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*Do politicians keep their word? Political pledges and their redeeming
as a research object of political science and media studies*

KEY WORDS

promise, political programme, political communication, methodology, revision of campaign promises

ABSTRACT

The question whether politicians keep their promises, in fact, concerns the functioning of representative democracy, respect of political elites for the needs and aspirations of society and, finally, the efficiency of the whole process of political communication, in which the media play an important role. Seeking the answer to this question is one of the constitutive features of the mass media, also called the Fourth Estate. On the basis of the findings of French, British and Canadian researchers, this article attempts to propose a particular set of research methods that would answer whether and how a particular political class keeps promises. According to the author, it is the media that are (should be) the entity – acting on behalf of society – which holds politicians accountable for the promises made. If this assumption is correct, then the methodology of research on how political commitments are translated into political practice (pragmatics of governance) in the light of social expectations (public opinion) should be a fundamental research problem for political scientists, sociologists and media experts. The author cites the results of a research project which analyzed the commitments made by Donald Tusk's government in 2007 and 2008, and compares them with the content of articles published in "Rzeczpospolita" and "Gazeta Wyborcza" during the first 100 days as well as the first year of government by the Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska) and the Polish Peasants' Party (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe).

One of the most important and desired elements of a political image are truthfulness, consequence, keeping one's word. These aspects determine the coherent vision that wins over voters, which is why politicians react nervously towards charges of inconsistency, or when their trustworthiness and credibility are undermined. From this perspective, it seems they should pay special attention to what they say and how they say it, what they promise and to whom, and finally – how they plan to keep their promises.

Reality however seems to be somewhat different. One does not need to be an expert observer of political communication to see how many needless, unwise or simply harmful words, for the quality of public debate, are uttered by the political class – and I don't mean simple lies or populist claims. I refer to those statements that many politicians are willing to make to compliment a group of voters. It is clearly visible during election campaigns, which *ex definitione* are based on slogans, catch-phrases or promises and create a postulated, perfect reality resembling the dreams of millions of voters. People casting their votes believe in stories about change, in politicians who put words action, who simply keep their word.

The importance of making and keeping promises by politicians in terms of their political communication should convince political scientists, sociologists, but also media studies experts, to make it a priority in political-media studies. These promises are part of a social contract with voters, who believe that this particular political platform, this politician, after winning the elections, will keep his word. Of course, one has to be aware that an equally important, if not prevailing altogether, factor influencing political decisions, is an image itself, understood in terms of marketing, post-politics¹. Perhaps here lies the answer to allegations on naively believing that voters are familiar with party programmes or promises, never intended to be kept in the first place. The author of this article assumes voter decisions are rational and certain politicians chosen because their diagnose of Poland's problems and the proposed remedies (election promises) seem justified, pragmatic and efficient. If that were not the case, it would mean voters are guided by feelings or impressions on the party image and its leaders. It would then mean a triumph of package over content, handshake and smile over substantial discussions, illusion over reality. Perhaps this is the core of modern political communication, which has begun to function as a comedy series and soap operas. What counts are vision, hope, dreams, aspirations, image (perfectly masking the faults and showing-off successes), not facts, numbers or accomplished and accounted campaign programs. In which case, political reality would have been substituted by the media world of politics. The question is not what really is, but how it is perceived. It ennobles the media and makes them “rulers of the mind” – as a result of civic apathy².

¹ See: B. Michalak, *Czy grozi nam depolityzacja polityki? Przyczynek do rozważań na temat wizji postpolitycznej*, “Studia Polityczne” No. 25 (2010), pp. 129–145. Compare: J. Macała, *Sukces postpolityki? Refleksje o wyborach prezydenckich w 2010 r.*, “Studia Politologiczne” Vol. 19 (2011), pp. 88–110; G. Ulicka, *Marketing polityczny a treści i postrzeganie polityki*, “Studia Politologiczne” Vol. 16 (2010), pp. 11–26; J. Garlicki, *Komunikowanie polityczne – od kampanii wyborczych do kampanii permanentnej*, “Studia Politologiczne” Vol. 16 (2010), pp. 26–46; S. Wilkos, *Strategia komunikacji politycznej, jako odpowiednik strategii budowania marki w biznesie*, “Studia Politologiczne” Vol. 16 (2010), pp. 63–75.

² Gurevitch and Blumer were right when in the 1990s they predicted the crisis of public communication – compare J. Blumler, M. Gurevitch, *The Crisis of Public Communication*, London 1995. Keppling is also right

If the above diagnose is true, then hopes connected with the quality of public debate, its substantiality, should be sought in media and journalists, who through their texts will convince voters that promises are made to be kept, campaign programmes written to be implemented, and political parties accounted for their actions. This is indeed the charm and potential of media studies. Bernard Marqueritte was right bringing up the diagnose of Jack Fuller, who believes that the fate of media is strictly connected with the world of politics: “Where media are weak, don’t have the trust of society or just don’t give honest, in-depth information allowing individual judgment, people quickly lose interest in public life, stop thinking about the common good and stop voting”³.

As Davis Merritt points out, such a situation results directly from the quality of journalism: “It is not a coincidence that the fall of journalism and the fall of public life are taking place at the same time. In modern society, they are interconnected: Public life needs the information and perspective that journalism can provide, and journalism needs a viable public life, because without [the latter] there is no need for journalism”⁴.

The article will attempt to draw attention to the specific area of political-media research – identifying pledges politicians make and monitoring how they keep them by looking into numerous academic fields: political science, media studies and sociology. Proposals of solutions to the nature of methodology enabling coherent, and comparable with other future research will be made.

Who researches if politicians keep their promises?

To begin with, a very important work concerning research on the degree of redeeming campaign promises was published by Louis M. Imbeau – *Do They Walk like They Talk? Speech and Action and Policy Processes*⁵. In it, one can find many political, philosophical and language studies, which are connected by their search for the title question: do politicians and their parties really say what they think, what they plan and what they plan to do? Among the articles is that of the Canadian scholars François Pétry and Benoît Collette⁶, who looked at English and French-speaking publications from the last forty years in search of works

writing about the dismantling of politics, devastation by the media – H.M. Kepplinger, *Demontaż polityki w społeczeństwie informacyjnym*, Kraków 2007.

³ J. Fuller, *News Values. Ideas for information age*, Chicago 1997, [after:] B. Marqueritte, *W poszukiwaniu misji mediów*, [in:] *Media a wyzwania XXI wieku*, pod red. M. Bonikowskiej, Warszawa 2009, p. 253.

