CHANGES IN THE INTERNATIONAL POSITION OF CENTRAL EUROPE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION INTEGRATION

Jerzy Stańczyk, Institute of Social Sciences, Siedlce University of Natural Sciences and Humanities, Poland

Abstract:
This article refers to changes in the international position of Central Europe in the context of integration to the European Union. The author presents the current nature of this region and future of the European Union and also problems of Central Europe region. This indicates the specificity of this region, its dependence on international actors and security deficiencies. There are analyzed changes resulting from development of the European integration. There is not perceived only the impact of international organizations, but also the role of superpowers in the region.

Key words:
Central Europe, European Union, European integration, European security, region, system transformation, international order

While attempting to precisely specify geographical scope of the term “Central Europe” one should emphasise that various authors (scientific researchers, politicians, and publicists) have given to it similar although not entirely identical territorial ranges (in more details in Stańczyk 2002; 171-188). Notwithstanding the variously formulated interpretations of the term in scientific theories, it is used in an even more diverse way in the current political practices of
different countries, depending on their immediate aims. In addition, the region is given various names: Central Europe, Middle Europe, Eastern Europe, Central and Eastern Europe, and Central-Southern-Eastern Europe, as well as “the reformist countries” (Reformstaaten) (Drozd 1994: 30). Generally, during the first years of transformation the term “Central Europe” was to denote the region between the close-knit structures of the Western European integration and the CIS group of countries, the position of which is to a large degree defined by their place in the European politics. Nowadays, in response to progress of the European integration, character of the Central Europe has changed.

**Current Character of the Region**

Large number of various definitions of the territorial range of Central Europe already presented the changes that have occurred to its position and role in international relations. It is evident at the outset that, in terms of sovereignty, the number of countries in the region has changed (through German reunification and the break up of Yugoslavia, the USSR, and Czechoslovakia). Recognising that restructurisation is an essential criterion for a comprehensive system transformation, one can observe the subsequent reorganisation of those countries external links, including their rejection of their old dependence on the USSR/Russia, the disintegration of many of the old ties between the countries, their gradual entry into the Western organisations and creation of new regional organisations.

Change of the international balance of power has highlighted the particular nature of the Central-European region. From a geopolitical point of view it is not well compared to its two neighbouring powers, Germany and Russia; from a political point of view it is highly fragmented, owing to the existence of many differing interests, even despite the beginnings of regional co-operation; from an economic point of view it has been hampered by crises and under-development; from a military point of view, for security reasons it remains in

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1 Compare the speech of Chancellor Helmut Kohl at a conference on Security Policy in Munich on February 5, 1994, Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung 1994, no. 15.
a “grey area” and is incapable of self-defence; from a cultural point of view it is a transitional area between the West (with which it generally identifies) and the East (in relation to which it is a defensive bulwark, but to which it is tied, connected by a joint fate and the intermingling of cultures); from a strategic point of view it is extremely unstable (representing a mosaic of nationalities and having numerous border changes and territorial disputes, with the revival of national discords and the growth of nationalism, often motivated by religious differences and memories of painful experiences of the past). These peculiarities result in the region’s inability to independently establish internal order and its dependence on protection of the West (Stańczyk 2004, Stefanowicz 1993: 42-43).

In addition, changes to the international balance of power have liberated the Central European region’s natural, extremely strong desire to find its new identity, through uncovering its latent internal tendencies and the region’s external links (combining its spheres of interest and of influence, in particular Germany, Russia, Turkey), and have destabilised the situation in certain areas (for example former Yugoslavia) and placed renewed integration with the West high up the agenda. It is evident that internal changes have clearly outstripped the development of new mechanisms for international co-operation, particularly between the region and Western institutions and countries. This has in many cases made it difficult for the countries of the region to establish new legal positions in the international environment and to develop alternative relations with Western countries, and has thus often deprived the West of a fully co-ordinated, effective and rational influence over the newly liberated internal processes of the region (Kukulka 1994a: 37-38).

