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## RUSSIA'S HYBRID WAR IN THEORY AND PRACTICE

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**ABSTRACT** The warfare is evolving and it is confirmed by last conflicts in which Russia was involved. They were asymmetric in nature and their objectives, developments, consequences in broader sense and end states have been a matter of research by many scholars. The nature of those conflicts is causing concerns and a question if there were randomly run or just perfectly synchronized operations? If so, should a hybrid war be considered a way of strategy and its objectives seen through the prism of the Russia's interests? The answer to this question can be obtained after the evaluation of the theory and practice employed by the Russian Federation in the concept of hybrid war. This is the purpose of this article. The results of the research are presented by solving the following problem: What does the concept of the new generation warfare mean?

### Introduction

Preparation for future conflicts requires serious tracing of events and drawing of appropriate lessons from the past. Particular attention should be paid to the blended threats and hybrid wars that are successfully carried out by the Islamic State and the Russian Federation (FR) within the Ukrainian conflict. Hybrid war defined as a combination of conventional methods and irregular

formations, asymmetric tactics, and terrorism with actions of a criminal nature, is a unique form of planned and synchronized impact on the opposite side through military and non-military instruments (Hoffman 2009).

Observation of the conflict in the Ukraine entitles anyone to say that it was a flawed argument that hybrid warfare has been conducted by non-state actors who represent a weaker side in the conflict. Theorists of the art of warfare and military experts on the basis of the experience involving Chechens, Hezbollah or the Tamil Tigers recognized how big challenges are being posed by multi-modal warfare. However, some of them have criticized the concept of hybrid warfare indicating that tactical problems have no relevance to a strategy and warriors having nearly mystical powers do not exist in reality (Kapugeekiyana 2014, p. 1).

It is difficult to agree with this opinion if we follow the conflict in practice which took place during the last few years in Ukraine. Attentive observers of the conflict have certainly noticed that Russian aggression in Ukraine was expressed by a combination of regular and irregular forms of warfare, economic sanctions, political destabilization, information warfare, financial pressures and finally cyber-attacks (Maigre 2015, p. 2). Were the above-mentioned spheres of influence random or just perfectly synchronized? If so, should a hybrid war be considered a way of strategy and its objectives seen through the prism of the Russia's interests (Koffman & Rojanski 2015, p. 1)? The answer to this question can be obtained after the evaluation of the theory and practice employed by the Russian Federation in the concept of hybrid war. This is the purpose of this article. The results of the research are presented by solving the following problem: What does the concept of the new generation warfare mean?

## War in Ukraine

The campaign against Ukraine was conducted for many years by diplomatic, political, economic and information means. One can notice its severity after W. Yanukovich's fall. It was expressed by a concentration of Russian armed forces nearby the Russian – Ukrainian borderline and the emergence of the so-called “green men” in Crimea who seized all the important state facilities, including those of military origin just within 24 hours. A similar scenario took place in April 2014 in Donetsk and Lugansk, when a group of demonstrators seized the state and police facilities and then declared themselves the separatists, thus expressing their strong dissatisfaction with the new government in Kiev.

Consequently, the Russian Federation without a single shot being fired has made rapid annexation of the Crimea; and Donetsk and Lugansk *oblasts* were proclaimed two independent republics. These actions were supported by a well-coordinated and intensive media campaign conducted on the territory of Ukraine and abroad, pressure to use concentrated regular detachments of the Russian armed forces, and pressure to cut off the gas supply. Unprecedented and very well-coordinated actions of Russian soldiers, pro-Russian local separatists, the media and diplomacy were described by many experts as hybrid warfare (Rącz 2015, p.11).

The concept of hybrid war gives the luxury of a wide range of possible choices of one or more actions like, for example, aggregated impacts in cyberspace, information space or even criminal activities involving kidnapping (Winięcki 2014) and killings. Such actions are usually spread over time and give the impression that they are not connected together in any way. They create ambiguity, because it is impossible to recognize those ones who really stand behind them. The flexibility of the instruments inherent in hybrid warfare inadvertently creates good conditions

for politicians to become involved. The politicians are those who achieve the desired goals by applying a special strategy and tactics in war. In this case, therefore, Clausewitz's warfare paradigm applies which says that war is the continuation of policy by other means (Clausewitz, p. 483).