⁴ D. Merritt, *Public Journalism and Public Life*, Mahwah–New Jersey 1995, [after:] B. Marqueritte, *W poszukiwaniu misji...*, p. 253.

⁵ *Do They Walk like They Talk? Speech and Action and Policy Processes*, ed. L.M. Imbeau, New York 2009.

⁶ F. Pétry, B. Collette, *Measuring How Political Parties Keep Their Promises. A Positive Perspective from Political Science*, [w:] *ibidem*, pp. 65–82.

attempting to answer whether politicians/political platforms keep their political pledges and in what degree. The analysis displayed how many methodological problems (terms, criteria, clarity, repeatability, intersubjectivity) researchers encountered in holding the political class accountable for their pledges.

Pétry and Collette draw attention to the few studies dedicated to the extent in which politicians fulfill their promises⁷. Moreover, according to their research and observations, few people (citizens) think that keeping promises by politicians is important⁸. At the same time however, they confirm the conviction made earlier in the article. However, supporting the findings of Schedler, one can expect politicians make promises referring to at least three criteria: 1) realism – avoid making promises which you knowingly cannot keep; 2) sincerity criterion – avoid making promises which you do not intend to keep; 3) the consistency criterion – avoid making contradictory promises⁹. These criteria are a good starting point in constructing research of the scale and range of pledges made by political parties.

The researchers, sougning the answer to the question: why should politician keep their word given to voters, with naive honesty answer: to not let down those voters, who could not vote for them in the next elections¹⁰. However, adding to this trivial statement, it is worth asking another question – why the confidence that voters will remember the promises? It is the media, journalists, who should remind society of these promises, as the political class, and hold them accountable for their commitments that helped them win the election. The above research claim draws consequences of a methodological nature for those who would like to take the trouble of conducting political-media studies analysis dedicated to politicians, their promises and interactions with journalists in media, with millions of viewers, listeners and readers.

However, before proposing a scheme for this type of research, it is worth looking into previous studies, their drawbacks and advantages, in order to choose the right methodological research perspective.

Research methods on pledge redeeming by politicians

In their studies, Pétry and Collette formulated four basic questions: 1) how to research the extent to which campaign pledges are redeemed by the political elite? 2) what is the level of

⁷ Ibidem, pp. 65–66.

⁸ Ibidem.

⁹ A. Schedler, *The Normative Force of Electoral Promises*, “Journal of Theoretical Politics” 10 (1998), 2, pp. 191–214.

¹⁰ F. Pétry, B. Collette, *Measuring How Political...*, p. 66.

congruence between pledges and actions? 3) How do we know when a campaign pledge is redeemed or not 4) (referring to question 3) To what extent do the reviewed studies present results that are valid and replicable?¹¹.

In search of answers to these questions, three methods distinguished by the Canadian researchers¹² can be distinguished: 1) roll call vote, which is external objectivization; 2) CMP - Comparative Manifesto Project, exposition in service of action; 3) *pledge method*, which amounts to counting the pledges and searching for their fulfillment.

Policy output

The first approach is based on a fully objective process of establishing political commitments and answering, whether a pledge was fulfilled or not. Here, respondents state what the pledge was and in what degree was it redeemed in the policy domains proposed by the interviewer¹³. Scholars using this method searched for correlations which would attribute certain variables (pledges were mentioned in the opinion poll, recalling a politician's actions – policy outputs and roll call vote) with the extent of their execution established by the respondents¹⁴.

Pétry i Collette rightly suggest that the undeniable advantage of this method is its maximum objectivization and minimal research interference. They maximize external validity and reliability of the data in both the independent and the dependent variables. The method however sacrifices valuable data, the so-called substance of the policies¹⁵. In the research we need three elements – information on the stand of the party on numerous issues (determined by pre-election policy preferences – this method is most popular among American scholars)¹⁶, second – a comparison of specific legislative initiative of the party, and finally – opinion polls on the degree and range of fulfilling these promises, which are a derivative of party standpoints on the issues. External objectivity and unambiguity of the criteria are the strongest side of this method.

CMP – Comparative Manifesto Project

The second method goes against the drawbacks of the above described opinion polling. Scholars associated in the Comparative Manifesto Project, a stable group of researchers in the

¹¹ Ibidem, p. 68.

¹² Ibidem.

¹³ Ibidem.

¹⁴ See: P.T. David, *Party Platforms as National Plans*, "Public Administration Review" 31 (1971), No. 3, pp. 303–315; E.J. Ringquist, C. Dasse, *Lies, Damned Lies, and Campaign Promises? Environmental Legislation in the 105th Congress*, "Social Science Quarterly" 85 (2004), No. 2, pp. 400–419.

¹⁵ F. Pétry, B. Collette, *Measuring How Political...*, p. 68.

¹⁶ Ibidem, p. 69.

European Consortium of Political Research (ECPR), compare two variables: on the one hand the measurable exposition degree of government action in certain defined, specific issues, and on the other, they analyzed the time and engagement of the winning party in presenting certain problems as most important during the election campaign. In other words, the aim is to compare the measurable degree of exposition of issues chosen by the winning party in the election campaign with the real actions of the later constituted government. The initial objective of the CMP project was (and still is) to record and analyze the contents of the election platforms in democratic countries since World War 2. These data are then used to position the parties in their respective national political space and track their evolution from one election to another¹⁷. The election platforms are coded into a pre-established set of policy categories¹⁸. Each category is then counted to establish the level of exposition during the election campaign. The results of the compared categories are the basis of distinguishing certain election pledges of the given political party, which are later checked (the degree of their realization) in the second part of the research – an analysis of government actions in these commitments. The second variable is the exposition of these issues in certain sectors of state budgets, which answer earlier research categories. The actual test is conducted by correlating the amounts of public spending (in percentage of GDP) with election platform emphases (content analysis of programs, slogans, speeches of party members).

This kind of research was conducted by scholars in different countries¹⁹. Some of them have proved that there is a meaningful correlation between political pledges during elections and government spending²⁰. It should however be underlined – after the Canadian researchers

¹⁷ A. Volkens, *Manifesto Coding Instructions (Second Revised Edition)*, Berlin 2002, <http://bibliothek.wzb.eu/pdf/2002/iii02-201.pdf> [accessed: 1.11.2011].

¹⁸ Ibidem.

