Sellars i McDowell o percepcji i wiedzy empirycznej

Abstract

The aim of the paper is to discuss two, supposed to be complementary, approaches to perception and empirical content. First, Wilfrid Sellars’ approach criticizes so-called ‘classical sense-data theories’ and shows inconsistencies within overall empiricist program of knowledge. The core of his critique comes down to the claim that the theories in question are based on the Myth of the Given: the (false) belief that there has to exist something that can constrain out thought from outside and be the conclusive justification of our knowledge. Second approach, that of John McDowell, agrees with that of Sellars in the critique of the Given, but also tries to detect sources of the Myth. He claims that one of its main sources is the desire to oppose internalist or coherentist positions. McDowell also suggests that recent philosophy has been under ‘interminable oscillation’ between epistemological foundationalism and coherentism. He also gives his own solution to the problem, which seems to consists of three parts: reformulating our understanding of experience, accepting his conception of minimal empirism, and coming back to the conception of second nature. All these questions are discussed at length in the paper.