As a result of the collapse of the old order and their inability to join a new order, the post-socialist European countries found temporarily themselves in a transition period within their transformation - a period of reorientation of their foreign policies towards the West, aimed at full integration, of which one of the conditions is the completion of system reforms. This transition stage affects not only the countries of the region, but also the entire international community (more for example see Rogers, Dando 1982), as the transformation
already achieved has led to creation of a new international order in Europe (one should rather view the necessity of a new arrangement of relations in the area of the OSCE, and thus on the American-European-Asian plain, or in other words within the Transoceanic context) (see Kuklka 1994b: 161-170).

However strident the opinion that the old order has been replaced temporarily with disorder or disorganisation (see Brzeziński 1994, Kuźniar 1993: 12), one should not confuse the new order with chaos (the links between these countries and international organisations and their mutual relations, and also international conventions and general standards of behaviour, continue to were recognised) (Kuźniar 1994: 6); it should be seen as far-reaching pluralisation and decentralisation within the international relations, rather than that the situation is sometimes slipping out of the control of the main players on the international stage (the great powers), thus making rational planning even more impossible (Kuźniar, Ciechański 1992: Kukułka 1992: 208-209). The Kosovo episode (NATO’s military intervention in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1999) would seem to provide confirmation of this (details Stańczyk 2004b: 225-235).

Generalizing the results of the transformation processes in Central Europe, can be formulated an opinion that in objective sense, the criteria for democratisation are evident in their transformation, which has been aimed at achieving system changes of a general, political, economic, and military nature. The democratisation criteria cannot be treated in an absolute manner because of the emergence of many non-democratic tendencies (nationalism, national conflicts etc.), but recognition of it as fundamental for this issue is motivated by the fact that democratisation (as a need and aim of Central European communities) was undoubtedly an impulse for the process of change to the international balance of power.

In functional terms, the degree of modernising transformation in Central Europe is determined by the efficacy of actions aimed at reinstating the sovereignty of its countries (by avoiding the risk of dependency associated with remaining within the sphere of influence of the great powers, particularly Russia) and at their reintegration with the Western Europe and making up development arrears in this respect. It may be
assumed that these directions constitute the aims of Central European transformation. At the same time they also conform to the general aims of system changes among the Central European post-socialist states, namely freedom, security and prosperity.

For a deeper analysis of this issue it would be useful to employ elementary contrasting features specifying the main trends in evidence in the described region. One can identify the following fundamental pairs: sovereignty versus subjugation, and integration versus disintegration (more see Stańczyk 1999). Viewed (as necessary) in the terms of system changes in the post-socialist countries, Central Europe remains at the crossroads of these trends. Sovereignty of its states (linked to their emancipation at the turn of the 80s and 90s) led, by the elimination of the block's dependency on the USSR/Russia, to the disintegration both of the paralysed geopolitical order in this part of Europe and of many of the existing ties between its countries. Movement in the direction of integration with the Western European structures is aimed at least in part at avoiding the subjugation of those countries, which would happen not only in the event of their possible subordination within the Russian sphere of influence, but also in the event of their remaining in a “grey area”. One should also note that for some time disintegration tendencies have been counteracted by regional integration processes (i.e. new regionalism), which also has one of its aims as strengthening of the subjective role of the Central European region in the international politics. These tendencies are interlinked, and their effects determine the position of Central Europe in international relations.

**The Future of the European Union and the Problems of Central Europe**

An analysis of the EU’s perspectives in the context of anticipated transformations in the area of the European security should cover both the strictly understood defence initiatives and capabilities of the EU and the political and economic stabilization it can provide on the continent, including the promotion of relevant social attitudes and awareness, which indirectly strengthen security. If the former aspect relates mainly to the deepened institutional reform, the
latter depends on the expansion of the EU’s territorial range. In this sense, the enlargements should be deemed as an investment in the European stability, as they contributed to a revitalization of the EU, even if it were mainly the new members that gained the greatest benefits while the old ones became sometimes tired of the enlargement processes (Bradley, Petrakos, Traistaru 2005; Cameron 2004).