In Ukraine, there appears uncertainty and ambiguity expressed by Clausewitz as the "fog of war" and ubiquitous friction (Clausewitz, p. 45). It turns out to be true that war is the realm of uncertainty; three-quarters of the factors on which action is based are wrapped in a fog (Górecki, p. 89). The new tactics that are based on the hybrid sequence of improvisations of disproportional and incomparable impacts in various spheres and in various geographic areas along with the conventional attributes of war, for example tanks and artillery, at the same time conducting humanitarian convoys creates an effect of the so-called nonlinearity and causes consternation not only on the attacked side, but also among politicians and policy-makers from international organizations. The effectiveness of hybrid war is expressed in the fact that only in the spring ministerial session, in June 2015, NATO came to the conclusion that in the Ukrainian conflict the Russian Federation is the aggressor (Sekretarz Generalny NATO [...] 2015). Perhaps it was easy to associate what was the purpose of the action and who stood behind the cyber-attacks in the Baltic States and Ukraine, who stood behind the vast disinformation campaign, who stood behind the random forays of fighter-bombers and strategic-bombers in NATO airspace, who played submarine games in the Baltic Sea (Schadlow 2015, p. 2).

## Rebellious Wars

Into the new nature of actions applied by the Russian Federation in Ukraine many actors are involved and they have various measures of influence at their disposal. They are inspired and

supported from outside by those who do not take direct part in the conflict and do not want to be associated with it. In the 60s of the last century this model of actions was described in detail by the theorist and strategist of the art of warfare J. Messner (Sykulski 2015, p. 105) in his book *Rebellious Wars* (Месснер 2005). J. Messner, while pointing to the nature of the wars of the late 20<sup>th</sup> century and early 21<sup>th</sup> century predicted the spread of international terrorism and the unpreparedness of state structures to withstand these kinds of threats. Messner's concept told about blurring of the differences between the states of war and peace, between regular and irregular activities.

According to the Russian strategist, the basic form of fighting the so-called rebellious wars were irregular activities under which one can mention diversions, sabotage, terrorism, guerrilla activities and uprisings (Месснер 2005, pp. 90-91). In the new form of armed conflicts which are called rebellious conflicts, not only the military will take part, but also civilian bodies and ordinary citizens who are involved in national movements, insurgent movements and rebellions.

This phenomenon can be considered from different points of view; however, the most important here is psychological one. In regular armies psychology does not matter much, but if anything, it plays a complementary role. Nevertheless, for fighting insurgents, separatists, terrorists or rebels, psychology plays a crucial role. Messer argues that guerrilla and terrorist wars will be separate types of wars and they will be called **psychological wars** (Месснер 2005, p. 12).

Psychology of the rebellious masses in the rebellious wars will eclipse regular forces' equipment and will become the deciding factor between victory and defeat. Messner claims that the psychological effect should be achieved not only through the usage of surprising strategy and tactics aimed at enemy troops but also at hostile society through intimidation and pressuring, blackmail,

guerrilla actions (Месснер 2005, p. 394) and terroristic attacks (Месснер 2005, p. 109).

Messner believes that new forms of armed conflict will be of revolutionary character (Месснер 2005, p. 420) which is called half-warfare. He indicates that aggressive diplomacy will play a big role in such half-warfare which he compares to a weaker form of war. He calls diplomacy the politics in white gloves that utilises various forms of intimidation, imposing will or negotiations on every important issue (Месснер 2005, p. 110). Diplomacy will be linked with subversive activities. In such half-warfare, partisans will take part or the so-called fifth column, terrorists, subversives, saboteurs, hooligans, devastators and propagandists who use the means of mass information. Demonstrations and manifestations, disorder, terror, rebellion recruitment will aim at changing the mentality of people and constructing a new social system.

**The purpose of the rebellious war strategy is to destabilize state structures and consequently to lead to the collapse of the state. Omnipresent chaos is a characteristic feature of the rebellious war.** The defending side cannot be abstracted from the chaos as it is possible to do in the case of conventional wars. Nobody knows where the attacking side and where the defending side will be located. There will be no possibility of physical separation of those objects. There will be no visible borders between the warring parties in the cities where future conflicts will take place. Chaos will not be created accidentally but in an organized, structured and thoughtful way by the central management representatives. The most important factor in future wars will be the belief that there is a just cause to overcome the opponents' fighting spirit.

