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dc.contributor.authorAriebi, Ali Taher
dc.date.accessioned2013-04-22T09:38:45Z
dc.date.available2013-04-22T09:38:45Z
dc.date.issued2000
dc.identifier.citationAriebi Ali Taher, Sinai Second Agreement: Assessment and reactions, Studia Arabistyczne i Islamistyczne 8, 2000, pp. 110-120en
dc.identifier.issn1231-3459
dc.identifier.urihttp://depot.ceon.pl/handle/123456789/1515
dc.description.abstractKissinger followed a unique policy in his mediation efforts between the Arabs and Israel by eliciting proposals from each side, getting preliminary reactions, identifying obstacles and then starting the diplomatic process in order to bridge the substantial gaps. On March the 10th 1975, President As-Sādāt presented to Kissinger concrete written proposals for onward transmission to the Israeli government. After being informed that the Israeli government had rejected these proposals, Kissinger, on March the 23rd, said that it was “a sad day for America which has invested hope and faith, and we know it is a sad day for Israel, which needs and wants peace so badly.”en
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherKatedra Arabistyki i Islamistyki, Uniwersytet Warszawskien
dc.rightsCreative Commons Uznanie autorstwa na tych samych warunkach 3.0 Polskapl_PL
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/pl/legalcode
dc.subjectAs-Sādāten
dc.subjectSynajen
dc.subjectEgipten
dc.titleSinai Second Agreement: Assessment and reactionsen
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleen
dc.description.epersonMaciej Klimiuk
dc.rights.DELETETHISFIELDinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess


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Creative Commons Uznanie autorstwa na tych samych warunkach 3.0 Polska
Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as Creative Commons Uznanie autorstwa na tych samych warunkach 3.0 Polska