¹⁹ Comparative studies: H.D. Klingemann, I. Budge, R.I. Hofferbert, *Parties, Policies, and Democracy*, Boulder 1994; Germany: R.I. Hofferbert, H.D. Klingemann, *The Policy Impact of Party Programmes and Government Declarations in the Federal Republic of Germany*, “European Journal of Political Research” Vol. 18 (1990), pp. 277–304; Canada: F. Pétry, *The Policy Impact of Canadian Party Programs: Public Expenditure Growth and Contagion from the Left*, “Canadian Public Policy” Vol. 14 (1988), Iss. 4, pp. 376–389; idem, *The Party Agenda Model: Election Programmes and Government Spending in Canada*, “Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de science politique” Vol. 28 (1995), No. 1, pp. 51–84; United States: I. Budge, R.I. Hofferbert, *Mandates and Policy Outputs: U.S. Party Platforms and Federal Expenditures*, “American Political Science Review” Vol. 84 (1990), No. 1, pp. 111–131; France: F. Pétry, *Fragile Mandate: Party Programmes and Public Expenditures in the French Fifth Republic*, “European Journal of Political Research” Vol. 20 (1991), pp. 149–171; Great Britain: R.I. Hofferbert, I. Budge, *The Party Mandate and the Westminster Model: Election Programmes and Government Spending in Britain, 1948–1985*, “British Journal of Political Science” 22 (1992), No. 2, pp. 151–182.

²⁰ I. Budge, R.I. Hofferbert, *Mandates and Policy...*; R.I. Hofferbert, I. Budge, *The Party Mandate...*; H.D. Klingemann, I. Budge, R.I. Hofferbert, *Parties, Policies...* These findings were undermined due to flawed research (mistakes in the regression coefficients, ignoring time as an important coefficient, no autocorrelation, lastly, without the correlation coefficients, there is no statistically significant result, supporting the correlation – G. King, M. Laver, *Party Platforms, Mandates, and Government Spending*, “The American Political Science

- that a significant drawback of the discussed method is reliance on the selective emphasis methodology which consists of only recording the space devoted by a party to a particular policy category in its platform, without differentiating negative from positive party attitudes toward issues²¹. Practitioners from CMP believe that stressing a particular priority implies an intent to take only positive action in the relevant policy domain²². Moreover, CMP methodology by definition ignores many aspects of public policy output (exposing budgetary expenditures), which can exemplify redeeming pledges made during the election campaign, e.g. laws, administrative decisions or speeches, which could answer public demand for a debate on issues so far neglected²³.

Pledge method

The last research method is based on the quantitative examining and counting pledges made during the election campaign, and later monitoring government actions of the winning party to see how many pledges have been redeemed. This method seems to be the most popular among the discussed²⁴. What is important is that it gives the degree of fulfilling promises in relative terms of percentage (which simplifies interpretation), not in complicated regression coefficients, where basic values are even methodologically uncertain. However, it must be underlined, that the reliability of data collected based on this method is burdened with the flaw of the subjective qualification of promises as real obligations, and then judging them as if they were redeemed. Thus, the outcome is as strong as the researcher's criteria (ex. regulatory definitions) and his ability to objectify decisions and judgment during the analysis.

Which method is the best?

Pétry i Collette analyzed 21 case studies (in 18 English-speaking and French-speaking articles from the last forty years), who's authors looked at pledges made by members of the political elite and the degree of their fulfillment. Before the analysis, they posed four questions²⁵:

Review" Vol. 87 (1993), No. 3, pp. 744–750 and H. Thome, *Party Mandate Theory and Time-Series Analysis: A Methodological Comment*, "Electoral Studies" Vol. 18 (1999), No. 4, pp. 569–585.

²¹ F. Pétry, B. Collette, *Measuring How Political...*, p. 69.

²² *Ibidem*.

²³ *Ibidem*, p. 70.

²⁴ *Ibidem*. See also: T.J. Royed, *Testing the Mandate Model in Britain and in the United States: Evidence from the Reagan and Thatcher Eras*, "British Journal of Political Science" 26 (1996), No. 1, pp. 45–80; T.J. Royed, S.A. Borelli, *Political Parties and Public Policy: Social Welfare Policy from Carter to Bush*, "Polity" 29 (1997), No. 4, pp. 539–563; T.J. Royed, S.A. Borelli, *Parties and Economic Policy in the USA. Pledges and Performance, 1976–1992*, "Party Politics" 5 (1999), No. 1, pp. 115–127.

²⁵ F. Pétry, B. Collette, *Measuring How Political...*, p. 73.

- Does the given study contain the operational definition of a campaign pledge? (yes or no). The operational definition must have clear criteria, which allow us to identify, if something is a promise. Moreover, did the researcher clearly define documentary sources of campaign pledge?
- Does the study contain an operational definition of government action/output? (Yes or No). A definition is considered operational here if it contains explicit criteria of exclusion of what a relevant government action/output is not. Another condition is that the documentary sources of government actions are precisely referenced.
- What is the extent of the documentation of government outputs with which campaign pledges are matched? (Large or Small). For example, are campaign pledges matched only with laws, or are they also matched with throne speeches, with budgets, with annual reports from various ministries?
- How precise, replicable and valid is the demonstration that a pledge is fulfilled or not? Or put in more simple terms, how much room is left to a researcher's own judgment?

The above questions were the criteria for evaluating studies on analyzing promises that were redeemed by politicians from different countries. Pétry and Collette found that only 5 out of 21 studies they reviewed met the four methodological criteria²⁶. All of them were published in the last 12 years. The remaining studies lacked operational definitions (how the author defined a campaign pledge, how pledge fulfillment was measured?) or reference to documentary sources of campaign pledges and government actions. According to the Canadian authors, criteria used by researchers were arbitrary, not to say random²⁷.

Pétry and Collette underlined that the pledge method was the most accurate – despite restrictions connected with the subjective judgment of the researcher²⁸. It guarantees capturing the substance of political pledges and the extent of their fulfillment. If we add to this the conscientious objectivization of research choices based on earlier criteria of operational definitions, then the outcome of such a project will gain external validity and comparable verification. That is why some researchers using the pledge method have nuanced the fundamental decision on whether a political pledge has been redeemed. E.g. Gerald Pomper, author of the oldest – according to the Canadian scholars – research on campaign pledges, created a typology of redeeming a pledge on a five-scale axis of the semantic differential, depending on government actions fulfilling the promise: full action (passage of a

²⁶ Ibidem.

²⁷ Ibidem, pp.73–77.

²⁸ Ibidem, pp. 77–78.

law), executive action, similar action (indirect action by the executive or legislative branch), negative fulfillment, defeated (the law did not pass), and no action (status quo)²⁹.