J. Messner claims that **subversive war** (Cierniak 2012) **is a psychological war and its objective is to defeat the mind and spirit of an attacked nation and to defeat its consciousness** (Месснер 2005, p. 394). The above statement gives the conclusion

that in the rebellious war psychology of the masses moves regular army weapons aside and becomes a deciding factor between victory and defeat. Admittedly, there are ways of exerting influence on the opposite side's actions by violence and intimidation, by terroristic and partisan actions, but classical weapons play a supporting role.

The philosophy of substitute weapons can be compared to pornography, drugs or brainwashing. In the past wars the most important was to capture and keep a territory. In modern wars the most important is to conquer the minds of society in an enemy country. In the past wars enemies were separated by the front line; in future wars there will be a lack of boundaries between the fighting sides and the theatre of operations, between the society and the fighting sides. The fight will take place throughout the territory of the enemy, and behind the front line there will appear political, social and economic warfare. There will be no distinction between legal and illegal ways of warfare and the latter will gain in importance. Regular forces will lose their monopoly on military operations which will bring us closer to new forms of warfare, breaking the law and ethics of war (Месснер 2005, p. 70). A new fourth dimension will appear which will constitute the psyche of the fighting nation (Месснер 2005, p. 135 & p. 395). The people involved will be guided and supported logistically and financially from the outside by a state which would neither be officially involved nor be a side of the conflict.

J. Messner believes that both classical and rebellious (revolutionary) warfare is an art. Considering the new generation war as a strategist is in more difficult situation because of the abundance of goals of its value and importance. Messner offers the following hierarchy of objectives (Месснер 2005, p. 132): 1) breaking the hostile nation's unity (lowering its morale); 2) overcoming an active part of nation, namely the part which is able to wage the armed struggle i.e. regular forces, guerrilla, fighting

national organizations; 3) seizing or destruction of objects valuable from a psychological point of view; 4) seizing or destruction of objects of material value; 5) achieving the externalities i.e. winning over new allies or weakening enemy's allies.

At the same time, efforts should be made to: 1) strengthen the unity of one's own nation; 2) protect own nation's forces; 3) avoid negative repercussions in neutral (but important for one's own interests) countries. In all cases, it is important to take into account not only the response of the government of the opposing state and selected fighting social groups but above all the response of the whole society. The paramount goal of rebellious strategic war is an enslavement of the hostile nation in a psychological way rather than a physical one by destroying its fundamental ideology, causing doubts, disappointment and dejection, confirming themselves in the victory of our ideas and eventually conviction that they are predominant.

The means for achieving those goals is propaganda. Propaganda is not only about winning a victory by means of weapons or terrorism. J. Messner believed that the end of the 20th century ended the era of classic wars in Clausewitz's meaning as a clash of two opposing forces. War takes the rebellious form without frontline and military columns. Success or failure will depend on the spirit of the nation (Месснер 2005, p. 118). Messner believed that there will be no direct clash of two powers with weapons of mass destruction. As the history has shown, Messner's words proved fully true. He claimed that the idea of a total breakdown of the opponent's manpower is an anachronism rather than a modern strategy. One cannot take the life of an entire nation if it is involved in a fight (Месснер 2005, p. 129). Instead, one should think about breaking the psyche of the opposing side, says Messner (Месснер 2005, p. 130). The era of keeping a conquered territory has ended. Today, the most important thing is to maintain control over strategic objects and the aim is not a routing the

enemy but the imposition of our will of victory upon him. It is tried to be achieved with all possible ways: military, information, economic and diplomatic. In such a war, mass troops with the accumulated technology and logistics facilities are useless.

Messner assumed that the main means of warfare is agitation. He distinguished between offensive agitation aimed at weakening the enemy and defensive agitation aimed at reinforcing the fighting spirit (Месснер 2005, p. 134). He was a supporter of half-truths and he stated that one half-truth belongs to our own nation and the other one belongs to the enemy, therefore, a war requires an art of the waging of the psychological dimension (Месснер 2005, p. 135).

To conclude, it is worth saying that in the rebellious war only one side has strategic purpose and management. The other side does not have it, so without seeing that warfare is taking place it replaces the strategy of hostile war with the strategy of peace. Such a situation clearly contradicts one of the fundamental war principles which states that one should firmly anticipate the enemy's actions or resist the enemy's attack.