After the accession of Bulgaria and Romania (1 January 2007) the prevailing approach has been a reserved and a moderate pace for future enlargements. There is also agreement that the convergence criteria should be more strict and future enlargements accompanied by a deepened reform inside the EU. This approach moreover promotes forms of cooperation with the selected countries, in particular non-European states, other than the actual membership (Dannreither 2004).

The queue for membership currently includes Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania, Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro, and Turkey. The negotiations with the former Yugoslavia states can be opened upon the condition that they will fully cooperate with the UN war crimes tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. This clearly testifies to the political character of this enlargement, which will be the price the EU must pay for the stabilization of the Balkans and guarantees of its own security.

The matter of Ukraine’s membership remains unsettled for the time being, because of objections raised mainly by France. The situation was not helped by the European Parliament’s vast majority vote of January 2005 in favour of Ukraine’s accession to the European Union. This may be a sign of weakness of the EU’s eastern policy, as opposed to the strategies for the Mediterranean region (the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership launched in 1995 in Barcelona).2

Another issue is an inevitable significance of Russia as a partner of the European Union. The EU-Russia summits are held regularly with the aim to reach agreements on cooperation programmes, in particular for the areas

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2 The EU’s Mediterranean and Middle East Policy. Creating an Area of Dialogue, Cooperation and Change, [online].

neighbouring the EU and Russia. New EU Member States are much concerned about any deference to Russia demonstrated by the old members, which is doubtlessly due to their dependence on Russian gas supplies. In 2006 Russia reduced its gas supplies to the Western Europe twice, which pointed at insufficiencies in the European energy security and the need for a diversification of raw resource and energy supply sources.

These are not the only security shortages of the European Union. It should be remembered that the EU is neither a classical political and military alliance nor a state, although the political integration processes are often described as a straightforward simulation of state structures and institutions (including the common foreign, security, and defence policies). According to Jan Zielonka, “the EU is becoming something like a neo-Medieval empire with a polycentric system of government, divided sovereignty, vague borders, multiple overlapping jurisdictions and outstanding cultural and economic diversity” (Zielonka 2006: v). Moreover, the European Union seems to have stopped at a crossroads due to both the enlargement eastwards and the rejection of the draft Constitutional Treaty. Without having a defined government centre but led by a multi-level management system (with overlapping competencies of various national and supranational institutions), vexed by divergent positions of the Member States and constant modifications of its external borders, the EU is exposed to a lack of unity and identity (De Burca 2005). It may be true that the power of Europe lies in its diversified unity yet this insufficient homogeneity sometimes poses significant problems. It must also be acknowledged that the enlargements, despite their unquestionable political and symbolic value, have transformed the EU in a way that necessitates a more precise definition of its identity.

In this context, the efforts to agree on a common foreign and security policy, defence policy, or the establishment of joint military units as a surrogate for a European army are not

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actually equivalent to the capacity to guarantee security. Naturally, it would be unreasonable to deny such facts as the Common Foreign and Security Policy (1992), European Security and Defence Policy, EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (1999), EU Military Committee and EU Military Staff, or the initial police and military operations of the EU in the Balkans and in Congo 2004 (more in Missiroli, 2004). Adoption of the Lisbon Treaty (2009) is also noteworthy. However, Europe still lacks a single decision-making centre for foreign and security policy matters, while the enlargements make things ever more complex. New Member States have always different priorities in this area, particularly towards the key partners of the European Union, i.e. the USA and Russia (Grabbe 2004). As a consequence, the European foreign policy is maintained by other international institutions, such as NATO, the OSCE or the UN, together with more or less formal ad hoc coalitions.5