The work of Pétry i Collette shows that in the articles of most European and American scholars on evaluating political platform pledges, the reference point for whether a promise was redeemed or not was the number and extent of actions undertaken by the government. It also concerned the correlation between the exposition and range of pledges made during the election campaign, and the financial or information input from legal acts in the Journal of Laws. This significantly differentiates research outcomes and allows maintaining a reasonable research distance.

Findings of the scholars show that political parties fulfill 67 percent of their pledges. The smallest number of pledges was kept by politicians from Wisconsin between 1947–1971: only in 45 percent³⁰. Great Britain had the best result in the analyzed period between 1979–1988: 85 per cent of their pledges³¹.

The fourth option – pledge method in prestigious daily newspapers

Accepting the results of Pétry i Collette, it should be considered if there are better research methods of the pledge making process and later monitoring how and if at all they are kept. It seems that scholars in the discipline – political scientists, sociologists and media studies experts – can count on the “Fourth Estate” to keep a watchful eye on the government. Media are a significant actor in the social structure, able to account politicians on behalf of citizens/voters/readers/viewers/listeners. Knowing this, certain media could be an excellent source to analyze if a given political party or government has fulfilled their campaign pledges. Taking into account that media play an increasingly important role in political communication, the author of this article, by means of the *pledge method*, decided to undertake a complex research project to answer the following questions:

- How many and what pledges did Platforma Obywatelska (Civic Platform) and the Polish People's Party (PSL) make during the 2007 election campaign?
- How many and what pledges did the parties make, while in office from 2007, during the first 100 days and the first year from forming the Tusk government on November 16th 2007?

²⁹ G.M. Pomper, *Elections in America. Control and Influence in Democratic Politics*, New York 1968, *passim*.

³⁰ R.C. Elling, *State Party Platform and State Legislative Performance: A Comparative Analysis*, “American Journal of Political Science” Vol. 23 (1979), No. 2, 1979, pp. 383–405.

³¹ T.J. Royed, *Testing the Mandate...*

- How many and what pledges has the coalition been accounted of by opinion-forming media in Poland – “Rzeczpospolita” and “Gazeta Wyborcza”³² – during the usually important moment in the term, which is the first “100 days” and one year after taking office.

Determining what PO and PSL promised voters

In the 2007 election campaign, politicians made numerous pledges. The winning parties – Civic Platform (PO) and the Polish People's Party (PSL) – by publishing their party platforms on the Internet, made meaningful commitments³³. Taking into account the doubts stated at the beginning of the article, the author believes that in a democracy, society can rely on the media to execute political commitment – especially with acclaimed journalists from daily newspapers “Rzeczpospolita” or “Gazeta Wyborcza”. The political opposition is in this case less reliable. It is the duty of journalist to account politicians of their campaigns and pledges for the purpose of fulfilling reader/viewer expectations.

To find out how “Rzeczpospolita” and “Gazeta Wyborcza” account politicians of their pledges, it was established, what kind of pledges PO and PSL made. Party platforms were subject to a quantitative and qualitative analysis. An extensive worksheet was created in MS Excel 2007 with all PO and PSL pledges made in campaign documents. These were then compared with pledges made by Donald Tusk, the head of the PO-PSL government, in his parliamentary exposé after swearing in the government by president Lech Kaczyński³⁴. For the purpose of this research terms (operational definitions) were created, which in the belief of the author, made it possible to organize the analysis.

³² Where else but in the nation-wide press is there space to – pledge by pledge – redeem politicians of their promises. There is not enough air-time for it on television or the radio, and the internet is governed by its own set of rules (See: L. Olszański, *Dziennikarstwo internetowe*, Warszawa 2006, *passim*) and still, many Polish voters do not use it as commonly as the younger generation (see e.g. *Polski Internet 2008/2009*, http://pliki.gemius.pl/Raporty/2009/02_2009_Polski_internet_2008_2009.pdf [accessed: 20.02.2011]). Weekly news magazines have less space in one issue than dailies issued six times a week. Moreover, many magazines exploit lifestyle, science and culture themes at the expense of politics. With tabloids, it's obvious that they cannot carry such an important function as redeeming political pledges: it requires more space and in-depth thought, and this is impossible due to the tabloid's layout and form. Industry dailies, such as “Puls Biznesu”, “Parkiet” or “Dziennik Gazeta Prawna” (the former “Gazeta Prawna”) are interested in a fraction of the socio-political reality – the stock market, economy or law. If an issue is on the verge of politics, they consider it, although focusing on industry information, not explaining the political background to the reader. A person who wants to know what's cooking in Polish politics reads “Wyborcza” or “Rzeczpospolita”, not “Puls Biznesu” or “Gazeta Prawna”. Reader expectations of both titles are of course different. To account politicians of their pledges are nationwide daily newspapers – “Rzeczpospolita” and “Gazeta Wyborcza”, “Dziennik Gazeta Prawna” (formerly known as “Dziennik Polska Europa Świat”, which is more “Gazeta Prawna” than “Dziennik”, judging by the editor board), then “Polska. The Times”, lastly “Nasz Dziennik”, and the no longer existing “Trybuna”.

³³ See: T. Gardziel, S. Gawroński, *Wybory 2007. Partie, programy, kampania wyborcza*, Rzeszów 2008, *passim*.

³⁴ See: J.H. Kołodziej, *Komunikowanie wartości politycznych – założenie, cele i metody*, [in:] *Studia nad mediami i komunikowaniem masowym. Teoria – rynek – społeczeństwo*, ed. by J. Fras, Toruń 2007, pp. 7–24.

Due to the nature of making promises by politicians to voters, three types of pledges were distinguished: These were **normatives**, pledges made in party platforms, declarations and in the exposé; **declaratives**, which are commitments from press statements and interviews made by politicians, and lastly, **speculatives** or **expectives**, a promise, which journalists assumed politicians made or should have made. Referring to the above distinction, an analysis of pledges made by PO and PSL was conducted, based on party platforms³⁵ and daily newspapers “Rzeczpospolita” and “Gazeta Wyborcza” from November and December 2007.

The exposé of prime minister Donald Tusk from November 23rd 2007 was analyzed in the same way – the number of pledges made. It should be stated that a **pledge** was defined as **every possible to independently distinguish, outside the sentence in which it occurs, postulated change or maintenance of *status quo* expressed in a volitional manner**. One sentence could contain more than one pledge, in which case each was counted separately. For example, six pledges were stated in the sentence: “Rationalizing the program »Study in Poland« and stationing the European Institute of Innovation and Technology in Wrocław, promoting the careers and academic promotion of young scholars through a better scholarship system and increasing international mobility, introducing financial rules in selected prioritized research projects³⁶.”