## **War in Chechnya**

W. Nemeth while presenting his assessment of the war in Chechnya argues that the armed forces of the contemporary society reflect this society. He claims that as a result of long-running conflict, the society evaluated and transformed into a hybrid society. This society also organized hybrid armed forces, which constituted a major challenge for the opposing side especially militarily. Nemeth compares hybrid war to the fourth generation war by indicating the weight of terrorism when combined with new technologies (Nemeth 2012, p. 3).

W. Nemeth claims that Chechens have successfully used the regular subdivisions which in turn used irregular tactics and guerrilla warfare. It is surprising that they used the skills of easy methods of transformation and ways of fighting which often took different forms. Ambushes were widely used at the tactical level. However, more sophisticated elements of action such as murder, kidnapping, arson, improvised explosives etc. were successfully introduced (Nemeth 2012, p. 61).

There were no well-defined boundaries between guerrilla and terrorist activities. On the example of Chechnya one can trace how the armed groups in underdeveloped societies use new ways to integrate their activities with highly developed technologies and adapt to the tactics of the enemy. It makes the fight more effective.

The nature of the activities described above clearly confirms Messner's predictions about the methods, ways and forms of fighting in the future wars. Messner's statement on the importance of psychological influence has been confirmed. Through the usage of mobile radio and television, Chechens combined successfully the new possibilities of guerrilla activities and reduced effectively the morale of Russian soldiers. Knowing perfectly the rules of the Russian psyche, Chechens were able to effectively strike the Russian society while remaining resistant to any attempt to break the resistance. An anti-Russian climate, ethnic unity and the most important – strong religion and public support for the fighters caused the Russian propaganda to be ineffective (Nemeth 2012, p. 62).

In Chechnya the modern media was used in a very skilful way. It was used as an effective means of command as well as disinformation. Through the media Chechens controlled the society of the opposing side. Through the skilful propaganda they effectively affected both the fighting soldiers and the rest of the society of the opposing side. Nemeth indicates the following

sources of power of the hybrid war (Nemeth 2012, p. 74): 1) ideas; 2) charisma of the leaders and particular rebels; 3) resistance of the society and people who fights to suffering and severe punishments; 4) strong belief in their cause; 5) decentralization of tactics.

Hybrid warfare in Chechnya took the form of total war as the people fought for their existence and had a strong belief in the cause of the struggle. The side which fought against the hybrid society always paid a high price in the form of damaged supplies of food and water as well as terror and massacres (Nemeth 2012, p. 74). As Messner underlines, the rebellious war has no front line, therefore, it is naive to say that the Chechen war took place only in the territory of Chechnya. War activities were carried out in neighbouring Ossetia and Dagestan. From time to time in the media, even after the official end of the conflict, there were some reports about bomb explosions in Moscow, Volgograd, Voronezh, Astrakhan and many other places. Chechen terrorists have operated under the guise of criminal organisations. They commit crimes throughout Russia in order to take control over its economy. As Messner says, one can only win the rebellious war by overcoming the psyche of the entire opposing nation. There is belief in Russia that people live in a peaceful country and the government does not risk the mobilization of the masses (Мясников 2005, p. 7).

### **New- generation Wars**

The development of new technologies in the 90s of the last century created new opportunities of waging armed struggle. Russian General M. Gareev in the book *If War Comes Tomorrow* (Gareev 1998) proposes the thesis that new technologies fundamentally change the character of war. New measures will allow using information better and waging a fight effectively in the

sphere of psychology which was the most important in Messner's theory.

Messner emphasized that new information and communication measures will allow collecting and processing the information quickly and thus responding in the sphere of information and effective destabilizing of the enemy's systems of command (Gareev 1998, p. 51-52). He argued that systematic dissemination of psychological and provocative information materials will create Clausewitz's effect of a fog through blurring the boundaries between the truth and falsehood. Activities of that kind can lead to mass psychosis, a sense of despair and hopelessness, loss of confidence in the government and the national armed forces that as a result lead to the destabilization of the attacked country and the creation of favourable conditions to use other instruments of influence (Gareev 1998, p. 53).

Gareev treated the information war as the decisive element of conflict. On the other hand, new methods of information struggle allow the opposing side to **attack without the declaration of war**. Those ideas and theses were developed by General W. Slipchenko. He characterized the future war as being **non-contact**. He argued that the war will begin with precise strikes from the air on the objects of military importance, such as command and control centres, as well as politically and economically significant places throughout the territory of the enemy, without the involvement of armed forces into a direct confrontation (Mattsson & Eklund 2013, p. 37). Similarly to W. Gareev, Slipchenko pointed out the significance of information war and global networking emergence (Mattsson & Eklund 2013, p. 33).

