Pozór jako zjawisko estetyczne

Abstract

The article deals with the issue of semblance in art, being only a sketch of the aesthetical problem which would need a detailed description. I concentrate on a few aspects of the fol-lowing question: “how a philosophy recognize semblance in art?”. Although philosophers as different as Plato, Hegel or Nietzsche had remarked on it, the semblance as an aesthetic appearance did not become the topic of sustained philosophical attention in its own right until past few decades – for example in Adorno‟s thought. In my essay I attempt to theorise the semblance “as an appearance”, that is assuming that the semblance is present without an ontological “superstructure” or a distinctive kind of re-presentation of logos, or truth. In my opinion, traditional thought (including Nietzsche‟s aesthetics) identifies the idea of mimesis and illusion in art. These two concepts correspond to two different kinds of semblance, which create different aesthetical experience. In fact, we think about the semblance through the prism of these ideas and our philosophical depiction of semblance is still deeply rooted in the traditional perspective, yet we experience it at many levels and dimensions.