Promises often had a tendency to overlap. More than once they concerned the same issue, although presenting another aspect of it. For example, the promise of a “cheaper state” is connected with the promise to “decrease bureaucracy”, and this in turn relates to the promise of “simplifying the legal system and improving its inner cohesion and transparency”. Despite such tendencies, each of these promises was treated separately because establishing borders between pledges and determining which is included in which would interfere too much with the intentions of the speaker. Especially since there is a premise in formulating a promises in a certain way. Pledges that were repeated were not counted additionally, however, their

³⁵ Two PO election platforms were analysed: *Podstawy programu politycznego Platformy Obywatelskiej RP. Polska Obywatelska. By żyło się lepiej* Warszawa 2007 and *Program wyborczy Platformy Obywatelskiej. Polska zasługuje na cud gospodarczy. By żyło się lepiej. Wszystkim!*, Warszawa 2007, along with the supplement *Roz. XI Wolni obywatele w bezpiecznym państwie*, www.platforma.org/pl/program/ [accessed: 24.04.2010]. PSL also prepared two platforms for the 2007 elections: *Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe. Razem tworzymy lepszą przyszłość. Narodowe priorytety PSL na lata 2007–2011*, Warszawa 2007 and *Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe. Nadzwyczajny IX Kongres PSL. Stawiamy na normalność – Polska lepszych szans. Deklaracja Polskiego Stronnictwa Ludowego*, Warszawa 15 kwietnia 2007 r., www.psl.org.pl/dokumenty/ [accessed: 24.04.2010]. PO documents altogether had 194 pages, PSL just 22. See: J. Kuciński, *Nowe elementy wizji państwa w dokumentach programowych głównych sił politycznych*, [in:] *Wybory 2007 i media – krajobraz po „IV RP” – wybrane problemy*, ed. by D. Waniek, Warszawa 2009, pp. 71–94.

³⁶ *Podstawy programu...*

repetition was marked as having a higher exposition than in the case of others, which were mentioned just once.

“Near-campaign” pledges

■ Normatives

PO made 363 pledges in their party platform, while PSL had nearly three times less, 116. Donald Tusk, still as Prime Minister of the PO–PSL coalition government, in his exposé from November 23rd 2007, announced fulfilling 136 pledges. While coding, it turned out that the coalition parties made 51 identical promises. The prime minister himself made 62 pledges from the PO program and 32 from that of PSL.

■ Declaratives

In November and December 2007, members of the PO–PSL government, in interviews with journalists of the daily “Rzeczpospolita”, made a total of 86 pledges, out of which 47 were new, not directly present in the platform of either party, or the exposé of Prime Minister Tusk. 36 cases, pledges made by members of the government confirmed their declarations in normatives. In “Gazeta Wyborcza”, ministers made 122 pledges, out of which half were in the PM exposé or other party documents.

The above numbers suggest that to the original 440 normative pledges (party platform and exposé), the government added an additional 88 promises, (47 in “Rzeczpospolita” and 61 in “Wyborcza”, out of which 20 promises were in both titles). Thus the voter, who might have assumed that after reading the election programs of PO and PSL, nothing more can be promised, such was the number of issues raised in party documents, finds that a conversation with a curious journalist brings a dozen more commitments.

■ Speculatives/expectants

In November and December 2007, 88 pledges were coded from “Rzeczpospolita” and 87 from “Wyborcza”. In “Rz”, 73 of the 88 promises were commitments made in the earlier analysed normatives and declaratives. Among speculatives/expectants in “Rzeczpospolita” there were 15 new promises. “Wyborcza” had only 5 new promises stated in a journalistic narrative (without political quotes or interviews).

“First 100 days” pledges

In the “first 100 days” text corpus³⁷, “Rzeczpospolita” had 75 new promises, out of which 13 (17 percent) were new, never before registered, so-called “first 100 days” promises. 72 pledges on “Wyborcza” were coded, with 21 new (29 percent) – they appeared for the first time after the 2007 elections and were not included as normatives (on PO and PSL party platforms). It is worth noting, that both dailies had the same number, but altogether different pledges – not many were present both in “Rzeczpospolita” and “Gazeta Wyborcza”. Moreover, not every minister was mentioned by the newspapers, which shows how dualistic a media reality the reader encountered reading both “Rz” and “Wyborcza” in February and March 2008 (although judging by the data provided by ZKDP, there were not many such people). It should be added that the reader of “Wyborcza” learned more about the promises of the Minister of Agriculture, Marek Sawicki or the Minister of Health, Ewa Kopacz, but did not know much about the commitments made by Mirosław Drzewiecki, Minister of Sport. Neither could he read about the declarations of the PM himself, which were mentioned in “Rzeczpospolita”.

“First year” pledges

“Wyborcza” had significantly less pledges made by politicians after the year in office of the Tusk government than during the first 100 days of government. At the same time, “Rzeczpospolita” had 1/3 more pledges than during the 3-month governing period of the PSL–PO coalition³⁸. The large number of promises, also those new, made at the time in “Rz”,

³⁷ The “first 100 days” text corpus dated between February and March 2008. On February 24, Prime Minister Donald Tusk announced his exposé in the Sejm, summarizing 100 days of his cabinet and presenting the plan for the years to come. With this, in order to examine the political discourse of that period in “Rzeczpospolita” and “Gazeta Wyborcza”, all the articles containing the following expressions were qualified: ‘100 dni’, ‘studniówka’, ‘sto dni’, ‘stu dni’, ‘stu dniach’, ‘trzy miesiące’, ‘trzech miesięcy’ – (all were a derivative or synonym of 100 days). For both the government and the media, this period is a particular time to get a perspective on the activities of the last months (abandoning current affairs for the sake of summaries). The most recent text containing one of the above expressions was an article in “Rzeczpospolita” by Piotr Semka entitled: *Tusk musi wyjaśnić decyzję Pawlaka* from February 2 2008. In “Gazeta Wyborcza”, the first piece on the “first 100 days” of government was published on the same day and entitled *Reformy? Dziękujemy*. It was an interview with Tadeusz Syryjczyk, by Witold Gadomski, on the accomplishments of the government. The texts closing the corpus were published in “Rzeczpospolita” on March 15 2008 – *Michał Boni, mózg rządu Platformy* by Dorota Kołakowska, and in “Gazeta Wyborcza”, on March 12 2008 – *A Platformie rośnie i rośnie* by Bogdan Wróblewski, WBS for short. The chronological range of the first research corpus was six weeks: three weeks before the “first 100 days” Tusk exposé and three weeks after it. At that time, “Rzeczpospolita” published 98 articles meeting the research criteria, 95 were in “Gazeta Wyborcza”.