New elements of military tactics and crisis management appear in the Military Doctrine of 2010, but they relate more to the characterization contemporary conflicts than to their own armed forces. The doctrine indicates the integrated use of military and non-military entities along with their resources. It stresses the

importance of the aerospace and information dimensions. It assumes that the information war allows for the achieving of political objectives without using armed forces, or may create the conditions for their use (The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation 2010, p. 7). Another Doctrine of 2014 contains provisions about asymmetric modes of action which allow mitigating the advantage of an opponent, participating in the conflict between irregular subdivisions and private military companies (Sabak 2014). Strong emphasis was placed on the use of political forces and social movements directed and funded from outside (Военная доктрина Российской Федерации 2014). Changes in the Russian strategists' views on waging a war can be seen in the articles and public speeches of the Chief of General Staff of the Russian Federation V. Gerasimov. General Gerasimov presented a model of the XXI century war called **the war of the new generation**, where the main emphasis is on non-military means in order to achieve the political and strategic objectives. Changes in the character of armed conflicts are presented in Figure 1.

In the opinion of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, future armed conflicts, including in the Eurasian area will be of considerably different character than we can see now. (Chief of the General Staff, Gen. Witalij Gierasimov, 2013)

Traditional military methods	New military methods
<p>Military action starts when strategic forces are deployed (declaration of war)</p>	<p>Military action starts by groups of troops/ action groups (battle groups) in time of peace (no declaration of war).</p>
<p>Frontal clashes between large units comprised mostly of ground units.</p>	<p>Non-contact clashes between varied manoeuvrable military groups.</p>
<p>Defeat of the forces (of enemy), firepower, taking control over regions and borders to gain territorial control.</p>	<p>Annihilation of the enemy's military and economic power by precise short-lived strikes in strategic military and civilian infrastructure.</p>
<p>Destruction of economic power and territorial annexation.</p>	<p>Massive use of highly precise weapons and special operations, robotics as well as weapons that use new physical principles (direct-energy weapons—lasers, shortwave radiation, etc.)</p>
<p>Combat operations on land, air and sea.</p>	<p>Use of armed civilians (4 civilian to 1 military).</p>
<p>Management of troops by rigid hierarchy and discipline.</p>	<p>Simultaneous strike on the enemy's units and facilities all over of the territory.</p>
	<p>Simultaneous battle on land, air, sea, and in the informational space.</p>
	<p>Use of asymmetric and indirect methods.</p>
	<p>Management of troops in a unified informational sphere.</p>

**Fig.1.** Changes in the nature of the armed conflicts. Source: Dave Johnson, *Russia's Approach to Conflict - Implications for NATO's Deterrence and Defence*, Research Paper No. 111, April 2015, p.7.

In February 2013, he wrote that in the 20th century it is possible to observe a blurring of boundaries between war and peace in the classic sense of the notions, and blurring of boundaries between uniformed personnel and activities under the cover. Wars are not declared but simply begin in a unique way. W. Gareev believes that the state could be in uproar within months or even days. Lack of any direct military intervention may lead to civil war, a humanitarian catastrophe and even total collapse of the state. In order to achieve the strategic objectives and policies the non-military means play a greater and greater role because they are more effective than military strikes. Therefore, it is necessary to synchronize instruments of political, economic, information and humanitarian impact. Military means are complementary elements and are means of a camouflaged nature, thus the need for special operations (GRU, FSB, SWR) grows.

Open use of the military forces may take place under the cover of peacekeeping operations or just in the decisive phase of conflict with the purpose of achieving ultimate success as occurred in Crimea. Particularly desirable are various specialized units which are compact, mobile, digitalized, networked, and integrated in the information space. Classic military actions are becoming the past, thus nowadays con-contact attacks from a distance are becoming the main means of achieving operational objectives. The differences between the level of strategic, operational and tactical disappear as well, as well as between offensive and defensive operations. The use of high-precision weapons will have a massive character.

Operations in Libya have shown that the private contractual units of the armed detachments cooperated closely with regular intervening forces and with opposition. Gerasimov, similar to Gareev and Slipchenko, indicates the major role of modern technology, for example DRONE type unmanned aerial vehicles or multi-functional robots. Asymmetric activities neutralizing the

opponent will be widespread. The massive use of special forces and internal opposition supported by information activities will be guided by a permanent army operating all over the territory of a hostile state. The information space will provide a range of opportunities to reduce the opponent's potential, especially through the use of new technologies and information networking. A non-standard approach to the fight will be crucial in the new-generation wars.