As anticipated, the enlargements of the European Union will be conditioned mainly by geopolitical reasons and undertaken with a strategic view to ensure stabilization and security, initially under the convergence processes enforced on the candidate states. In this context, the list of potential EU members includes not only Turkey or Ukraine but also Georgia or Moldova, and in the long-term perspective also Russia or Israel and Lebanon (Zielonka 2006). However, cultural and religious differences, reinforced by divergent positions towards the democracy or free-market values, are bound to hinder any agreements on a common European identity, which alone could give the EU an effective instrument to ensure security and in general carry on with successful interstate policies. In this way, the proposals of a hard core of the European Union to be established by the most influential members lose much of their astonishing character. Although such proposals will continue to raise controversy and thus criticism among Member States, it seems inevitable that the growing diversity of the European Union will require new methods of

management in the future (Hayward, Menon 2003; Smith 2000).

It should be noted that even today the European Union, with its thriving bureaucracy, displays growing difficulty in decision-making processes and financial system irregularities, which prevent it from establishing a different quality in the management of security matters, more capable than that of NATO. Nothing more than an imitation of NATO, weakened by the absence of the USA, lurks behind the proposals to establish a common European defence structure without the US participation. An increase in anti-American attitudes within the European Union is now a fact, which springs not only from cultural differences but also from divergent interests. The USA is a global actor in the global arena. The Americans do not limit their way of thinking to the borders of their state. The Europeans do think and act in this respect in a regional perspective (Weatherill, Bernitz 2005).

The EU's neighbourhood policy and protection of the external borders as well as recently implemented at the initiative of Polish and Swedish Eastern Partnership Program clearly manifest Europe's regional range. European activities focus mainly on internal affairs, as testified to by the enhancements gradually introduced to the Schengen Agreement, cooperation for the protection of the EU's external borders (with the new Member States opposing the establishment of the joint border guard unit) and the establishment of the FRONTEX Agency in Warsaw. This cooperation has been stepped up in connection with the measures to combat terrorism.6

An assessment of the EU's abilities to ensure security is bound to encompass its regional and integrative character. Therefore, the main sphere of its activities consists of further geographical extension and deepened cooperation, to date almost exclusively in non-military areas. Of course, this involves security matters as well, even if only indirectly. The integration processes, including aid programmes for sub-

6 *The Hague Programme: Ten Priorities for the Next Five Years. The Partnership for European Renewal in the Field of Freedom, Security and Justice.*

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regional cooperation with the closest neighbouring state, constitute the EU's tool to counter conflicts and prevent new threats. These measures concentrate on the following sub-regions: the Balkans, Mediterranean, Baltic and Black Sea regions and Eastern Europe (which, according to the European Commission, it covers Russia, Eastern European states, together with Central Asia and the Caucasus). The European Union puts its efforts into influencing these areas by offering certain incentives under its aid programmes for states to liberalize economic exchange and trade, undertake democratization processes and reforms, and respect human rights and freedoms, among other goals and by fostering an enhanced intercultural dialogue. A top priority in security matters is given to conflict management via early warning and preventive diplomacy measures.

Among the perspectives of European security, the issue of Central European security requires a separate consideration due to its specific character (a diversified unity, infiltration of Eastern and Western European features, its position in the policies of the global powers) and the significance role of the process of change of the international alignment of forces in Europe in the late 1980's and early 1990's. Some have argued that, as a result of the transformation processes and enlargements of NATO and the EU, the role of this region or at least its geopolitical significance has diminished (Kuźniar 2006: 36), yet we still have some institutions of the new regionalism in Central Europe, such as the Visegrad Group or the Central European Initiative. Of course, the success of their activities is debatable, including their cooperation in relation to both the Euro-Atlantic issues (positions towards the EU and

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the USA) and eastern matters (towards Russia and Ukraine). Therefore, the criterion of interests takes priority over the criterion of geographical location. The interests vary especially in terms of the position towards the role of the United States in the global arena, with Poland standing out among the states of this region. However, it cannot be said to be the only consistently pro-American state in Europe as, besides the United Kingdom, we could also name Ireland and Italy. Apart from historical and cultural ties, these sentiments are substantially grounded precisely in shared political, economic, and security interests (Zielonka, Pravda 2001).