³⁸ The anniversary text corpus consisted of articles published in “Rzeczpospolita” and “Gazeta Wyborcza” in November and December 2008. This was because on November 20 2008, Donald Tusk delivered another, third, exposé, in which he summarized the year’s activities of his cabinet and presented plans for the future. To analyse the political discourse around the first year of the Donald Tusk government. In order to examine the political discourse of that period in “Rzeczpospolita” and “Gazeta Wyborcza”, all the articles containing the following

was the result of interviews with nearly all the ministers, therefore the comparative advantage over “Wyborcza”. Newly made promises made up 52 percent of the 106 pledges made in “Rzeczpospolita”. One might assume that inviting politicians to summarize their year in government bears a high risk of them making new pledges, instead of accounting those already made – especially with the degree of freedom given in the mentioned daily. This, of course, might not have been the case, if the interviews had the purpose of redeeming and digging deeper into campaign pledges. The idea of the interview was for the first three questions to draw on self-assessment of the minister: what he thinks was accomplished, what was not, and what are his priorities in the near future. Politicians of the governing coalition easily used this freedom to promote themselves. They exhibited successes, disguised failures, postponed unfulfilled promises and made new ones, which allowed them to steer the conversation, and reader interest, to the desired issues. It gave them a chance to focus journalist and reader attention not on the real world, but the postulated one, which is yet to come through. It is a clever maneuver made by coalition politicians, who are obviously well prepared in dealing with the media.

Accounting pledges

After the “first 100 days” of governing, both press titles accounted the government in nearly the same degree: in “Rzeczpospolita” 75 original accounts were coded, in “Wyborcza” only 3 less – 72. For the first year of the government, “Rzeczpospolita” noted 103, “Wyborcza” – 86 redeemed pledges.

A review of both lists shows, that in the “first 100 days” discourse, “Rzeczpospolita” redeemed the government for different things than “Wyborcza”. The first asked about changes in public media. According to the authors of “Rzeczpospolita”, the promise changed into action on the new media law, which would allow PO to control public media and grant concessions to private broadcasters. “Wyborcza” asked about de-politicizing media, thus a change of the current situation. “Rz” questioned evidence of faults and crimes, which the PiS

expressions were qualified: ‘rok rządu’, ‘rok rządów’, ‘roku rządów’, ‘roku rządu’, ‘pierwszy rok rządów’, ‘pierwszy rok rządu’, ‘po roku rządów’, ‘po dwunastu miesiącach’, ‘po 12 miesiącach’, ‘od dwunastu miesięcy’, ‘od 12 miesięcy’. The first text qualifying was in “Rzeczpospolita” from November 3, 2008. It was an interview with Waldemar Pawlak, deputy minister in the PO–PSL government, and minister of economy, by Karolina Baca and Jakub Kurasz, entitled: *To dobry czas na zakupy akcji*. In “Gazeta Wyborcza”, the first article appeared on November 6, 2008 – *PO podsumuje rok rządu*, by Bogdan Wróblewski (WBS). The end of the sample for “Rzeczpospolita” was on December 12 2008, in which Dorota Kołakowska published the article *Rekonstrukcja na zapleczu*. In “Wyborcza” that day was December 4 2008 with 2 texts by Marcin Markowski (*Orliki przylecą na mikołajki i Pierwszy w Warszawie*). Similarly in the case of the first sample, this time to the research corpus stretched out for 6 weeks. Again, three weeks before the yearly exposé and three weeks after it. In the second sample, 67 articles from “Rzeczpospolita” and 48 from “Gazeta Wyborcza” were published.

government was burdened with. This account also appeared in “Wyborcza”, but with a different intention. The first daily believed that revenge and settling accounts by the PO–PSL government is a mistake, as was scaring Poles with “kaczyzm³⁹” and alleged abuse of power⁴⁰.

“GW” accounted the Tusk government of inefficiency in clearing the political field of allies of Jarosław Kaczyński, and not disclosing hard evidence of his government's abuse, which clearly existed (!)⁴¹.

Among accounts of the Donald Tusk government made in daily newspapers, it was more than once noted that these were not accounts *par excellence* (they did not directly concern pledges made *explicite* in normatives, sepculatives or declaratives), but had the nature of a media postulate: what the government should do, and doesn't or didn't do, according to the given press title – in “Rzeczpospolita” during the 100 days in was, e.g. the issue of taking away retirement privileges from former security service officers, the status of Chorzów and Kraków in their efforts towards Euro 2012, or the case of traders from the 10th Anniversary Stadium.

It turns out that redeeming government, the media used the occasion to articulate specific demands towards the authorities, discussing the PO–PSL government issues which – according to the press – are urgent, but still neglected by politicians. This shows an uplifting observation that media not only thrive on pledges made by politicians (main narrators of political issues), but also expect them to take a stand on the issues left out. Daily newspapers keep a watchful eye on the authorities, redeem them, but also put them before problems, which politicians rather not see – they straightforwardly tell politicians what to do.

Fulfilled pledges

In the “first one hundred days” narration in “Rzeczpospolita”, 43 redeemed pledges were coded (only one of them, or rather a collection of a few solutions speeding up privatization, were attributed directly to a PO politician)⁴², two were pointed out by experts⁴³. On the pages

³⁹ “Kaczyzm” is a discrediting and satirical term, describing the period in Polish politics when the party PiS (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość – Law and Justice) was in power between 2005 and 2007. The term is derived from the last name of the Polish politicians, leaders of PiS, Lech and Jarosław Kaczyński.

⁴⁰ Texts by Waldemar Kuczyński and Jacek Kucharczyk were exceptions: W. Kuczyński, *PiS-owski wilk nadal niebezpieczny*, “Rzeczpospolita” 20.02.2008; J. Kucharczyk, not. K. Baranowska, *Rząd PO nie zawiódł*, „Rzeczpospolita” 19.02.2008.

⁴¹ E.g. M. Czech, *PO i PiS, czyli pies jeża nie tknie*, “Gazeta Wyborcza” 12.02.2008; A. Kublik, M. Olejnik, *Tusk: trzeba zmienić konstytucję*, interview with Donald Tusk, “Gazeta Wyborcza” 20.02.2008; W. Gadomski, *Rząd nudny i zaskakujący*, “Gazeta Wyborcza” 10.11.2008.

