchenyi István University in Győr, Hungary. He acquired MA degrees in law and history from the Eötvös Lorand University, Budapest. He teaches constitutional law, human rights and political science. His research fields include parliamentary opposition (topic of his PhD in 2008), parliamentary government (habilitation in 2013), freedom of expression, electoral campaigns and deliberative democracy. He has authored four books, more than 70 articles and book chapters. He is a member of the Association of Hungarian Constitutional Lawyers and the Hungarian Political Science Association.

Ágnes Vass is a PhD Candidate at the Institute of International Relations, Faculty of Social Sciences at Corvinus University of Budapest. From 2012 to 2015 she worked as a research fellow at the Institute for Minority Studies, Centre for Social Sciences. In 2015 she also worked as a visiting research fellow at the Polish Institute of International Affairs in Warsaw. Currently she is Hungarian Research Fellow at Wirth Institute for Central European Studies at University of Alberta in Edmonton, Canada. Her dissertation examines kin-state policy of Hungary from the perspective of Hungarian communities living in neighboring countries around Hungary.

Andrzej Wierzbicki, dr. habil., is Professor at the Warsaw, Institute of Political Science, Department of Eastern (post-Soviet) Studies, University of Warsaw. He was visiting lecturer in Russian Federation and Kazakhstan. Main field of his research interests is ethnopolitics in post-Soviet area (Central Asia and Russia), orthodox and politics, political and economic integration post-Soviet states.
Over a quarter of a century has passed since the initiation of political transition in Central and Eastern Europe. During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the area was a veritable kaleidoscope of peoples, with the politics of nationalism being both virulent and dominant in this part of the continent. One of the most significant components of the contemporary transformation process is nationalist revitalisation throughout the continent, not least in the countries covered in this volume. The result of this experience and more importantly the memory of this experience, is that it has become commonplace to assert that in post-communist Europe, questions surrounding the idea of nation and state and minority protection are more germane to everyday discourse than are similar questions in Western Europe. The lessons drawn from the case studies presented in the volume are intended to provide valuable lessons for those engaged in the study of nationalism in the central and eastern part of the continent.