To conclude, we can say that no matter what forces and capabilities the opponent possesses, it will be always possible to select such forms and methods which allow for defeating him in a battle. Yet the opponent will always have sensitivity (weaknesses) that means that it will be possible to find a way to counteract (Герасимов 2013).

As stated in Gerasimov's speech, the future new-generation wars will be of hybrid character known also as nonlinear, similar to that which takes place in the Ukraine. The new-generation war will have the following characteristics (Dave 2015, p. 8): 1) the majority of the activities will be covered (masked) indirect actions; 2) activity in the information sphere will play a crucial role; 3) large-scale masking operations will be conducted in order to hide the real purpose of war; 4) the role of cooperation between planners involved in the operation will be increased; 5) steering the involved actor's actions must be done from the central level, and the managers must incorporate a member of the government.

The theory of the new-generation war, alongside Messner and Gerasimov, was also developed by Czekinow and Bogdanov. They postulate that new warfare forms and methods will develop with the help of new technologies. They support the thesis with the experience of the war in Iraq in 2003 – 2011. They confirm the statements of the above-mentioned theorists on the importance of contactless strikes from a distance on the most important state facilities throughout its territory, which is an example of non-

contact fighting and the entry into the age of the high technology (Chekinov&Bogdanov 2013, p. 15).

They prove that the technological superiority of arms reduces the quantitative advantage and casts doubt on the possessing of large and heavy armed forces structures which are dominated by a terrestrial component. The consequence of the new technologies' application is the boundaries blurring between the warring parties and the lack of clear front lines reflecting the nonlinearity of the new-generation war. They confirm the need of joining reconnaissance and fire with the use of radio-electronic operations, information and modern technology. The usage of satellites, networked forces and electronic warfare elements will have a decisive impact on the development of doctrinal usage of the new generation armed forces. Robotics, weapons systems automation, reconnaissance and communications systems efficiency will be extremely helpful in achieving the objectives of the fight (Chekinov & Bogdanov 2013, p. 14).

The above-mentioned specialists confirm Messner's theory as to the meaning and psychological impact of information indicating that they are primary determinants of weakening morale as well as the will to fight, and thus having an advantage over the opponent. The specialists do not decrease the importance of propaganda in social networks, carried out especially by the so-called *trolls* and of electronic warfare. They predict that in the new-generation war **the fight will take place in the information sphere** (Chekinov & Bogdanov 2013, p. 18).

They agree also with Gerasimov and Messner about the need to act in an asymmetric way. They feel that the advantage will be achieved through the combination of political, economic, ecological and informational campaigns in a communal strategy of indirect actions. The usage of those instruments will enable the implementation of new forms, methods and non-military techniques and non-military means of struggle which, combined

with the information fight, will help to gain dominance in all dimensions. The specialists calculate that media, religious organizations, cultural, economic, public, and other entities can lead coordinated attacks on the enemy state (Chekinov & Bogdanov 2013, p. 16). The catalyst for these actions should be special operations. The attacker will have non-military and indirect techniques at their disposal, including cyber-attacks on vulnerable infrastructure systems of the state (Chekinov & Bogdanov 2013, p. 18).

They predict that in future wars non-traditional forms of struggle will be widespread, for example, earthquakes, tornadoes and prolonged rainfalls will be deliberately caused and such a situation can lead to the destruction of the economy and social psyche deterioration of the target country (Chekinov & Bogdanov 2013, p. 14). The above mentioned theorists claim that the new-generation war will be preceded by a long-term planning process. This point of view proves that the conflict in the Ukraine must have been planned long before Yanukovich escaped. On the basis of Bogdanov and Czekinow's article, the new generation war can be divided into the following phases (Chekinov&Bogdanov 2013, p. 18-20):

**Phase 1.** It starts at least one month before the decisive moment of conflict (it may also take several months and even a few years). It involves non-military asymmetric warfare encompassing psychological, ideological, diplomatic and economic spheres. This phase creates favourable conditions to start the military operation.