⁴² B. Chomętowska, P. Jabłoński, *Koniec drenażu państwowych firm*, an interview with Aleksandr Grad, “Rzeczpospolita” 28.02.2008. Issues in the interview: project of the law on amending the law on

of government-friendly “Wyborcza”, 70 such pledges were noted, out of which 31 percent were quotes of PO politicians or their interviews.

The narration of the two titles was significantly different in distinguishing the fulfilled pledges. “Wyborcza” saw as successes even projects in the Sejm, simple meetings or detailed government action plans⁴⁴, contrary to more critical of the coalition “Rzeczpospolita”. It referred to a fulfilled promise only when it was on the legislative path or when a meeting on an international level bore fruit⁴⁵. On the one hand side, is the favourable attitude of “GW”, on the other, distance in praising the government “before sundown” by “Rz”. Most likely, the difference can be ascribed to “Wyborcza” giving the government a voice by often literally reporting conferences of ministers, summarizing their first 100 days in government. This certainly influenced the fact that in 22 cases (31 percent) the reader learned of redeeming a pledge from quotes of ministers or from interviews, which politicians of the government coalition gave “Gazeta”.

commercialization and privatization – privatization auctions, restricting the scope of analysis, broader use of market regulation instruments in privatization, abolishing the necessity for the PM to confirm selling stock in a different than public mode, simplifying transferring stock to district governments, privatization cards, transparency, transferring many privatization decisions to the minister of treasury.

⁴³ Jarosław Flis, politologist from the Jagiellonian University, discussed clearing up legal errors by member of parliament Janusz Palikot; Jacek Kucharczyk, sociologist from the Institute of Public Affairs, commented on the skillful extinction of strikes and an improvement in international relations, also on the efficient work of the “Przyjazne Państwo” (Friendly State) Sejm committee headed by Janusz Palikot.

⁴⁴ These would be the following examples: bill on the possibility to suspend economical activities – amending the law on economic activity (“reformatorska pasja Szejnfelda”), a bill already in the Sejm on accounting – simplifying accounting – increased limit from 0.8 mln to 1.2 mln Euro, legal changes in civil law and simplifying legal procedures, separating the Prosecutor General from the Ministry of Justice – an almost finished bill, efficient clean-up after PiS in the Ministry of Regional Development (especially the case of spending EU funds), accepting the government amendment on the freedom of economic activity, restricting the posts of deputy ministers in the Ministry of Agriculture, addressing the EU for a one-time, interventional purchase of swines and surcharge to pork export, decreasing to 90 the number of laws that need to be adapted to EU directives, regaining voter trust and calmness after the PiS government, preparing in the Ministry of Internal Affairs the bill on reforming administration and local governments, and in mid January, closing negotiations with the European Committee on the operational program “infrastructure and Environment”, unblocking Russia's ability to enter OECD as a gesture of goodwill, talks in Moscow on sailing on the Vistula Lagoon and the pipeline to the Polish oil refinery in Możejki, telling the USA that the possible anti-missile shield will also concern a modernization package for the Polish army, reforming the Prosecutor General – dividing the salaries of prosecutor offices and judges – the 24-hour courts reform – bill – voluntarily accepting punishment without a court trial, digital courts – a ready bill, proposal to regulate legal applicants and the career model of a judge, signing the contract with Eureco by 2008, improving the actions and changing the staff in the Agency for Restructuring and Modernisation of Agriculture, expanding the special economic zones, changes in civil law that speed up and simplify actions in economic cases, supervising by minister Cwiąkowski, in a subtle matter, the investigation on abuses of the former government

⁴⁵ Even if “Rzeczpospolita” saw the successes, it wrote about them in the following form (in the words of deputy editor in chief): “Prime Minister Tusk was not wrong in the speech made Thursday in the Sejm. Indeed, his government was successful, in some part, in its first year. The thing is though, that these promises were not the ones it intended to fulfill. [...] First of all, it is successful in the issues started already by the cabinets of Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz and Jarosław Kaczyński. [...] Second, the ministers are successful in issues which cannot be postponed, but of course, wrong decisions could have been made, such as giving in to strong interest groups, which the government didn't”. – P Gabryel, *Wszystkie cuda Donalda Tuska* “Rzeczpospolita” 21.11.2008.

It is worth noting, that in the case of the “first 100 days” of the PO–PSL coalition, as during the 1st year in office, more than once a pledge was seen as fulfilled, only to be discussed, by another journalist, in the same paper, as being unfulfilled. To some degree, this undermines the credibility of redeeming politicians by the most prestigious, opinionated daily newspapers.

For the 1st anniversary, “Rzeczpospolita” noted fulfilling 111 promises, out of which the authors praising the government for its determination were in 56 percent the party concerned: the PM or other ministers, who were interviewed by the daily. Apart from that, the daily quoted the anniversary exposé of the Prime Minister, in which he counted government successes. Ministers themselves, during press conferences, presented their accomplishments (quotes) and this too had a significant influence on the total count of “media fulfilled” promises. In 48 cases (43 percent) “Rz” journalists, publishers and experts saw the government as efficient. It seems that for their 1st year in office, politicians managed to appropriate the discourse in “Rzeczpospolita” through interviews and numerous statements of ministers, who went by the rule that if they’re not praising you, or you don’t know if they are, then praise yourself.

“Wyborcza” on the other hand, placing 19 articles less than “Rz” (67 articles), wrote about fulfilling 65 promises out of which – contrary to the rival “Rzeczpospolita”, which opened its doors for politicians – the PM and other ministers praised each other only 12 times. In 82% it were editors of “GW”, its journalists and experts, who saw the successes of the government and praised PO–PSL for their consequent realization of pledges. “Wyborcza” had only two interviews for the anniversary – with PM Donald Tusk⁴⁶ and deputy minister Adam Szejnfeld⁴⁷. This shows that had “Rzeczpospolita” not decided to print the series of interviews with members of the cabinet, then it would have had maybe even twice as less statements showing, how the government fulfills its pledges (or even less because the pledges were an important element in “Rz” narration, which publicists and journalists of the title could not ignore).

On the other hand, “Wyborcza” did not give the stage to government politicians, nonetheless it praised and counted more fulfilled pledges than “Rzeczpospolita” (although these were different commitments). Journalists and experts mentioned 53 fulfilled promises in “GW” (apart from the quotes and interviews, in which politicians complimented themselves).

