Zagadnienie emotywizmu we współczesnej filozofii polityki

Abstract

This paper outlines some main problems connected with my PhD research. I present in it the current discussion concerning the justification of the normative order in terms of emotivism. Firstly, I briefly mention the metaethical emotivism of Alfred J. Ayer and Charles L. Stevenson. Then I discuss certain problems that ensue from Alsdair MacIntyre’s formulation of emotivism as a predominant theory of use of moral statements in modern Western societies. I briefly outline his argument and discuss the criticism of his account of the scope and character of current moral disagreement (Jeffrey Stout is a main figure here) and objections to his project of the rational rivalry of the main moral traditions. Finally, I discuss proposals of Richard Rorty and Chantal Mouffe who want to resolve the aporias of rationalistic modernity which has brought about such problems as disguised emotive use of moral utterances. I try to show that they simultaneously seem to adopt an openly emotivistic view on good, justice and moral change. I also point out an important Wittgensteinian element in their theories as they depict the moral shift as a change in the use of moral terms in the context of various ‘language games’.