**Phase 2.** Special operations are conducted to mislead the political and military leaders regarding the real operational objectives. Well-coordinated measures are carried out by diplomatic channels, media, and top government and military agencies; they include leaking false data, orders, directives, and instructions. Cyber-attacks may be

successfully carried out as well. The major role in the phase of military action is played by propaganda targeted at the armed forces and the civilian population of a hostile state. The propaganda aims at making chaos, loss of control over the situation by the authorities in the whole country and demoralization in the society. The attacker can use also genetically engineered biological weapons.

- Phase 3.** The attacker attempts to intimidate the enemy and deceive him. He/she tries to blackmail and bribe the authorities as well as the officers in top positions and to make them abandon their service duties. The attacker manipulates the society to change its behaviour as well as tries to isolate an unsatisfied segment of the society.
- Phase 4.** Destabilizing propaganda by use of secret services (of agents) to increase discontent among people and to incite them to undertake unlawful activities, cause chaos, panic and make people disobedient towards the legal authorities. In comparison to subversive activities, agents are supported by funds, weapons and materials from outside i.e. by the interested state. Sharpening and deterioration of situation may be the consequence of the armed military groups and aggressive propaganda.
- Phase 5.** The use of non-military means (before the direct armed forces) by establishment of no-fly zones, imposition of land and sea blockade, and extensive use of private military companies in close cooperation with local armed opposition units.
- Phase 6.** The start of the military operation is preceded by the reconnaissance and subversive missions conducted under the cover of the information operation. In the troops' operations there all types of the armed forces

will be applied, including special troops as well as all forms and methods of operation in the aerospace and radio-electronic space. In order to identify the object of strikes and to evaluate their effects, industrial espionage, diplomatic, military as well as aerospace operations, navigations and investigations are used.

**Phase 7.** Multi-day electronic overwhelm combined with aerospace operations using high-precision weapons launched from various platforms, special operations conducted by means of reconnaissance units and military robots. Network-centric missiles from the aerospace, land; air and sea are targeted at communication centres, key military capabilities and industrial facilities. Water, food and energy supplies are cut off which as a result should lead to the opposing side's surrender. In the new generation war the extensive use of new-generation robots capable of carrying out reconnaissance, gathering and processing information, coordinating troops operations, building defensive positions, destroy the enemy's fortifications, removing mines and carrying out a decontamination of an area is anticipated.

**Phase 8.** A couple days after the aerospace operations are completed and physical elimination of key facilities is ensured and the majority of the armed manpower, the terrestrial component may be implemented. Military subdivisions are used together with the special troops to roll over the remaining points of resistance.

S. G. Czekinow and S. A. Bogdanov assumed that the final victory in the new-generation war cannot be achieved without the terrestrial component. Therefore the general military subdivisions must be equipped with the latest high-precision missiles and radio-electronic weapons. They argue that the war will be waged

according to the rules dictated by the side which is stronger and better prepared to fight. To conclude, they indicate that when the military actions do not bring their expected results, the Russian Federation may ultimately use nuclear weapons on the territory of the enemy's state (Chekinov&Bogdanov 2013, p. 22).

## Conclusions

Past experience in the Ukraine and theory evaluation indicate that the new-generation war includes multi-level efforts aimed at destabilizing the state functions and changing the internal order. *The centre of gravity of the new-generation war*, in contrast to conventional warfare, **will be focused on the society**. Messner indicated that Russian perception of the modern warfare is based on the idea of fighting in people's minds. Consequently, it leads to the extensive use of information impact to gain the psychological advantage, bringing frustration and moral decay of both armed detachments and civilian populations. The aim of the new-generation war is to deploy combat detachments of the armed forces only as a last resort. On the other hand, the enemy will be forced to reach its full potential. It will allow the implementation of the destructive actions towards the government and the entire country. It should lead in turn to the country's bankruptcy. It is worth noticing the fact that the concept of a permanent war appears with the notion of a permanent enemy. In the current geopolitical order, it is clear that Russia's enemy is Western civilization, its values and culture, political system and ideology (Bērziņš 2014, p. 4).

The results of the research prove that Russian actions undertaken on the territory of Ukraine are not just an improvisation but a reflection of the ordered use of the entire spectrum of tools available to the opposing side. In terms of the whole sequence of events one can argue that they fit well into the Clausewitz

paradigm on waging armed struggle which says that the war is merely the continuation of policy only by other means. The author of this article claims that hybrid actions refer precisely to these very measures, although, the rules of warfare, its nature and objectives still remain the same.

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