⁴⁶ A. Kublik, M. Olejnik, *Po wyborach odblokujemy Polskę*, “Gazeta Wyborcza” 08.11.2008.

⁴⁷ S. Śmigiel, *Robimy rewolucję dla firm*, wywiad z Adamem Szejnfeldem, “Gazeta Wyborcza – Mój Biznes” 25.11.2008.

This shows the scale of favorability of “Wyborcza” and the criticism of “Rzeczpospolita” towards the Donald Tusk government⁴⁸.

Summary

The research found that in the chosen sources and dates, the Donald Tusk government made 647 pledges. If we were to sum the total number of pledges accounted (336) and redeemed (246) in both “Rz” and “GW” after 100 days and the 1st year of the government, and divide it in half, as 50% of the accounts, to a different degree, overlapped and not every redeemed pledge was such *par excellence* and others were in both dailies, all in all, the newspapers redeemed the government in 291 cases.

Table 1. Pledges, their account and redeeming – PO–PSL coalition government (2007–2008) in “Rzeczpospolita” and “Gazeta Wyborcza”

	Pledges	Accounts of pledges	Redeemed pledges
Fall 2007 (N,D,SvE)	548	-	-
“100 days”	34	147	99
1 st year in government	65	189	147
Total	647	336	246

* Sum of normatives, declaratives, speculatives vel expectants.

Source: Own research.

With results like this, other research questions arise: why did the media account the government of only 45% of the issues they promised to manage? Is that a lot or a little? Media cannot write about everything as they are restricted by the place and time of working on journalistic material, however, through this explanation, we assume they prioritize and chose the most important issues (for the sake of *gate keeping*)⁴⁹, convinced they are doing it for the

⁴⁸ It should be mentioned that there were cases, that the PM or the minister complimented himself for a redeemed pledge and this was acknowledged by the expert or journalist. In a case where a pledge was mentioned once by a politician and once by an expert, it was counted as the government bragging about successful pledges. When it was mentioned more than once, by an expert or journalist, then it was counted as a redeemed promise noticed by non-politicians, thus independent media/experts. If a redeemed pledge was noticed by a journalist/expert, and not mentioned by a minister in an interview or was not quoted in the newspaper when he spoke about it, then the pledge counted as a commitment noticed and noted by non-politicians – journalists/experts.

⁴⁹ B. Dobek-Ostrowska, *Komunikowanie polityczne i publiczne. Podręcznik akademicki*, Warszawa 2007, pp. 33–35; W. Pisarek, *Wstęp do nauki o komunikowaniu*, Warszawa 2008, pp. 277, 281; D.M. White, *The “gate keeper”: a Case Study in the Selection of News*, “Journalism Quarterly” 3 (1950), pp. 383–390; J. Galtung, M.H. Ruga, *The Structure of Foreign News*, “Journal of Peace Research” 1 (1965), pp. 64–91; *Individual and routine*

benefit of society. Other questions which should be posed concern the number of pledges made – why do politicians promise so much if the media account them of only the most important ones? Perhaps an answer is in the *comprehensive political marketing theory*⁵⁰, which obliges never to leave a sense of emptiness, actively create reality, even if it's only in the realm of wishes, postulates or reader and journalist expectations.

Each of the presented methods of researching the character, degree and extent of keeping pledges by political elites is based on different assumptions. The polling method assumes that respondents-voters have the competences to rationally distinguish political pledges and account their realization. Researchers from the Comparative Manifesto Project believe that campaign programmes of certain political parties really do influence what the governing party will do during its term in office. Enthusiasts of the pledge method are certain that promises politicians make during their election campaigns point to the direction of their future activities. This is the answer to fulfilling pledges – in the engagement of politicians in the given issue and the time and attention they dedicate to it. All these methods have advantages, but also serious drawbacks. Similarly to the hybrid method proposed in the article – combining the assumptions of the pledge method (identifying the political substance of election pledges and rationalizing the actions of the political elite in terms of exposing certain issues) with the conviction that opinion-forming media, playing an important role in the process of political communication, can be for the scholar, in essence, an important reference point in analyzing political pledges and the degree of their fulfillment by governing elites. The media function as a radar that verifies and qualifies political pledge reality, on behalf of society and voters marking the kept and unkept promises, accounting politicians of unfulfilled pledges, and finally, as inspiration granting politicians diverse solutions or even expecting of them certain behaviour and actions. From a theoretical perspective, the above functions can be seen as valid because the operationalization of the hybrid method, supported by research practice as shown, is fairly easy, thus accessible to almost any researcher. Results of the study pose many important questions to media scholars, political scientists and sociologists concerning the efficiency of political communication, the political substance of campaign promises and public debate, and finally, the social, democratic and mediatized (mediated) nature of the relationship on the line of authorities–society and politicians–citizens.

forces in gatekeeping, aut. P.J. Shoemaker i in., “Journalism and Mass Media Communication Quarterly” 78 (2001), No. 2, pp. 233–246, 75–89; P.J. Shoemaker, *Gatekeeping*, Newbury Park 1991, *passim*.

⁵⁰ J.H. Kołodziej, *Nowy paradygmat legitymizacji władzy? Wybrane konsekwencje marketingu i mediatyzacji polityki*, “Zeszyty Prasoznawcze” 2006, No. 1/2, pp. 27–29; M. Jaśniok, *Strategie marketingowe na rynku politycznym*, Kraków 2007, p. 29. Por. W. Cwalina, A. Falkowski, *Marketing polityczny. Perspektywa psychologiczna*, Gdańsk 2006, *passim*.

The above questions and answers are surely not a complete analysis of the presented data. A different article altogether could be dedicated to the regularities discovered in this research. This article however, should be treated as contributing to a wider discussion on the methods and utility of political-media studies dedicated to analyzing pledges made by the political class and the extent and nature of their redeeming. These types of projects integrate representatives of diverse disciplines (political scientists, sociologists, media studies experts) around a subject that concerns fundamental issues such as functionality and teleologicalness of election campaigns and their real influence on later decisions of the government, who tries to redeem the pledges they made. Worth considering is creating a Polish equivalent of the Comparative Manifesto Project, in which researchers from different disciplines could attempt to organize knowledge on Polish political parties, monitor the evolution of their world views and pledges made during elections, and finally, hold them accountable of earlier made promises, which were not redeemed. A multivector analysis of media that are a meaningful entity interacting with the political class on behalf of and before citizens/voters, should also be a basis of this project.