The “old” and “new” members of the Euro-Atlantic structures have divided over issues of security (Longhurst, Zaborowski 2005). It is matter of Central Europe that the dissonance between the political and economic choice of the European Union and orientation of defence strategies towards NATO and the USA is particularly sharp. This is the decisive factor in the lack of support for the European Security and Defence Policy, withdrawn by this region in favour of a sustained position for NATO. Obviously, this is also a problem of identity, which affects the European unity. Central European countries declare they decided to support the American military presence in Europe, supported the US intervention in Iraq, entered into negotiations with the USA over the deployment of the US military installations in their territories, support the anti-missile shield project, and acknowledge the significance of energy security in the context of a possible breakdown in relations with Russia. At the same time, they are unwilling to refuse the benefits of their membership in the European Union and reject an “either-or” alternative between positive relations with the European Union and the United States. They deem unfortunate the declaration of the division into the “old” and “new” Europe (Larrabee 2006: 10-11).

Since the goals of membership in NATO and the EU were reached, Central European countries are free to enter into new agreements in the coming years, both on regional and Euro-Atlantic policy matters, in line with their respective interests. Among such novel relations, particular attention is paid to the political rapprochement between Poland and Ukraine (Wolczuk, Wolczuk 2002). Its symbolic expression is the joint
military unit in the Kosovo peace-keeping operation or the shared hosting of the European Football Championship Euro 2012. In the long-term perspective, Poland’s support to Ukraine’s efforts to join the Euro-Atlantic structures is important. Ukraine’s participation in these structures may contribute substantially to increased stability and security in Europe, due to the geopolitical position of this state and its resources (Garnett 1997, Pietraś 2006: 43-61).

An obvious hindrance in Central European cooperation in the economic, political, and security dimensions is the recent revival of Russia as an active international actor whose interests differ from those of Central European countries (Lieven 2001). Russia aims to maintain Ukraine under its influence and prevent the pro-Western orientation of Georgia and Moldova. The measures employed feature, in particular, economic pressure, especially energy blackmail. In this situation, the anxiety over the intensified contacts between Russia and Germany is well justified, even if these take place in the economic and political sphere. Poland’s protest against the North European Gas Pipeline under the Baltic Sea, which would directly connect Russia and Germany, springs from a fear of a potential blockage of gas supplies to Central European countries that would leave Western Europe intact.

Central European countries entrust their security to NATO (Stańczyk 2008: 130-150). Therefore, the rise in anti-American attitudes in Europe and the questioning of the leading position of the USA in NATO become a substantial concern, all the more so given that the main culprits are the leading members of the European Union, i.e. France and Germany. Added to Russia’s regaining its influence in Europe, as supported precisely by France and Germany, this may result in weakening the position of NATO as the guarantor of security in Central Europe. This is so because the above developments are accompanied by a standstill in the construction of the EU’s common foreign and security policy (Kamiński 2007: 29-30).

From the security point of view in Central Europe, key importance is attributed to the strengthening of the multilateral structures of cooperation, in particular the European Union and NATO, together with supporting the system reform processes (democratization and economic
liberalization) in Eastern European countries. Moreover, it is essential that the trans-Atlantic ties with the United States be maintained and further developed.

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Analysis of the European security perspectives should therefore include a due consideration of the needs of the European community in the context of the above-outlined challenges and threats. There is no doubt that strengthening democracy in the European countries and in the neighbourhood is one of these needs. It is the democratic system that facilitates a collective effort to contribute to a higher level of security, including by countering potential crises.

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